Debt Agency Research Articles

DEBT POLICY OF UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF MODERNIZATION OF PUBLIC FINANCES

Since the full-scale invasion of Russian Federation, public finances (PF) have been operating under conditions of uncertainty and unprecedented security challenges, akin to those experienced by the entire economic system. The level of uncertainty is such that it overshadows the current financial crises and parity with the consequences of the Second World War. This became the core objective of the study, which consisted of substantiating conceptual approaches to the formation of debt policy, considering the peculiarities of the projection of martial law on the functioning of PF. The research employs a systematic approach to methodology, integrating methods of factual and situational analysis that are grounded in international standards for public debt assessment and theoretical generalisations. Furthermore, through a comparative analysis, the interrelationships and mutual influences between debt policy and budget strategy are monitored. Furthermore, the study assesses the potential of leveraging the frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine's post-war recovery through the PF system. The study revealed that the debt policy is an integral component of the PF system. Unlike other program documents, it demonstrated resilience to both endogenous and exogenous challenges and the capacity to implement corrective measures during economic crises. This has laid the foundation for a Marshall Plan-like strategy for Ukraine. The PF strategy, which was approved just before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, prompted discussions on enhancing the predictability of budgetary policy and debt sustainability. This, together with the adoption of a medium-term public debt management strategy, became the basis for the actual establishment of the Debt Agency as a legal entity, which in the future will ensure, on the one hand, the privileging of grants among the financial mechanisms for covering the budget deficit, and, on the other hand, an additional level of budgetary strategy for generating a multiplier effect from the borrowed funds for post-war reconstruction. On the other hand, this approach will create conditions for the transition from external sources of financing the budget deficit to internal ones by expanding and diversifying the range of investors in government securities. It is proved that debt policy in both the short and medium term will serve as the basis for the implementation of the budgetary strategy of post-war reconstruction, and will create conditions for accelerating the process of forced reparations to compensate for the damage caused by the Russian Federation.

European sovereign debt risk management: The role of a European Debt Agency

This paper proposes the establishment of a European Debt Agency (EDA) as a tool for the efficient management of Eurozone public debt, to address two primary risks: roll-over and sustainability risk. The proposed EDA would price its loans using a transparent formula that would anchor the price to fundamental economic factors. This approach would encourage fiscal discipline among Member States and avoid inefficient costs resulting from market price deviations from fundamentals, without resorting to debt mutualization. In addition, the paper suggests that adopting flexible fiscal rules alongside the EDA could result in a smoother path towards debt stabilization, by mitigating the macroeconomic effects of excessive fluctuations in risk premia. The simulations indicate that this combination could offer a comprehensive strategy for managing sovereign debt in the Eurozone that would promote fiscal responsibility and stability.

How does corporate ESG performance affect bond credit spreads: Empirical evidence from China

In recent years, as the concept of sustainable development has grown in popularity, ESG has attracted widespread interest from people of all backgrounds. This paper empirically investigates the impact of corporate ESG performance on bond credit spreads using a sample of 988 bonds issued by 443 A-share listed companies from the first quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of 2020. Results indicate that bond credit spreads are lower for listed companies with higher ESG performance. Good ESG performance decreases bond credit spreads by decreasing corporate financial risk, enhancing corporate transparency, and decreasing debt agency costs. The effect of ESG performance on bond credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state enterprises, enterprises in poor macroeconomic environments, and enterprises in regions with a higher degree of marketization. This study provides evidence for the positive economic consequences of ESG performance from the perspective of bond financing, with implications for firms to improve ESG performance and bond investors to optimize investment decisions.

Can trade credit rejuvenate Islamic banking?

This study proposes a renewal of the contemporary Islamic banking Murabaha financing model as it aggravates financial fragility with waning economic efficiency. We adapt the working capital framework of successful US companies like Amazon and Walmart and model an innovative Murabaha facility as trade credit within the real sector of the economy. We then test its robustness in a range of simulation tests. Our approach is novel and stands in contrast to the familiar financial sector fixed-income facilities, characteristic of Western economies, stealthily mimicked as mark-up (interest rate based) Murabaha by Islamic banks. We argue that this is neither appropriate nor effective for Islamic economies, making them fragile under monetary pressures in crises like the current coronavirus and energy ones. Our simulation results indicate that the trade credit Murabaha not only transforms debt into a risk-sharing one but also offers more competitive financing rates, reduces systemic risk, and improves financial stability. Furthermore, our results imply that the trade credit Murabaha can increase the efficiency of Islamic financial systems and make them more resilient to shocks. Consequently, this paper discusses the integration of our novel Murabaha within a recreated architecture of Universal Banking. As an implication, this should promote business activity and contribute to global growth. Finally, we recommend how to deploy our novel Murabaha based on trade credit (as opposed to the currently deployed fixed-income-mimicked Murabaha) to alleviate twin agency debt costs (risk shifting, underinvestment) and solve the ownership transfer problem of modern Islamic banking.

Creating a Safe Asset without Debt Mutualization: the Opportunity of a European Debt Agency

Creating a Safe Asset without Debt Mutualization: the Opportunity of a European Debt Agency

Squaring the Circle: How to Guarantee Fiscal Space and Debt Sustainability with a European Debt Agency

Squaring the Circle: How to Guarantee Fiscal Space and Debt Sustainability with a European Debt Agency

Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?

This paper provides an empirical explanation of the more frequent use of restricted stock plans for executives than stock option plans, to reveal the determinants of a restricted stock plan and understand its subsequent effects. We find that firms with higher growth opportunity, smaller size, higher executive ownership, smaller rent-seeking probably, and dividend payment prefer to grant restricted stock plans. Moreover, the preference of regulators drives the tendency of using restricted stock plans, designed to have higher pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and lower pay-risk sensitivity (vega). Under the intensive regulation, the restricted stock plans designed by firms with executive ownerships and large agency debt costs are more sensitive to risk. As a result, granting restricted stock plans rather than stock options helps improve firm performance and the preference of regulators on restricted stock plans can also enhance firm performance and decrease firm risks.

Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency

The Covid-19 crisis has radically changed the game for world and EU-economies, and urged for a reappraisal of the guidelines for a healthy management of public expenditure. This requires a deep rethinking of the role of public debt in modern capitalistic economies and of efficient, equitable and politically viable ways of financing it. This paper outlines the main operating framework of a Debt Agency tasked with the management of the Eurozone sovereign debts and the creation of a truly European safe asset. The framework leverages on the potential irredeemable nature of sovereign debts in order to build a common bond. By structurally filtering liquidity risk, the Debt Agency can price the Member States’ funding costs by referring only to their credit risk, as defined by EU agreed rules. The common bond issued by the Debt Agency thus avoids mutualisation by design; hence, it can be directly bought by the ECB. Due to its structural intertemporal sustainability, the Debt Agency’s framework delineated in this paper can serve as a benchmark for institutional and political decisions. In this perspective, a counterfactual exercise has been conducted in order to evaluate the future potential impact of the Debt Agency as well as the past distortions in market pricing of Member States’ fundamental risk due to market mispricing of the liquidity risk.

Debt Relief as a Last Resort for the Lender of Last Resort?

The coronavirus crisis has led to a sharp increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios of the euro area member states. Without external support, access to the capital market could be seriously threatened in the medium term for Italy, but also for other member states. While the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, which is designed as a monetary policy instrument, is regarded by some as a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing, the Next Generation EU recovery fund is likely to direct the fundamental structures of the European Union towards a fiscal union with considerable redistribution elements. This article analyses an alternative strategy, namely debt relief by the European System of Central Banks through an EU debt agency. Such a scheme would be possible without amending the EU treaties and would avoid negative equity at the central banks. The question is under what circumstances would this approach be suitable and proportionate?

Debt Financing and Agency Cost on Profitability: Are Real Estate Firms’ Performance in India Getting Affected?

This article tries to understand the relationship between agency cost, debt financing and Indian real estate companies’ performance. The study attempts to document the effect of debt on the firm’s profitability and then explores the reason behind such an impact by introducing the agency cost as a parameter. The study is conducted in two phases. Phase I is carried out to establish the relationship between debt financing and the firm’s financial performance. In Phase II, the study is conducted to understand the impact of agency cost on debt financing. Firms from the BSE Realty Index were selected for the period 2011–2018. Profitability is measured through return on equity (ROE), whereas debt financing is measured through the firm’s leverage ratio. The agency cost is measured through the asset utilisation ratio and general expense to sales ratio. Panel regression method is used to understand the impact of debt financing and agency cost on the firms’ profitability. The result of Phase I suggests a significant negative relationship between debt financing and the ROE and the result of Phase II suggests a positive relationship between the agency cost and debt financing. This means that reduction in agency cost will lead to lesser amount of debt financing thereby improving the firm’s financial performance.

Ein Schuldenerlass als Ende mit Schrecken?

Abstract The rising debt-to-GDP ratios of the eurozone member states result not least from the coronavirus crisis. Without external support, especially with regard to Italy, but also for other Mediterranean states, access to the capital market could be seriously threatened in the medium run. The recovery fund ‘Next Generation EU’ likely directs the fundamental structures of the European Union (EU) towards a fiscal union with considerable transfer elements, while the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which is declared as a monetary policy instrument, is even discussed as a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing. As an alternative, this contribution analyses a debt relief by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), implemented via an EU debt agency. This construction would avoid a negative equity position of the central banks and also enable a legal integration into the EU system. The question remains: What would be the consequences of such a non-recurring step?

БОРГОВІ ЗОБОВ’ЯЗАННЯ ДЕРЖАВИ: СТАТИСТИЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ

The article analyzes the meaning of the concept of "public debt" according to the views of domestic and foreign scholars. The essence of this term according to norms of the Budget code of Ukraine is investigated. The activity of public authorities in the management of debt obligations of our state is considered. The state and dynamics of public debt of Ukraine for the period 2015-2019 are studied. The structure of public debt of Ukraine according to its division into external and internal is analyzed, and the shares of external and domestic debt in the total amount of public and state-guaranteed debt are determined. The dynamics of public debt obligations in terms of the amount of public and state-guaranteed debt is shown. The structure of external and internal debts of the state budget of Ukraine to the main creditors and the dynamics of payments for its repayment are described. The dynamics of the ratio of public debt to GDP of Ukraine is calculated and analyzed. The activity of a new state structure – the Debt Agency of Ukraine – in the field of debt management of our state has been studied. It is determined that a significant problem of the state is to ensure the debt burden. Ways to solve the problem of debt burden are proposed, among which an important measure is proposed – to strengthen control over the effective use of borrowed projects. It is determined that the best step in improving the system of management of debt obligations of the state can be stimulated the development of the internal capital market with the involvement of private reorientation from external to internal prevention. In modern conditions, both market economies and developing countries have inherent needs for additional funds to cover the budget deficit. This situation necessitates the constant search for additional sources of financing government liabilities, in particular, such as loans. Thus, the additional funds raised make it possible to increase total expenditures under conditions of lower national income only through a balanced and effective government policy in the field of borrowing. However, the downside of debt obligations is that sooner or later they must be repaid and interest paid for the use of these borrowed funds. The purpose of the study is to determine the structure and dynamics of public debt of Ukraine, as well as the features of its repayment.

DEBT MANAGEMENT AGENCY IN UKRAINE: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE CREATION AND OPERATION

The article considers a comprehensive approach to the formation and operation of a debt agency in Ukraine based on international experience. Ensuring the full functioning of the Public Debt Management Agency of Ukraine in accordance with international best practices in order to increase the effectiveness of debt policy aimed at reducing the debt burden and reducing the cost of public debt service is one of the most important tasks of Ukraine's strategic development. Analysis of international experience shows that the creation of a debt agency, as a new structure, does not automatically guarantee increased efficiency of external public debt management. It depends on the qualifications of the staff, the structure of the country's public debt and the degree of influence of the agency's staff on the change in the debt burden. Quite a wide resonance in society on the creation of a debt agency in Ukraine, incomplete regulatory support of this process necessitates the definition of approaches to the creation of a debt agency of Ukraine and justification of its functional capacity, which is associated with: creating favorable conditions for the newly created debt agencies of Ukraine; introduction of mechanisms for monitoring and control over its activities and strengthening the interaction of various government agencies within the general government sector; increasing the efficiency and productivity of the debt agency.

Non-traditional monetary policy and the future of the financial industries

This paper investigates how expansionary monetary policy after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has affected the U.S. banking sector. In response to the GFC, the Federal Reserve first lowered the overnight federal funds rate from 5.25% in August 2007 to zero in December 2008. It then turned to quantitative easing, purchasing housing agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, and longer-term Treasury bonds to stimulate the economy. While these policies helped the overall economy to recover, they may have harmed the banking sector. Banks accept safe short-term deposits and transform these into risky longer-term loans. They make a profit on the difference between the interest rate they earn on longer-term assets and the rate they pay of short-term deposits (the net interest margin). Low short-term interest rates and compressed spreads between long- and short-term interest rates may impair bank profitability. Bernanke and Gertler (J Econ Perspect 4:27–48, 1995) showed that reduced bank profitability can hinder their ability to extend loans. Bernanke (FRBNY Q Rev 18:50–70, 1993) noted that this is problematic because banks play a special role in channeling savings to promising borrowers. Financial markets are plagued by information imperfections. Savers release funds today for the promise of obtaining funds later. Whether they get repaid depends on the character of the borrower, the quality of the investment, the collateral that the borrower can provide, and other factors. The lender needs to consider these items and not just interest rates. Asymmetric information can thus hinder the flow of funds from savers to small businesses and other borrowers whose quality is hard to evaluate. Banks can bridge imperfect information problems because they have a comparative advantage because of the following reasons: (1) economies of specialization, as lending officers gain expertise in a particular industry; (2) economies of scale, as it is cheaper for bank to evaluate a loan than for small savers to; and (3) economies of scope, as it is cheaper to provide lending services together with other services. This paper investigates how lower short-term rates and falls in the spread between long-and short-term rates affect bank profitability. To do this, it investigates how these variables affect bank stock prices. Stock prices provide valuable information since they are the expected present value of future cash flows. The results indicate that falls in short rates and in the spread have caused large drops in bank stock returns after the GFC. Banks are also facing competitive pressures from Fin Tech firms and big technology firms. Their performance after the GFC has lagged other parts of the U.S. economy. They are thus vulnerable to negative shocks that could arise during a downturn or a crisis. The Fed should take account of the impact of their policies on the banking sector, since an interruption on the flow of credit through the financial system could prevent funds from going to the most promising firms. This misallocation of resources could then hinder long-term economic growth.

Current trends in debt policy of city councils and directions of its improvement

The need to rethink the role of urban debt policy in accordance with the growing needs of urban communities and their sustainable socio-economic development is identified. In Ukraine, the legal preconditions for the formation of cities' own debt policy and the implementation of borrowing in both domestic and foreign nancial markets. The current state of local budgets and decentralization processes only highlight the need for cities to develop debt policy. The formation of the institution of local borrowings in Ukraine is analyzed and an in-depth analysis of borrowings of city councils in 2014-2019 is carried out with the definition of three periods: 2014-2015 - increase in borrowed funds, but such borrowings were formed mainly due to debt activity of Kyiv City Council domestic local bonds; 2016–2017 - decrease in the amount of borrowed funds, which occurred under the inÀuence of macroeconomic, political and fiscal instability; 2018-2019 - resumption of debt activity of city councils that had experience of borrowing in the previous, relatively analyzed, period and diversification of forms of local borrowing. Based on the cluster analysis, the main characteristics of the modern debt policy of city councils of Ukraine, which is based on the di൵erentiation of city councils-borrowers, are determined. The main borrower remains the Kyiv City Council (the share was about 67%), the activity of borrowings was noted in the following city councils: Zaporizhia, Dnipro, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk. It is established that the debt policy of city councils is based on raising funds from NEFCO, state-owned banks and the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. Improving the debt policy of city councils of Ukraine should be based on the synergy of actions of central government agencies: (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, Debt Agency of Ukraine, NBU, National securities and stock market commission (NSSMC)Financial Control Ofice, etc.) and city councils. Vectors for improving the debt policy of city councils should be an integral part of the Strategy for the Development of the Financial Sector of Ukraine until 2025 and meet its key strategic goals and directions. Key words: debt policy, local debt, local borrowings, domestic local government bonds, external local government bonds, fiscal decentralization.

Transforming Sovereign Debts into Perpetuities through a European Debt Agency

This paper outlines the main operating framework of a Debt Agency (DA) for the management of the Eurozone sovereign debts. The framework leverages on the potential irredeemable nature of sovereign debts in order to build a common bond. Structurally filtering liquidity risk, the DA can price the Member States' installments by referring only to their fundamental risk. The common bond issued by the DA then avoids mutualisation by design, hence it can be directly bought by the ECB. Thanks to its structural intertemporal sustainability, the DA framework sketched here can serve as a benchmark for institutional and political decisions.

Disclosures of CEO inside Debt Changes and the Timing of New Bond Issuance

I explore the timing strategies for bond issuances based on disclosures of CEO inside debt by using hand-collected data of 5,775 U.S. public companies from 2006 to 2017. During the months before proxy statement releases, new changes in CEO inside debt are private information to companies' insiders. Companies can exploit this information asymmetry to issue bonds when the market, based on publicly available information of inside debt, perceives these companies' debt agency problems as relatively insignificant. I find that companies cluster their bond offerings in the immediate quarters after (before) disclosures of positive (negative) inside debt changes. The tendencies to time bond issuances based on inside debt disclosures also increase with the magnitudes of the disclosed changes. In addition, the adoption of these timing strategies is more observable when the issuing firms are regular issuers or when the new issues do not include covenants, especially the debt-restriction covenants. Finally, I verify that these timing strategies help reduce the cost of borrowing, as the bonds issued at favorable times, i.e. right after positive disclosures or before negative disclosures, have lower offering yield spreads than those issued at non-favorable times.

Debt Covenants, Agency Costs and Debt Maturity

Corporate debt maturity is a concave function of financial leverage when the debt has restrictive asset-based covenants attached. This concavity kicks in earlier with increasing covenant tightness and is absent when firms have no restrictive asset-based covenants. We argue that this concavity is suboptimal for equityholders and will arise if managers' prioritize maintaining firm control over reducing the firm's cost of capital. Managers of highly levered firm choose shorter-term debt (at a higher cost) to reduce the probability of covenant violation. We also find that maturity-leverage concavity is reduced when executive remuneration contracts better align managers and owners' interests.

Real Option, Debt Agency Conflicts and Corporate Investment Decisions

This paper studies enterprise investment decisions under debt agency conflicts by the method of real option. It is different from the existed literatures that this paper considers not only the influence of investment goals alienation on investment decisions without bankruptcy agency, but also analyzes the investment decisions distortion under bankruptcy agency conflicts. The study result shows that enterprises with debt usually exist overinvestment; on the one hand, the overinvestment comes from excessive pursuing of the tax benefits under the investment goals alienation, on the other hand, it comes from the protection for shareholders’ investment risk under strategic default bankruptcy. What’s more, under the lower debt level, the former is the dominant mechanism for investment decisions distortion; while under the higher debt level, the influence of the later is prominent.

Demand for Agency MBS in the Era of the Fed Balance Sheet Unwind

Since the Federal Reserve signaled plans to gradually pare down its holdings of Treasuries and agency debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) accumulated in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, investors have expressed concern over how the removal of the Fed as an active buyer would impact the government-sponsored enterprise MBS market. In addition, expectations for increased MBS issuance fueled by a strong labor market have added to worries about rising supply in the face of declining demand. It has been more than one year since the Fed began to shrink its balance sheet. This article examines how market conditions over the past year have affected the speed of Fed balance sheet normalization relative to expectations, as well as ongoing developments in the agency MBS market, and finds that feared market imbalances have largely failed to materialize.