Defense Of America Research Articles

New England beyond Criticism: In Defense of America’s First LiteratureThe Dream of the Great American Novel

New England beyond Criticism: In Defense of America’s First LiteratureThe Dream of the Great American Novel

Nation and Migration: The Making of British Atlantic Literature, 1765–1835 by Juliet Shields

Reviewed by: Nation and Migration: The Making of British Atlantic Literature, 1765–1835 by Juliet Shields Robin Runia Juliet Shields, Nation and Migration: The Making of British Atlantic Literature, 1765–1835 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). Pp. 195. $74.00. Juliet Shields's aim to "decenter the Anglo-American focus of transatlantic literary studies by extending the reach of archipelagic criticism to include the literature of the early American republic" is fully realized in this systematic study of Scottish, Irish, Welsh, and American identities on both sides of the Atlantic (139). She organizes her study around each of these regions and the literary genres in which they are represented in order to complicate scholarly narratives that continue to position them against a metropolitan England. Chapter 1 examines Samuel Johnson's Taxation No Tyranny alongside Edmund Burke's "Speech on Conciliation with America" and John Jay's contributions to the Federalist Papers. This comparative approach enables Shields to examine [End Page 352] the strategic deployment of racialized discourses by an English center and its subordinate and colonized possessions. In particular, she demonstrates how while Johnson defines English public spirit as the foundation of liberty, Burke insists on Ireland's and Scotland's resistance to submission as definitive of a British love of liberty. Interestingly, Shields also outlines how Jay and his detractors deploy both of these concepts in defense of America as an ethnically homogeneous republic. The role of the Gothic in Romantic Irish and American novels produces an opportunity for Shields to reconsider the nature of political threat within an American post-revolutionary context. In chapter 2, she examines Charles Brockden Brown's fiction as both an American response to the Irish Rebellion of 1798 and a manifestation of the motives behind the United States' 1798 Naturalization Act and the Alien and Sedition Acts. Through close reading of the relationship between the Irish, the American Indians, and the occult in Brockden Brown's work, Shields reveals American anxieties about the role of homogeneity, both racial and cultural, in the new republic. Chapters 3 and 4 explore the depiction of American Indians in the work of James Fenimore Cooper, William Joseph Snelling, and early nineteenth-century repetitions of the Welsh legend of Prince Madoc, the purported twelfth-century discoverer and settler of the North American continent. Shields first focuses on representations of the Scottish to come to opposing conclusions about the role of racial purity in The Last of the Mohicans and Snelling's Tales of the Northwest; or Sketches of Indian Life and Character. Specifically, she identifies how both fictions rely on a Scottish identity "defined by chivalry and cunning, courtesy and prudence" and perceived as archaic and ultimately disposable in its replacement by more commercially progressive behaviors (90). Shields subsequently focuses on the complexity of Welsh history to explain Robert Southey's Madoc and its descriptions of an alternative American tradition of martial valor and colonial resistance. She also analyzes Gilbert Imlay's novel The Emigrants; or the History of an Expatriated Family as an example of England's ongoing interest in and claim upon Western American territories. The literary sketch is the target of Shields's last chapter, in which she considers how American writers, like those in Ireland and Scotland, challenged London's literary centrality within the British Atlantic. Washington Irving's The Sketch Book of Geoffrey Crayon is celebrated for its innovations of addressing both American and British readers while simultaneously offering tales of life in both the old world and the new. However, Shields compares Sidney Owenson's Patriotic Sketches of Ireland to Mary Russell Mitford's Our Village to conclude that while both Irish and American writers recognized regional identities as components of a national one, American writers were distinct in their incorporation of migration and emigration on both the regional and national levels. Shields's monograph is essential reading for anyone engaged in research on the Anglophone Atlantic world. Not only does she provide essential political and historical context for the focus of each chapter's reasoned literary analysis, she proves, unquestionably, the ongoing and transformative role of Scotland, Ireland, and Wales in shaping regional, British, and American identities. Shields's study...

New England beyond Criticism: In Defense of America’s First Literature by Elisa New (review)

New England beyond Criticism: In Defense of America’s First Literature by Elisa New (review)

Mortality salience, self‐esteem, and defense of the group: mediating role of in‐group identification

AbstractNumerous studies have shown that mortality salience strengthens defense of cultural institutions and that this effect is buffered by self‐esteem. The present study examines a novel prediction, based on social identity processes, that group identification mediates the impact of the interaction of mortality salience and self‐esteem on worldview defense. Self‐esteem and mortality salience were manipulated using Greenberg and colleagues' standard methods, the dependent measure was defense of America, and the mediating variable was identification with America. As predicted, mortality salience only increased identification with America and defense of America when self‐esteem was not enhanced, enhancing self‐esteem attenuated the effects of mortality salience. Also following predictions, the interactive effect of mortality salience and self‐esteem on defense of America was mediated by identification with America.

Religious Toleration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism

Religious Toleration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism Randall A. Poole (bio) In 2008, Martha Nussbaum published Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality. She believes that tradition to be under threat, not only from Christian fundamentalists but also from "new atheist" public intellectuals like Daniel Dennett.1 To defend our tradition of religious freedom and pluralism, a tradition she esteems, Nussbaum begins her book with a chapter on perhaps the most important founder of that tradition, Roger Williams, who established the colony of Rhode Island on the principle of unlimited religious liberty. In works such as his 1644 book The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Williams anticipates and goes deeper than John Locke's more famous treatise of 1689, A Letter concerning Toleration. Nussbaum argues that Williams is concerned not only, or even primarily, with civil peace but also with the nature of human personhood, dignity, and equality. He found their source in conscience, which for him meant the capacity for moral choice and aspiration, or for self-determination. In this, Nussbaum notes, he was influenced by Stoic natural-law doctrine. She also points to the striking similarity with Kant's later ideas of human autonomy and dignity. The link between this natural-law tradition of philosophical anthropology, with its emphasis on conscience as the source of human dignity, and freedom of conscience in the specific sense of religious liberty, is that individuals must be permitted and encouraged to seek God or ultimate meaning in their own way.2 [End Page 611] In the first years of the 20th century, Roger Williams was known by Russian liberals, who appreciated him for the same reasons Martha Nussbaum does today. In 1901, Petr Struve, the leader of the Russian Liberation Movement that would culminate in the Russian revolution of 1905, published an important essay, "What Is True Nationalism?" which lays out his liberal theory.3 Struve calls Williams the first apostle of the idea of the inalienable rights of man, beginning with freedom of conscience—the "first word of liberalism," in Struve's phrase. He refers in this connection to the work of his Russian colleague, Pavel Novgorodtsev, who devoted a few pages of his History of the Philosophy of Law to Williams.4 Struve and Novgorodtsev were then organizing Problems of Idealism, conceived as a defense of liberty of conscience and of its importance in liberalism.5 By the time it was published in November 1902 as a type of philosophical companion to Struve's famous émigré newspaper Osvobozhdenie, the Russian Liberation Movement was well under way. Freedom of conscience was its common platform. "The desire for religious freedom in the empire had ... accomplished what seemed beyond the capacity of all other public issues," writes John Basil in one recent study. "It drew together for one purpose all but a handful of Russians."6 That purpose seemed to be achieved when Nicholas II issued the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, though, as Paul Werth and others [End Page 612] have recently shown, the October Manifesto granted freedom of conscience more as a promise that was to be implemented through future legislation—legislation that was in fact never enacted.7 Before 1905, the autocracy generally described its policy toward non-Orthodox religions in the empire as "religious toleration," which meant something different from freedom of conscience. The nature of this difference is one of the main themes of this forum. Toleration in imperial Russia was a revocable privilege or concession granted by the state to recognized religious groups, while freedom of conscience is an inalienable individual right. Freedom of conscience, because it specifies an intrinsic and inviolable entitlement or right, is incompatible in principle with autocratic state power—and for that reason the tsarist regime resisted recognizing it as long as possible. This is also why, as Werth indicates in his article here, scholars have tended to treat it (naturally) as a problem in the history of Russian liberalism, which aimed to transform autocratic Russia into a constitutional regime under the rule of law. Russian liberal philosophers, as I shall try to show, understood freedom of conscience as more than one natural right among others: for them...

Pearl Harbor May Change You as it Once Changed the World

Pearl Harbor May Change You as it Once Changed the World

COMMON PRINCIPLES, DIFFERENT HISTORIES: UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

In her bookLiberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality(New York: Basic Books, 2008) the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum joins a chorus of American intellectuals who have criticized France and other European nations for their failure to embrace the concept of cultural pluralism. In Nussbaum's opinion, the meaning that the French attach toegalitéhas remained stuck in circumstances peculiar to the eighteenth century. The concept is outdated and has not in the contemporary world been able to protect cultural diversity in general and religious diversity in particular. Her book takes to task what she terms “the French tradition of “coercive assimilation” that is insensitive to what George Washington stressed as the “‘delicacy and tenderness’ that is owed to other people's ‘conscientious scruples.’” The French refusal to allow Muslim schoolgirls to cover their heads with a foulard, however stylish it might be, is linked back to the French emancipation of Jews that required, in Nussbaum's analysis, a heavy requirement of cultural erasure. The French, like most Europeans, grew used to the idea “that citizens are all alike,” an idea that now haunts France as it tries to figure out what to do with its Muslim population.

NO TEARS FOR CREON

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality (2008). Nussbaum's thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood (as a historical exercise) and justified (as a philosophical one) by recourse to the overarching principle of equal respect—that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that equal respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are subordinate to it. She examines various free-exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense. This essay criticizes Nussbaum's elevation of the principle of equal respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum's single-minded focus on equal respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the established context. This essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum's approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses.

The Political Origins of Religious Liberty. By Anthony Gill. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xi + 263 pp. $75.00 cloth, $23.99 paper - Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality. By Martha C. Nussbaum. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008. 406 pp. $28.95 cloth

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Liberty of conscience: in defense of America's tradition of religious equality

From one of America's most distinguished moral philosophers, a sweeping, historically based argument that equal respect for citizens is the bedrock of American freedom. Since even before it was a nation, America had to address the ongoing struggle between religious fervour and religious freedom. But the Founders of the future United States overcame religious intolerance and hatred in favour of a constitutional order dedicated to fair treatment for people's deeply held conscientious beliefs: of conscience became a right. This respect for religious difference formed the bedrock of America: it made equality possible. Yet today there are signs that this legacy is misunderstood. The prominence of a particular type of Christianity in US public life suggests the unequal worth of citizens who hold different religious beliefs, and political and legal traditions are invoked to defend the idea that this widespread Christianity is what defines America as a nation. Yet nothing, Nussbaum insists, could be further from the Founding Fathers' objectives. Liberty of Conscience is an historical and conceptual study of the great tradition of religious freedom at the heart of the American system. Weaving together political history, philosophical ideas and key constitutional cases, this is a rich chronicle of an idea that has always been a necessary condition for freedom and equality, but which is now in serious danger.

Count Every Vote - All 538 of Them

This article strikes a blow in defense of America's much-maligned system of choosing a president: the Electoral College. It argues that, although imperfect, the Electoral College is superior to the alternatives and should be retained because it does an excellent job of balancing the two central purposes of presidential elections: choosing the right winner, and doing so in a reasonably timely and undisputed fashion. Whereas most literature defending the Electoral College focuses primarily on federalism, this article details the pragmatic and procedural case for maintaining the status quo. Simply put, a direct national election would be a nightmare in a close race. Recounts and legal challenges would stretch from sea to shining sea, and with two centuries of legal precedent tossed aside, courts would have a very difficult time managing it all. Without the multiple layers of unappreciated procedural safeguards provided by the current system, post-election uncertainty could stretch well into January, raising doubt about whether we would have a clear winner by inauguration day. No election system can be perfect, because an election is a measurement of the popular will, and all measurements have margins of error. The current system, however, has served us well for more than two centuries. It gets the result right, at least arguably, almost every time - and it gives us a definitive result every single time, as any presidential election system must. It always gives us a president. And in a very close election, an arguably wrong president is better than no president at all. The article's introduction discusses a hypothetical 2012 election between President Barack Obama and Governor Jeb Bush. In this scenario, the interstate compact system, a proposal currently under consideration in various states, has come into effect. This means the Electoral College still exists, but now purports to represent the nationwide popular vote. The scenario briefly outlines some of the dire results this change could have in a very close election. The remainder of the article is split into five parts. Part I argues that, as mentioned above, presidential elections have two main purposes: choosing the right winner, and doing so in a reasonably timely and undisputed fashion. Parts II, III and IV analyze how well these purposes are served by three different possible election systems: the current Electoral College system, a true direct popular-vote election, and the hybrid interstate-compact proposal. The article contends that the current system is, on balance, superior to either alternative; it more reliably fulfills both purposes than would either proposed reform. However, acknowledging the possibility that this balance could someday shift, Part V suggests a set of minimum requirements that would be absolutely necessary for a functional popular-vote system, should it ever become necessary to abandon the Electoral College.

Chapter 10: Democratic Citizenship and the Narrative Imagination

Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of EducationVolume 107, Issue 1 p. 143-157 chapter 10: Democratic Citizenship and the Narrative Imagination Martha C. Nussbaum, Martha C. Nussbaum University of ChicagoSearch for more papers by this author Martha C. Nussbaum, Martha C. Nussbaum University of ChicagoSearch for more papers by this author First published: 08 July 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7984.2008.00138.xCitations: 9 If democratic citizenship involves learning to live with and alongside other people, then an appropriate civic education must foster the capacity to understand people who may act from very different understandings, motives, and capacities. In this chapter, Martha Nussbaum makes an argument for the vital role of the arts, and particularly literature, in cultivating the powers of the imagination which, in turn, contribute to the kind of judgment and sensitivity needed by responsible citizens.She begins her argument by considering two very different literary works: Sophocles’Philoctetes and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man, showing how the former concerns the proper treatment of a citizen who has become an outcast and the latter the refusal to recognize a fellow citizen. Both works allow us “to see how circumstances shape the lives of those who share with us some general goals and projects.” Nussbaum explores how the imagination contributes to moral-political development in various ways, using examples from the most democratic of all literary forms, the modern novel. She contends that literature allows us to understand our common humanity, wresting “from our frequently obtuse and blunted imaginations an acknowledgement of those who are other than ourselves, both in concrete circumstances and even in thought and emotion.”Martha Nussbaum is the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, appointed in the Philosophy Department, Law School, and Divinity School. She has taught at Harvard, Brown, and Oxford Universities and was a research advisor at the World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, part of the United Nations University. She has received many awards, including honorary degrees from thirty-two colleges and universities in the United States, Canada, Asia, and Europe. Among her many publications are The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986, updated edition 2000), Love's Knowledge (1990), Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (1997), Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001), and Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality (2008). Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume107, Issue1April 2008Pages 143-157 RelatedInformation

“Someone Else’s Daughter”: Women in Defense of America

Lessons argues persuasively that the shift in policy focus from natural disasters to terrorism and the rise of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which absorbed and subsumed the Federal Emergency Man agement Agency (FEMA), has significantly weakened the latter agency's ability to address disasters. Birkland is not alone in making such claims, echoing the con cerns of Donald Kettl (2007), Kathleen Tierney (2005), and George Haddow and Jane Bullock (2006) that the transformation has severely undermined U.S. capacity to respond to its own natural disasters. Birk land's assertion may still be valid despite the establish ment of a so-called new FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security in 2007.

Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions

One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America? To a large measure, the answer to this question should determine the behavior of the strategic leaders of these professions, including the uncommon behavior of public dissent. Using the “Revolt of the Generals” in 2006 as stimulus, the author develops from the study of military professions the critical trust relationships that should have informed their individual decisions to dissent. After doing so, he makes recommendations for the restoration of the professions’ ethic in this critical area of behavior by the senior Officers who are the professions’ strategic leaders.

Roosevelt: America's Strategist

At his death Franklin Roosevelt's domestic program had long been subordinated to the demands of war, and the toils of establishing a world peace settlement were still to be faced. The relief, recovery and reform measures of the New Deal had been put into effect before the end of the second Roosevelt Administration, several years before he formally abandoned Doctor New Deal. Thereafter, the President's attention was overwhelmingly devoted to preparations for the defense of America, to the maintenance of possible allies, and to the even more difficult task of winning popular and congressional support for these and further measures. In a speech at Chicago, during the campaign of 1944, Roosevelt returned to the theme of social security, but it is hard to believe that even he in all his enormous confidence and vitality could have expected to live through the labors of war and a peace settlement to fight the battles of another New Deal.