David Archard Research Articles

The Private Sphere in Citizenship Education for Deliberative Democracy: The Liberal and Feminist Arguments against Public-Private Dualism

One of the challenges in substantiating deliberative democracy as a normative theory is the educational challenge of how to cultivate civic virtue, especially mutual respect and civility, in children. The cultivation of civic virtue is not limited to school education, but is also an activity related to family education. However, liberal theorists who advocate the theory of deliberative democracy, based on the dualism of public and private, have limited their discussions to the issue of civic development in the field of public education. This article proposes to understand and compare the many competing theories on public-private dualism, particularly in liberal and feminist spaces. Beginning with an analysis of the work of liberal theorists such as David Archard as well as Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, and moving on to that of feminist theorists such as Susan Okin, this article examines competing theories on education in school and in the family, to whom the responsibility of education belongs, and where feminist and liberal thought enlighten these debates. This article will clarify the theoretical tendencies and principles of liberal arguments aimed at overcoming the public-private dualism in education, and present a strategy for overcoming the challenges that this theory encompasses by seeking reference points in feminist thought, especially with attention to conception of relational autonomy.

Natality and Development in Education: A Rapprochement Between Hannah Arendt and Gert Biesta?

Background/Context: Recent accounts of learning from experience in education tend to impoverish development and temporal processes as constructive categories for thinking about freedom and action. Drawing on Jacques Rancière’s critique of development, Gert Biesta’s 2010 article, “How to Exist Politically and Learn from It: Hannah Arendt and the Problem of Democratic Education,” makes the case for a mode of democratic education that excludes the concept of development. In doing so, Biesta interprets Hannah Arendt’s work as both problematic and constructive for democratic education. Purpose: This article challenges Biesta’s reading of Arendt’s concept of natality and development by focusing on what she calls the “double aspect of the child.” It questions Biesta’s deconstruction of development and attempts to show that natality and development cannot be that easily separated, especially if we are to maintain Arendt’s radical account of freedom. The purpose of the research is to reclaim Arendt’s “temporal framing” of childhood and adulthood, and to argue that development, while not unproblematic in traditional psychological accounts, is in fact a necessary condition of her concept of natality—what she calls the essence of education. Research Design: The argument in this article is developed through a critical interpretation and discussion of the works of Gert Biesta and Hannah Arendt, with a specific focus on their ideas about action and new beginnings, and the role of development for an adequate understanding of natality in education. Conclusions/Recommendations: In making my case for a more radical reading of natality in education than Biesta offers, I present an alternative, with the aid of David Archard’s work, to the standard normative account of the developmental model that Biesta attributes to Arendt when he describes her account of the “child”–“adult” relation as “too psychological.” I then appeal to Arendt’s understanding of temporality in her essay “Between Past and Future,” in which she names the “gap” in time as the juncture where freedom can occur. I attempt to show that this gap mirrors our actual human birth and our reception into a language community, in such a way that suggests how freedom and action entail a kind of “unready readiness” that is not unique to newborns. However, unlike Biesta, who acknowledges as much with respect to our insertion into the human world, I maintain that this temporal gap in time is a constitutive feature of development and, as such, of natality. I conclude by arguing that development and becoming are important concepts that should not be left solely to the discipline of psychology if we are to reduce the likelihood of developmental ism in education.

Let's Talk About the Birds, Not the Bees:

Just as math and history classes aim to prepare students to do math and history well, sex education must prepare students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing. I reject David Archard’s autonomy-centered view of sex education because it fails to address deeply ingrained social inequalities. I deny Paula McAvoy’s mutuality-centered view of sex education because mutuality and consent are not sufficient for good sex. I draw on Quil Kukla’s work on sexual negotiation and claim that for sex to be good, we must engage in communicative sex that goes beyond consent. Therefore, sex education should not only instruct students how to avoid bad sex, but also enable students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing.

Let's Talk About the Birds, Not the Bees

Just as math and history classes aim to prepare students to do math and history well, sex education must prepare students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing. I reject David Archard’s autonomy-centered view of sex education because it fails to address deeply ingrained social inequalities. I deny Paula McAvoy’s mutuality-centered view of sex education because mutuality and consent are not sufficient for good sex. I draw on Quil Kukla’s work on sexual negotiation and claim that for sex to be good, we must engage in communicative sex that goes beyond consent. Therefore, sex education should not only instruct students how to avoid bad sex, but also enable students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing.

Let’s Talk About the Birds, Not the Bees

Just as math and history classes aim to prepare students to do math and history well, sex education must prepare students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing. I reject David Archard’s autonomy-centered view of sex education because it fails to address deeply ingrained social inequalities. I deny Paula McAvoy’s mutuality-centered view of sex education because mutuality and consent are not sufficient for good sex. I draw on Quil Kukla’s work on sexual negotiation and claim that for sex to be good, we must engage in communicative sex that goes beyond consent. Therefore, sex education should not only instruct students how to avoid bad sex, but also enable students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing.

The nature and value of bioethics expertise.

In this article, I address the extent to which experts in bioethics can contribute to healthcare delivery by way of aid in clinical decision-making and policy-formation. I argue that experts in bioethics are moral experts, in that their substantive moral views are more likely to be correct than those of non-bioethicists, all else being equal, but that such expertise is of use in a relatively limited class of cases. In so doing, I respond to two recent arguments against the view that bioethicists are moral experts, one by Christopher Cowley and another by David Archard. I further argue that bioethics experts have significant additional contributions to make to healthcare delivery, and highlight a hitherto neglected aspect of that contribution: amelioration of moral misconception among clinicians. I describe in detail several aspects of moral misconception, and show how the bioethicist is in a prime position to resolve that sort of error.

The Aims of Sex Education: Demoting Autonomy and Promoting Mutuality

AbstractIn this essay, Paula McAvoy critiques a commonly held view that teaching young people to be good choice makers should be a central aim of sex education. Specifically, she argues against David Archard's recommendation that sex educators ought to focus on the development of autonomy and teaching young people that “choice should be accorded the central role in the legitimation of sexual conduct.” Instead, McAvoy argues that under conditions of gender inequality this view advantages boys and disadvantages girls. Juxtaposing a case of a culturally arranged marriage with a spring break scene from Ariel Levy's Female Chauvinist Pigs: Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture, McAvoy shows that focusing on sexual choice making obscures and reifies the unequal social conditions that young people navigate. She concludes by suggesting an alternative that is in line with Sharon Lamb's argument in “Just the Facts? The Separation of Sex Education from Moral Education” that intimate encounters are better governed by attending to our ethical obligations to others.

David Archard and David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children

David Archard and David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children

Moral Philosophers Are Moral Experts! A Reply to David Archard

In his article 'Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts' David Archard attempts to show that his argument from common-sense morality is more convincing than other competing arguments in the debate. I examine his main line of argumentation and eventually refute his main argument in my reply.

Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children, by David Archard and David Benatar (eds)

Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children, by David Archard and David Benatar (eds)

Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children * Edited by DAVID ARCHARD and DAVID BENATAR

Procreation and Parenthood deals with moral questions in relation to decisions about bringing children into existence and how to rear them. In their comprehensive introduction, David Benatar and David Archard provide a helpful overview of contemporary discussions of these two sorts of questions and explain how each chapter fits into the larger picture. In the following, I shall focus primarily, but not exclusively, on the part of the book that deals with procreation. In Chapter 2, Tim Bayne discusses the theoretical basis for so-called wrongful life cases and in particular three possible accounts thereof, namely the no-faults model, parity models and dual benchmark models (32). According to the no-faults model, it is incoherent to claim that being caused to exist can be harmful to the child. The two other models deny this. According to parity models, the level of welfare required for a life to be worth starting does not differ from the level required for a life to be worth continuing, whereas dual benchmark models require a higher level in the former case. Bayne critically discusses no-faults and dual benchmarks models and ends up defending a parity model. While I agree with his conclusion and many of his arguments, I nevertheless find a couple of them too swift. For example, I cannot see that no-faults theorists need to be committed to an Epicurean view of death (while they deny that existence can be better/worse than never existing, e.g. because the latter outcome does not include a welfare level, the badness of death can be assessed by comparing outcomes with different life lengths and indeed with different welfare levels; see e.g. McMahan 2002: Ch. 2).

David Archard and David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children

David Archard and David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children

Introduction

Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume 26, Issue 3 p. 217-218 Introduction David Archard, David ArchardSearch for more papers by this authorSusan Mendus, Susan MendusSearch for more papers by this author David Archard, David ArchardSearch for more papers by this authorSusan Mendus, Susan MendusSearch for more papers by this author First published: 23 July 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00445.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume26, Issue3Special Issue: Philosophy and Public Policy. Guest Editors: David Archard and Susan MendusAugust 2009Pages 217-218 RelatedInformation

Children’s Rights and the Parental Authority to Instill a Specific Value System

Liberals who want to support multiculturalism need to be able to justify the parental authority to instill cultural value systems or worldviews into children. However, such authority may be at odds with liberal demands that citizens be autonomous. This paper argues that parents do not have the legitimate authority to instill in their children a specific value system, contrary to the complex and intriguing arguments of Robert Noggle (2002). Noggle’s argument, which draws heavily on key ideas in Rawls’ theory of justice, is that children are not moral agents and that parents are in a special kind of fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis their children. Noggle’s position is contrasted with the more limited conception of parental authority advanced by David Archard (2002). I argue that we can accept that parents are agents of their children, but contra Noggle, this does not entitle them to impose their parochial value systems onto their children. I argue that while children have an interest in acquiring values, they do not have an interest in acquiring a value system.

A definition of paternalism

I define paternalism in the following way. X behaves paternalistically towards y: (1) only if x aims to close an option that would otherwise be open to y, or x chooses for y in the event that y is unable to choose for himself; and (2) to the extent that x does so in order to promote y's good. Paternalism covers both acts and omissions and may be successful or unsuccessful, and I distinguish it from benevolence. This definition is contrasted with some alternatives offered by others, including Gerald Dworkin, John Kleinig and David Archard. On my account, paternalism need not be coercive, nor restrict freedom. Paternalism need not be against the will, nor need it limit the autonomy, of the person paternalised, nor involve the violation of any moral rule. Finally, a paternalist may believe both that paternalistic intervention is for the good of the target and that the target shares this view.

Patriotism without Obligation

Should we educate for patriotism? The issue has exercised many political philosophers and philosophers of education over the last few years and produced radical divisions among them. This paper comments on two recent contributions to the debate, by David Stevens and David Archard. While both these essays oppose education for patriotism, the present paper supports it. It argues that David Stevens's essay wrongly assumes that patriotic sentiment must be based on obligations to one's fellow-nationals, while David Archard's misgivings about education for patriotism seem to turn largely on his over-restrictive conception of education.

Book ReviewDavid Archard, .Sexual Consent. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. 189. $20.00 (paper).

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook Review David Archard, . Sexual Consent. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. 189. $20.00 (paper).Rosemarie Putnam Tong Rosemarie Putnam TongUniversity of North Carolina at Charlotte Search for more articles by this author University of North Carolina at CharlottePDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 109, Number 3April 1999 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/233926 Views: 130Total views on this site Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Book Reviews

Brenda Almond, Exploring Ethics. A Traveller’s TaleDavid Archard, Sexual ConsentJohn O’Neill, The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and PoliticsDavid Theo Goldberg, Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America

The Philosopher's child: critical perspectives in the Western tradition

Part 1 Ancient children: Socrates's children, Gareth B. Matthews Aristotle's children - formation through Genesis, Oikos and Polis, Daryl Tress. Part 2 Modern children: Thomas Hobbes's children - the emergence of reason and the emergence of rights, Peter O. King John Locke's children, David Archard Immanuel Kant's children - Kant and the family, Arnuf Zweig John Stuart Mill's children - liberalism and the school of obedience, Susan M. Turner. Part 3 Twentieth-century children: Ludwig Wittgenstein's children, Phil Shields John Rawls's children - their moral status, Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle.

The status of children in a liberal society

Conservative legislators in California recently have proposed a "Parent's Rights" amendment to the state constitution. One of the avowed purposes of the amendment is to make it more difficult than it now is for the state to intervene in cases in which parents use corporal punishment to discipline their children. Supporters of the amendment argue that parents should have the right to control their children without fear of state intervention. They argue that social agencies are often too quick to intervene, with the result that families are disrupted and children suffer emotional harm when removed from their parents for long periods of time. Opponents of the amendment predict that if it should become law, cases of childhood death due to parental abuse will dramatically rise due to the inability of state agencies to intervene when parents claim that they are merely attempting to "control" their children. The current debate in California raises an old but important ethical question: Under what conditions is it morally permissible for the state to coercively intervene in the family? It is one of the merits of David Archard's book is that he helps the reader to see the complexity of this question. In Part III ("Children, parents, family and state"), Archard points out that even if we make the traditional liberal assumptions that (a) it is desirable that children are brought up within families and (b) child-rearing families require privacy and autonomy in order to do this job adequately, there is still a great deal of room for debate about the appropriate conditions for state intervention. However, Archard forces the liberal both to clarify her language and to support both (a) and (b). For example, if family privacy refers to the right of parents to refuse unconsented intrusions into the family, then why is