Davidson's Argument Research Articles

Replies to Kirk Ludwig and Alexander Miller

ABSTRACTThis paper is a reply to Kirk Ludwig's and Alexander Miller's comments on the first part of Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. It addresses concerns Ludwig expresses about the triangulation argument's success in establishing the social character of language and thought. It answers Miller's invitation to compare Davidson's non-reductionism with that of Crispin Wright, as well as the social aspect of Davidson's view with the social aspect of Saul Kripke's. And it addresses Miller's worries concerning my claims about the normativity of meaning.

Triangulating on Thought and Norms

ABSTRACTThis article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrific book,Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. The first question, concerning the first part of the book, is whether, starting from the assumption that a solitary individual cannot have thought contents, we can show that adding another individual to the picture cannot resolve the problem. The second question, concerning the second part, is whether a more sophisticated, decision-theoretic, Humean about the pro-attitudes can respond to the objections to the simple Humean view, and whether Davidson was not in fact just such a sophisticated decision-theoretic Humean.

Introduction

ABSTRACTIn Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, Robert H. Myers and Claudine Verheggen spell out, and extensively build on, the triangulation argument advanced by Donald Davidson. This paper is an introduction to a symposium devoted to their development of that argument. The symposium began in 2018 as an authors-meet-critics session at the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, and consists in the responses of three critics, Kirk Ludwig, Alexander Miller, and Paul Hurley, followed by Verheggen's and Myers's replies. I offer a brief sketch of each of the two parts of the book, and an overview of the questions raised by the critics.

Replies to Kirk Ludwig and Paul Hurley

ABSTRACTIn response to Paul Hurley, I argue that Donald Davidson's triangulation argument can be applied to normative beliefs only if such beliefs are answerable to properties that are at once normative and causal. The argument thus commits Davidson to a non-reductive and strikingly non-revisionary form of naturalism. In response to Kirk Ludwig, I argue that Davidson had good reason to abandon Humean accounts of pro-attitudes because he had good reason to welcome the non-reductive and non-revisionary form of naturalism that comes into view once the triangulation argument is applied to normative beliefs.

Realismus und unübersetzbare Sprachen

This paper argues against Davidson's claim that there is no distinction between conceptual schemes and their content and derives the implications for the debate on realism and antirealism. Starting from a semantic conception of realism, I discuss Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes and untranslatable languages. I argue that the idea of an untranslatable language is consistent since language attribution is essentially normative. Untranslatable languages are metaphysically possible, but epistemically unrecognizable. This leads to a Berkeleyan argument against antirealism: if antirealism is conceived of as dependence from a total language (instead of merely some actual language), the distinction between realism and antirealism vanishes: antirealism is realism.

The Temptations of Theory

When students of religion are tempted to theorize, they are more apt to spread confusion than to get things right. In Believing and Acting (2012), Scott Davis offers philosophical therapy for the resulting perplexities. There is no more instructive methodological essay in the field. Because the temptations Davis identifies are real, any would-be theorist of religion, society, or culture would be well advised to take his diagnoses seriously. “Understanding religion,” according to Davis, “requires nothing more than the sensitive and imaginative reading of human phenomena informed by the best available historical narrative.” The study of religion is a tangled garden in need of “judicious pruning and weeding” (2012, 3). In some cases, the prudent gardener will need only to reshape something that goes by the name of “theory.” Davis praises Mary Douglas, Clifford Geertz, and Wayne Proudfoot for freeing earlier research programs of their theoretical excesses. These are Davis’s model gardeners, the heroes of “the pragmatic turn” he recommends. What links the three together, he argues, is that they borrow their pruning hooks from the same shed—the pragmatic philosophical tradition initiated by C. S. Peirce.1 The book has villains as well as heroes. In “cognitive studies and the postmodern hermeneutics of suspicion,” Davis finds nothing worth saving. He concludes that they “should probably be uprooted altogether” (2012, 4). In somewhat different ways, these programs fail to learn what pragmatism has to teach about studying human beings as rational agents. The lessons that figure most heavily in Davis’s critical project come from Donald Davidson.2 While I mostly agree with Davis on what those lessons are and admire the acumen with which he explicates them, I worry that he is too quick to dismiss some research programs as worthless. If we are not careful here, something valuable will end up in the compost heap. Davis argues that Peirce was basically right about how inquiry works. Inquiry is the activity in which human beings engage to resolve their doubts about what is the case and what to do. Like other things we do, it is something we can do well or poorly. Properly conducted, inquiry is part of living well.

TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS

According to the orthodox view, it is impossible to know how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and whether they are interpersonally comparable at all. Against the orthodox view, Donald Davidson (1986, 2004) argues that the interpersonal comparability of preferences is a necessary condition for the correct interpretation of other people's behaviour. In this paper I claim that, as originally stated, Davidson's argument does not succeed because it is vulnerable to several objections, including Barry Stroud's (1968) objection against all transcendental arguments of a ‘strong’ kind. However, I argue that Davidson's strategy can still achieve results of anti-sceptical significance. If we reformulate Davidson's argument as a ‘modest’ transcendental argument and if we embrace an ‘internal’ account of epistemic justification, it is in fact possible to have at least justified beliefs about how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and about their interpersonal comparability.

Are all Actions Movements of the Agent's Body?

Abstract Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading "movements", in "all actions are bodily movements", transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to conflict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.

Rejoinder to Davidson on Counterfeiting

Block (1976) makes case that while counterfeiting legitimate money (e.g., gold) should indeed be considered a crime, creation of fake, fraudulent copies of money that is itself fake and fraudulent (fiat currency) should not be characterized as illicit behavior. Rather, as in stealing from a thief (which, logically, cannot be done; one can only liberate crook's ill gotten gains), same applies to present case. If A is victim of initial counterfeiting, and B (the bank, and/or government) is guilty party, responsible for first, and illegitimate, episode of counterfeiting, then when C (the counterfeiter) counterfeits counterfeit money improperly created by B, C is innocent of any wrongdoing. Davidson (2009) demurs. She charges that in my focus on A, B, and C, I have ignored X. And who are these worthies? States Davidson (2009): they are the private holders of B's counterfeit notes who are neither original owners of gold or silver nor a part of any counterfeiting scheme. My critic goes on to wax eloquent about how truly innocent and victimized are Xs, all of which, unhappily, is completely true. I regard Davidson's argument as extremely original, pertinent, and insightful in general, and in particular with regard to her creative introduction of Xs. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced. No doubt Xs have little or no choice. But, still, I contend, they are not entirely innocent, (1) such that they have a right not to have value of their dollar notes reduced by our counterfeiter of counterfeit bills. (2) Suppose that one day, all Xs of world become fed up, sick and tired of fiat currency that has been foisted upon them for lo these many years. However, they are powerless to overcome powers that be; central banks, Fed, government that backs up these illicit organizations at point of a gun. One of Xs says to his confreres: Hot diggity; I have an idea! Let us all become counterfeiters (of course of counterfeit, not legitimate, money); if we all do so, powers that be will be unable to stop us all; then and only then can we rid ourselves of this monetary pox. With massive counterfeiting, we will make Germany of 1923, and Zimbabwe of early 21st century look like pikers. This sounds like a pretty good plan to me; at least, I have heard worse, far worse. However, squarely standing in way of this wonderful idea is what I would characterize as mistaken analysis of Davidson (2009). (3) For, it is her view that counterfeiting counterfeit money is per se illicit. If so, then long suffering masses of whom Davidson is so protective will have this road to freedom barricaded, paradoxically, by her perspective. If a slave objects to freedom, one has to wonder whether there is real slavery afoot or not. Suppose, now, that only some of Xs adopt this policy of undermining fiat currency through massive counterfeiting, thus creating hyperinflation, which will bring this system to a halt. Call them As. In contrast, Bs refuse to go along with other Xs, and thus in effect support status quo. (4) The Bs, as does Davidson, oppose counterfeiting counterfeit money. What can we say about Bs, under such circumstances? At very least, their claim to complete innocence starts to look a bit tarnished (as in case of slaves who oppose liberation). But, if so, then, so does coherence of their (and Davidson's) opposition to counterfeiting counterfeit money start to crumble. I have some difficulty with this statement of Davidson's (2009): since members of X are forced to use fiat money, and have only one viable medium of exchange, it can be seen that such money, in fact, ceases to be counterfeit in their hands. First, it is not strictly true that Xs are forced to use U.S. fiat currency. Rather, they are all but prevented from using anything else. (5) Second, it is not clear why counterfeit money radically changes its status due to this force imposed by governmental central banking. …

Conceptual schemes and empiricism: what Davidson saw and McDowell missed

En este artículo examino las posiciones de McDowell y Davidson acerca del dualismo de esquema y contenido. Defiendo que este dualismo no puede recuperarse de las críticas de Davidson incluso en la sugestiva forma defendida por McDowell. Defiendo que McDowell falla al evaluar el verdadero alcance y significado de los argumentos davidsonianos y que su empirismo mínimo no puede evitar algunos de los problemas que otras posiciones empiristas muestran

Synchronous Events in By-Sentences

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No Speech, Never Mind!

In a series of classic papers, Donald Davidson put forward an ingenious argument to challenge the ascription of minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's conclusions have been mercilessly demolished in the literature by cognitive ethologists, but none of them have directly addressed Davidson's argument. First, this paper is an attempt to elucidate and evaluate Davidson's central argument for denying minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's central argument puts forth a challenge to those of us who want to attribute minds to nonlinguistic animals. Second, this paper uses counterexamples offered in the cognitive ethology literature to meet Davidson's challenge directly.

COMMUNICATION AND RATIONAL RESPONSIVENESS TO THE WORLD

Abstract: Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson's central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom's defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not necessary to engage in the practice of interpersonal reasoning because possession of the concept is independently integral to the practice of intrapersonal reasoning.

Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice

ABSTRACTThis article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions.

Davidson's Transcendental Externalism

One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson's later work was to show that participation in a certain causal nexus involving two creatures and a shared environment–Davidson calls this nexus “triangulation”–is a metaphysically necessary condition for the acquisition of thought. This doctrine, I suggest, is aptly regarded as a form of what I call transcendental externalism. I extract two arguments for the transcendental‐externalist doctrine from Davidson's writings, and argue that neither succeeds. A central interpretive claim is that the arguments are primarily funded by a particular conception of the nature of non‐human animal life. This conception turns out to be insupportable. The failure of Davidson's arguments presses the question of whether we could ever hope to arrive at far‐reaching claims about the conditions for thought if we deny, as does Davidson, the legitimacy of the naturalistic project in the philosophy of mind.

Davidson's Derangement: Of the Conceptual Priority of Language

Davidson has argued that the phenomenon of malapropism shows that languages thought of as social entities cannot be prior in the account of communication. This may be taken to imply that Dummett's belief, that language is prior in the account of thought, cannot be retained. This paper criticises the argument that takes Davidson from malapropism to the denial of the priority of language in the account of communication. It argues, against Davidson, that the distinction between word meaning and what speakers mean by words, used by Davidson to account for metaphor, suffices to account for malapropism. The reasons for the failure of Davidson's argument are used to throw light on what is meant by the priority of language over thought, and to argue that the priority thesis is ambiguous.

Incommensurability without Dogmas1

Summary This article is a defense of a semantic concept of incommensurability. Davidson's criticism of the dualism of scheme and content and Ramberg's davidsonian pragmatic concept of incommensurability are discussed. It is argued that Davidson's argument against conceptual relativism fails to undermine the notion of two languages being mutually partially not translatable. It is then claimed that a non-trivial concept of semantic incommensurability based on the notion of intranslatability does makes sense, does not presuppose the scheme-content dualism and is consistent with an objectivist view of progress in science. It is then concluded that, although the widely held view that the incommensurability thesis entails some form of epistemological relativism must be rejected, it does follow from Davidson's criticism of the “third dogma” of empiricism that a sharp distinction of the kuhnian kind between “normal” disagreement and conceptual change can not be drawn.

DAVIDSON ON SOCIAL EXTERNALISM

Abstract: A central premise in Tyler Burge's argument for social externalism says that an incomplete understanding can be sufficient for concept possession. Burge claims that this premise is grounded in ordinary practices of giving psychological explanations. On the basis of an extended version of Burge's ‘arthritis’ case Donald Davidson has argued that this claim is false. The paper argues that Davidson's argument is unconvincing. A closer analysis of Davidson's extended ‘arthritis’ case shows that the belief ascriptions Davidson focuses on actually support social externalism.

Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy

Quine and Davidson employ proxy functions to demonstrate that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is compatible with indefinitely many radically different reference relations. They also believe that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is all that determines reference. From this they infer that reference is indeterminate, i.e. that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what predicates apply to. Yet referential indeterminacy yields rather dire consequences. One thus does wonder whether one can hold on to a Quine--Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics and still avoid embracing referential indeterminacy. I argue that one can. Anyone adhering to the behaviouristic account pivotal to the Quine--Davidson stance is bound to acknowledge certain facts about verbal behaviour -- that some utterances are tied to situations, that some utterances are tied to segments in situations, that some predicates have non-contextualised conditions of application, and that use involves causal dependencies. The restrictions from these facts ensure that only reference relations generated by means of rather exceptional proxy functions are compatible with verbal behaviour. I conclude that this allows one to rebuff the Quine--Davidson argument for the indeterminacy of reference, as it were, from within. I moreover tentatively conclude that the line of thought laid out provides good reason for just about anyone to hold that there are facts about reference after all.

In Defence of a Dogma: Davidson, Languages, and Conceptual Schemes

AbstractIn this paper I draw on Davidson's work to generate counter examples to his claim that since there are no untranslatable languages there are also no alternative conceptual schemes. I argue that Davidson's argument to that effect is based upon an equivocation.