This article, which is a work-in-progress very nearing completion, offers a proposal for improving the jury's measure of noneconomic damages through the use of a mandatory testimony ad damnum. Part I provides a working definition of noneconomic damages and distinguishes them from economic damages. Part II focuses on the two main conceptual difficulties inherent in noneconomic damages-namely, the nontransferability and immeasurability of noneconomic harm. It explains that, although there are no meaningful solutions to these problems, American tort law has nonetheless chosen to tolerate them in light of its longtsantding commitment to compnesating noneconomic harm with money. Part III explains the current process by which noneconomic damages are awarded and describes a system of standardless jury discretion with limited, deferential judicial review. Part IV outlines three of the more practical problems created by the current system-variability, unpredictability, and open-ended liability. Part V considers the various proposals to change noneconomic damages that have been previously tendered by scholars. Part V.A discusses proposals to abolish noneconomic damages and explains that such proposals, though not entirely without merit, are politically infeasible given the tort system's longstanding commitment noneconomic damages generally. Part V.B discusses the trend over the past three (almost four) decades, which has been to reform noneconomic damages through legislative caps. Caps do nothing more than set an upper-limit beyond which no noneconomic damages award could ever tread. Thus, they are relevant in only the most extreme cases. Caps leave the current system of standardless jury discretion and limited, deferential judicial review virtually untouched for the vast majority of cases. Part V.C discusses alternatives to abolition and caps that would seek to provide some guidance or standards for juries in their difficult task of measuring noneconomic harm and translating it into money damages. It explains that such proposals for better methods of calculation have gone largely unnoticed or discussed by courts, legislatures, and practitioners because the substantive political debate regarding noneconomic damages is-and remains-exclusively focused on legislative caps. Part VI advances a proposal that would require plaintiffs seeking noneconomic damages in tort to make a testimonial ad damnum. That is, a plaintiff would be required to take the stand during trial and to testify to a sum certain that she subjectively believes would be reasonable compensation for her noneconomic harm. In many ways, this proposal is similar to the current practice followed in many jurisdictions whereby the plaintiff's attorney makes an ad damnum argument during closing statements, but it differs in three important respects. First, the plaintiffs' ad damnum would be mandatory, not permissible. Second, the plaintiff's ad damnum would be testimonial, not argumentative. Third, the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to the amount requested. Jurors would not be bound to give all that is requested, but they would be instructed not to exceed the amount requested. The first and primary benefit of this proposal is that it would provide case-specific predictability of the noneconomic damages component of a potential award in a given case. Because the plaintiff would be required to disclose the amount of his anticipated ad damnum during discovery, the upper limit of the defendant's potential liability would be established early in the litigation process, and the potential for settlement would increase. The second benefit of this proposal is that it maintains case-specific flexibility. Although the testimonial ad damnum would effectively operate as a cap on the plaintiff's noneconomic damages, it is a cap that would be set and controlled by the plaintiff herself. The plaintiff of course has incentive to ask for as much as she believes the jury would award, but the plaintiff (and her attorney who would undoubtedly advise the plaintiff regarding the amount to request) has equally compelling strategic incentives to avoid overreaching in her ad damnum. The final benefit of this proposal is its simplicity and feasibility. Rather than relying on intricate guidelines, schedules, and/or matrices or on creating new phases in the litigation process, this proposal relies on only slight modifications to existing substantive and procedural rules. Thus, it could be implemented within the courts and through advancement of the common law. It need not wait for legislatures and policymakers.