Kemp and Long (1987) showed that, in the long run, non-saving workers may be unable to improve their lot by controlling the effective supply of labour. Their proposition was interesting not least because it offered the germ of an explanation for the recent decline in unionism in some capitalist countries, notably the United States and Japan. However, the Kemp-Long analysis was conducted in terms of a simple model economy of the Solow-Swan type, with just one product, constant returns to scale and a constant savings propensity for capitalists. Since the appearance of their article, the possibility of long-run labour impotence has been reconsidered by several authors and it has emerged that an allembracing labour union might be able to do something for its members, even in the long run, if the production function is convex-concave, cf. Palokangas (1989), or if the union resorts to all-or-nothing offers, cf. Manning and Shea (1988), or if capitalists optimize over time, cf. Kemp and Long (198 9a, b). In all of the papers just mentioned, it is assumed that the wellbeing of workers depends on their consumption of the produced commodity only. However, labour economists typically assume that the wellbeing of workers also depends on the amount of leisure time available to them. The purpose of the present note, then, is to examine the implications of that assumption for the Kemp-Long problem. In all other respects, our specification of the economy is the same as that of Kemp and Long. It will be shown that if the workers' marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure is greater than the steady-state wage rate when the