Jorge Ibarra, Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958 (trans. Marjorie Moore. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998), 229pp.This is the first work by Jorge Ibarra, Cuba's most distinguished social historian, to appear in English. First published in Cuba in 1995 (Editorial de Ciencias Sociales), it appears now in Reinner's Studies in Cuban History Series, edited by the Cuban-American historian Louis A. Perez, Jr. It is a welcome addition to the slowly growing list of works by Cuban historians now available to anglophone readers in a field hitherto dominated by US and Cuban-American writers. This is more particularly the case, since it provides us for the first time with a Cuban historian's perspective on a period which has already attracted worldwide as well as much Cuban scholarly attention.The book presents a forceful, rigorously documented and keenly analytical interpretation of the economic, social and political circumstances which produced the 1959 Cuban Revolution. It is densely written and comprehensively conceived. Building on a swathe of carefully critiqued Cuban statistical, periodical and secondary sources, Ibarra investigates the shifting economic and political conditions of each class and stratum within the class: its composition is carefully defined and its history is then traced across the whole period. This innovative approach establishes that the impetus for revolution derived not, as other writers (Blackburn, 1963; Sabbatini, 1968) have suggested, solely from the proletarianization of the middle class, but from the proletarianization of the people, middle class, peasant, proletarian and youth as a whole.Central to this process was the operation of US capital which moved into the island on a substantial scale in the wake of the 1895-1898 War of Independence and, assisted by US tariff policies and reciprocal trade treaties (1902, 1934), siphoned off Cuba's national surplus. It dominated sugar, tobacco, transport, utilities and, increasingly from 1934, the Cuban import market. Cuban governments depended on loans from US banking houses (they were not allowed to borrow in Europe) and, from 1927, on US government bodies which could exert (like the IMF) even closer control of Cuban government policies.Within this framework, however, elements of Cuban and Spanish capital survived and one of Ibarra's most interesting findings is that among the import and export merchants, traditionally considered simply as pillars of US neocolonialism, there were some who played a dual role as merchants and industrialists. They maintained significant interest in sugar and tobacco, expanded into paper and textile mills, cement and crackers, beer and footwear, and also into banking.This trend accelerated, as in most of Latin America, in World War II when US imports were reduced. Most enterprises, however, were small scale (almost 50 percent had five workers), so a nationwide working class did not develop. And although large-scale Cuban landlords and leaseholders maintained and expanded (1932-1959), their hold on agricultural production - more than 50 percent of sugar production in 1958 came from Cuban-owned mills - they did not use their profits to modernize production. Cuban capital gains, instead, increasingly took refuge in foreign banks, real estate investments and illicit activities. These investments generated what Ibarra calls an absentee bourgeoisie whose interests were allied with international capital and the US mafia. This was the economic structure which under the impact of the 1930s world depression resulted in the unfinished 1933 revolution and the successful 1959 uprisings.In the first decades of the Republic the middling classes (small merchants, manufacturers, proprietors and professionals) joined forces to defend their political interests, opposing US exploitation and its corrupt Cuban government agents, and playing a leading role in the movement to topple Machado. …
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