Crisis Management Missions Research Articles

The Strategic Repositioning of the European Union in the New Global Geopolitical Context

The transformations in the world economy, the globalization of information, the globalization of security issues have brought non-state powers to the position of main actors of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon, in which transnational, international or supranational organizations play a special role. The unprecedented period of peace and stability that Europe went through at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century is due to the existence of the European Union. The European Union is a relevant actor in the international arena; the emergence of the European Union radically changed the European and global geopolitical balance. Having an extensive network of economic relations worldwide, carrying out crisis management missions and humanitarian actions, the European Union cannot be omitted from any geopolitical analysis. In a very dynamic and unpredictable global geopolitical and geoeconomic context, the European Union launched on June 20, 2023 the European Strategy for Economic Security, a strategy that emphasizes bilateral and plurilateral cooperation - in different formats and degrees of institutionalization, from the G-7 to high-level economic talks, investment partnerships and commodity clubs. The European Union wants to reduce, for the next decades, the economic risks related to dependence on China. The strategy outlines how the European Union - a key trading partner for both China and the United States - is trying to manage its economic dependence on Beijing and avoid the kind of economic rupture with Russia that followed the invasion of Ukraine. The paper aims to analyze what China's "risk reduction" means for Europe and, at the same time, to understand how the European Union's approach to economic security will shape future relations in terms of geopolitics and geoeconomics at the international and regional level.

European Union military operations and global security: ambitions and reality

In the last twenty years, the European Union (EU) has made notable efforts in improving its military capabilities to react to crises. The Union launched crisis management missions and operations, aiming to play a relevant role in the field of international security. Thirteen military operations and missions were established amongst its overseas action to date. Notwithstanding, the results are questionable, i.e. the positive relationship between what the EU says, and its concrete action in practice. The paper aims to present what is the real role of EU military operations by arguing that although high ambitions the Union’s military interventions are still limited. It is demonstrated by using a model with proxies from inputs to impacts through which I analyse perceptions and intentions and how they have been translated into effective implementation. I used quantitative data combined with certain qualitative remarks collected from primary and secondary sources. It concludes that the EU military operations remain more as ambitions than to project its best features in favour of a better world security environment

Blueprints and Modalities of Status Arrangements for CSDP Operations and Missions

Status agreements for EU crisis management operations and missions represent a necessary legal aspect of their consensual conduct and completion. The adopted Status of Forces (SOFA) and Status of Mission (SOMA) Model Agreements for military and civilian deployments respectively have been implemented regularly in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) undertakings for the presence and transit of EU-led multinational contingents and assets on land or at sea. Variations and repetition in the application of the ready standard frameworks dominate the spectrum of evolved practice, but casual and adaptive solutions have also indicated the occasional need for specific modalities of status arrangements for CSDP operations and missions. These include the extension of existing SOFA arrangements of an EU member, a UN peacekeeping mission or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to an EU-led successive, supplementary or reinforcing multinational engagement in the same theatre of operation. With respect to non-standard arrangements for certain civilian CSDP crisis management deployments, their status came to be defined as activities of diplomatic missions due to the particular nature and context of EU undertakings in Bosnia, in Congo or in Kosovo. The available blueprints and tested modalities of status arrangements offer a comprehensive set of examples for the choice of adequate solutions for any future CSDP operation or mission. CSDP, crisis management operation, crisis management mission, status of forces, status of mission, Model Agreement, EU forces, EULEX Kosovo

Gender Justice in EU Crisis Management Missions

This paper examines competing understanding of gender justice between CSDP civil and military staff and representatives of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Using the three GLOBUS concepts of justice as an analytical framework the paper shows that there is a sharp contrast between CSDP staff discourse on gender justice and the implementation the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, and discourse from CSOs. It finds that approaches to gender justice in CSDP missions have been largely dominated by a justice as impartiality approach, located in the language of universal human rights but when we look at the actual the implementation of the WPS agenda in the field (or lack thereof), an approach rooted in the state-centric model of justice as non-domination emerges. In contrast, CSOs tend to advocate for the inclusion of a more context specific approach, one that takes account of intersectionality and complexity, more aligned with justice as mutual recognition. This disconnect in understandings of gender justice is problematic because in order for missions to be successful, or to have any transformative power, there is a need for a level of engagement between mission staff and CSOs. This is in order to take a context specific approach to gender justice in CDPD missions and to avoid the curtailing of certain women’s voices. The paper uses qualitative data from interviews with civilian and personnel from within military field missions and representatives of a variety of CSOs from both the global North and South.

Successful Crisis Management? Evaluating the Success of the EU Missions in the Western Balkans

This article focuses on the achievements and shortcomings of the EU’s CSDP missions in the Western Balkans. The question addressed is: to what extent are the EU crisis management missions successful in accomplishing their objectives in the Western Balkans? The study analyses the cases of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and EULEX Kosovo, which operate until today and are the largest military and rule of law missions in the Western Balkans. Rather than studying the policy-making process that leads to the initiation of these missions, this article focuses on their implementation and assesses to what degree they have achieved their goals. In doing so, the article builds on analytical frameworks from studies that focus on the implementation of the CSDP missions, it utilizes mission reports and the findings from semi-structured interviews. The article argues that EUFOR Althea fulfilled the 2004 and 2007 mandates, but not all the goals of the latest 2010 mandate. Consequently, the mission successfully contributes to a safe and secure environment in BiH. On the other hand, EULEX Kosovo faces many constraints to fulfil its goals, especially regarding the remediation of the Kosovar judiciary and providing a safe and secure environment in the north of Kosovo. These hinder the success of the mission, despite the achievements for supporting the Kosovar Police and Customs.

Earth Observation for Security and Defence: The European Union Satellite Centre Experience and Future Views

The European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) was founded in 1992 under the framework of the Western European Union. Today it is a Council agency of the European Union. It supports decision-making and actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It thus provides the European External Action Service, as well as European Union crisis management missions and operations, products and services based on the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, including satellite and aerial imagery, and related services. The Centre, under the operational direction of the High Representative for the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mrs Frederica Mogherini, is located in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain. It has approximately 130 members of staff and a global budget of EUR 26 million

Enhanced European Union–Australia security cooperation through crisis management

ABSTRACTSince January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy. These missions have involved the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign such an agreement with the EU. This agreement reflects both the common interest and values shared by Australia and the EU and the extent to which EU–Australia relations have evolved and deepened over the years. In addition, the increased engagement and socialisation of Australian military and civilian personnel with individual EU member states through their participation in such operations as the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force have further facilitated opportunities for security cooperation at the EU level. Shared concerns and interests on counterterrorism, counter-piracy, instability and capacity-building have also opened up opportunities for increased cooperation between the EU and Australia. This article assesses the significance of the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management for EU–Australia relations within the area of security cooperation, and examines future prospects for cooperation.

Political guidance or autonomy in peacebuilding? EU police reform in Afghanistan and Kosovo

ABSTRACTReviewing findings from the recent institutional turn in peacebuilding research, this article identifies two conflicting arguments with respect to institutional designs that affect the performance of peace operations. One perspective favours functional decentralization and mission latitude, while the other perspective argues that a lack of political guidance strips mission leadership of their authority vis-à-vis local power brokers and reduces the likelihood of a ‘robust’ approach. Comparing two EU crisis management missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the article asks which of the two perspectives is supported by the institutional design and performance of EU peace operations. Unlike the UN – the focus of most previous research – the EU’s institutional framework is highly centralized. This provided member states with ample opportunities for political guidance, but such guidance was, in fact, negatively associated with performance. This finding suggests that the political guidance thesis must be treated with caution. Because member states’ interests vis-à-vis a conflict state rarely converge, the conditions for meaningful political guidance are absent. The article, therefore, finds that increasing managerial latitude provides the more promising avenue to enhancing peacebuilding performance. Addressing policy-makers, my findings speak to the urgent need for the EU to review and potentially reform its crisis management system.

La aplicabilidad de los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos a las operaciones de gestión de crisis de la PESC: delimitando los retos

<p>Con la aprobación del Tratado de Lisboa, la integración de los derechos humanos ha alcanzado una nueva dimensión en la acción exterior de la UE. La promoción y protección de los derechos humanos a través de las Operaciones de Gestión de Crisis presenta importantes dificultades operacionales que podrían debilitar la credibilidad de la UE y la efectividad de las misiones. Este artículo pretende enmarcar los retos que surgen en términos legales y prácticos respecto de la aplicación del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el Derechos Internacional Humanitario a las Operaciones de Gestión de Crisis de la UE.</p><p><strong>Recibido</strong>: 20<strong>.</strong>05.2015<strong><br />Aceptado</strong>: 15.06.2015</p>

Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An institutionalist perspective

The European Union (EU) has launched an impressive number of crisis management missions since its Common Security and Defence Policy became operational in 2003. This article analyses the agenda-setting phase of these civilian and military operations in order to explain why the EU has sent troops, policemen, judges, prosecutors and monitors across three continents. It presents an institutionalist perspective and argues that the former High Representative Javier Solana and his officials have been instrumental in putting various operations on the agenda. They have employed deliberate agenda-setting strategies, such as venue shopping, conflict expansion and issue framing, to further their bureaucratic interest of launching new missions. Solana and his officials had the ability to affect the agenda-setting process thanks to their pivotal position in policy making. This gave them with superior information on the state of play and an early mover advantage as well as strong international networks. The article provides empirical evidence from the crisis management missions in Aceh, Bosnia, Chad and Kosovo. It concludes with the changes to the Common Security and Defence Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon.

The European Debt Crisis and American Security Policy

The European Union (EU) is building the institutional capability to play a larger role in global security affairs and there is an acknowledged need for it to develop improved power projection capabilities if it is going to engage in the full range of crisis management tasks. European militaries, however, are for the most part still in the process of transforming themselves from static defense forces into deployable units that are useful for the sort of crisis management missions in which the EU envisages itself playing a larger (and more independent) role in the future. In doing so, Europeans will encounter distinct costs that have only been partially dealt with to date. We should not discount the progress that has been made in pooling assets as a way to manage the costs of European ambitions, but there are near-term and long-term trends that will significantly impact European spending on defense and foreign affairs. In the near term, there is the on-going sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone that has obvious implications for spending across the board. Yet, even if this is solved in a relatively painless manner, there is a more consequential long-term demographic trend in Europe that will impact spending for security and defense for many years to come. The consequences of Europe's fiscal difficulties for the United States' economy are self-evident, but there are security consequences to consider as well. Although it is easy to dismiss European militaries for their relatively small contributions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US-led military operations, those militaries compose the vast majority of the assistance the United States has received in global military operations since the end of the Cold War. A rapid decline in the ability of European states to fund their militaries would mean that the United States would be faced with conducting future operations without significant contributions from the militaries with which it has developed 60 years of standardization and coordination through the NATO alliance. Even more of the burden of global security operations would be shifted onto the United States while it is attempting to cut defense spending and modernize aging weapons systems and platforms. European miltary contributions to NATO and US-led operations are modest, but they do add up. In Afghanistan, for example, the member states of the European Union contribute approximately 35,000 of the 130,000 forces in the country. (1) European partners supply close to 90 percent of all non-US forces in the country with most of the remainder supplied by Australia and non-EU allies such as Turkey. In other words, European militaries supply a number of boots on the ground roughly equal to forces in the surge implemented by the United States in 2010. If European defense budgets continue to collapse and those states are no longer capable of their current level of contributions to ongoing operations, the United States armed forces will be stretched further than they currently are and lose a degree of strategic flexibility in terms of a surge capacity that has been employed with limited success in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The ability of European states to manage the effects of the dual storm of the financial crisis and the long-term demographic shift on their military capabilities will be determined by two factors. First, their ability to shift funds within existing defense budgets away from personnel and toward operations and procurement. Second, their ability to manage the process of base closures across Europe as a whole and rationalize their defense infrastructure on a European rather than a purely national basis. This is a process that is far more likely to occur within the context of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) rather than in a NATO context because of the higher public popularity of the CFSP in Europe compared to public enthusiasm for the tranatlantic alliance. …

Putting Ideas into Action: EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Western Balkans

Since the early days of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU has always paid special attention to developments in the Western Balkans and therefore declared them a strategic priority for European external action. Thus, it is not surprising that the first missions in the framework of ESDP were deployed to this region. Considering the deployment of civilian crisis management missions to the Western Balkans a first step in the shaping of a strategic culture and based on the assumption that the European Union clearly possesses the prerequisites to form such a strategic culture, the following chapter will analyse the development of civilian crisis management and chronologically describe and evaluate the four civilian missions carried out in the Western Balkans. The conclusion is that despite the fact that ESDP is still a work in progress, the engagement in civilian crisis management missions already provides a marker for the existence of an emerging European strategic culture in the process of formation.

The Internal-External Security Nexus: More Coherence Under Lisbon?

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has intensified its efforts to establish closer coordination between the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s security policies – i.e. between the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA) and foreign and security policy – based on the assumption that this serves the interests of all actors involved. More inward-looking actors, typically from the ministries of the interior and justice in individual Member States, believe that they can strengthen their internal problem-solving capacities if the EU uses its foreign policy instruments and capabilities in a targeted and focused way to improve internal security and to engage third countries in achieving its goals in the JHA domain. At the same time, JHA expertise and actors have become an indispensable resource for traditional foreign policy actors in terms of dealing with today’s security challenges and achieving the EU’s main foreign policy objectives, such as promoting the rule of law and preventing state failure.This Occasional Paper seeks to analyse the issue of coherence and complementarity between EU internal security policies and external relations/foreign policy, focusing on the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on existing political and institutional challenges. A key political challenge has been that the mainstreaming of internal security objectives in EU external relations, frequently driven by a security rationale that relegated human rights and civil liberties-related issues to secondary status, has risked undermining the stated normative principles of EU foreign policy-making. At an institutional level, the EU has had difficulties in living up to the expectations of its ambitious strategic papers, not least due to the tendencies of each Council formation (Justice and Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs Council) to protect its own turf.The paper argues that the EU can address the institutional and political challenges by strengthening existing coordination mechanisms and fully exploiting the possibilities which the Lisbon Treaty offers. The European Parliament, now a legislative actor equal in standing with the Council in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), should become more engaged in the process of negotiating international agreements in the JHA field and the Council should no longer sideline its priorities in relation to issues such as readmission of third-country nationals and data protection involving high stakes in the sphere of human rights and civil liberties. The problem of insufficient institutional cooperation between the Justice and Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs Councils can be tackled by, firstly, establishing a strong JHA expertise in the European External Action Service and, secondly, involving the JHA Council structures in a more comprehensive and systematic way in the planning and conduct of CSDP civilian crisis management missions and in CFSP thematic and geographical working groups. The paper concludes by underlining that the EU’s success in moving towards comprehensive coherence will also be determined by the political will and ability of internal and foreign policy actors to overcome their habit of thinking in different security mindsets and to develop a shared understanding of European security challenges.

Civilian Crisis Management in the EU – Structural and Functional Aspects

This article offers a general overview of civilian crisis management in the EU, its mechanisms and instruments, the nature of civil-military cooperation (coordination), and an overview of civilian crisis management missions. Particular attention will be paid to the EULEX Mission in Kosovo as a case-study of how participating civilian experts judge both the mission itself and the mission preparations (i.e. selection and training of personnel, mission strategy, mission related activities, the problems identified etc.). The article will argue that seemingly trivial operational details, such as personnel selection, the quality of pre-deployment training and advance preparation are important factors which, if not properly coordinated, could jeopardise EU goals in the field of crisis management. The author also presumes that unregulated civil-military cooperation and coordination can lead to the failure of crisis management operations.

The System of EU Crisis Management – From Bringing Peace to Establishing Democracy?

I. Overview of EU Crisis Management Operations and Missions 1. Differentiation 2. Operations and Missions in Particular II. General Legal Framework 1. Mixture of Civilian and Military Crisis Management and its Problems 2. Legal Basis in European and International Law III. Transfer of Democracy? 1. Rule of Law Concept of the EU 2. Result of the EU Crisis Management Missions and Operations: Practical Output Annex

Conclusion

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Chapter Two: National Ambitions and Performance

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Glossary

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Chapter Three: Domestic Determinants of National Profiles: Constraints or Enablers?

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Chapter One: EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.