Cross-domain Deterrence Research Articles

Cross Domain Deterrence in Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region

Deterrence as a concept is deeply rooted in human nature and for a considerable time it was contested and jilted, yet it resurfaced in one way or the other. Nuclear weapons became the backbone of the concept of Deterrence. Due to the inherent dynamism of Revolution in Military Affairs, the supremacy of Nuclear is being challenged with the advent of the latest technologies which are acting as enablers and disruptors. The concept of Cross DomainDeterrence emerged a decade ago, took shape, and entered the strategic lexicon. It has enablers and drivers, while a gradual shift in this direction is visible. While remaining within the ambit of complex interdependence theory given by Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye. This article examines the applicability of Cross-Domain Deterrence in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region focusing on the US, China, India, and Pak to identify the need to look beyond the horizon and embrace the change.

Using Military Cyber Operations as a Deterrent

The Deterrence theory was formed after the World War II to describe the tensions between nuclear-armed states. Because of its origins, deterrence is mainly researched from the point of view of powerful states. However, deterrence nowadays is essential for any state to include in their strategies. The ever-increasing dependence on technology forces states to protect their sovereignty in cyberspace as well as in other domains. Cyber operations should be considered not just as a means to protect the cyber domain, but as means of deterrence. Cross domain deterrence (CDD) is a theory that includes all the warfighting domains in creating deterrence, including cyberspace. Despite these new perspectives, the use of military cyber operations as a deterrent has been studied mainly in terms of offensive strategies. Incorporating all types of military cyber operations into deterrence strategies is understudied. This study focuses on the possibilities of a small state to use cyber operations to create deterrence. The research question is: “How can a small state use cyber operations as a deterrent?” According to the Finnish understanding, cyber operations can be divided into three types: offensive, defensive and supportive operations. Using Finland as a case study, this paper argues that using military cyber operations is noteworthy for any state dependent on cyberspace, not only for military purposes, but for building CDD. The CDD theory and characteristics of cyber operations are studied in order to form better understanding of the topic and provide ideas for academic discussion. The research methods are content and SWOT analysis. The key observation presented is that each type of cyber operation has a role in forming CDD. For a small state, it´s profitable to use every type of cyber operations and thus expand the tool box for deterrence.

Military Deterrence vs Foreign Interference? Record of the Cold War

Academic literature is largely skeptical regarding the role of military deterrence in addressing low-level coercion. The stability-instability paradox suggests that increasing destructiveness of the armed forces (especially with the emergence of nuclear weapons) diminishes their utility in response to limited wars, proxy conflicts or economic sanctions. Recent debates often extend the same logic to foreign interference in internal affairs, as they position it as a supplement for forcible rivalries. This article seeks to advance understanding of the linkage between military deterrence and foreign interference in internal politics by exploring the record of the early Cold War starting from 1948 to the mid-1950s. The analysis attests that concern over the Soviet military capabilities had a major restraining effect on Washington. As a result, the US pursued more cautious activities against the Soviet Union in comparison to the campaigns targeting less capable states. This historical record reveals that interference is more amenable to military deterrence than other types of low-level coercion. It differs from them, as covert operations produce an existential danger to the political leaders of a target state, inciting overreaction on their behalf. Therefore, they create escalation risks when threatening a great power. Interference exacerbates confrontation even between adversaries that perceived each other as malign beforehand. Apart from signaling hostile intentions, it aggravates a sense of urgency on finding a response. Although military capabilities do not provide a direct solution to political threats, they serve as a repellent against potential subversive activities. These conclusions do not depend on the specific type of interference pursued by external agents. The findings of the article demonstrate that cross-domain deterrence is more prevalent than stability-instability paradox envisages.

Cross-Domain Deterrence in the Cyber World

Abstract: Cyber Space, like outer space, is strategically a vital domain for state offence and defence. However, there has been a substantial rise in the sponsored cyber activities to inflict heavy losses to critical infrastructures due to the lack of rules or norms or any strict international regulations to govern the conflicts in cyberspace. This activity affects the national defence strategies when oppressed by the response crisis and hugely impacts the risk factors. In these circumstances, the dilemma is whether any operative or offensive choice in the event of a cyber threat or cyber-attack violates international law. War has always been a last resort when other forms of punishment have failed, but the power dynamic has fundamentally shifted since World War II. State Governments have been hoarding the arsenals that could destroy cities in a second; hence a need for unconventional resolution has led to the evolving nature of deterrence. States must reconsider alternate strategies to protect their sovereignty by implementing cross-domain deterrence that can cripple an adversary economy, swift surgical strike as retaliation, or curb the attack using counterintelligence. The threat landscape in Cyber Space is beyond frontiers, and the consequences cannot be contained at the perimeter by the regular armed forces. Require special forces and strategies to mitigate the risks. Cross-Domain deterrence to increase cyber resilience, it is crucial to identify existing strategy disparities to take necessary actions on the state misconduct and the misconduct of a policy for global cooperation during state-sponsored cyberattacks. This paper discusses the evolving framework by assessing the changing threat landscape and its associated risks.

Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity. Edited by Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. 408p. $99.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.

Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity. Edited by Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. 408p. $99.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.

Cross-domain deterrence: strategy in an era of complexity

Cross-domain deterrence: strategy in an era of complexity

Back to Reality: Cross Domain Deterrence and Cyberspace

This paper examines cross domain deterrence strategies involving cyber incidents. By focusing on efforts to halt Russian and Chinese cyber operations against the United States this paper examines the importance of developing, maintaining and implementing (when necessary) cross domain deterrence strategies. This paper departs from more theoretic debates on the value and potential success, or lack thereof relating to cyber deterrence strategies and focuses on two cases in which cross domain retaliations were utilized to halt adversary behavior. From these two cases this paper posits a preliminary theory of cross domain deterrence applicable to cyber interactions between states and advances the debates in the field by shifting the center of gravity away from within domain responses to other mechanisms to deter adversary behavior.