Decline In Cooperation Research Articles

Freedom to dream: Black Owenites and co-operation in America

Robert Owen’s vision of a co-operative society inspired two centuries of utopian experimentation among African Americans. In the nineteenth century white planter Joseph Davis and Scottish reformer Fanny Wright attempted to apply Owenite principles to their management of slave plantations. After emancipation freed people founded Black towns, such as Mound Bayou, Mississippi, pooling their resources to protect themselves against white supremacist violence. During the Great Migration in the 1910s and 1920s, W. E. B. DuBois and other Black activists and intellectuals promoted co‑operatives in urban centres. And the Great Depression of the 1930s inspired significant experiments in co‑operation, most notably the prosperous utopian community of Father Divine’s Peace Mission. While the post-war period saw a decline in co-operation, in more recent decades there has been a resurgence in interest in the movement. From co-operative grocery stores to large-scale utopian communities, African Americans drew on Owenite ideas of co-operation to assert their independence and self-sufficiency.

Stages of Anglo-American cooperation in the framework of the first atomic projects

Nuclear weapons, which have largely defined the landscape of international relations since the mid-20th century and have turned conflicts between great powers into proxy wars and local clashes, were first developed through the collective efforts of the United States and Great Britain during World War II. Although the allies eventually completed their work on nuclear weapons together, their contributions were not equal. This was reflected in the dividends received by each side in the end. In addition, the nuclear projects were not initially conducted separately, experiencing periods of growth and decline in cooperation with each other that did not coincide with the overall trend of allied relations. The purpose of the study is to identify and capture the specific stages of Anglo-American cooperation within the framework of the first atomic projects of Great Britain and the United States. US and UK historiography has studied various aspects of both the American Manhattan Project and the British "Tube Alloys", including the role of diplomacy and the influence of allied cooperation on the development of nuclear weapons. Soviet and Russian historiography, despite a significantly smaller volume of works on this topic, also addressed these issues. However, neither Russian nor American and British researchers have established any clear periodization of allied nuclear projects cooperation. The study demonstrates the dynamics of relations between Great Britain and the United States in the atomic sphere, identifies the main contradictions between allies that led to the stagnation and cessation of atomic cooperation, and indicates the causes of the resumption and intensification of such cooperation. The conclusion separates Anglo-American cooperation into seven stages. Each stage is determined and characterized by the comparative level of project development at a particular moment, as well as constantly changing interests of the both sides.

The Evolution of Cooperation in Multigames with Uniform Random Hypergraphs

How to explain the emergence of cooperative behavior remains a significant problem. As players may hold diverse perceptions on a particular dilemma, the concept of multigames has been introduced. Therefore, a multigame is studied within various binary networks. Since group structures are common in human society and a person can participate in multiple groups, this paper studies an evolutionary multigame with high-order interaction properties. For this purpose, a uniform random hypergraph is adopted as the network structure, allowing players to interact with all nodes in the same hyperedge. First, we investigate the effect of the multigame payoff matrix differences on the evolution of cooperation and find that increasing the differences in the payoff matrix promotes cooperation on the hypergraph network. Second, we discover that an increase in the average hyperdegree of the hypergraph network promotes network reciprocity, wherein high-hyperdegree nodes influence surrounding nodes to form a cooperator cluster. Conversely, groups with a low hyperdegree are more susceptible to betrayal, leading to a decline in cooperation.

Роль митрополита Антония Сурожского (Блума) в построении отношений РПЦ и церкви Англии в XX веке

Introduction. The article is devoted to the consideration of the role of the metropolitan Anthony Bloom of Sourozh in the development of relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of England. The personality of the metropolitan Anthony is connected with the formation of the Surozh diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. In addition, Father Anthony assisted in the functioning of the Commonwealth of Saint Albania and Reverend Sergius, an Orthodox Anglican organization. The organization began its work in 1928. In this organization, Father Antony Bloom began his service in England in the role of spiritual director. Materials and Methods. Important sources for this article were the writings of Antony Bloom himself, where he describes the pages of his biography, tells about his work in England. In addition, information from publicist literature was also used. An important source was information from the website of the Foundation for the Spiritual Heritage of the Metropolitan Anthony Surozhsky. It contains memoirs of contemporaries and Bloom's own articles. It is also important to note the works of N.M. Zernov, a Russian emigrant, one of the initiators of the Commonwealth of St Albans and Reverend Sergius. N.M. Zernov invited Fr Anthony to England to conduct the work of the Commonwealth. N.M. Zernov together with his wife in the journal "Sobornost" left a series of his memoirs about the activities of the organization. In these memoirs there is a reference to the role of Antony Bloom in the development of relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of England in the 20th century. Results. The author concludes that Father Anthony Bloom conducted active missionary work among English society. This allowed to increase the number of Orthodox believers in England. During the period of Antony Bloom's ministry, new parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church were opened in Great Britain. Father Anthony assisted in the activities of the Commonwealth of St Albans and Reverend Sergius. Conclusion. In the twentieth century there were a number of events that affected the decline in co-operation between the ROC and the Church of England. However, thanks to individual representatives of the Russian emigration, the relationship between the ROC and the Church of England not only survived, but continued to develop with greater vigour. To a greater extent this result is due to the personality of Metropolitan Anthony Surozhsky Bloom. He conducted work with believers and was engaged in explaining the fundamentals of the Orthodox faith on radio and television. This great work contributed to the development of dialogue between the Orthodox and Anglicans. Anthony Bloom was a participant in important events in the history of the dialogue between Orthodox and Anglicans in the second half of the 20th century.

Payoff-based learning best explains the rate of decline in cooperation across 237 public-goods games.

What motivates human behaviour in social dilemmas? The results of public goods games are commonly interpreted as showing that humans are altruistically motivated to benefit others. However, there is a competing 'confused learners' hypothesis: that individuals start the game either uncertain or mistaken (confused) and then learn from experience how to improve their payoff (payoff-based learning). Here we (1) show that these competing hypotheses can be differentiated by how they predict contributions should decline over time; and (2) use metadata from 237 published public goods games to test between these competing hypotheses. We found, as predicted by the confused learners hypothesis, that contributions declined faster when individuals had more influence over their own payoffs. This predicted relationship arises because more influence leads to a greater correlation between contributions and payoffs, facilitating learning. Our results suggest that humans, in general, are not altruistically motivated to benefit others but instead learn to help themselves.

Cooperative play and globalized social change: Mexican children are less cooperative in 2017 than in 1967

Greenfield's theory of social change and human development is based on the distinction between Gemeinschaft (low-income agricultural communities with low levels of formal education and technology) and Gesellschaft (wealthier commerce-based societies with high levels of formal education and technology). Cooperation is more adaptive in a Gemeischaft environment; in contrast, competition is more adaptive in a Gesellschaft environment. As Mexican ecologies moved in the Gesellschaft direction over recent decades, children's cooperative behavior declined, as predicted by the theory. The current quasi-experiment extends this finding from a two-person game, the marble pull, to a new situation, Madsen's cooperation board, a game that requires cooperation among four children. Based on a sample of 57 groups of four children each tested in 2017 and 70 groups of four children each tested in 1967, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (p < 0.001) showed that the decline of cooperation and the rise of competition generalizes across middle-class urban, low-income urban, and rural children in Mexico and that it applies to male, female, and mixed groups. In conclusion, we provide continuing evidence that child behavior is responsive to ecological conditions and shifts over time in order to adapt to them. Given that cooperation is a fundamental human trait that binds social units together, our study also contributes to the conclusion that globalized social change in the Gesellschaft direction entails human loss as well as gain.

Self-reliance crowds out group cooperation and increases wealth inequality

Humans establish public goods to provide for shared needs like safety or healthcare. Yet, public goods rely on cooperation which can break down because of free-riding incentives. Previous research extensively investigated how groups solve this free-rider problem but ignored another challenge to public goods provision. Namely, some individuals do not need public goods to solve the problems they share with others. We investigate how such self-reliance influences cooperation by confronting groups in a laboratory experiment with a safety problem that could be solved either cooperatively or individually. We show that self-reliance leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in self-reliance undermine social welfare and increase wealth inequality between group members. Less dependent group members often choose to solve the shared problem individually, while more dependent members frequently fail to solve the problem, leaving them increasingly poor. While self-reliance circumvents the free-rider problem, it complicates the governing of the commons.

The stability of conditional cooperation: beliefs alone cannot explain the decline of cooperation in social dilemmas

An often-replicated result in the experimental literature on social dilemmas is that a large share of subjects choose conditionally cooperative strategies. Cooperation generated by such choices is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in reaction to other subjects’ free-riding. This has led to the widely-held conclusion that cooperation observed in experiments (and its decline) is mostly driven by imperfect reciprocity. In this study, we explore the possibility that the type of reciprocally cooperative choices observed in experiments may themselves evolve over time. We do so by observing the evolution of subjects’ choices in an anonymously repeated social dilemma. Our results show that a significant fraction of reciprocally cooperative subjects become unconditional defectors in the course of the experiment, while the reverse is rarely observed.

Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks

This paper considers the utility of each player consisting of two parts: the objective utility and subjective utilities. We assume that a player obtains its objective utility from the interactions with its neighbors in the spatial population. Besides, the subjective utility, which is largely ignored by previous studies, is determined by its attitudes. Here, we focus on how attitudes affect the evolution of cooperation on two different complex networks, the namely square lattice and Barabási–Albert scale-free network. First, the simulations indicate that populations with a higher average attitude can achieve a higher level of cooperation. Furthermore, a positive average attitude is conducive to promoting cooperation, while a negative average attitude leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, in populations with a positive average attitude, as the attitude heterogeneity increases, the average level of cooperation decreases. Conversely, in populations with a negative average attitude, increased attitude heterogeneity induces the promotion of cooperation.

Динаміка та оцінка ефективності зовнішньоторговельних відносини України та Канади.

Trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and Canada is analyzed in the article. A dynamic analysis of export and import performance of goods and services showed decline in cooperation between the countries in 2014, which is due to military events in eastern Ukraine and hryvnia devaluation. Based on the calculated complementarity index, the authors conclude about complementary structure of bilateral trade and economic relations (complementarity index (TCI) was 56.6 in 2018), which indicates the prospects for further cooperation. The positive impact of the complementarity index on the growth of exports and imports between Ukraine and Canada is confirmed by empirical analysis. However, a major factor to explain the slowdown in foreign trade between countries is the considerable distance, which is accompanied by rising transport costs. The positive impact of foreign trade turnover between countries on Ukraine's GDP was proved by the Scatterplot model.

Favoritism and cooperation

In a series of laboratory experiments, two types of players were created randomly. Participants of one type were selected for a group based on performance on a task, whereas participants of the other type were selected automatically without prerequisite. In the main experiment, such favoritism induced a decline in cooperation, measured as contributions in pairwise public goods games, compared to when all participants were treated equally. The reduction in cooperation was observed both for those participants who did not benefit from the favoritism and for those who did, and regardless of whether a player was matched with someone who was favored or not. In extensions of the original experiment, the main results were replicated. Furthermore, the negative effect on cooperation was shown to exist also continue when a rationale was given for the use of favoritism, but to be turned off when selection was random instead of performance-based.

Psychological Contract Fulfillment on Employees Reactions within the Context of Organizational Justice

Aim - The objective of the study was to examine the psychological contract expectations by employees and the impact of any deviation from its perceived benefits by the employees of an organization, as they occur within social exchange relationships to account for employee responses. &#x0D; Methodology - This is an exploratory longitudinal study in which an investigation is made into the changes in employment obligations as perceived by employees based on the level of fulfillment of contract obligations by their employer(s). &#x0D; Findings - It was deduced that an employer's inability to fulfill its contractual commitments was the foundational cause associated with the decline in cooperation of the employees to fulfill their employment obligations. &#x0D; Significance - The results of the current study show that there is a significant and positive relationship between Psychological Contract Fulfilment and Employee Reaction. Results presented that there is a significant and positive relationship between Organizational Justice and Employee Reaction. Results presented that there is a significant and positive relationship between Organizational Justice and Psychological Contract Fulfilment.

Groups and scores: the decline of cooperation.

Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.

Persistent cooperation and gender differences in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games: Some things never change

In the finite-horizon repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, a compelling backward induction argument shows that rational players will defect in every round, following the uniquely optimal Nash equilibrium path. It is frequently asserted that cooperation gradually declines when a Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated multiple times by the same players, but the evidence for this is unconvincing, and a classic experiment by Rapoport and Chammah in the 1960s reported that cooperation eventually recovers if the game is repeated hundreds of times. They also reported that men paired with men cooperate almost twice as frequently as women paired with women. Our conceptual replication with Prisoner's Dilemmas repeated over 300 rounds with no breaks, using more advanced, computerized methodology, revealed no decline in cooperation, apart from endgame effects in the last few rounds, and replicated the substantial gender difference, confirming, in the UK, a puzzling finding first reported in the US in the 1960s.

Perancangan Buku Cerita Pop-Up Petualangan Lentera Kunang-Kunang

This research enables the design of a pop-up storybook about cooperating while learning and about social skills. This pop-up storybook is made to remind the importance of cooperation for children age 4-6. The research is made because of the decline in cooperation among children which is the result of lack of social interaction, development in technology, and parenting issues. The research covers data collected about children age 4-6, interviews with child psychologists, literature study, dan direct observation. Data results were then processed to build story, visual, and paper engineering techniques.&#x0D; Keywords: storybook, pop-up, social skills, cooperation, children

A Game-Theoretic Model of Cooperation in Law School Faculties

A standard account of group cooperation would predict that group stability would bring about greater cooperation, because repeat-play games would allow for sanctions and rewards. In an academic unit such as a department or a law faculty, one might thus expect that faculty stability would bring about greater cooperation. Faculty turnover, by contrast, would cause faculty to invest less in each other, and depress cooperative behavior. However, academic units are not like most other groups. Tenured professors face only limited sanctions for failing to cooperate, for engaging in unproductive conflict, or for shirking. It is thus open to question as to whether faculty turnover actually leads unambiguously to a decline in cooperation. This article posits that within limits, some faculty turnover may enhance cooperation. Certainly, excessive and persistent loss of faculty is demoralizing, and reduces the number of individuals among which administrative work can be spread. But for less dire losses, faculty turnover may play the disciplining role that academic units are deprived of by the tenure system. This article sets forth a game-theoretic model showing how the possibility of exit may induce greater cooperation in a faculty. The intuition is that while some antisocial behavior in a faculty – fighting or shirking – may garner some short-term gains at the expense of others, the possibility of exit may reduce this behavior, on the grounds that loss of a colleague could be worse than the gains from fighting or shirking. Losing a colleague means probably losing a productive colleague, taking the time to replace her, and possibly replacing her with a less productive substitute. These downsides may play a role in curbing unproductive behavior in a faculty. This article presents some evidence in support of the hypothesis that faculty turnover short of some excessive amount does, in fact, produce higher levels of collegiality.

Mail survey abroad with an alternative web survey

The large decline in cooperation in surveys experienced in the first decade of the twenty first century has placed representative surveys in a veritable quagmire, although numerous researchers have shown that the decline in the total nonresponse has been much higher in administered surveys (face-to-face and telephone) than in self-administered (mail and web surveys). The move from the “traditional” mail survey to the internet survey has brought important changes, but, at the same time, new challenges have arisen related to the lower coverage and the reduced visibility, the need for certain skills to fill out a questionnaire, changes in response rates, etc. This is a self-administered survey that informs the addressees by mail that they have been selected to participate in a research survey to which they can respond either by using the paper questionnaire (in the letter there is a prepaid envelope), by means of a web questionnaire (accessing a link and using a password), or by telephone (the respondent provided a contact time telephone number via a prepaid envelope or by calling an answering machine). The respondents themselves, therefore, choose the mode of response. An analysis of the responses achieved by each modality shows that the majority of the questionnaires were received by ordinary mail (83.6 %), 359 by internet (14.4 %), and 51 were answered by telephone (2.0 %).

Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games.

Economic games such as the public goods game are increasingly being used to measure social behaviours in humans and non-human primates. The results of such games have been used to argue that people are pro-social, and that humans are uniquely altruistic, willingly sacrificing their own welfare in order to benefit others. However, an alternative explanation for the empirical observations is that individuals are mistaken, but learn, during the game, how to improve their personal payoff. We test between these competing hypotheses, by comparing the explanatory power of different behavioural rules, in public goods games, where individuals are given different amounts of information. We find: (i) that individual behaviour is best explained by a learning rule that is trying to maximize personal income; (ii) that conditional cooperation disappears when the consequences of cooperation are made clearer; and (iii) that social preferences, if they exist, are more anti-social than pro-social.

The decline of cooperation, the rise of competition: developmental effects of long-term social change in Mexico.

Using Greenfield's theory of sociocultural change and human development as a point of departure, we carried out two experimental studies exploring the implications of decades of globalised social change in Mexico for children's development of cooperation and competition. In rural San Vicente, Baja California, the baseline was 1970 and the historical comparison took place 40 years later. In Veracruz, the baseline was 1985 and the historical comparison took place 20 years later. In Veracruz, children were tested in both rural and urban settings. We hypothesized that cooperative behavior would decrease in all three settings as a result of the sociocultural transformations of the past decades in Mexico. The Madsen Marble Pull Game was used to assess cooperative and competitive behavior. As predicted by Greenfield's theory of social change and human development, the Marble Pull procedure revealed a striking decrease over time in levels of cooperative behavior, with a corresponding rise in competitive behavior, in all three settings.

Ethnic dominance damages cooperation more than ethnic diversity: results from multi-ethnic field experiments in India

Research in many societies shows that ethnic diversity correlates with a decline in cooperation at the community level. This literature neglects cases in which ethnic heterogeneity is hierarchically structured. Power and status differences between ethnic groups, or ethnic dominance, may play an important role in determining cooperative outcomes. We test this hypothesis using public goods experiments with caste groups in India in which we manipulate the caste composition of experimental groups. Conservative estimates show that ethnic dominance between high and low ranking castes has a much larger negative effect on contributions in the public goods experiment than does caste diversity. We argue that ethnic dominance interactions such as ethnic discrimination constitute a type of antisocial punishment between groups. We also find that conditional cooperation is limited to within ethnic groups, revealing ethnocentric cooperation preferences. These results confirm the importance of group structure in human cooperative patterns, and help bridge the gap between evolutionary theory and cooperation dynamics in multi-ethnic real world settings.