Definite Descriptions Research Articles

The Case for Referential Quantifier Phrases

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that the referential/attributive distinction that Donnellan introduced for definite descriptions applies to other quantifiers phrases as well. Furthermore, I argue that the referential use of some quantifier phrases is as standard and conventional as the referential use of definite descriptions. This supports the idea that the referential use of some quantifier phrases is a semantic rather than a pragmatic phenomenon.

Defending Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions Against a Strawsonian Attack

Although Russell’s theory of definite descriptions is highlyappreciated in the area of philosophy of language, it has faced some objections from different angles. One of the major objections is known as the objection arising from incomplete definite descriptions. According to this objection, a speaker by his/her utterance of a sentence containing an incomplete definite description often succeeds in saying something true despite the fact that such a sentence always expresses a false proposition. This particular objection against Russell’s theory arises because of an ignorance concerning the distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the assertion made by a speaker by using that sentence in a particular context. To address this distinction between meaning and assertion Scott Soames’ theory concerning the connection between meaning and assertion has been adopted. With the help of this theory, it has been shown that the problem arising from incomplete definite descriptions does not pose a genuine threat to Russell’s theory. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#73-74; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2023 P 317-336

Normalisation for Negative Free Logics without and with Definite Descriptions

Normalisation for Negative Free Logics without and with Definite Descriptions

The problem of the variable in Quine's perspicuous lingua franca of the sciences

AbstractSome 55 years after the publication of Russell's seminal ‘On Denoting’, Quine adopted the theory of definite descriptions presented therein to formulate his perspicuous lingua franca for the sciences. This paper illustrates how, in so doing, Quine's lingua franca inherited an old antinomy at the core of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, specifically, the lack of congruency between notation and metaphysical commitments when the variable assumes the role of fundamental singular reference. In this context, the paper contends that the phrase ‘to be is purely and simply to be the value of the variable’ is far from the straightforward solution Quine initially envisioned for his lingua franca. Additionally, it argues that it is unlikely that an attempt to account for a determinate object theory, such as those propounded by Russell and Quine, can prove successful when grounded in a referential theory of quantificational logic where the variable, seen as a simple range of values, holds fundamental singular referent‐position. The paper concludes by suggesting that Meinong's object theory could resolve the problem of the variable, albeit at the cost of potentially undesirable ontological and logical commitments. Alternatively, Kit Fine's recent work on other antinomies in the variable may provide a promising approach to exploring how to salvage the variable as a formal foundation for ontology.

A three-way distinction in definiteness: sortal, individual, and functional concepts in Réyoné

Abstract This article offers a case study of a definiteness split in a language in which three different types of nominal expressions are available for definite descriptions. The article contributes ample empirical data and comprises a close investigation of the patterns found in Reunion Creole (Réyoné), the language under study. Réyoné displays one kind of contrast also found in other languages which is frequently analyzed in terms of semantic versus pragmatic definiteness (following Löbner) or uniqueness versus familiarity (following Schwarz). What sets Réyoné apart from other languages though, is that it features a determiner that is dedicated to functional concepts. The language thereby distinguishes individual from functional concepts: the former type (the sun; the News) is exclusively expressed by bare noun phrases, while functional concepts – definite descriptions with functional head nouns (prefect of y; head of y), including a subtype of bridging reference, as well as compositionally created functional relations such as superlatives – are realized by lo-marked noun phrases. These facts offer strong support for Löbner’s theory. The article also discusses demonstrative descriptions, which have already been reported to play a role in certain definiteness splits, and which are obligatory with sortal concepts in Réyoné. It is argued that demonstratives are pragmatic definites.

A Pragmatic Presupposition Analysis in Sir David Attenborough’s Climate Change Speeches

Climate change is a critical global issue that requires effective communication and public engagement to drive necessary actions and policy changes. Despite the critical importance of climate change communication, this topic has been limited in its coverage within discourse analysis research, making this study’s investigation particularly significant. This study aims to examine the communication strategies used by a prominent public figure, namely Sir David Attenborough, in addressing climate change issues. To achieve that, this study conducts a qualitative analysis of Sir David Attenborough’s discourse on climate change, with a specific focus on the role of presuppositions in framing his communication strategies. Through analyzing a corpus of his public speeches, this investigation identifies and categorizes the presuppositional triggers employed by Attenborough, particularly those that elicit existential presuppositions triggered by definite descriptions (78% of observed triggers) and structural presuppositions such as restrictive relative clauses (14% of observed triggers). This analysis provides insights into how Attenborough effectively conveys notions of ownership, shared responsibility, and inspires action through strategic use of presuppositions. Examining the persuasive strategies of a prominent public figure, this study makes a valuable contribution to the field and future investigations on climate change communication.

Knowing who occupies an office: purely contingent, necessary and impossible offices

This paper examines different kinds of definite descriptions denoting purely contingent, necessary or impossible objects. The discourse about contingent/impossible/necessary objects can be organised in terms of rational questions to ask and answer relative to the modal profile of the entity in question. There are also limits on what it is rational to know about entities with this or that modal profile. We will also examine epistemic modalities; they are the kind of necessity and possibility that is determined by epistemic constraints related to knowledge or rationality. Definite descriptions denote so-called offices, roles, or things to be. We explicate these α-offices as partial functions from possible worlds to chronologies of objects of type α, where α is mostly the type of individuals. Our starting point is Prior’s distinction between a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ definite article ‘the’. In both cases, the definite description refers to at most one object; yet, in the case of the weak ‘the’, the referred object can change over time, while in the case of the strong ‘the’, the object referred to by the definite description is the same forever, once the office has been occupied. The main result we present is the way how to obtain a Wh-knowledge about who or what plays a given role presented by a hyper-office, i.e. procedure producing an office. Another no less important result concerns the epistemic necessity of the impossibility of knowing who or what occupies the impossible office presented by a hyper-office.

The truth conditions of sentences with referentially used definite descriptions

The truth conditions of sentences with referentially used definite descriptions

(Im)possible Traces

In this article, I argue that when movement maps onto a λ-bound variable (a “trace”), that variable must be of an individual semantic type, such as type e or type d. Thus, even though natural language has expressions of higher types, these expressions cannot be represented as traces. When an individual-type trace would not be able to semantically compose in the launching site of movement, the moved element is forced to syntactically reconstruct. The motivation for this constraint on traces comes from a detailed investigation of how DPs in their different semantic guises—entities, properties, and generalized quantifiers—are interpreted when they move. I then argue that strong definite descriptions exhibit the same type-based restriction—namely, they cannot occur in higher-type positions, which I take as evidence for the theory that traces are definite descriptions.

Nonattributive and Nonreferential Uses of Definite Descriptions

Nonattributive and Nonreferential Uses of Definite Descriptions

Attitude ascriptions: a new old problem for Russell’s theory of descriptions

In order to explain that sentences containing empty definite descriptions are nevertheless true or false, Russell famously analyzes sentences of the form ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’. Against this it has been objected that Russell’s analysis provides the wrong truth-conditions when it comes to non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. For example, according to Heim, Kripke, and Elbourne (HKE), there are circumstances in which (1) is true and (2) is false. Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.Hans wants there to be exactly one ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet tonight. After all, the argument goes, unlike (2), (1) can be true without Hans wanting there to be exactly one ghost in his attic. Kaplan and Neale famously reply that the HKE objection presupposes that non-doxastic attitudes are closed under entailment, which they are not. For Rostworowski, on the other hand, the problematic principle used by the HKE objection is a substitutivity principle for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. This is further supported by the fact that, as Elbourne points out, Russell’s analysis already leads to a problem similar to the HKE objection together with substitutivity alone. By questioning substitutivity for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, Rostworowski tries to block both the HKE objection and Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection. In this paper, I will argue that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions leads to a variant of the HKE objection even in the context of doxastic attitude ascriptions. Since, as we will see, doxastic attitude ascriptions do not seem to suffer from the substitutivity problems discussed by Rostworowski in the context of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, this will further exacerbate the problem for Russell’s analysis. I will then discuss the possibility to reject substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions using a contextualist analysis of attitude ascriptions. However, we will see that, independent of whether we accept substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions, a complete solution of the doxastic problem has to reject Russell’s analysis of the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘The F is G’. Concluding, I will show that, unlike Russell’s analysis, the Frege–Strawson analysis of definite descriptions, according to which a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ presupposes that there is exactly one F, rather than asserting it, provides an explanation of the HKE objection, Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection, and the doxastic problem presented in this paper. This will speak not only in favor of a Fregean analysis of definite descriptions, but also of a Fregean conception of propositions.

On Compulsive Talkers

AbstractThis paper reevaluates Kaplan’s (Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 481–563, 1989b) infamous ‘compulsive talker’ objection to Reichenbach’s (Elements of symbolic logic, AQ1 Macmillan, New York, 1947 ) token-reflexive theory of indexicals. It argues that Kaplan’s objection depends on the modal status of Reichenbachian tokens. On one interpretation, Kaplan’s objection stands. But on another, equally plausible interpretation, the following points hold: (i) Reichenbach’s theory effectively preempts contemporary discussion of rigid definite descriptions, (ii) Kaplan’s own analysis of indexicals in terms of dthat-terms comes extremely close to Reichenbach’s own analysis, and (iii) Kaplan’s ‘compulsive talker’ objection should be rejected.

Focus on demonstratives: Experiments in English and Turkish

This paper deals with an unexpected contrast between demonstrative descriptions and definite descriptions on their anaphoric uses. If two (or more) discourse referents are introduced in the preceding sentence, it is perfectly natural to refer to one of them in the following sentence using a definite description. Use of demonstrative descriptions in the same context, however, is degraded, with existing accounts of anaphoric demonstratives and definites providing no explanation for this contrast. We present experimental evidence from two languages, one with definite determiners (English) and one without (Turkish), and show that the acceptability of demonstratives depends independently both on (i) whether one or two NPs are introduced in the initial sentence, and (ii) whether the follow-up sentence introduces a new situation or not. We propose a focus-driven information structural approach to demonstratives to account for this pattern. Following Dayal & Jiang (2021) (building on Schwarz 2009) in assuming that definite and demonstrative expressions in anaphoric contexts are similar in including an anaphoric index argument, we argue that demonstratives essentially differ in evoking focus alternatives on the index argument.

Are there “weak” definites in bare classifier languages?

This paper motivates a new view on the typology of definiteness that integrates (quasi-)names. The primary data is drawn from Cantonese and Bangla, where both bare classifier constructions and bare nominals are recruited for definite expressions. We argue that these bare nominals, while often analyzed as the so-called “weak”/unique definites in other languages, are indeed name-like expressions akin to the quasi-name Mom in English, in contrast with the definite descriptions denoted by bare classifier constructions. We propose that quasi-names, as well as proper names, are derived by a definite determiner that encodes a functional relation between the discourse participants and the referent. We further discuss cases where quasi-names compete with definite descriptions and proper names. The findings not only suggest that names should be brought into the picture, but also shed light on how pragmatic principles interact and determine the choice of referring expressions.

Eugenio Montale’s Loose Endecasillabi

ABSTRACT The great majority of lines in Eugenio Montale’s published work are written in recognizable metres, mostly hendecasyllables. There are, however, approximately 300 lines that are slightly longer than the hendecasyllable, yet shorter than other known metres, typically counting 13 metrical syllables. These lines have traditionally been referred to as ‘tridecasyllables’, or ‘hypermetrical hendecasyllables’, simply acknowledging their length. This article, after a review of the literature and of the structural features of the tridecasyllable, and on the basis of a scansion of all such lines, argues that they can be given a definite description by adopting the formalism known as Bracketed Grid Theory. Thus, this article develops an account of these forms, including both 13- and 12-syllable lines, and explains both their structural features and their similarities with the dodecasyllable and, most importantly, the hendecasyllable.

Каплан и Марти об определенных дескрипциях: нестандартные случаи референтного употребления

Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions has two explanations — the semantic and the pragmatic one. A version of semantic explanations was outlined by Kaplan and elaborated in detail by Marti. They construe a referentially used definite description as a proper name in the Millian sense. In a recent paper, I showed that the evidence Kaplan–Marti theory relies on is inappropriate with respect to the standard case of referential use, which makes the pragmatic theory preferable. This paper is a continuation of the cited one. Here I examine a number of non-standard cases of referential use and demonstrate that, with respect to them, Kaplan–Marti theory has no advantage over the pragmatic account either.

“Definite Associative Deixis”: Between Referential and Attributive Readings

This paper investigates different readings of definite descriptions within “definite associative deixis”. The term itself was proposed in Dvořák (2023) to refer to Hawkins’ “larger situation uses based on general knowledge” (1978). The terminological choice is grounded in an analogy between the phenomenon under investigation and definite associative anaphora since in both cases, the head noun of the definite description is a functional concept (Löbner, 2011) calling for a contextual argument. What changes is the source of this argument (anchor). While in cases of definite associative anaphora, the contextual argument is provided by discourse, as far as “definite associative deixis” is concerned, it is provided by the situation of utterance. In the present study, we argue that within a particular situational framework, one and the same associative deictic description is prone to be interpreted either in a referential or in a non-referential, i.e. “attributive”, fashion (Donnellan, 1966). We also attempt to show how this discrepancy in terms of referentiality builds on the unequal access that the speaker and the hearer have to a particular extralinguistic reality. In certain situations, more than one account of the functioning of the associative deictic description seems acceptable. Hence, the question of whether we are dealing with a referential or an attributive use remains open.

The Quest for a Language of Science Consisting of Non-Contradictory Propositions: Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions and Denotation after the Theory of Meaning

Bilimsel bir dilin inşası için çelişik olmayan önermelerin araştırılması elzemdir. Nitekim Leibniz’den bu yana filozoflar, bilimin kullanımına uygun olan sembolik bir dil üretimi için çaba sarf etmişlerdir. Frege, her türlü akıl yürütme için genel bir cebir dilini kavram yazısıyla (Begriffsschrift) ortaya koymuştur. Önermedeki kavramın referansının hiçbir nesneye tekabül etmemesi yöntemimizi şekillendirmiş ve bizi, kaplamı boş olan kavramlar içeren önermelerin geçerliliği üzerine araştırma yapmaya, özellikle de Russell’ın tanımlı betimlemeler teorisine yönlendirmiştir. Bu makalede “Çelişik olmayan önermelerden oluşan bir bilim dili nasıl oluşturulabilir?” problematiğine çözüm olanağı bulmak amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırmamızın sonunda, Russell'ın tanımlı betimlemeler teorisinin, çelişik olmayan önermelerin gönderimi sayesinde çoğulcu bir formülasyona izin verdiğini ve söz konusu teorinin amaçlanan bilimsel bir dil için elverişli olduğunu tespit etmekteyiz.

On the Internal Structure of Pronouns: From the Perspective of Noun Ellipsis

The widespread pattern of “noun-less” variants of DPs (e.g. two/these [nP/NumPØ] vs. two/these cars) might lead to the expectation that the definite determiner should be able to head DPs with a null complement. The best candidate for representing the structure [Ddef [nP/NumPØ]] are 3rd person personal pronouns (Elbourne, 2005; a.o), an analysis supported by evidence for NP-ellipsis (or N-anaphora) in pronouns. However, equating pronouns with THE+[nP/NumPØ] faces a number of issues: the different behavior of pronouns and other definite descriptions with respect to binding; the differences in syntactic and semantic features between pronouns and DPs headed by THE (e.g. gender); the one-to-many structure-form relationship between the single structure THE+[nP/NumPØ] and different series of pronominal forms (strong and weak forms); and, a gap in the attested combinations of THE and [NØ]. Our account addresses these issues. We propose that the D used in pronouns, which we label Dpron, has the semantics of THE, but THE and Dpron differ in their formal features. We posit that a null NP complement needs to be licensed by features on the determiner the NP merges with, and that Dpron bears such features. Thus, we capture the fact that typical THE does not surface in cases where there is no overt element in the complement of D (i.e. what we call total emptiness) via the absence of these features on THE. Additionally, to further explore the differences between strong and weak forms in Romanian, we present the results of a corpus study on these forms.

Embosi Definiteness: A Semantic Account

The contribution broaches the semantic analysis of definite description in Embosi, a Bantu language spoken in the Republic of Congo. The work is carried out through the meaning theories of reference and sense, and it also aims at providing promotion and documentation of this Bantu language. The analysis demonstrates that demonstratives are the primary means of expressing Embosi definite descriptions, aside from proper nouns and possessives. The study reveals that Embosi definiteness, semantically, encodes uniqueness with the existence of one and only one entity meeting the noun phrase description and inclusiveness with the totality of entities concerned with the depiction. The analysis also shows that the context-independent approach of the Embosi definite description does not provide a successful meaning for a felicitous communication; the context of use should be taken into account.