Kant and the Ethics of Humility bears the subtitle: A story of dependence, corruption, and virtue. Grenberg not only defend[s] philosophically the view that humility remains a she also argues that familiar Kantian principles of action . . . become character traits, and we can indeed speak then of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtues (7).1 Like Grenberg, I see Kantian virtue ethics as a story of dependence and corruption as well as virtue, but I argue that Grenberg misstates the relationship between dependence and corruption, with consequences for her overall account of Kantian virtue, her treatment of the unity of the virtues, her critiques of alternative theories of humility, and the secular nature of Grenberg's Kant. Before I turn to my primary comments, I have two words of caution about speaking of thick, Aristotelian-style . . . virtues in Kant. First, for Aristotle but not Kant, virtue involves habits (hexis). In Kant, even morally relevant interests are tied to the higher faculty of desire and linked with choice; habitual desires are inclinations of the lower faculty of desire.2 For Aristotle, virtue comes about as a result of (1103al8). For Kant, a habit ... is ... not a moral aptitude (6:407) and maxims, unlike technical ones, cannot be based on (6:409, see too 6:383-4). Cultivating better inclinations is at best an indirect duty for Kant; it is central for Aristotle. Second, while Kant admits a role for moral respect, respect is a feeling in only a very special sense. Unlike Aristotle, for whom every feeling has a mean that constitutes virtue for that feeling, for Kant, neither feelings (with the exception of respect) nor even any degree of feeling is good or evil