The study of leadership succession in modem Thai politics is vexing because there are no clear patterns to explain the myriad changes of government since the 1932 revolt that overthrew the absolute monarchy. In the sixty years since then, political succession has at times been by peaceful and constitutionally sanctioned transfers of power, such as elections, but more often by nonauthoritative coups d'etat, usually led by dissident members of the military. These governmental changes do not appear to correspond to patterns of economic downturn or improvement, nor to foreign or internal threats to Thai security. Instead, political succession in Thailand, unguided by consistent norms, is best viewed as an unpatterned, ad hoc event dependent on changing allegiances and power advantages held by various elite groups, such as politicians, bureaucrats, capitalist business leaders, and military officers. Although it is too early to evaluate precisely the succession crisis of May 1992, the uprising of Thais against their military rulers suggests a continuation of ad hoc changes in government leadership. In modern Thai politics, the military has played the dominant role in determining succession changes. However, military coups have occurred in nonpatterned ways, as a function of varying perceptions of self-interest, and have resulted in diverse outcomes. Although the military has had the most to do with determining the success or failure of governmental change, the random nature of the succession changes has made it impossible to predict when coups will take place and with what results. Indeed, not only did Thai and Western scholars fail to predict the military coup of February 23, 1991, but they had asserted the conventional wisdom that coups were an anachronistic part of the nation's past, no longer pertinent to the new democratic kingdom. This article seeks to show that Thailand has not institutionalized a systematic succession process but that succession nevertheless has been
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