Abstract The international (non)recognition of governments is a composite macro practice that has grown in visibility in recent years in response to contentious domestic political processes such as coups d’état, revolutions, and civil wars, yet it remains understudied in international relations. Doctrinal debates in international law and foreign policy reveal the normative vacuum and normative competition that have long surrounded this phenomenon, but say little about its specific operation and effects. This article brings together insights from recognition theory and international practice theory, and uses post-2011 Libya as an in-depth case study, drawing on elite interviews with diplomats, international officials, and other practitioners. The aim is to sketch a new research agenda by building a generalizable typology of smaller-scale government recognition micro practices (declaratory, diplomatic, informal engagement, intergovernmental cooperation, and support practices), and uncovering their guiding logics and consequences. I argue that, first, the international (non)recognition of governments is endowed with a distinct generative power, as it produces its own creatures through a range of micro practices that have identity formation and change, material empowerment, political legitimation, and sovereignty line-drawing effects. Secondly, it is geopolitically inevitable, as external actors involved in a country cannot ultimately avoid engaging with territorially grounded domestic political actors. Thirdly, it is not a black-and-white situation, as it involves a broad variety of practices guided by different, often contradictory logics. Finally, international government recognition practices are likely to run into three dilemmas stemming from three tensions: international versus domestic recognition, legitimacy versus effectiveness, and coherence versus inclusivity in conflict mediation.
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