Deception Paradigm Research Articles

Mind over muscle? Time manipulation improves physical performance by slowing down the neuromuscular fatigue accumulation.

While physical performance has long been thought to be limited only by physiological factors, many experiments denote that psychological ones can also influence it. Specifically, the deception paradigm investigates the effect of psychological factors on performance by manipulating a psychological variable unbeknownst to the subjects. For example, during a physical exercise performed to failure, previous results revealed an improvement in performance (i.e., holding time) when the clock shown to the subjects was deceptively slowed down. However, the underlying neurophysiological changes supporting this performance improvement due to deceptive time manipulation remain unknown. Here, we addressed this issue by investigating from a neuromuscular perspective the effect of a deceptive clock manipulation on a single-joint isometric task conducted to failure in 24 healthy participants (11 females). Neuromuscular fatigue was assessed by pre- to post-exercise changes in quadriceps maximal voluntary torque (Tmax ), voluntary activation level (VAL), and potentiated twitch (TTW ). Our main results indicated a significant performance improvement when the clock was slowed down (Biased: 356 ± 118 s vs. Normal: 332 ± 112 s, p = .036) but, surprisingly, without any difference in the associated neuromuscular fatigue (p > .05 and BF < 0.3 for Tmax , VAL, and TTW between both sessions). Computational modeling showed that, when observed, the holding time improvement was explained by a neuromuscular fatigue accumulation based on subjective rather than actual time. These results support a psychological influence on neuromuscular processes and contribute significantly to the literature on the mind-body influence, by challenging our understanding of fatigue.

Does deception involve more cognitive control than truth-telling? Meta-analyses of N2 and MFN ERP studies.

A number of psychological theories propose that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Over the last decades, event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to unravel this question, but the findings are mixed. To address this controversy, two meta-analyses were conducted to quantify the results of existing studies reporting N2 or medial frontal negativity (MFN) associated with deception. In total, 32 papers consisting of 1091 participants were included, which yielded 32 effect sizes for N2 and 7 effect sizes for MFN. We found that deception was associated with a more negative N2 and MFN than truth-telling with medium and large effect sizes (r = .25 and .51, respectively). We also found that the deception paradigm modulated the results (p = .043), but found no evidence for publication bias. Our findings indicate that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Our review also identifies gaps in this literature, including a need for more ERP studies using spontaneous deception.

Neural processes underlying faking and concealing a personal identity: An electroencephalogram study

The detection of lies told about one's identity challenges traditional methods considering characteristics of the lie. This study explored the neural activities underlying identity deception by using electroencephalogram recordings to promote the development of a detection tool. The participants (N = 18) were required to tell a lie or the truth about true and false identity information with the differentiation of deception paradigm. The results showed deceptive (vs. honest) responses to true identity information were associated with a prolonged reaction time and enhanced upper alpha oscillations as well as the attenuated P300 and theta activities, which indicates identity concealment engaged portent honest response control and reduced processing of self-relevant information. By contrast, deceptive (vs. honest) responses to false identity information were associated with absent reaction time cost and decreased alpha activities, which suggests identity faking involved low cognitive conflict but required some degree of behavioral regulation.

Meta-analytic connectivity modelling of deception-related brain regions.

Brain-based deception research began only two decades ago and has since included a wide variety of contexts and response modalities for deception paradigms. Investigations of this sort serve to better our neuroscientific and legal knowledge of the ways in which individuals deceive others. To this end, we conducted activation likelihood estimation (ALE) and meta-analytic connectivity modelling (MACM) using BrainMap software to examine 45 task-based fMRI brain activation studies on deception. An activation likelihood estimation comparing activations during deceptive versus honest behavior revealed 7 significant peak activation clusters (bilateral insula, left superior frontal gyrus, bilateral supramarginal gyrus, and bilateral medial frontal gyrus). Meta-analytic connectivity modelling revealed an interconnected network amongst the 7 regions comprising both unidirectional and bidirectional connections. Together with subsequent behavioral and paradigm decoding, these findings implicate the supramarginal gyrus as a key component for the sociocognitive process of deception.

Disentangling Deception: An Empirical Investigation of the Nature of Lying and Cheating

An individual lies if they misreport honestly generated information. They cheat if they create fraudulent information. The field of behavioral ethics has sought to investigate both types of ethical decision making. To do so, scholars have deployed experiments that rely on incentivized self-report procedures in which the generation of information is often random. In this article, I demonstrate that incentivized self-report procedures are incapable of studying cheating behavior. This limitation, combined with the motivation to theorize about the nature of cheating, has caused the theoretical and empirical literatures to make competing predictions about the nature of deception. In this article, I introduce a new class of deception paradigms capable of identifying both cheating and lying behavior. Across four experiments, I demonstrate that cheating and lying are fundamentally different activities, each with their own set of environmental antecedent and behavioral consequences. By distinguishing between these types of deception, I reconcile several conflicting predictions presently asserted in the behavioral ethics literature.

Assessing the impact of previous experience on lie effects through a transfer paradigm

Influential lines of research propose dual processes-based explanations to account for both the cognitive cost implied in lying and for that entailed in the resolution of the conflict posited by Simon tasks. The emergence and consistency of the Simon effect has been proved to be modulated by both practice effects and transfer effects. Although several studies provided evidence that the lying cognitive demand may vary as a function of practice, whether and how transfer effects could also play a role remains an open question. We addressed this question with one experiment in which participants completed a Differentiation of Deception Paradigm twice (baseline and test sessions). Crucially, between the baseline and the test sessions, participants performed a training session consisting in a spatial compatibility task with incompatible (condition 1) or compatible (condition 2) mapping, a non-spatial task (condition 3) and a no task one (condition 4). Results speak in favour of a modulation of individual performances by means of an immediate prior experience, and specifically with an incompatible spatial training.

The Impact of a Training Device on Perception and Performance by Novice Users of an Autoinjector

The study was conducted to understand the effects of having access to different training materials in the interim between training and first use of an injection device for 27 injection-naïve participants. Participants were told they would be giving themselves a real injection of saline in the return session, and were not told that they would use injection pads until after subjective data was gathered during session 2. This deception paradigm was used to increase the external validity of the study. Participants self-trained in one of three conditions based on what they were given to take home: instructions for use, mechanical trainer, and/or a training video. Participants self-trained in session 1, performed a simulated injection in the session 2 two weeks later, and completed three online surveys in the interim. In session 2, a majority of participants were able to achieve minimally acceptable performance to deliver the medication during the simulated use of the autoinjector. Participants who took home a mechanical trainer had fewer use deviations than those who did not have the trainer at home. This difference was only seen in injection specific subtasks; performance on pre- and post-injection subtasks was low across all groups. Intermittent practice with a mechanical trainer was seen to improve performance on subtasks involved in the motor performance of the injection itself but did not impact performance or compliance with other tasks important to the injection. More holistic training solutions may be required to impact other aspects of the injection beyond the injection itself. While performance differed, subjective ratings did not differ, showing an overconfidence bias that may affect a user’s ability to self-report competence in device use.

Where is the real trap? Domination and mutualism in Teetl’it Gwich’in sensibilities about trapping

Teetl’it Gwich’ins, NWT, Canada have consistently positioned trapping as a valuable exercise despite fluctuations in the price of furs. Materialist anthropological theories applied to the trapping economies of boreal forest First Nations created an image of trapping as an activity that necessarily leads to individualism, alienation, nucleated family structures and disenchantment because the furs were being produced for trade in the world economy. The rise of anti-fur sentiments and Canadian industrial intrusions helped cement this imaginary of the trapper as corrupt but, instead of simply being the victims of European domination, they were positioned to have abandoned the ‘traditional’ sensibilities of trust and reciprocity to adopt the cruelties of the steel trap. In contrast with these conjectural world histories, the author argues that trapping as it is practiced today is far from being an alienating practice. Indigenous trappers work with animals in ways that suit their pre-existing practices. In order to dispel the imaginary of the cruel dominator of animals, more recent thoughts on mutualism in human–animal relationships help but it would be difficult to argue that this activity does not require some deception. Indigenous trappers will create methods and tinker with their traps in ways that are counterintuitive to some of the human–environment dualisms found in the deception paradigm that posits that the human presence and the intention to trap is hidden from the animal and tricks it into making a fatal error. The author argues that trapping is effective and valued because it plays upon the signs and expectations which lie between the past and the present, and between domination and mutualism.

Police officers’ ability to detect lies within a deception paradigm.

This study aimed to examine police officers’ accuracy in classifying guilty and innocent participants using 3 interviewing styles (evidence-focused, relationship-focused, and control). In a modified version of Russano, Meissner, Narchet, and Kassin’s (2005) deception paradigm, participants who had violated a rule (i.e., cheating while solving problems) were considered guilty, whereas those who had followed the rule were considered innocent. After interviewing 234 adult men, 11 experienced male police officers accurately classified over 90% of them as guilty or innocent. Of 160 participants who did not admit to cheating, 140 (87.5%) were correctly classified. There was no statistically significant relationship between interviewing style and police officers’ identifications of guilty deniers (i.e., liars) and innocent deniers (truth tellers). However, interviewers were more likely to believe guilty deniers in the evidence-focused condition, and they tended to believe innocent deniers in the relationship-focused condition. These findings suggest that the ability to detect deception might be influenced by interviewing style.

Lying takes time: A meta-analysis on reaction time measures of deception.

Lie detection techniques are frequently used, but most of them have been criticized for the lack of empirical support for their predictive validity and presumed underlying mechanisms. This situation has led to increased efforts to unravel the cognitive mechanisms underlying deception and to develop a comprehensive theory of deception. A cognitive approach to deception has reinvigorated interest in reaction time (RT) measures to differentiate lies from truths and to investigate whether lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Here, we provide the results of a meta-analysis of 114 studies (n = 3307) using computerized RT paradigms to assess the cognitive cost of lying. Results revealed a large standardized RT difference, even after correction for publication bias (d = 1.049; 95% CI [0.930; 1.169]), with a large heterogeneity amongst effect sizes. Moderator analyses revealed that the RT deception effect was smaller, yet still large, in studies in which participants received instructions to avoid detection. The autobiographical Implicit Association Test produced smaller effects than the Concealed Information Test, the Sheffield Lie Test, and the Differentiation of Deception paradigm. An additional meta-analysis (17 studies, n = 348) showed that, like other deception measures, RT deception measures are susceptible to countermeasures. Whereas our meta-analysis corroborates current cognitive approaches to deception, the observed heterogeneity calls for further research on the boundary conditions of the cognitive cost of deception. RT-based measures of deception may have potential in applied settings, but countermeasures remain an important challenge. (PsycINFO Database Record

One angry woman: Anger expression increases influence for men, but decreases influence for women, during group deliberation.

We investigated whether expressing anger increases social influence for men, but diminishes social influence for women, during group deliberation. In a deception paradigm, participants believed they were engaged in a computer-mediated mock jury deliberation about a murder case. In actuality, the interaction was scripted. The script included 5 other mock jurors who provided verdicts and comments in support of the verdicts; 4 agreed with the participant and 1 was a "holdout" dissenter. Holdouts expressed their opinions with no emotion, anger, or fear and had either male or female names. Holdouts exerted no influence on participants' opinions when they expressed no emotion or fear. Participants' confidence in their own verdict dropped significantly, however, after male holdouts expressed anger. Yet, anger expression undermined female holdouts: Participants became significantly more confident in their original verdicts after female holdouts expressed anger-even though they were expressing the exact same opinion and emotion as the male holdouts. Mediation analyses revealed that participants drew different inferences from male versus female anger, which created a gender gap in influence during group deliberation. The current study has implications for group decisions in general, and jury deliberations in particular, by suggesting that expressing anger might lead men to gain influence, but women to lose influence over others (even when making identical arguments). These diverging consequences might result in women potentially having less influence on societally important decisions than men, such as jury verdicts.

Placebo Effects and Informed Consent

The concepts of placebos and placebo effects refer to extremely diverse phenomena. I recommend dissolving the concepts of placebos and placebo effects into loosely related groups of specific mechanisms, including (potentially among others) expectation-fulfillment, classical conditioning, and attentional-somatic feedback loops. If this approach is on the right track, it has three main implications for the ethics of informed consent. First, because of the expectation-fulfillment mechanism, the process of informing cannot be considered independently from the potential effects of treatment. Obtaining informed consent influences the effects of treatment. This provides support for the authorized concealment and authorized deception paradigms, and perhaps even for outright deceptive placebo use. Second, doctors may easily fail to consider the potential benefits of conditioning, leading them to misjudge the trade-off between beneficence and autonomy. Third, how attentional-somatic feedback loops play out depends not only on the content of the informing process but also on its framing. This suggests a role for libertarian paternalism in clinical practice.

Lying relies on the truth

Cognitive models of deception focus on the conflict-inducing nature of the truth activation during lying. Here we tested the counterintuitive hypothesis that the truth can also serve a functional role in the act of lying. More specifically, we examined whether the construction of a lie can involve a two-step process, where the first step entails activating the truth, based upon which a lie response can be formulated in a second step. To investigate this hypothesis, we tried to capture the covert truth activation in a reaction-time based deception paradigm. Together with each question, we presented either the truth or lie response as distractors. If lying depends on the covert activation of the truth, deceptive responses would thus be facilitated by truth distractors relative to lie distractors. Our results indeed revealed such a “covert congruency” effect, both in errors and reaction times (Experiment 1). Moreover, stimulating participants to use the distractor information by increasing the proportion of truth distractor trials enlarged the “covert congruency” effects, and as such confirmed that the effects operate at a covert response level (Experiment 2). Our findings lend support to the idea that lying relies on a first step of truth telling, and call for a shift in theoretical thinking that highlights both the functional and interfering properties of the truth activation in the lying process.

Who is honest and why: Baseline activation in anterior insula predicts inter-individual differences in deceptive behavior

Humans engage in deceptive behavior that negatively affects others. The propensity to deceive is, however, characterized by vast inter-individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. Attempts to investigate the origins of this heterogeneity have so far mainly relied on subjective measures and have shown little predictive power. Here, we used resting electroencephalography to measure objective and stable individual differences in neural baseline activation in combination with an ecologically valid deception paradigm. Results showed that task-independent baseline activation in the anterior insula, a brain area implicated in mapping internal bodily states and in representing emotional arousal and conscious feelings, predicts individuals’ propensity for deceptive behavior. The higher the neural baseline activation in this area is, the lower individuals’ propensity to deceive. Moreover, results provide evidence that high baseline activation in the anterior insula is associated with negative affect and dispositional tendencies to avoid aversive emotional situations. These results provide converging neural and psychological evidence that individuals might avoid a deceptive act due to a highly active negative emotional system which would make a deceptive act too stressful and bothersome.

The Impact and Desirability of News of Risk for Schizophrenia

In studies of schizotypy, investigators seldom inform participants that they are engaged in research designed to shed light on risk for schizophrenia. Such nondisclosure is justified in part by the argument that disclosure of risk status may be harmful. However, there is little evidence that this is the case. Harm arising from disclosure of risk status was examined in two experiments. In the first, participants (n = 114 psychology undergraduates) were asked to anticipate their reactions to news of risk for schizophrenia, depression, cancer, and diabetes, and also to indicate whether they would want to know their schizophrenia risk status. Participants anticipated schizophrenia risk would have a negative impact that was significantly greater than depression or diabetes risk but similar to cancer risk. The anticipated impact of schizophrenia risk was predicted by expectations of stigmatization as well as confidence in the accuracy of biological screening. Although 81% indicated a preference for knowing their risk status, just 11% were prepared to undergo an assessment to find out. In the second, a between-subjects deception paradigm was used to inform participants (n = 144 psychology undergraduates) they had an enzyme deficiency that placed them at increased risk for schizophrenia, cancer, or depression. Impact was assessed using prospective self-report and salivary cortisol and retrospective self-report. Impact was modeled using measures of stigmatization and health locus of control. Retrospectively, schizophrenia, cancer, and depression risk had strong negative impacts relative to a control group, but there was no effect on prospective measures. Together, the findings suggest that news of risk for schizophrenia has the potential to engender distress, although participants’ anticipations and reflections of responses are not corroborated in prospectively measured outcomes.

Deceptively simple … The “deception-general” ability and the need to put the liar under the spotlight

This Focused Review expands upon our original paper (You can't kid a kidder": Interaction between production and detection of deception in an interactive deception task. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6:87). In that paper we introduced a new socially interactive, laboratory-based task, the Deceptive Interaction Task (DeceIT), and used it to measure individuals' ability to lie, their ability to detect the lies of others, and potential individual difference measures contributing to these abilities. We showed that the two skills were correlated; better liars made better lie detectors (a “deception general” ability) and this ability seemed to be independent of cognitive (IQ) and emotional (EQ) intelligence. Here, following the Focused Review format, we outline the method and results of the original paper and comment more on the value of lab-based experimental studies of deception, which have attracted criticism in recent years. While acknowledging that experimental paradigms may fail to recreate the full complexity and potential seriousness of real-world deceptive behavior, we suggest that lab-based deception paradigms can offer valuable insight into ecologically-valid deceptive behavior. The use of the DeceIT procedure enabled deception to be studied in an interactive setting, with motivated participants, and importantly allowed the study of both the liar and the lie detector within the same deceptive interaction. It is our thesis that by addressing deception more holistically—by bringing the liar into the “spotlight” which is typically trained exclusively on the lie detector—we may further enhance our understanding of deception.

Does the inferior frontal sulcus play a functional role in deception? A neuronavigated theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation study

By definition, lying involves withholding the truth. Response inhibition may therefore be the cognitive function at the heart of deception. Neuroimaging research has shown that the same brain region that is activated during response inhibition tasks, namely the inferior frontal region, is also activated during deception paradigms. This led to the hypothesis that the inferior frontal region is the neural substrate critically involved in withholding the truth. In the present study, we critically examine the functional necessity of the inferior frontal region in withholding the truth during deception. We experimentally manipulated the neural activity level in right inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) by means of neuronavigated continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS). Individual structural magnetic resonance brain images (MRI) were used to allow precise stimulation in each participant. Twenty-six participants answered autobiographical questions truthfully or deceptively before and after sham and real cTBS. Deception was reliably associated with more errors, longer and more variable response times than truth telling. Despite the potential role of IFS in deception as suggested by neuroimaging data, the cTBS-induced disruption of right IFS did not affect response times or error rates, when compared to sham stimulation. The present findings do not support the hypothesis that the right IFS is critically involved in deception.

A Repeated Lie Becomes a Truth? The Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception

Deception has been demonstrated as a task that involves executive control such as conflict monitoring and response inhibition. In the present study, we investigated whether or not the controlled processes associated with deception could be trained to be more efficient. Forty-eight participants finished a reaction time-based differentiation of deception paradigm (DDP) task using self- and other-referential information on two occasions. After the first baseline DDP task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group in which participants finished the same task for a second time; an instruction group in which participants were instructed to speed up their deceptive responses in the second DDP; a training group in which participants received training in speeding up their deceptive responses, and then proceeded to the second DDP. Results showed that instruction alone significantly reduced the RTs associated with participants’ deceptive responses. However, the differences between deceptive and truthful responses were erased only in the training group. The result suggests that the performance associated with deception is malleable and could be voluntarily controlled with intention or training.

Temporal course of executive control when lying about self- and other-referential information: An ERP study

Recent neuroimaging studies have been trying to investigate the neural correlates of deception. To explore the temporal course of neural activity underlying deception, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants were performing the Differentiation of Deception Paradigm (DDP) task to self- and other-referential information. Results showed that lying was associated with increased N1 (parietal–occipital area), N2 (frontal–central area) and decreased P3 (frontal–central area). Moreover, self-referential information elicited larger P2 and P3 compared with other-referential information. Finally, the interaction between stimulus and response types on N2 and P3 suggested that lying about self-referential information is more difficult than lying about other-referential information. These results revealed a temporal course of neural activity regarding executive function underlying deception, which complemented the current understanding of deception from the spatial dimensions.

P02-68 - Neural correlates of the processes of deception: an fMRI study

IntroductionDetection of deception is important for the practice of psychiatry, especially for forensic psychiatry. Previous neuroimaging studies have identified that activity of the prefrontal and parietal cortices was associated with deceptive behaviors. However, the temporal sequence of neural activation in these regions remained unknown.ObjectivesIn this fMRI study, we used a face recognition deception paradigm involving three mental processes in the following temporal order of a deceptive response:(1)Perception(2)Formulation(3)Response, to examine the activation of the brain regions during the process of deception.MethodsFourteen healthy males were scanned by a 3T Philips scanner while performing the deception task. A 2-way ANOVA model was employed to understand the activation pattern of neural correlates of deception during the three processes studied.ResultsActivations of the prefrontal, the fusiform, the supramarginal, the postcentral, the angular, the precuneus, and the rolandic areas were found to peak at different processes. Specifically, the fusiform, the prefrontal, and the precuneus regions were activated first, with their activation peaked at the perceptual process. On the other hand, the activity of the supramarginal, the angular, and the postcentral regions peaked at the formulation process. Activity of the rolandic region was peaked at the response process.ConclusionsThis study showed that there are different temporal gradients of neural activations with respect to the cognitive processes that evolve in deception. By understanding the specific role played by each of the neural correlates during deception, the accuracy and reliability of lie detection could be enhanced.