Critical Philosophy Of Race Research Articles

Response to Robert Bernasconi's “Slavery's absence from histories of moral and political philosophy”

AbstractI focus in this response on what I take to be Bernasconi's proposal to dissolve and reframe moral and political philosophies around the problematic of slavery. Insofar as, in the wake of Afro‐diasporic and Black radical thought, it offers us one version of an argument that has now touched virtually all aspects of modern European philosophy, how are we to understand the specific orientations of Bernasconi's approach? Reading Bernasconi's article, I comment on the following points: (1) the notion of “absence” or “silence” about slavery, (2) Bernasconi's focus on methodology rather than individual moral or political responsibility, and (3) his shift away from canonical philosophical figures. To conclude, I open further questions regarding the relationships between the “material” approach to the history of philosophy he advocates in this article and the project of a “critical philosophy of race” he has defended elsewhere.

An Irrealist Theory of Race

ABSTRACT In this article I draw upon an analogy between a debate in the critical philosophy of race over the metaphysics of race and a debate in Buddhist philosophy of mind over the metaphysics of selves. I argue that there is a defensible irrealist theory of race, corresponding to the performativist theory of self found in certain Buddhist thinkers.

Racialized Disgust and the Depiction of Native Americans in the Ranown Cycle Westerns

This article explores mainstream audience reactions concerning race and how they intersect with late 1950s Westerns known as the Ranown cycle. Synthesizing ideas from critical philosophy of race, philosophy of film, cognitive film theory, and philosophy of emotion, I analyze how these films elicit racialized reactions of sociomoral disgust toward Native American characters. Because such responses are not ordinarily processed through higher-level forms of cognition, I argue that these embodied, affective, implicit reactions are key to understanding how films like those in the Ranown cycle convey feelings, perspectives, and ideas concerning race, with important implications for ideology as well as philosophizing about film.

Ta-Nehisi Coates's Between the World and Me: A Phenomenology of Racialized Conflict

AbstractThis article investigates the structure of racialized conflict experience. Embarking from a conflict event in Ta-Nehisi Coates's autobiography Between the World and Me and contrasting the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz with insights from Black phenomenology, I argue that Coates's experience discloses conflictual, but intertwined, modes of being-in-the-world. Further, it presents an instantiation of a particular kind of conflict, i.e., corporeal conflict. Corporeal conflict applies whenever the body is politicized, i.e., when it becomes the marker for traits representative of a rival political group. Understood this way, racialized conflict is always political. I conclude the article with some remarks on the shortcomings of two dominant conflict theories in political philosophy and the potential for an alternative, phenomenological approach that enables new ways of engaging the other in conflict. The analysis is preceded by a meditation on the role of the White researcher in critical philosophy of race.

Disgust, Race, and Carroll’s Theory of Solidarity

This article examines Noël Carroll’s theory of solidarity from a critical race theoretical perspective. Using recent work in philosophy of film, philosophy of emotion, and critical philosophy of race, it argues his theory pays insufficient attention to both the role disgust plays in generating solidarity and the role race plays in generating disgust. Numerous and significant examples are cited to support these claims. The article also suggests implicit bias and embodied affect figure into character allegiance more seriously than Carroll’s theory indicates. These weaknesses arguably affect related theories in both philosophy of film and cognitive film theory, such as those advanced by A. W. Eaton, Margrethe Bruun Vaage, Murray Smith, and Carl Plantinga. The result is a call for revision of Carroll’s and these other thinkers’ theories, as well as a call for deeper investigation into disgust, race, and their importance in generating character allegiance.

Anti-Racism and Releasement

This paper explores the selective uptake of Martin Heidegger’s work in critical philosophy of race and in black studies. While scholars have drawn from Heidegger’s thinking on technology to offer accounts of the technological production of race in general and of blackness in particular, few have engaged with Heidegger’s response to technology: his discussions of Gelassenheit or “releasement.” This paper analyzes this avoidance of Gelassenheit, arguing that its interpretation as passivity points to broader anxieties about the need to act that are symptomatic of Heidegger’s account of technology itself. These anxieties lead to a potentially damaging tacit prioritization of action at the expense of thought, and a reduction of black people to their value as actors or workers, even among thinkers like Saidiya Hartman who valorize a resistant waywardness.

Wittgenstein and Feminism: Alice Crary in Conversation with Mickaëlle Provost

Alice Crary is a moral and social philosopher who has written widely on issues in metaethics, moral psychology and normative ethics, philosophy and feminism, critical animal studies, critical disability studies, critical philosophy of race, philosophy and literature, and Critical Theory. She has written on philosophers such as John L. Austin, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Iris Murdoch and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This is the first of two parts of the interview with Crary conducted in a single exchange in the first weeks of January 2022, where she discusses ordinary language philosophy and feminism, Wittgenstein’s conception of mind and its relation to feminist ethics, the link between Wittgenstein and Critical Theory, and her own views about efforts to bring about social and political transformations. The second part on “Wittgenstein and Critical Theory” is published in the regular volume 11 of NWR.

Disability and White Supremacy

Abstract It is widely known that Black Americans are significantly more likely to be killed by the police in the United States than white Americans. What is less widely known is that nearly half of all people killed by the police are people with disabilities. The aim of this article is to better understand the intersection of racism and ableism in the United States. Contributing to the growing literature at the intersection of philosophy of disability and critical philosophy of race, I argue that theories concerning white supremacy should take more seriously the ways in which it functions as a process and apparatus of making abled and disabled. I conclude by discussing why understanding white supremacy in this manner is a valuable coalitional tool in fights for social justice more generally.

Anti-Racism and Existential Philosophy

Kathryn Sophia Belle’s (formerly Kathryn T. Gines’) publications engaged in this interview:2003 (Fanon/Sartre 50 yrs) “Sartre and Fanon Fifty Years Later: To Retain or Reject the Concept of Race,” Sartre Studies International, Vol. 9, Issue 2 (2003): 55-67, https://doi.org/10.3167/135715503781800213.2010 (Convergences) “Sartre, Beauvoir, and the Race/Gender Analogy: A Case for Black Feminist Philosophy” in Convergences: Black Feminism and Continental Philosophy, pages 35-51. Eds. Maria Davidson, Kathryn T. Gines, Donna Dale Marcano. New York: SUNY, 2010.2011 (Wright/Legacy) “The Man Who Lived Underground: Jean-Paul Sartre and the Philosophical Legacy of Richard Wright,” Sartre Studies International, Vol. 17, Issue 2 (2011): 42-59, https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2011.170204.2012 (Reflections) “Reflections on the Legacy and Future of Continental Philosophy with Regard to Critical Philosophy of Race,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50, Issue 2 (June 2012): 329-344, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00109.x.

Race, Reproduction, and Biopolitics: A Review Essay.

This review essay critically examines Catherine Mills's Biopolitics (2018) and Camisha Russell's The Assisted Reproduction of Race (2018). Although distinct works, the centrality of race and reproduction provides a point of connection and an opening into reframing contemporary debates within bioethics and biopolitics. In reviewing these books together I hope to show how biopolitical theory and critical philosophy of race can be useful in looking at bioethical problems from a new perspective that open up different kinds of analyses, especially around historically embedded problems like institutional racism and the legacies of colonialism in healthcare.

The Philosophy of Black Lives Matter

The Philosophy of Black Lives Matter

Blinde Flecken der Politischen Philosophie?

AbstractThis article examines which lessons political philosophers can learn from discussions within Critical Philosophy of Race. The article assumes a social-constructionist understanding of “race” and focuses on the question of how we can reconcile normative universalism with sensitivity to differences that have been created by processes of racialisation. To answer this question, it looks exemplarily at debates within three different fields of political philosophy: normativity, politics, and law. First, it presents objections voiced by critical race theory against liberal, ideal conceptions of justice. Second, the article reconstructs the main arguments for and against affirmative action as a policy measure directed at minority groups. Third, it focuses on racial inequalities in the context of penal law. By way of conclusion, it suggests how debates around justice and punishment and the conceptual lenses offered by CPoR can be fruitfully applied to the German context.

Resolving the Tensions Between White People's Active Investment in Racial Inequality and White Ignorance: A Response to Marzia Milazzo

AbstractThis article responds to Marzia Milazzo's article ‘On white ignorance, white shame, and other pitfalls in critical philosophy of race’ (2017), in which Milazzo argues that the concepts white shame, white guilt, white privilege, white habits, white invisibility and white ignorance are pitfalls in the process of decolonisation. Milazzo contends that the way these concepts are theorised in much critical philosophy of race minimises white people's active interest in reproducing the racial status quo. While I agree with Milazzo's critique of white shame and white guilt, I argue that these affective responses are fundamentally different to the remaining concepts. Drawing on critical whiteness studies and agnotology, I argue that white privilege, white invisibility and white ignorance are valuable conceptual tools for revealing (as opposed to minimising) white people's active investment in maintaining racial inequality. Whereas Milazzo sees a contradiction between white people's active interest in maintaining racial inequality and concepts like white invisibility and white ignorance, I argue that, correctly theorised, these concepts resolve this apparent contradiction. I contest Milazzo's call to reject white privilege, white invisibility and white ignorance, arguing that these concepts are useful tools in the project of decolonisation.

Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform

Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform

Steve Biko and the Liberatory Potential of Non-Racialism and Post-Racialism

Abstract Discussions of non-racialism in South Africa and discussions of post-racialism in the United States are sufficiently similar to invite the question as to whether South African thinkers could help to develop new ways of thinking about post-racialism and its potential in the United States. Biko's ideas are rarely taken up in the United States, yet they are relevant to contemporary discussions in critical philosophy of race. This article begins with an evaluation of the typology of non-racialism provided by Rupert Taylor and the historical study of non-racialism provided by Julie Frederikse, distinguishing different understandings of non-racialism. The second section presents Biko's understanding of non-racialism, arguing that Biko's understanding of which is embedded in his account of Black Consciousness, and not a variant of racial eliminativism. The final section focuses on the striking similarities between understandings of non-racialism and post-racialism using a distinction it introduces between principled and progressive forms of both these terms. Ultimately, this article makes the case for a progressive understanding of post-racialism, which has yet to be articulated and is too easily dismissed in the United States.

Critical Philosophy of Race as Political Phenomenology: Questions for Robert Bernasconi

ABSTRACTThis article is a response to Robert Bernasconi’s critical philosophy of race. I start by speaking of the specific style in which life and philosophy are related in his work. I argue that he devises a political phenomenology which considers the lived experiences of racialization and inquires into their historical conditions, which have become “practico-inert” in facticity. Bernasconi’s thesis that the history of race is not determined by racial essentialism and his account of race as a border concept call for an expansion of the notion of race that will better serve the cause of the global fight against racism.

Facing up to the Eurocentrism and Racism of Academic Philosophy in the West: A Response to Davis, Direk, and Mills

ABSTRACTIn this paper I address the questions posed to me by Bret Davis, Zeynep Direk, and Charles Mills, by focusing on, first, the eurocentrism of academic philosophy in the West and strategies to overcome it; secondly, the interface of critical philosophy of race and global politics, especially as the latter touches on Islamophobia; and, thirdly, the role of critical philosophy of race in challenging the complacency of philosophy departments in the face of the discipline’s long-standing complicity with racism.

An Englishman Abroad: Robert Bernasconi’s Work on Race

ABSTRACTThis article focuses on the contribution Robert Bernasconi has made to the critical philosophy of race. I look at some representative samples of his work under four categories: (i) his racially informed critiques of canonical Western philosophical figures; (ii) his expositions/reconstructions/recuperations of racially informed theory from canonical (and some non-canonical) Western philosophical figures; (iii) his reflections on race/whiteness/imperialism and their implications; and (iv) his views on race as it has shaped the historic and current realities of philosophy as a discipline.

On White Ignorance, White Shame, and Other Pitfalls in Critical Philosophy of Race

AbstractThis article examines Samantha Vice's essay ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’ (2010), which sparked a storm of controversy in South Africa, as a starting point for interrogating understandings of whiteness and racism that are dominant in critical philosophy of race. I argue that a significant body of philosophical scholarship on whiteness in general and by white scholars in particular obfuscates the structural dimension of racism. The moralisation of racism that often permeates philosophical scholarship reproduces colourblind logics, which provide individualistic explanations for structural problems, thereby sustaining white dominance. In the process, I show that notions of white guilt, white habits, white ignorance, white invisibility, white privilege, and white shame as they are theorised in much critical philosophy of race share a crucial limitation: they minimise white people's active interest in reproducing the racist status quo. Studies, such as Vice's, that frame racism as a moral dilemma while silencing its institutionalisation and the central cause for its existence and longevity – that is, white people's investment in maintaining economic, political, and symbolic power – further naturalise white supremacy.

Theorising and Exposing Institutional Racism in Britain: The Contribution of Ann and Michael Dummett to Critical Philosophy of Race

By helping to introduce the relatively new concept of institutional racism into Britain, Sir Michael and Ann Dummett expanded the concept of racism beyond the limited sense it had been given in the 1940s and 1950s when racism tended to be associated with the scientific concept of race and when the focus tended to fall on the intent to harm or speak harm of a group that was identified as a race by science. They recognised that ‘race’ was primarily a political and not a scientific concept. This led them in a different direction from that taken by the next generation of mainstream philosophers working in this area, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, who adopted the UNESCO approach of highlighting the scientific deficiencies of the concept of race. However, although they both succeeded in developing ways to break through the forms of self-deception that allow institutional racism to go unnoticed and at the same time offered instructive insights into the ways politicians hide behind the racism of others, I argue that they failed to see, as clearly as Sartre and Fanon did, that the conception of institutional racism necessitates a structural changes in society beyond anything they contemplated.