Defensive Information Warfare Research Articles

Old wine in new bottles: China—Taiwan computer-based ‘information warfare’ and propaganda

This article considers the operational utility of computer-based information warfare across the Taiwan Strait. It reviews the capacity of both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan to wage offensive and defensive information warfare, and acknowledges that both sides have invested and continue to invest considerable amounts of resources into developing their information warfare ability, both have taken part in the Revolution in Military Affairs process that has redefined military strategy in an age of high-technology warfare, and computer-based information warfare will serve as part of a broader military strategy that revolves principally around conventional methods of attack and deterrence. However, using a critical security approach the article suggests that the capacity to wage computer-based information warfare is currently limited, and plays more of a psychological role in the propaganda offensive that continues across the Taiwan Strait. Hence, computer-based information warfare is ‘old wine in new bottles’.

Defensive Information Warfare: A Review of Selected Literature

Information warfare is a threat not only to military formations but to the civilian population as well. Private organizations need to understand the context in which information warfare happens and be able to defend against attacks when they occur. This article reviews the current literature about defensive information warfare and suggests some avenues for ongoing research.

Is the mouse click mighty enough to bring society to its knees?

Over the years, we have created an information infrastructure, with most of us connected but nobody totally responsible, which is easily targeted for attacks by adversaries. A series of deadly viruses and denial-of-service attacks are warnings of the fragile state of information security. Information warfare (IW) is a serious concern as it has no border and operates in a different realm. This paper articulates how IW can devastatingly attack the critical information infrastructure. Two aspects of IW are considered, viz., Defensive IW and Offensive IW. Currently, security solutions lag far behind the potential threats. Loosely coupled defenders cannot avert the damage caused by orchestrated coordinated attacks. Society is locked up in a vicious circle of wits and resources. This situation is likely to continue and we need to be proactive and make progress on a rocky path. It is time we got battle space ready. Without the coordinated efforts of government, disparate groups and organisations, society is one click away from grave danger of exploitation and dominance.

Information Warfare and Democratic Accountability

This essay explores how the expansion of information technology may affect two defining features of democracy: how power and accountability are structured at the apex of the political system, and how government and governed interact. Offensive information warfare may carry consequences for democracy at two levels. First, by rendering ambiguous the very definition of warfare, it makes it harder to ensure democratic controls over its conduct. Second, tools of offensive information warfare may seek to influence an adversary's will and capacity to fight through ‘perception management’. As this often means manipulating the adversary's perceptions with a view to distorting his view of reality, it may convey the distortions to a domestic audience, undermining the public's ability to form an autonomous judgment of government actions and to hold it accountable for these actions. Defensive information warfare poses a different threat, that of civil liberties. Government's efforts to ferret out threats to critical information infrastructures may involve a level of monitoring and surveillance that threatens Fourth Amendment protections and other norms limiting governmental intrusiveness into the lives of its citizens. The broad concerns crystallize into the following three problems: (1) the implications of information warfare for decisions to initiate war, (2) its potential to distort judgments that are at the roots of public control of its leaders, and (3) the possibility that the requisites of defensive information warfare may lead to excessive government intrusiveness into the lives of its citizens.

Strategic intelligence and networked business

The chances of firms achieving, or being subjected to, strategic surprise have escalated with the growth of internetworking technologies and the opportunities these afford for various forms of information warfare (IW) and net terrorism. The more a business depends on sophisticated information systems, the greater its vulnerability to stealth attack. Defensive IW will soon become a necessary cost of doing business. In practical terms, this means identifying mission-critical information assets, conducting threat assessments, implementing information systems security procedures and developing strategic intelligence and counter-intelligence capability.

Report: 4th ACM Conference On Computer and Communications Security

The 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security [1] was held on 1-4 April 1997 in Zurich, Switzerland. About 100 participants from around the world gathered to discuss advances being made primarily in the area of defensive information warfare. This was primarily a research-oriented event which attracted principal investigators working in the security field from about 14 nations. I attended the conference for the following four reasons:• I wanted to update my knowledge of the area.• I wanted to ascertain what progress has been made in the field.• I wanted to determine whether there were any breakthrough technologies on the horizon.• I wanted to understand the threats being guarded against and the defensive strategies that leaders in the field were recommending.As I will relate later, significant progress has been in many defensive information warfare areas. I particularly was impressed by the advances that have been made in the area of cryptography, digital signatures and communications protocols. I was disappointed by the perceived lack of progress over the years in the important area of trusted systems and information security infrastructure development.This was the first conference that I have attended on the subject in about a decade. I selected the event because I thought that it would allow me to view both present work in the field and look into the future.