Das Man Research Articles

Conceptualization of everyday life in philosophy of M. Heidegger and R. Barthes

The article is devoted to the analysis of the concepts of everyday life in the works of M. Heidegger and R. Barthes. Based on textual and comparative analysis, the author offers her own interpretation of the meaning of the concept of "everyday life" in "Being and Time". In the first section of the study, the author examines Dasein and some structures of its existence, the concept of "das Man" as the basis of inauthentic existence, two modes of Dasein's existence and their connection with the meaning of everyday life. Particular attention is paid to Barthes's work "How to Live Together: Novelistic Simulations of Some Everyday Spaces", which is a collection of his lectures, his concept of "idiorrythmie" in connection with the study of the structure of everyday life. Barthes continues the work begun by Heidegger, but tries to establish and reveal the cultural and ideological influence on human everyday life. To accomplish the tasks, the author uses a methodology that is based on the methods of textual and comparative analysis, as well as the problematization of concepts. The main conclusions of the conducted research are, firstly, the identification of three possible meanings of "everyday life" in the work "Being and Time", secondly, the disclosure of the discourse on everyday life in the framework of R. Barthes's philosophical works, thirdly, an attempt to identify the cultural and ideological influence on the grasp of everyday life by man. Thus, it was established that everyday life itself, as an a priori-ontological condition of human existence, is unchangeable, but only the perception of everyday life by man or his way of grasping everyday life in consciousness changes. In this sense, Barthes continues and brings to a new level the work begun by Heidegger, but he starts not from individual consciousness, but from the life of the "I" with others in everyday life as a space of idiorrhythmes. The discovery of common features of reflections on everyday life in Heidegger and Barthes prompts the author to trace the influence of philosophical texts on changes in the subject of the humanities.

The state of the question in early Heidegger studies

AbstractThis article surveys the state of the literature in English‐language scholarship on Heidegger's early work (1919–29). The survey falls into roughly two halves. The first is devoted to scholarship on Heidegger's intellectual development during the 1920s, focusing on four themes: Heidegger's relationship to Husserl; Heidegger's early phenomenology of religious life; Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle; and Heidegger's retrieval of Kant's First Critique. The second half focuses on work on the early Heidegger that has arisen out of the reception of his early thought into mainstream Anglophone philosophy. It examines Hubert Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger, the status of “das Man” and social normativity, Heidegger's concept of death, Heidegger's conception of authenticity, and truth (with a very brief overview of further topics).

The True Sense оr to My Only Desire: The Music as a Reason for Sun Reflections

The article presents musicological and existentialist philosophical discourses on renaissance and baroque structures in the works of two contemporary classical composers. The existentialist point of view is imposed due to the examination of contemporary music works in which historically conditioned practices are also found. Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics by Martin Heidegger serve as a starting point for the reflections. The two works D’Om Le Vrai Sens by Kaija Saariaho and Concerto Grosso “Sun Reflections” by Yordan Goshev are stylistically very different but the first bears renaissance and the second – baroque features respectively. In consequence, Der Man or Das Man is defined by the opposition between renaissance humanism and the metaphysics of Being.

Authenticity, Releasement, and Mindfulness

The concept of mindlessness is tacitly present in Heidegger’s earlier and later works. In Being and Time, Dasein is mindless insofar as it engages with the world in ways already publicly interpreted by das Man. In Heidegger’s later work, mindlessness reaches its peak in the technological mode of revealing, according to which reality is disclosed as a standing reserve. In this technological mode, efficiency becomes an end in itself. Mindlessness is present here in two senses: (a) efficiency is a publicly dictated norm, which we adopt more or less automatically and (b) efficiency demands that we are never fully absorbed in our work, but always concerned to move on to the next task. The question then arises as to what extent mindfulness is associated with the structures Heidegger describes as being opposed to inauthenticity and technology, namely authenticity and releasement. In what follows, I argue that mindfulness can be understood as a tool to cultivate the distance from the they-self necessary to engage more authentically with the world or to cultivate a free relation to technology. Mindfulness can also be viewed as a tool to dwell in the fourfold. I conclude by drawing distinctions between Heidegger’s thought and the practice of mindfulness.

“Mankurt” — “Xrod” — “Das Man”: Crisis of Modernity in Late Period of Chingiz Aitmatov’s Work

The research is devoted to the historical and philosophical analysis of the work of the Kyrgyz humanist writer of the Soviet period, Chingiz Aitmatov, whose early work is characterised as a fascination with the “Soul of Faust.” (Spirit of Faust) The result of this was the writer's earlier works, where he fervently perceives the ideas of progress, socialism, and enlightenment, in other words, the main ideas of the modern era. Later, under the huge influence of Russian classical literature, as well as active study of traditional Kyrgyz culture, epic “Manas”, he spoke on such fundamental metaphysical topics as people, personality, fate, morality, humanism, etc., thereby trying to get rid of the “Soul of Faust” (Spirit of Faust) with its straightforwardness, its propensity for the infinite settlement of everything. So the writer gradually asserted himself more and more as a traditional humanist. But despite these attempts, the writer still retained some ambivalence: on the one hand, he acted as a staunch critic of modernity, faceless technology and on the other, he perceived the modernization process as an objective development of history that needs to be perceived and comprehended. The results of the writer's later ideas are new concepts such as “Mankurt” and “Ixrod” usually used to describe the consciousness of a person who became possible at the junction of modernity with tradition. To a certain extent, these concepts are identical to the idea of “Das Man” by M. Heidegger.

Pengaruh Miskonsepsi Dan Polusi Informasi Dalam Citayam Fashion Week Menurut Filsafat Das Sein Martin Heidegger

The purpose of this research is first to make people aware, especially young people, so that through the Citayam Fashion Week phenomenon, they are able to provide an understanding of fair content in the digital world according to the correct concept. Second, viralism that is too free on social media as happened in Citayam Fashion Week can stifle the right reason and knowledge so that it requires the right concept knowledge. The focus of this research is to systematically review how the forms of misconceptions and information pollution according to the ethics of digital communication are based on the review of Martin Heidegger's thoughts on the existence of today's humans as the future Das Man, namely Digi-sein. The research method of this scientific paper uses critical analysis through a study of the approach to documents. The flow of discussion in this study reviews the definition of misconception, the concept of das Man Martin Heidegger, information pollution, reviews the Citayam Fashion Week phenomenon to critically reviews problems according to the ethics of digital communication based on a review of Martin Heidegger's thoughts. The findings of this study include the effects of misconceptions and information pollution in Citayam Fashion Week that have the potential to harm young people and describe in detail the forms of misconceptions and information pollution as knowledge to anticipate negative impacts on society, especially young people. This research is very relevant to the current situation, especially in the digital world, so it is hoped that both content creators and young people as citizens will be able to become ethical and responsible digital actors.

Druk (2020) Movie as an Example of Authentic Way of Being: A Heideggerian Approach

Heidegger's philosophical project is generally seen as atheoretical and anti-logical because he remarked on the subjective conditions of knowledge and the everydayness of human behaviors. To him, Dasein's everyday reasoning is coercively and inevitably framed by the present-at-hand modes of understanding. Heidegger alerts us about the possible origins of present-at-hand modes of everyday experience. One of them is Das Man that, is associated with a categorical otherness for Heidegger. It can be regarded as an origin of the primordial scheme of experiences for Dasein that takes those experiences for granted as an axiological ground for their lives in the World. Heidegger sees that process as an inauthentic condition for Dasein's fundamental character. Everyday reasoning generates a variety of present-at-hand instruments to understand and interpret the World and Dasein itself; thus, Dasein moves between Das Man and authentic modes. With a Heideggerian approach, this article observes how the characters in the film Druk take themselves out of Das Man and go into the authentic mode and how they do this through alcohol. The primary data source is Druk and the four teacher characters in the film. In the movie, alcohol is not a ready-to-hand object but a tool motivating its users and pushing them to perform. It is an example equivalent to the Heideggerian analogy of the hammer. The movie is a well-fitting example of the Heideggerian position with the story of four teachers who experiment with having a certain amount of alcohol in their blood to achieve a better version of themselves.

Freedom and Agency in The Second Sex

Freedom and Agency in <i>The Second Sex</i>

The call of the unlived life: On the psychology of existential guilt.

This paper examines the psychology of existential guilt with Martin Heidegger and Rollo May’s conceptualizations as the point of departure. The concept of existential guilt describes preconditions for responsibility and accountability in life choices and the relationship to the potential given in the life of a human. It might also be used as a starting point to examine an individual’s relationship to the potential offered in their life and life context and, in this way, the hitherto unlived life of an individual. The following questions are discussed in contexts of identity development, perfectionism, and current cultural shifts in conceptualizations of selfhood: How can humans relate to the fact that only limited parts of who they might be can ever be actualized? Moreover, how can they relate to the fundamental ambiguity and “groundlessness” in the contexts of life where choices are made? There are striking parallels between the role of exploration in the Eriksonian approaches to healthy identity development and the ontological groundlessness that stands out as a premise for existential guilt. There are also parallels between identity fore-closure and normative identity styles and “falling” into das Man in the existential framework. Perfectionistic ideals easily become an objectivization – and closure – of possible alternatives and choices. In contemporary theories of constructions of selfhood, the dangers of alienation from the community on the one hand and escape into what might become totalitarian collectivism on the other is pointed out. The contextualization of personal responsibility offered through the concept of existential guilt might address both dangers. It provides a perspective on how personal responsibility is embedded in contexts of human relationships, relationships to nature, and the finitude, freedom, uncertainties, and suffering that is given through human existence. Existential guilt can wake sorrow and regret over opportunities overlooked and lost. However, most of all, it can be seen as a drive toward repair in the relationship toward both oneself and the other. It takes the form of receptivity, an openness to a life not yet lived, and creative use of imagination.

The Representation of Muslim Arab Women by Nike and Discourse Analysis on Heidegger's Concept of "Das Man"

Reklamlar, kapitalist pazar ekonomisiyle birlikte siyasal otoritenin şekillendirdiği medya içeriklerinden biridir. Aynı zamanda reklamlar, toplumsal yapıların ve kültürel kodların üretilmesinde ve yeniden üretilmesinde etkileyici bir araç konumundadır. Söz konusu durum, Nike’ın reklam filmi (“What will they say about you?”) üzerinden tartışmaya açılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada söz konusu reklamın Müslüman Arap kadınını, hangi söylemlerle ve temsil biçimleriyle yansıttığını reklam ve gerçeklik ilişkisi bağlamında sorunsallaştırılmıştır. Reklam metni Norman Fairclough’un üç aşamalı modeline göre eleştirel söylem analizi yöntemiyle çözümlenmiştir. Sonuç olarak reklamda oryantalist temsil, patetik temsil ve yok temsili bulgulanmıştır. Aynı zamanda reklam, söylem dilini üçüncü şahıs çoğul zamiri “onlar” üzerinden kurmuştur. Bu nedenle “Onlar” tabiri Heidegger’in “das Man” (onlar) kavramı üzerinden okunarak çözümlenmiştir. ‘Onlar’ın iktidarın farklı görünümleri olan siyasi erk, aile, komşu, sosyal çevre, gelenek ve kültür çerçevesinde şekillenmiş ataerkil toplum baskısını nitelediği bulgulanmıştır. Ayrıca Nike firmasının kendisini hâkim olan ideolojik ve geleneksel yapıya karşı çıkan tarafta konumlarken aslında bu yapıyı beslediği ve yeniden üretime soktuğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

BEING TOWARD DEATH (THAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED)

The article addresses the Heideggerian notion of being-towards-death and the specific role anxiety plays in Dasein’s transformation from inauthenticity to authenticity vis-à-vis Lacan’s conception of anxiety. Heidegger’s presentation of everyday Dasein’s attitude towards death is mainly focused on Dasein’s inauthentic denial of its possibility of dying, and the tranquility it takes in Das Man’s idle talk which shifts the attention from one’s own possibility of death to the death of the other. Heidegger locates a shift in Dasein’s attitude toward death when Dasein is struck by anxiety which facilitates Dasein’s shift from inauthenticity to authenticity. Yet Heidegger’s account of anxiety raises a lot of difficulties. Is everyday Dasein truly exposed to the radical circumstances which Heidegger outlines in the context of death-anxiety, such as the discovery of one’s own existential singularity in the case of the impossibility of sacrifice? What are the conditions under which such anxiety takes place? In this article I propose a further development of the relation between Dasein and death, based on the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan. Following Lacan, I argue that death-anxiety could be understood with respect to a prior loss, the loss of the subject or its own signifying disappearance, and hence being-towards-death is first and foremost a relation to the subject’s own division, to what “has already taken place” so to speak, rather than to what is “not yet.” Hence I argue that a subjective relation to death is a relation to one’s lack of being (manque-à-être) rather than to what is yet to come. The article proposes the following claims: (1) being-towards-death is a relation to what has already happened, rather than to a future event; (2) anxiety in the face of death assumes a “familiarity” with a moment of prior loss, which the subject interprets as death, i.e., a signifying disappearance; (3) “what happened” is not an event in the empirical sense, but a void or a lack constitutive of being.

GEORGY CHERNAVIN PHILOSOPHY OF THE TROLL.THE PHENOMENON OF PAID BOTS Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2021. ISBN 978-5-386-13894-3

The review is devoted to Georgy Chernavin’s book Philosophy of the Troll. The Phenomenon of Paid Bots. The central concept of the book–default opinion as an opinion that nobody is behind – is outlined. In the light of the idea of the default opinion Georgy Chernavin seeks to lay bare the anonymous character of the natural attitude and the general positing which belongs to it–“the” world is always there as an actuality. The natural attitude turns out to be the attitude that nobody has ever taken up, since it has always already taken me up and, thus, is taken for granted without my taking part in it. The review analyzes the ambiguity of the troll as interpreted in the book: on the one hand, the troll is the one who expresses someone else’s opinion in the first person, and, in this way, embodies the natural attitude, on the other hand, the troll turns the natural attitude into the professional one, and, therefore, breaks it involuntarily, setting it down as an attitude, that is, moving toward its defamiliarization. Yet the review problematizes the research strategy Georgy Chernavin follows in some respects. In the first instance, this refers to the almost complete reduction of the other to the anonymity, which leaves no room for the meaningful others in the structure of experience. Like Heidegger, Georgy Chernavin relies on the alternative “Me or nobody (das Man)” (despite the problematical character of “me” and “my own” in the book), whereas the other in proper sense and one’s own others remain offscreen. I also try to show the problematical character of the interpretation of the involvement and the noninvolvement, represented in the book. The involvement is treated by Georgy Chernavin only as something that buries philosophical problems in oblivion, and all possibilities of philosophical understanding are attributed to the noninvolvement. I argue that, on the contrary, the involvement in phenomenology is also essential for the non-identity of the self and, thus, is the condition of the possibility of the philosophical problematization, whereas the noninvolvement, as exemplified by the trolls, can turn out to be the source of the default opinions too. In conclusion, I consider the possibility of turning the central argument of the book against the book itself by representatives of other philosophical traditions.

The Call: Leo Strauss on Heidegger, Secularization, and Revelation

The Call: Leo Strauss on Heidegger, Secularization, and Revelation

Education and the task of deconstructing the history of ontology

Throughout the history of Ontology, the comprehension of Being has often deviated from its original path and taken different directions. What are the consequences of this detour when it comes to the current conception about the phenomenon we call Education? From the Fundamental Ontology of Martin Heidegger until the considerations of other contemporary thinkers, this article proposes an involvement and commitment regarding the task of deconstructing the history of Ontology in order to enable an approach that unveils the most original essence of Education as παιδεία. This is the challenge that concerns all those who somehow confront the questions related to everydayness and the possibility of Dasein to find its truth even in face of the dictatorship of the ‘they’ (das Man). Therefore, the aim of these reflections is to offer a new and introductory perspective that can open a horizon of projects in which we become transparent to ourselves in our resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).

Existencia y otros

Considerado habitualmente como un tema secundario en la analítica existencial, das Man se entiende además de forma negativa por el fuerte significado conformista con el que se destaca. Al contrario, permaneciendo siempre en las páginas heideggerianas, lo que nos gustaría intentar es una reevaluación del mismo. Partiendo de la consideración del Dasein como existencia, y pasando del Mitsein como nivel trascendental de constitución de la existencia y del mundo, queremos resaltar das Man como dimensión fundamental de las posibilidades con las que el Dasein realiza sí mismo. En este escenario la carga conformista se convierte en una cuestión de segunda instancia, dejando espacio para una comprensión más profunda de la existencia en sus limitaciones.

THE HEIDEGGERIAN CONCEPT OF DASEIN AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL MODALITY: DAS MAN

The paper presents a non-standard interpretation of the celebrated Heideggerian existential das Man in terms of its oft-underrated unity with Dasein—an entity of a special ontic-ontological prerogative. The present authors intend to highlight this essential theme in terms of the specific unity of Dasein being-in-the world, covering many subsequent and adjacent existentials in the analytics of the Heideggerian existential hermeneutics, especially Mitsein/Mitdasein. Dasein’s existence-essence is based on the structure of possibilities, and hence free, spontaneous choices, while Das Man is a concrete choice of a certain modus of existence rendering—as it were—all other modi invalid and non-operational. Although Heidegger is far from taking up an ethical or moral stance in its traditional understanding, he is quite adamant that the phenomenon of das Man invalidates a truly human project of existing one’s own possibilities—to wit—be oneself (Jemeines).

Heidegger’s Endoxic Method

I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.

Heidegger on Melancholia, Deep Boredom, and the Inability-to-Be

Heidegger on Melancholia, Deep Boredom, and the Inability-to-Be Kevin Aho (bio) In her article, “Melancholia, temporal disruption, and the torment of being both unable to live and unable to die,” Emily Hughes offers a provocative and powerful analysis of an experiential aspect of depression that is often overlooked in the psychiatric literature. Drawing on Heidegger’s account of ontological death, what he calls “dying” (Sterben) in Being and Time, Hughes illuminates how episodes of major depression can disrupt the synchronous unity of time that structures our experience and gives meaning to our lives. When this happens, the sufferer enters a paradoxical liminal space, one in which we live through our own death, where death is understood ontologically as an inability-to-be. For Heidegger, “to be” human is to understand and make sense of things, to have things count and matter to us in our everyday lives. This is why he says, “to exist is essentially . . . to understand” (Heidegger 1982, p. 276, my emphasis) The desynchronization characteristic of major depression destroys this everyday understanding of things by stripping away the intelligibility of the world, affectively bleaching out the qualitative significance and radiance of things. This leaves the sufferer trapped in a meaningless present, with no future and no past. In this state, as Hughes writes, “one is unable to live and unable to die.” When Heidegger says human existence (or Dasein) is structured by “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit), he means that our existence simultaneously stretches forward into the future and backward into the past, creating a unified horizon that allows things to meaningfully reveal themselves. He refers to this dynamic temporalizing movement in terms of “thrown projection” (geworfen Entwurf) in the sense that we are irrevocably “thrown” into a uniquely embodied socio-historical situation (the past), and it is against the background of this situation that we “project” possibilities for ourselves (in the future). Time, understood this way, is not an entity that is external to us. Dasein, rather, is time, the temporalizing event that opens up a space of meaning and possible ways to be in the world. As Heidegger writes, “Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of being” (1962, p. 377). And Hughes’ article shows the extent to which depression can shatter this disclosive movement, leaving the sufferer abandoned in a meaningless atemporal void. One of the aims of therapy, then, is to work with the patient to restore the temporal unity and cohesion that gives meaning to things by recreating the tacit rhythms of everyday life and slowly reestablishing the patient’s orientation towards [End Page 215] future projects, making it possible for things to light up again with value and significance. When this occurs, the patient’s ability-to-be can be restored. This is why, according to Hughes, special care must be taken when considering cases of physician-assisted suicide for treatment-resistant depression. The longing for death by suicide is understandable in the face of desynchronization; suicide can be viewed as a decisive act of power and agency, of taking back one’s finitude when one is both unable to live and unable to die. But the decision is fraught because without the orientating framework of temporality the depressed person is not oneself. Moreover, the terminal act closes the depressed person off from, what Heidegger sees as, the potentially liberating aspect of ontological death. When our ability-to-be is compromised in depression and the world-constituting framework of temporality collapses, we are confronted with the ultimate questions: “Who am I? and “What it is the meaning of my life?” Although, as sufferers know all too well, this is a terrifying experience, it also provides an opportunity for personal growth and transformation by creating a nihilating space that makes it possible for Dasein to reevaluate its choices and take back ownership of its existence from the tranquilizing grip of “the They” (das Man). In Heidegger’s words, the experience “rips Dasein out” (reiβt aus) of its everyday comforts and distractions, making it possible for Dasein to authentically confront itself, to “come back to itself” (selbst zurückommt)” by identifying...

Transformacja ideału kultury w platońskiej teorii edukacji

W artykule ideał kultury został przyjęty jako podstawowy aspekt odróżniający teorię edukacji Platona od teorii edukacji zaproponowanej przez Izokratesa. Odwołując się do historii kultury, przybliżono znaczenie ideałów kulturowych w teoriach edukacji w starożytności, średniowieczu oraz epoce nowożytnej. Autor podejmuje dwie zasadnicze kwestie. Po pierwsze, rozważa spójność ideału kulturowego „inteligentnej osoby” ze współczesną wiedzą odnoszącą się do doświadczeń bycia dasein-the-one (tzn. istnienia w pojedynkę). Po drugie, proponuje nowy typ ideału kulturowego, który wskazuje też sposób zbudowania idealnej ziemskiej republiki. Autor stoi też na stanowisku, że na początku XXI w. ludzkość po raz pierwszy dysponuje możliwościami kształtowania poszczególnych społeczeństw na całej Ziemi, dlatego też uważa, że trzeba ten fakt odpowiednio uwzględnić we współczesnej teorii edukacji. W pracy przedstawiono ponadto krytykę współczesnego ideału „inteligentnej osoby” oraz zaproponowano nowy ideał kulturowy, który można oddać za pomocą określenia „Ci, którzy przekształcają wszechświat”. Wspomniany ideał rozjaśnia przepaść, która istnieje pomiędzy autentycznością a nieautentycznością, między Sobie a Innemu.

Speaking sabbath: the invitation to wrest

ABSTRACTIn this essay, the author follows Martin Heidegger and considers the formative structure of the they-self (das Man) to call attention to the communicative, hermeneutic possibility of “twisting free” from within it. The author then calls upon Kenneth Burke, Paul Ricoeur, Richard Kearney, and Catherine Keller to help “borrow back” a sacred but fragile language. Heidegger's twisting free thus explored allows readers to imagine different modes of being-with and communicative passageways within the They, which the author proposes as an anatheistic feminist reconception of sabbath as poetic language.