Definition Of Good Research Articles

The Influence of Cicero's Translation Theory on Translation Theory

Marcus Thulius Cicero was a famous orator, politician, philosopher, rhetorician, and translator in the ancient Roman period. Although his works "On the Most Excellent Speakers" and "On the Definition of Good and Evil" did not provide specific explanations of translation theory, some of the theories in these chapters well expressed his translation ideas, such as the famous "Speaker" and "Interpreter" theories, It has had a huge impact on translation theory in later generations. This article will analyze his views on literal translation and free translation from excerpts from his two works and their impact on future generations.

Solar Power: A new mathematical definition and theoretical proof it is a Green Public Good

Solar Power is redefined in a new mathematical framework which describes its pertinent properties. It is shown that it is an economic good and that there are Property Rights and Economic Ownership associated with it. Its externalities have been examined with a view of including economic obligations created during the post emission control periods which correspond to growth without climate sustainability obligations. Also its valuation has been examined in states of both non-use and use in electricity production. A new definition of a Green Public Good is described which retains Samuelson's classic definition and has an climate externality component which under Pigouvian tax/subsidy does not satisfy Samuelson's second condition for Pareto optimality.

David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts

The denial of the intrinsic value of acts apart from both motives and consequences lies at the heart of Ross’s deontology and his opposition to ideal utilitarianism. Moreover, the claim that acts can have intrinsic value is a staple element of early and contemporary attempts to “consequentialise” all of morality. I first show why Ross’s denial is relevant both for his philosophy and for current debates. Then I consider and reject as inconclusive some of Ross’s explicit and implicit motivations for his claim, stemming from his philosophy of action, his axiology, and his concept of intrinsic value, or a combination of these. I also criticize Ross’s later view that all right acts somehow produce some good, but that the value of some of these goods is explained by the prior rightness of the act. In the course of the discussion, the idea that acts can have intrinsic value apart from motives and consequences gains credibility both from the weaknesses in Ross’s arguments and from some putative examples. So, finally, I distinguish two attitudes in the history of ideal utilitarianism towards the necessity or not to give a detailed account of the intrinsic value of acts, and suggest that a Why Bother attitude is more promising than a Constructive one. References S. Brennan. Ross, Promises, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts. Lyceum, 1:43–56, 1989. J. Broome. Weighing Goods. Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. J. Dancy. Wiggins and Ross. Utilitas, 10:281–5, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S095382080000621X S. Darwall. Under Moore’s Spell. Utilitas, 10:286–91, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800006221 J. Dreier. Structures of Normative Theories. The Monist, 76:22–40, 1993. A. C. Ewing. The Morality of Punishment. Kegan Paul, London, 1929. A. C. Ewing. The Definition of Good. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1947. A. C. Ewing. Utilitarianism. Ethics, 58(2):100–111, 1948. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/290597 T. Hurka. Virtue, Vice and Value. Oxford University Press, New York, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195137167.001.0001 O. A. Johnson. Rightness, Moral Obligation, and Goodness. Journal of Philosophy, 50:597–608, 1953. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2020443 O. A. Johnson. Rightness and Goodness. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959. H. W. B. Joseph. Some Problems in Ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1931. J. Louise. Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella. Philosophical Quarterly, 54:518–536, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00370.x G. E. Moore. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. P. Pettit. The Consequentialist Perspective. In M. Baron, P. Pettit, and M. Slote, editors, Three Methods of Ethics, pages 92–174. Blackwell, Oxford, 1997. D. Portmore. Consequentializing Moral Theories. Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly, 88(39-73), 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00280.x H. A. Prichard. Moral Writings. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199250197.001.0001 W. Rabinowicz and T. Ronnow-Rasmussen. The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value. Ethics, 114:391–423, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/381694 H. Rashdall. The Theory of Good and Evil. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1924. W. D. Ross. The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1930. W. D. Ross. Foundations of Ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939. A. Sen. Rights and Agency. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11(1): 3–39, 1982. R. Shaver. The Birth of Deontology. In T. Hurka, editor, Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. A. Skelton. William David Ross. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010. A. Skelton. Ideal Utilitarianism: Rashdall and Moore. In T. Hurka, editor, Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. M. Smith. Natural and Relative Value After Moore. Ethics, 113(3): 576–598, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/345626 D. Sosa. Consequences of Consequentialism. Mind, 102:101–122, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/102.405.101 P. Vallentyne. Teleology, Consequentialism and the Past. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 22:89–101, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00135455 D. Wiggins. “The Right and the Good” and W. D. Ross’s Criticism of Consequentialism. Utilitas, 10:261–80, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800006208

The Definition of the Good: The Reconstruction of the Unwritten Ontology of Aristotle and Plato

The Definition of the Good: The Reconstruction of the Unwritten Ontology of Aristotle and Plato

Creating a Shared Definition of Good and Bad Writing through Revision Strategies

(2008). Creating a Shared Definition of Good and Bad Writing through Revision Strategies. Middle School Journal: Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 46-53.

Colloquium 6: The Good is Benefit: On the Stoic Definition of the Good

Colloquium 6: The Good is Benefit: On the Stoic Definition of the Good

Open Definitions of the Common Good

Doesn't work. Has failed. Apolitical. Naive. Pre-modern. Non-scientific. Such hardly ornamental epithets get pinned on anybody who still sets out to define the common good today. Ideas and interests cannot be translated into one another without fracture. There is no abstract basic norm from which all normative decisions could be deduced. But neither the individual, nor society and the state can forego a definition of the common good. The ostensive a priori dissolves when a closed definition of the common good is exchanged for an open one. A definition of the common good cannot claim validity once and for all, but always just for one time. Such openness is able to be created with numerous decision-making techniques. The co-existence of incommensurable ideas can be organized through differentiation. Institutions can keep the struggle between conflicting ideas open over the long run. Or decisions and reasons break up. It is easier if the conflict is only settled for the concrete circumstance to be decided upon. Sometimes there is even agreement in the concrete case about the reasons on which a decision is based; more often in any case there is agreement about the decision itself. The plasticity of the definition of the problem can also be used. The need for a decision for which no reasons can be given does not completely disappear with any of these techniques. However, it does diminish. And if it does come to such a decision, that decision is more controlled.

Unfoldings in knot theory

In IN-R] the link at infinity of a hypersurface V CIE r~ defined by a good polynomial map f : tY~--.II2 was used as an extended example, f was called good if it had only isolated singularities and it was claimed that the link at infinity then always has a Milnor fibration. This is incorrect (although we have found it to be a common misconception). To correct it, the definition ofgood must be modified as follows.

ANALYSIS OF A COMMERCIAL BANK MINORITY LENDING PROGRAM: COMMENT

ROBERT EDELSTEIN'S RECENT ARTICLE in this Journal examines the role of banks in financing the development of Black-owned businesses.' In Edelstein's article the key issue is does a bank differentiate between potentially good and potentially bad credit risks (p. 37). His empirical analysis suggests some variables that may be useful for screening the credit worthiness of loan applications from Black entrepreneurs. We share his concern about how banks differentiate between good and bad credit risks, but have serious reservations about his approach and findings. We especially disagree with his interpretation of loan size as an indicator of loan soundness. He examines a sample of 290 Black-owned businesses who received loans from Philadelphia banks between April 1968 and January 1970. A loan was classified to be GOOD or BAD on the basis of its repayment status in January 1970; loans whose repayment was on schedule on that date are GOOD loans, and all others are classified as BAD loans.2 In January 1970, 122 (42%) of the 290 sampled loans were GOOD.3 With this definition of GOOD and BAD loans, Edelstein attempts to explain loan repayment performance (LRP) with loan size and borrower characteristics using two-stage least squares. The dependent variable, LRP, is dichotomous taking on a value of unity for GOOD loans and zero for BAD loans. For the jth loan recipient,

XIII—The Definition of Good: Moore's Axiomatic of the Science of Ethics

MooRE's doctrine of the indefinability of good has occasionally been misunderstood as meaning that good is indefinable because it is not clear; indeed, that it could not be clear because it is not accessible to rational understanding. Even Moore himself, for a very short moment in his life,' doubted that it was; and thus faltered in his intuition of the self-evident clarity of this notion. With this one exception, however, he steadfastly kept to the conviction expressed in Principia Ethica, that the notion of good is so simple as to be incapable of proof, so transparently clear as to be in no need of proof, so self-evident as to be understood as soon as it is mentioned,2 so unique as to belong to nothing but Ethics, and so fundamental as to serve as basic for a systematic science. Anyone familiar with the concept of a systematic science ought, on reading Moore's account, immediately to conclude that his notion of good had all the characteristics of an axiom, and that all that were needed to bring about the systematic science of Ethics would be to articulate this notion so as to form this axiom, and to deduce the science from it. But nobody, so far, has

A Note on Mr. Ichimura's Definition of Related Good

A Note on Mr. Ichimura's Definition of Related Good

Reviews of Book: The Definition of Good

Reviews of Book: The Definition of Good

The Definition of the Good

The Definition of the Good

The Definition of Good

FROM age to age, men have contemplated the problem of good; not infrequently, however, they have found themselves discussing what things are good, an entirely different question. Dr. A. C. Ewing is quite clear ; his concern is with the former. This being so, he sets out to offer stout resistance to subjectivism and to naturalism in ethics. Why exactly does he do this ? Because these tanets erode, as it were, any rational basis, and therefore render the superstructure of moral obligation insecure. The approach is positive and impressive—criticism, counter—criticism and the development of an appropriate alternative. The author modestly (and no doubt rightly) declines to put pressure upon "people to do what they know to be their duty" ; unluckily, however, the number of readers of this book cannot be expected to be very great, and outside them must be a multitude by whom guidance—perhaps even direction—would willingly be accepted. In a word, we need an interpreter, somebody like Thore, who in his day demonstrated to the uninitiated the power and majesty of the Barbizon painters; for, power and majesty these pages possess, but they are not easy reading. The Definition of Good By Dr. A. C. Ewing. Pp. vii + 215. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947.) 12s. 6d. net.

The Definition of Good.

The Definition of Good.

The Definition of Good by Alfred Cyril Ewing

Book Review| July 01 1948 The Definition of Good by Alfred Cyril Ewing The Definition of Good. By Ewing, Alfred Cyril. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Pp. 212. $3.00. Denison Allan Denison Allan Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google South Atlantic Quarterly (1948) 47 (3): 427–428. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-47-3-427 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Denison Allan; The Definition of Good by Alfred Cyril Ewing. South Atlantic Quarterly 1 July 1948; 47 (3): 427–428. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-47-3-427 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsSouth Atlantic Quarterly Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 1948 by Duke University Press1948 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Definition of the Good

The Definition of the Good

A Definition of the Good

A Definition of the Good