Davidson's Principles Research Articles

Interpretation und das Prinzip der Nachsicht

AbstractDavidson's principle of charity says that we should interpret someone's beliefs and utterances in such a way that these beliefs and utterances are, according to our own standards, mostly true. Davidson has advanced three major arguments for this principle. In the first part of this essay, I reconstruct these arguments and explain Davidson's project of a theory of interpretation as far as it is necessary for this reconstruction. In the second part of my article, it is shown that none of the three arguments for the principle of charity put forward by Davidson is convincing. I also examine the two most important arguments against Davidson's principle. It is demonstrated that these arguments are not compelling, too. The upshot of my discussion is that the debate between proponents and opponents of the principle of charity has reached stalemate.

Moore‐Paradoxicality and the Principle of Charity

AbstractIn a recent article in Theoria, Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore‐paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.

Books

Acta Neurologica ScandinavicaVolume 71, Issue 2 p. 174-176 Books First published: February 1985 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0404.1985.tb03185.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract Book reviewed in this article: C. J. Frederickson, G. A. Howell & E. J. Kasarskis (eds.): The neurobiology of zinc. P. E. Belchetz (ed.): Management of pituitary disease. F. Clifford Rose (ed.): Research progress in epilepsy. Fritz E. Dreifuss: Pediatric epileptology. Classification and management of seizures in the child. John Wright M. Baldy-Moulinier, D. H. Ingvar & B. S. Meldrum: Cerebral blood-flow, metabolism and epilepsy. J. Macleod (ed.): Davidson's principles and practice of medicine. O. Spreen, D. Tupper, A. Risser, H. Tuokko & D. Edgell (eds.): Human developmental neuropsychology. S. Carpenter & G. Karpati: Pathology of skeletal muscle. Volume71, Issue2February 1985Pages 174-176 RelatedInformation

Why does the plasma urea concentration increase in acute dehydration?

Acute dehydration biochemically manifests itself with mild uremia and a normal creatinine concentration. The reason for this, as quoted in popular medical textbooks, is that there is increased reabsorption of urea by the kidneys ([1][1]). This explanation is rarely taken further by clinical tutors

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine, IE Edition, 20th Ed

"Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine, IE Edition, 20th Ed." Journal of Endocrinology, Metabolism and Diabetes of South Africa, 13(2), p. 75

Intercultural pragmatics and the clash of civilizations: Western and Muslim interactions before and since 9/11

This paper is concerned with what is too often seen as the inevitable clash of civilizations between Western and Muslim peoples and nations. I argue against Quine's pessimistic conclusions regarding radical translation and in favor of Davidson's principle of charity, according to which communication can only be possible when each communicator takes the other party to be rational. I argue against the view that Muslims, including Muslim terrorists, are of necessity irrational, plead for a more charitable approach to their views of the relations between the West and Islam, criticize Huntington's view on the so-called clash of civilizations, and reject the notion of it as an unavoidable event. I then point out that other ways of dealing with the problem of Muslim terrorism are possible, ways that take into account the public opinion in the Muslim countries rather than relying on sheer force. From that point of view, I advocate a policy based on the Prisoner's Dilemma solution to the promotion of cooperation.

Philosphical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement

1. What are called 'intuitions' in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it rests on bad epistemology: specifically, on an impossible ideal of unproblematically identifiable evidence. 3. Our resistance to scepticism about judgement is not simply epistemic conservativism, for we resist it on behalf of others as well as ourselves. A reason is needed for thinking that beliefs tend to be true. 4. Evolutionary explanations of the tendency assume what they should explain. Explanations that appeal to constraints on the determination of reference are more promising. Davidson's truth-maximizing principle of charity is examined but rejected. 5. An alternative principle is defended on which the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge rather than truth. It is related to an externalist conception of mind on which knowing is the central mental state. 6. The knowledge-maximizing principle of charity explains why scenarios for scepticism about judgement do not warrant such scepticism, although it does not explain how we know in any particular case. We should face the fact that evidence is always liable to be contested in philosophy, and stop using talk of intuition to disguise this unpleasant truth from ourselves.

Re‐Enactment and Radical Interpretation

AbstractThis article discusses R. G. Collingwood's account of re‐enactment and Donald Davidson's account of radical translation. Both Collingwood and Davidson are concerned with the question “how is understanding possible?” and both seek to answer the question transcendentally by asking after the heuristic principles that guide the historian and the radical translator. Further, they both agree that the possibility of understanding rests on the presumption of rationality. But whereas Davidson's principle of charity entails that truth is a presupposition or heuristic principle of understanding, for Collingwood understanding rests on a commitment to internal consistency alone. Collingwood and Davidson diverge over the scope of the principle of charity because they have radically different conceptions of meaning. Davidson endorses an extensional semantics that links meaning with truth in the attempt to extrude intensional notions from a theory of meaning. Since radical translation rests on a truth‐conditional semantics, it rules out the possibility that there may be statements that are intelligible even though based on false beliefs. Collingwood's account of re‐enactment, on the other hand, disconnects meaning from truth, thereby allowing for the possibility of understanding agents who have false beliefs. The paper argues, first, that Davidson's account of radical translation rests on inappropriately naturalistic assumptions about the nature of understanding, and that Davidson commits this error because he develops his account of radical interpretation in response to an epistemological question that is motivated by a skeptical concern: “how can we know whether we have provided the correct interpretation?” Second, that in the twentieth century far too much philosophizing has been driven by epistemological concerns that have obscured attempts to provide adequate answers to the sort of conceptual question with which Collingwood is concerned, namely: “what does it mean to understand?”

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine

A Pedagogy of Charity: Donald Davidson and the Student-Negotiated Composition Classroom

Drawing on classroom experiences, the author suggests that philosopher Donald Davidson's interpretive principle of charity can help explain why communication is impoverished or even impossible in classrooms governed by traditional, authoritarian practices that form a “pedagogy of severity.” If the classroom is to be a place of dialogue, learning, and mutual transformation, teachers should promote a “pedagogy of charity,” which assumes that students are rational beings with mostly true and coherent beliefs.

New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats

A number of influences have combined to make reductionism an unpopular position in recent philosophy of mind and psychology. Davidson's Principle of the Anomalousness of the Mental, the multiple realizability arguments of Putnam, Fodor, and others, and attempts to characterize supervenience or dependency as the appropriate nonreductive relation to seek between psychological and physical kinds are the most well-known objections (Kim 1989). And these have found their mark. Being a psychophysical reductionist nowadays, as Jaegwon Kim aptly puts it, a bit like being a logical positivist or a member of the Old Left-an aura of doctrinaire naivete hangs over such a person (1989, 32). This aura is mistaken, however, in light of the development over the past decade of a brand of psychophysical reductionism, built upon a novel general account of theory reduction in science (Hooker 1981; P. M. Churchland 1979, sec. 11 and chap. 4, and 1985; P. S. Churchland 1986, chaps. 7, 9; Enc 1983; Bickle 1991, 1992c). From this new wave, the reductionist thesis gets reformulated as. the broadly empirical prediction that developed psychological theories ultimately will stand in the intertheoretic reduction relation (construed in the novel fashion) to developed counterpart theories from cognitive and computational neuroscience.1 The empirical evidence mustered in defense of this prediction is drawn from work now being pursued in the relevant sciences; and some work from recent neuroscience is already demonstrating reductive potential of the relevant sort for sophisticated psychological

Interpreting students' and teachers' discourse in science classes: An underestimated problem?

This article deals with the problem of the proper interpretation of discourse between students and teachers in classrooms. First, several interpretations of a concrete classroom protocol dealing with the paradigmatic case of static forces are discussed: an “ordinary” teacher's analysis, an analysis in terms of misconceptions, and an analysis in terms of alternative conceptions. Though they represent common ideas from the literature, it is argued that those analyses all in some way misinterpret the discourse. By drawing on Davidson's principle of charity and by distinguishing between belief and meaning, we present an analysis that in our opinion interprets the discourse correctly. Its consequences for teaching are discussed, as well as its foundation in Davidson's philosophy. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Interpreting students' and teachers' discourse in science classes: An underestimated problem?

This article deals with the problem of the proper interpretation of discourse between students and teachers in classrooms. First, several interpretations of a concrete classroom protocol dealing with the paradigmatic case of static forces are discussed: an “ordinary” teacher's analysis, an analysis in terms of misconceptions, and an analysis in terms of alternative conceptions. Though they represent common ideas from the literature, it is argued that those analyses all in some way misinterpret the discourse. By drawing on Davidson's principle of charity and by distinguishing between belief and meaning, we present an analysis that in our opinion interprets the discourse correctly. Its consequences for teaching are discussed, as well as its foundation in Davidson's philosophy. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism

Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists should revise some significant details of the program, particularly the conception of theories, to circumvent this more potent Davidson-inspired worry.

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine

Book Review: Davidson's Principles & Practice of Medicine, 15th Edition

Book Review: Davidson's Principles & Practice of Medicine, 15th Edition

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine.

Part 1 - Principles of medicine . Good medical practice . Good prescribing . Molecular mechanisms of disease . Immunological factors in disease . Environmental and nutritional factors in disease . Principles of infectious disease . Ageing and disease Part 2 - Practice of medicine . Critical care and emergency medicine . Poisoning . Medical psychiatry . Oncology . Palliative care and pain management . Infectious diseases . Human immunodeficiency virus infection and the human acquired immunodeficiency syndrome . Sexually transmitted infections . Clinical biochemistry and metabolism . Kidney and urinary tract disease . Cardiovascular disease . Respiratory disease . Endocrine disease . Diabetes mellitus . Alimentary tract and pancreatic disease . Liver and biliary tract disease . Blood disorders . Musculoskeletal disorders . Neurological disease . Skin disease . Appendix

Book Review: Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine (14th Edition)

Book Review: Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine (14th Edition)

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine: A Textbook for Students and Doctors

At one time during its 33 years of existence, Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine was the best selling textbook of internal medicine in the world. Its coverage of tropical diseases was said to be especially useful. The 14th edition has now appeared and is worthy volume in the succession. The editor, John G. Macleod, is former chief of medicine at Edinburgh. All 26 authors are British and 17 are currently located in Edinburgh. This is not comprehensive treatment of internal medicine la Harrison, Cecil, or Stein, but medium-sized usable textbook comparable to such texts as Wilkins and Levinsky or Kaye and Rose. The editor states that his primary objective has been to provide a rational and easily comprehensible basis for the practice of medicine. His audience consists of medical students, both undergraduate and post-graduate. I think he has succeeded in his goal as well

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine: a Textbook for Students and Doctors

Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine: a Textbook for Students and Doctors