Decision-making In Social Contexts Research Articles

The role of loss aversion in social conformity: psychological and neural representations.

The impact of others' choices on decision-making is influenced by individual preferences. However, the specific roles of individual preferences in social decision-making remain unclear. In this study, we examine the contributions of risk and loss preferences as well as social influence in decision-making under uncertainty using a gambling task. Our findings indicate that while both individual preferences and social influence affect decision-making in social contexts, loss aversion plays a dominant role, especially in individuals with high loss aversion. This phenomenon is accompanied by increased functional connectivity between the anterior insular cortex and the temporoparietal junction. These results highlight the critical involvement of loss aversion and the anterior insular cortex-temporoparietal junction neural pathway in social decision-making under uncertainty. Our findings provide a computational account of how individual preferences and social information collectively shape our social decision-making behaviors.

Capuchin monkeys' (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) categorization of photos of unknown male conspecifics suggests attention to fWHR and a dominance bias.

The ability to quickly perceive others' rank minimizes costs by helping individuals behave appropriately when interacting with strangers. Indeed, humans and at least some other species can quickly determine strangers' rank or dominance based only on physical features without observing others' interactions or behavior. Nonhuman primates can determine strangers' ranks by observing their interactions, and some evidence suggests that at least some cues to dominance, such as facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), are also present in other primates. However, it is unknown whether they can determine strangers' rank simply by looking at their faces, rather than observing their interactions. If so, this would suggest selective pressure across the primates on both cues to dominance and the ability to detect those cues accurately. To address this, we examined the ability of male and female tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) to categorize images of the faces of unknown conspecifics (Sapajus from different colonies) and humans (computer-generated and real) as dominant or nondominant based only on still images. Capuchins' categorization of unknown conspecific faces was consistent with fWHR, a cue to dominance, although there was a strong tendency to categorize strangers as dominant, particularly for males. This was true despite the continued correct categorization of known individuals. In addition, capuchins did not categorize human strangers in accordance with external pre-ratings of dominance by independent human raters, despite the availability of the same cue, fWHR. We consider these results in the context of capuchin socio-ecology and what they mean for the evolution of rapid decision-making in social contexts.

Impact of total sleep deprivation and related mood changes on approach-avoidance decisions to threat-related facial displays.

Study ObjectivesTotal sleep deprivation is known to have significant detrimental effects on cognitive and socio-emotional functioning. Nonetheless, the mechanisms by which total sleep loss disturbs decision-making in social contexts are poorly understood. Here, we investigated the impact of total sleep deprivation on approach/avoidance decisions when faced with threatening individuals, as well as the potential moderating role of sleep-related mood changes.MethodsParticipants (n = 34) made spontaneous approach/avoidance decisions in the presence of task-irrelevant angry or fearful individuals, while rested or totally sleep deprived (27 h of continuous wakefulness). Sleep-related changes in mood and sustained attention were assessed using the Positive and Negative Affective Scale and the psychomotor vigilance task, respectively.ResultsRested participants avoided both fearful and angry individuals, with stronger avoidance for angry individuals, in line with previous results. On the contrary, totally sleep deprived participants favored neither approach nor avoidance of fearful individuals, while they still comparably avoided angry individuals. Drift-diffusion models showed that this effect was accounted for by the fact that total sleep deprivation reduced value-based evidence accumulation toward avoidance during decision making. Finally, the reduction of positive mood after total sleep deprivation positively correlated with the reduction of fearful display avoidance. Importantly, this correlation was not mediated by a sleep-related reduction in sustained attention.ConclusionsAll together, these findings support the underestimated role of positive mood-state alterations caused by total sleep loss on approach/avoidance decisions when facing ambiguous socio-emotional displays, such as fear.

Decision-making in a social world: Integrating cognitive ecology and social neuroscience.

Understanding animal decision-making involves simultaneously dissecting and reconstructing processes across levels of biological organization, such as behavior, physiology, and brain function, as well as considering the environment in which decisions are made. Over the past few decades, foundational breakthroughsoriginating from a variety of model systems and disciplineshave painted an increasingly comprehensive picture of how individuals sense information, process it, and subsequently modify behavior or states. Still, our understanding of decision-making in social contexts is far from complete and requires integrating novel approaches and perspectives. The fields of social neuroscience and cognitive ecology have approached social decision-making from orthogonal perspectives. The integration of these perspectives (and fields) is critical in developing comprehensive and testable theories of the brain.

On the role of vocal emotions in social decision-making

Emotional expressions constitute valuable information for decision-making in social interaction contexts. However, the range of emotions that have been studied is limited. The present study addresses the effects of a wider range of emotional expressions using a methodology modeling interdependent decision-making in social contexts, the Assurance Dilemma. Joy, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and emotionally neutral vocal expressions were presented to 46 participants taking part in the Assurance Dilemma, obtaining behavioral and judgment data on cooperation behavior. For each emotion, predictions based on theoretical accounts and research on emotion induction in decision-making contexts were advanced; joy, sadness and fear were predicted to increase cooperation while anger and disgust to decrease it, as compared to neutral expressions. Results show that emotional expressions reliably affected cooperation, although not always according to the predictions: except for joy, all emotions decreased cooperation. Judgment measures provide further insight into the decision-making process. When collected before participants experienced feedback in the interactions, judgment measures show that participants hold a priori expectations on others’ likely behaviors depending on the emotional expression they display and are willing to use them to guide their decision-making process. This data aligns more closely with predictions. However, after experiencing outcomes, expectations are revised and converge with the behavioral patterns observed in the actual interactions. Results are discussed in terms of how emotional expressions are used for guiding expectations and taking decisions in social interaction contexts and the role that experience plays in this process. Limitations are pointed out directions for future research suggested.

Depressive symptoms are associated with blunted reward learning in social contexts.

Depression is characterized by a marked decrease in social interactions and blunted sensitivity to rewards. Surprisingly, despite the importance of social deficits in depression, non-social aspects have been disproportionally investigated. As a consequence, the cognitive mechanisms underlying atypical decision-making in social contexts in depression are poorly understood. In the present study, we investigate whether deficits in reward processing interact with the social context and how this interaction is affected by self-reported depression and anxiety symptoms in the general population. Two cohorts of subjects (discovery and replication sample: N = 50 each) took part in an experiment involving reward learning in contexts with different levels of social information (absent, partial and complete). Behavioral analyses revealed a specific detrimental effect of depressive symptoms–but not anxiety–on behavioral performance in the presence of social information, i.e. when participants were informed about the choices of another player. Model-based analyses further characterized the computational nature of this deficit as a negative audience effect, rather than a deficit in the way others’ choices and rewards are integrated in decision making. To conclude, our results shed light on the cognitive and computational mechanisms underlying the interaction between social cognition, reward learning and decision-making in depressive disorders.

To trust, or not to trust? Individual differences in physiological reactivity predict trust under acute stress

The stress response represents an evolutionarily ancient array of biological responses to challenge or threat that facilitate survival by promoting adaptive behaviors. ‘Adaptive’ in the evolutionary sense, however, does not easily translate to explain stress’ effect on human decisions. Much research demonstrates that acute stress alters decision-making, but outcomes are obscured by a range of methodological factors. Further, less is known about how stress affects decision-making in social contexts in which people so often act. This is of great importance in today’s increasingly complex social environment, replete with potential stressors, where cooperation and trust are critical. Here the aim was to explore acute stress’ effect on prosocial decision-making, while also controlling for methodological factors that may contribute to varied research outcomes. Ninety-six participants were exposed between-subjects to acute stressors with or without a significant social evaluative component, or a control procedure, after which they performed a variant of the Trust Game (a social decision-making task requiring cooperation and trust with a ‘partner’). Task performance occurred at different times with respect to exposure to examine the roles of temporally distinct biological stress pathways. Overall acute stress was associated with reduced trust, but a more complex pattern emerged when accounting for individual differences in physiological stress responses via multivariate analysis. In keeping with the complexity of stress itself, acute stress may enhance or reduce propensity to trust based on an individual’s unique pattern of physiological reactivity.

Theory of mind deficits partly mediate impaired social decision-making in schizophrenia

BackgroundUsing paradigms from game theory, researchers have reported abnormal decision-making in social context in patients with schizophrenia. However, less is known about the underpinnings of the impairment. This study aimed to test whether theory of mind (ToM) deficits and/or neurocognitive dysfunctions mediate impaired social decision-making in patients with schizophrenia.MethodsWe compared thirty-five patients with schizophrenia to thirty-eight matched healthy controls with regard to social decision-making using the mini Ultimatum Game (mini UG), a paradigm from game theory. Additionally, we assessed ToM using the Theory of Mind Picture Stories Task, a mental state attribution task, and assessed neurocognition using the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia. Mediation analyses were performed on the data.ResultsIn contrast to the behavioral pattern of healthy controls in the mini UG, the patients with schizophrenia significantly accepted more disadvantageous offers and rejected more advantageous offers, and showed reduced sensitivity to the fairness-related context changes in the mini UG. Impaired ToM and neurocognition were also found in the patients. Mediation analyses indicated that ToM but not neurocognition partially mediated the group differences on the disadvantageous and advantageous offers in the mini UG.ConclusionsPatients with schizophrenia exhibited impaired social decision-making. This impairment can be partly explained by their ToM deficits rather than neurocognitive deficits. However, the exact nature of the ToM deficits that mediate impaired social decision-making needs to be identified in future.

Decision-making in social contexts in youth with ADHD

This study examined reward-related decision-making in children and adolescents with ADHD in a social context, using economic games. We furthermore examined the role of individual differences in reward-related decision-making, specifically, the roles of reward sensitivity and prosocial skills. Children and adolescents (9–17 years) with ADHD-combined subtype (n = 29; 20 boys) and healthy controls (n = 38; 20 boys) completed the ultimatum game and dictator game as measures of reward-related decision-making in social contexts. Prosocial skills were measured with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The ADHD group had a larger discrepancy between ultimatum game and dictator game offers than controls, indicating strategic rather than fairness driven decisions. This finding was supported by self-reports showing fewer individuals with ADHD than controls who considered fairness as motive for the decisions. Perspective taking or empathic concern did not differ between groups and was not significantly associated with offers. In conclusion, the results suggest that rather than a failure to understand the perspective of others, children and adolescents with ADHD were less motivated by fairness than controls in simple social situations. Results encourage the use of economic games in ADHD research.

Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making.

An essential element of goal-directed decision-making in social contexts is that agents' actions may be mutually interdependent. However, the most well-developed approaches to such strategic interactions, based on the Nash equilibrium concept in game theory, are sometimes too broad and at other times ‘overlook’ good solutions to fundamental social dilemmas and coordination problems. The authors propose a new theory of social decision-making—virtual bargaining—in which individuals decide among a set of moves on the basis of what they would agree to do if they could openly bargain. The core principles of a formal account are outlined (vis-à-vis the notions of ‘feasible agreement’ and explicit negotiation) and further illustrated with the introduction of a new game, dubbed the ‘Boobytrap game’ (a modification on the canonical Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm). In the first empirical data of how individuals play the Boobytrap game, participants' experimental choices accord well with a virtual bargaining perspective, but do not match predictions from a standard Nash account. Alternative frameworks are discussed, with specific empirical tests between these and virtual bargaining identified as future research directions. Lastly, it is proposed that virtual bargaining underpins a vast range of human activities, from social decision-making to joint action and communication.

Adolescents’ risky decision-making activates neural networks related to social cognition and cognitive control processes

This study examines by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging the neural mechanisms underlying adolescents’ risk decision-making in social contexts. We hypothesize that the social context could engage brain regions associated with social cognition processes and developmental changes are also expected. Sixty participants (adolescents: 17–18, and young adults: 21–22 years old) read narratives describing typical situations of decision-making in the presence of peers. They were asked to make choices in risky situations (e.g., taking or refusing a drug) or ambiguous situations (e.g., eating a hamburger or a hotdog). Risky as compared to ambiguous scenarios activated bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG), right medial prefrontal cortex, and the precuneus bilaterally; i.e., brain regions related to social cognition processes, such as self-reflection and theory of mind (ToM). In addition, brain structures related to cognitive control were active [right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral orbitofrontal cortex], whereas no significant clusters were obtained in the reward system (ventral striatum). Choosing the dangerous option involved a further activation of control areas (ACC) and emotional and social cognition areas (temporal pole). Adolescents employed more neural resources than young adults in the right DLPFC and the right TPJ in risk situations. When choosing the dangerous option, young adults showed a further engagement in ToM related regions (bilateral MTG) and in motor control regions related to the planning of actions (pre-supplementary motor area). Finally, the right insula and the right superior temporal gyrus were more activated in women than in men, suggesting more emotional involvement and more intensive modeling of the others’ perspective in the risky conditions. These findings call for more comprehensive developmental accounts of decision-making in social contexts that incorporate the role of emotional and social cognition processes.

How social cognition can inform social decision making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make inferences of others' mental states in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes like valuation and reward processing. A growing body of research in neuroeconomics has examined decision-making involving social and non-social stimuli to explore activity in brain regions such as the striatum and prefrontal cortex, largely ignoring the power of the social context. Perhaps more complex processes may influence decision-making in social vs. non-social contexts. Years of social psychology and social neuroscience research have documented a multitude of processes (e.g., mental state inferences, impression formation, spontaneous trait inferences) that occur upon viewing another person. These processes rely on a network of brain regions including medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporal parietal junction, and precuneus among others. Undoubtedly, these social cognition processes affect social decision-making since mental state inferences occur spontaneously and automatically. Few studies have looked at how these social inference processes affect decision-making in a social context despite the capability of these inferences to serve as predictions that can guide future decision-making. Here we review and integrate the person perception and decision-making literatures to understand how social cognition can inform the study of social decision-making in a way that is consistent with both literatures. We identify gaps in both literatures—while behavioral economics largely ignores social processes that spontaneously occur upon viewing another person, social psychology has largely failed to talk about the implications of social cognition processes in an economic decision-making context—and examine the benefits of integrating social psychological theory with behavioral economic theory.

Emotional conflict in interpersonal interactions

Facial displays of emotions can help to infer the mental states of other individuals. However, the expectations we generate on the basis of people's emotions can mismatch their actual behaviour in certain circumstances, which generates conflict. In the present study, we explored the neural mechanisms of emotional conflict during interpersonal interactions. Participants had to accept or reject economic offers made by several partners who displayed emotional expressions. On every trial, a cue informed participants of whether they could trust the emotion of their partner or not. Trustworthy (low-conflict) partners with happy facial expressions were cooperative and those with angry expressions did not cooperate. Untrustworthy (high-conflict) partners, on the other hand, cooperated when their expression was angry and did not cooperate when they displayed a happy emotion. Behavioural responses were faster for trustworthy than for untrustworty partners. High-conflict partners activated the anterior cingulate and the anterior insula. In turn, trustworthy partners were associated with activations in the left precuneus. Our results suggest that the emotion displayed by another person affects our decision-making in social contexts. When emotional expressions are linked to their natural consequences, they engage ToM processes. In contrast, untrustworthy emotional expressions engage conflict-related brain regions.