Psychological Deception Research Articles

Exploratory Analysis of Decision-Making Biases of Professional Red Teamers in a Cyber-Attack Dataset

Attacker psychology is currently under-examined in cybersecurity research. A prior, large-scale study sought to understand attackers’ behavior by testing both technological and psychological deception. Professional “red team” members participated over two days in various conditions. This data was examined for further evidence that cognitive biases, a potential disruption for attackers, may be present, and may be affecting the outcome. An applied, novel methodology for measuring confirmation bias and framing effects is presented using this realistic dataset. Both confirmation bias and the framing effect occurred in this interpretation. The framing effect appears to have reduced attacker interactions with systems in the network, which may benefit cyber defenders. These results provide additional, exploratory evidence that biases in the decision-making of cyber attackers could be used as part of a defensive cyber strategy. Limitations to the approach and directions for future study of attackers are discussed.

Ecologies of Deception in Psychology and Rhetoric

This article explores deception through the lenses of rhetorical theory and experimental social psychology, thus performing an important interdisciplinary gesture. It argues that deception is emergent in experimental conditions as it likewise is in rhetorical encounters. In so doing, it builds toward an understanding of human agency outside the bounds of the subject/object split. Examining work on rhetorical ecologies and ambience on the one hand, and experimental social psychology on the other, the article argues that deception is not something that one person does to another, but rather is an emergent phenomenon within moments of encounter, whether they be rhetorical interactions or psychological experiments.

Deception in Social Psychological Experiments: Two Misconceptions and a Research Agenda

n Constructing the Subject,Kurt Danziger(1990) traces the history of psychologyOsresearch methodology from the nineteenthcentury to the emergence of modern rules ofexperimentation; the changes are striking. IntodayOs psychology laboratories, there is astrict division of labor. One is either anexperimenter or a participant, but neverbothNat least, not in the same laboratory.Not so in Wilhelm WundtOs laboratory at theUniversity of Leipzig, the dedication ofwhich in 1879 is generally recognized as thebirth of modern experimental psychology. InWundtOs laboratory, the roles of participantand experimenter were fluid, and laboratorymembers took on both roles. Wundt himselfparticipated regularly as a subject in theexperiments published by his students; healso contributed much of the underlying the-ory. That this giant himself served as a datasource and rarely, if ever, as an experimentersuggests that the role of subject was thoughtto require greater psychological sophistica-tion than that of experimenter.Retracing the history of oneOs disciplinehelps demonstrate that its practices of exper-imentation are also a product of its times,notwithstanding often deeply entrenchedbeliefs to the contrary. Deception of partici-pants is an experimental tool about whichmany currently harbor strong beliefs; some,for instance, deem it indispensable (e.g.,Brsder 1998; Kimmel 1998). In WundtOs lab-oratory, deception was impossible.Researchers at the Leipzig laboratory wouldfunction as participants, experimenters, andtheorists for one another. Deception wouldhave meant self-deception or deception ofclose collaborators. One does not have totravel in time, however, to realize that a dis-ciplineOs preferred practices of experimenta-tion are relative. Sometimes glancing beyondthe fence of oneOs discipline suffices. In lab-oratories of experimental economists, the useof deception is essentially impossiblebecause the community has effectively pro-scribed it (although there are rare excep-tions). Economists fear that participantsOexpectations of being deceived trigger suspi-cion and second-guessing, and that theseresponses swamp the impact of the experi-mental scenario on behavior (see Hertwigand Ortmann 2001, 2003; Ortmann andHertwig 2002).Having established that beliefs about therules of experimentation evolve and differacross disciplines, we discuss two wide-spread misconceptions about the contempo-rary use of deception in psychology andsketch a research agenda for the future.Before we do so, however, let us briefly clar-ify what is typically considered to be decep-tion. Although deception is not easilydefined, a consensus has emerged acrossdisciplinary borders that intentional andexplicit provision of erroneous informa-tionNin other words, lyingNis deception,whereas withholding information aboutresearch hypotheses, the range of experi-mental manipulations, or the like ought notto count as deception. In the words of theeconomist Hey (1998:397), Othere is a worldof difference between not telling subjectsthings and telling them the wrong things.The latter is deception, the former is notO

Deception in Psychology: Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge

Is it ethically permissible to use deception in psychological experiments? We argue that, provided some requirements are satisfied, it is possible to use deceptive methods without producing significant harm to research participants and without any significant violation of their autonomy. We also argue that methodological deception is at least at the moment the only effective means by which one can acquire morally significant information about certain behavioral tendencies. Individuals in general, and research participants in particular, gain self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play a role in shaping education, informing policies and in general creating a more efficient and just society.

From coercion to deception: the changing nature of police interrogation in America

This article describes and explains changes in the nature of police interrogation that have occurred during the last half-century in America. The author argues that, during the last fifty to sixty years, there has been a profound transformation in the methods, strategies, and consciousness of police interrogators. Psychological deception has replaced physical coercion as one of the most salient, defining features of contemporary police interrogation. Where once custodial interrogation routinely involved physical violence and duress, police questioning now consists of subtle and sophisticated psychological ploys and techniques that rely on manipulation, persuasion, and deception for their efficacy. Not only do police now openly and strongly condemn the use of physical force during interrogation, they also believe that psychological tactics are far more effective at eliciting confessions. The use of deception has, in effect, become a functional alternative to the use of coercion. With this change, police power in the context of interrogation has acquired new meaning: it has become more subtle, more invasive, and more total, effectuated through psychological manipulation rather than physical violence.