Degree Of Wage Flexibility Research Articles

Unemployment and vacancy dynamics with imperfect financial markets

This paper proposes a simple general equilibrium model with labour market frictions and an imperfect financial market. The aim of the paper is to analyse the transitional dynamics of unemployment and vacancies when financial constraints are in place. We model the financial sector as a monopolistically competitive banking sector that intermediates financial capital between firms. This structure implies a per period financial resource constraint which has a closed form solution and describes the transition path of unemployment and vacancies to their steady state values. We show that the transition path crucially depends on the degree of wage flexibility. When wages do not depend on the unemployment rate the transition path is always downward sloping. This implies unemployment and vacancies adjust in opposite directions as observed in the data. When calibrating the model to the Great Recession and its aftermath we find that the lack of an improvement in the financial sector's effectiveness to intermediate resources played a crucial role in the slow recovery of the labour market.

How Sticky Wages in Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring

We consider a matching model of employment with wages that are flexible for new hires, but sticky within matches. We depart from standard treatments of sticky wages by allowing effort to respond to the wage being too high or low. Shimer (2004) and others have illustrated that employment in the Mortensen-Pissarides model does not depend on the degree of wage flexibility in existing matches. But this is not true in our model. If wages of matched workers are stuck too high in a recession, then firms will require more effort, lowering the value of additional labor and reducing new hiring.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

The responsiveness of industry wages to low‐frequency shocks in Canada

Abstract The first objective of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between low‐frequency shocks to labour demand and average wages on an industrial basis using a Canadian longitudinal data set. We estimate a fixed‐effects model that controls for workers’ unobservable attributes. The second major objective is to extend the existing industry‐based literature by estimating a specification allowing for a comparison between the degree of wage responsiveness of within‐firm stayers and between‐firm movers. The findings indicate that average wages by industry tend to respond positively to low frequency changes in employment, and that there is some degree of wage flexibility within firm‐worker matches.

Labour Market Flexibility and Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union

Sufficiently flexible labour markets are considered an important precondition for countries to benefit from membership in the monetary union. Economic policy coordination within the European Community is extensive and includes issues related to labour market structures. In this paper we study the determination of flexibility of the labour market and, ultimately, of wages in a member country of the monetary union. As a starting point, the analysis assumes that each country’s government, in formulating its labour market policy, decides the degree of nominal wage flexibility in light of the fact that this involves political costs that increase with the degree of wage flexibility. The study then focuses on the effects of monetary union membership on each country’s prospects for coordination of economic policies – specifically labour market policies. The study shows that coordination of labour market policies contributes to greater nominal wage flexibility in member countries. However, coordination of labour market policies will be effective only if unemployment is persistent or under discretionary monetary policy. From the perspective of macroeconomic stability, there is no particular need for coordinating labour market policies among member countries if the common central bank can credibly precommit to a low inflation target or if fluctuations in unemployment are white noise.

Job Security Policies and Trade Union Behaviour in an Open Economy

In this paper, the authors analyze how job security policies, which in practice result in higher firing costs, affect long-run employment and investment in a two-country model with free trade in goods and capital. The effects turn out to depend crucially on the preferences of trade unions and, in particular, on the degree of wage flexibility. If wages are downward inflexible, job security policies give rise to a clear trade-off between achieving low employment variability over the business cycle and a good employment and investment performance in the long run.

An alternative measure of wage flexibility

Wage flexibility is usually defined as the responsiveness of wages to market disequilibrium. But market disequilibrium can be defined in different ways. One can accept a non-Walrasian definition of equilibrium, the market being in equilibrium when agents have no incentive to change their decisions, even if a change of wages can improve their position. To study the behavior of wages as an equilibrating variable, it is appropriate to consider Walrasian demand and supply functions, in which wages are allowed to move in each period in a direction to restore equilibrium between Walrasian demand and supply, even when agents experience restrictions and take notice of these restrictions when making decisions. The degree of wage flexibility is most often measured as the amount of equilibrating change that took place in a certain period. In most wage equations wage flexibility is measured by the coefficient of the unemployment variable, which links the equilibrating change in the wage variable to the degree of market disequilibrium. The equalization of market disequilibrium with unemployment poses some problems.

An evaluation of blinder's alternative to profit sharing

Blinder has suggested that wages be partially tied to a firm's own price change, so that the key feature behind Weitzman's profit-sharing proposal might be created without the same need for fundamental institutional change. We examine whether this proposal for labor's remuneration yields the “better disequilibrium properties” that Weitzman expects from this class of policies. Using a standard quadratic adjustment cost model, we find that a tax-based indexing incentive is equivalent to there being a decreased degree of wage flexibility. We then examine output variability within a conventional macro model, while trying to avoid the Lucas critique by continuing to use the underlying microeconomic analysis at that stage.