Credibility Deficit Research Articles

The Credibility Deficit Experienced by Black Patients

The Credibility Deficit Experienced by Black Patients

Verbal attacks on terrorist groups increase violence against civilians

Abstract Terrorists and other transnational extremist groups are responsible for thousands of civilian deaths. In confronting extremists, governments have relied heavily on threats, demands, denunciations, and other forms of verbal conflict. Do these efforts at verbal coercion have any effect on terrorist behavior? This analysis focuses on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which continues to be the world's deadliest terrorist group and was responsible for recent high-profile attacks in Baghdad, Vienna, Kabul, and Russia. We use Bayesian structural vector autoregression models to analyze daily event data on interactions between ISIS and foreign governments for the 2014–2020 period. We find that verbal conflict initiated by governments not only failed to deter ISIS but in fact increased the frequency of ISIS's attacks on civilians. Additional empirical analyses, combined with evidence from ISIS's publications and public statements, suggest that this effect resulted from a perceived credibility deficit. Extremists use terror attacks to signal that they have the capabilities and willingness to inflict pain and suffering on civilian targets. Government attempts to coerce extremist groups verbally, rather than militarily, reflect an underestimation of the group's capabilities and resolve. In an effort to solidify their reputations, extremists engage in further violence toward civilians, thus leading to worse humanitarian consequences. We extend the analysis to Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Boko Haram and find similar results.

Challenging Prejudice as the Necessary Condition for Testimonial Injustice: Unveiling the Role of Epistemic Vice

ABSTRACT The conception of epistemic injustice as a campaign tool has generated considerable debate. The challenge lies in identifying instances of testimonial injustice within complex real-world situations. Miranda Fricker suggests that credibility deficits and identity prejudice serve as necessary conditions for recognizing testimonial injustice. However, this approach faces conceptual generalisation: certain cases that intuitively seem to fit the definition fail to meet the criteria, while some cases that meet the criteria appear counterintuitive. Addressing this issue by introducing additional conditions alongside the original ones seems ineffective and redundant. Simply reverting to Fricker’s original definition is not a straightforward solution either. Identity prejudice plays a decisive role in Fricker’s establishment of testimonial injustice, but it is itself a broad and vague concept. The blurry boundary between heuristics and prejudices has led to many difficulties. An examination of the nature of prejudice indicates that the initial prejudice condition should be modified. It is epistemic inertia, rooted in our thought processes, that serves as the catalyst rendering heuristics unreliable and triggering various epistemic vices, including identity prejudice. Therefore, the prejudice condition is too narrow, while the superordinate concept of epistemic vice is more fundamental as a necessary condition for testimonial injustice.

A Critical Perspective on Testimonial Injustice: Interrogating Witnesses' Credibility Excess in Criminal Trials

This paper offers a critical race theory perspective on the testimonial injustice experienced by racially minoritized criminal defendants in evidential practice. It builds off Federico Picinali’s paper, inter alia, substantiating how minoritized criminal defendants experience testimonial harm through credibility deficit, by exploring epistemic injustice to the same when prosecutorial witnesses receive identity-based credibility excess. It argues that in an adversarial criminal legal system, the testimonial injustice of credibility excess afforded racial in-group prosecutorial witnesses should be considered in tandem with the testimonial injustice of credibility deficit imposed on racial out-group defendants. Only then can the epistemic harm and resultant unfairness at trial for defendants be fully assessed. The paper advocates for expanding the definition of testimonial injustice to encompass the epistemic wrong of socially biased credibility excess and “transferred epistemic harm.” In instances of transferred epistemic harm, the harm inflicted by an epistemic wrong impacts the speaker’s interlocutor rather (or more) than the speaker themselves.

Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices

ABSTRACT This article focuses on unjust credibility deficits in cases of testimony about emotional reactions towards acts of oppression. It argues that the injustice in these cases is not rooted in the hearer’s identity prejudices against the speaker, but the hearer's problematic way of dealing with his simulation of being in the speaker's situation. The simulation is in itself not morally problematic. However, I focus on a case where the hearer either recklessly or negligently fails to consider knowledge about the differences in people’s emotional reactions and comes to believe that his simulated reaction is the only possible reaction, thus believing that the speaker does not report her emotions truthfully.In this case, the ‘epistemic poison’ results from the recklessness or negligence not necessarily from identity prejudice against the speaker. This credibility deficit is unjust, yet its persistent and systematic nature stems from the fact that a hearer who is not from the same marginalized or oppressed group as the speaker will simulate different emotional reactions to those reported by the speaker. Hence, the unjust credibility deficit can be connected to other forms of social injustices suffered by the speaker.

Unfair knowledge practices in global health: a realist synthesis.

Unfair knowledge practices easily beset our efforts to achieve health equity within and between countries. Enacted by people from a distance and from a position of power ('the centre') on behalf of and alongside people with less power ('the periphery'), these unfair practices have generated a complex literature of complaints across various axes of inequity. We identified a sample of this literature from 12 journals and systematized it using the realist approach to explanation. We framed the outcome to be explained as 'manifestations of unfair knowledge practices'; their generative mechanisms as 'the reasoning of individuals or rationale of institutions'; and context that enable them as 'conditions that give knowledge practices their structure'. We identified four categories of unfair knowledge practices, each triggered by three mechanisms: (1) credibility deficit related to pose (mechanisms: 'the periphery's cultural knowledge, technical knowledge and "articulation" of knowledge do not matter'), (2) credibility deficit related to gaze (mechanisms: 'the centre's learning needs, knowledge platforms and scholarly standards must drive collective knowledge-making'), (3) interpretive marginalization related to pose (mechanisms: 'the periphery's sensemaking of partnerships, problems and social reality do not matter') and (4) interpretive marginalization related to gaze (mechanisms: 'the centre's learning needs, social sensitivities and status preservation must drive collective sensemaking'). Together, six mutually overlapping, reinforcing and dependent categories of context influence all 12 mechanisms: 'mislabelling' (the periphery as inferior), 'miseducation' (on structural origins of disadvantage), 'under-representation' (of the periphery on knowledge platforms), 'compounded spoils' (enjoyed by the centre), 'under-governance' (in making, changing, monitoring, enforcing and applying rules for fair engagement) and 'colonial mentality' (of/at the periphery). These context-mechanism-outcome linkages can inform efforts to redress unfair knowledge practices, investigations of unfair knowledge practices across disciplines and axes of inequity and ethics guidelines for health system research and practice when working at a social or physical distance.

Testimonial justice and the voluntarism problem: the virtue of just acceptance

ABSTRACT This paper examines the ‘voluntarism’ challenge for achieving testimonial justice and advocates the virtue of just acceptance of testimony as the right target for efforts to alleviate testimonial injustice. First, we review the credibility deficit case of interpersonal testimonial injustice and explain how the doxastic voluntarism problem poses a challenge to redressing such testimonial injustice. Specifically, the voluntarism problem seems to rule out straightforward control over what and whom people believe; thus, the solution to the problem of testimonial injustice cannot lie in voluntarily self-correcting unjust credibility judgements and replacing them with just testimonial beliefs. Second, we identify three distinctive characteristics of acceptance of testimony, as distinct from belief, and argue that, while it might be difficult to form credibility judgements completely voluntarily, it is easier to control one’s attitude of acceptance towards a speaker’s testimony. We hold that shifting focus from testimonial belief to acceptance can overcome the problem of (synchronic) involuntarism about testimonial belief. Third, we articulate a vision of a virtue of just acceptance of testimony that can move a hearer to collect the right evidence to reliably find the answer to whether a speaker’s testimony is true. Finally, we demonstrate that encouraging people to take a virtuous attitude of just acceptance towards a speaker’s testimony forms the basis of a remedial vision of education that can play a distinctive role in fostering the virtue of just acceptance aimed at testimonial justice.

The epistemic injustice in conflict reporting: Reporters and ‘fixers’ covering Ukraine, Israel, and Palestine

This paper investigates the epistemic injustice in conflict reporting, where foreign parachute reporters collaborate with local producers and ‘fixers.’ Drawing from existing research on ‘fixers’ and other media professionals covering conflict zones and the philosophy of emotion and knowledge, I address the following questions: What is the role of local and foreign media professionals’ affective proximity and professional distance in the social epistemology of conflict news production and the epistemic hierarchy among the collaborators? What implications is this particular social epistemology believed to have for conflict reporting accuracy and ethics? Based on 36 semi-structured to in-depth interviews with foreign and local media professionals covering Ukraine, Israel, and Palestine and further online and offline contact with the Ukrainian ecosystem of foreign/conflict news production, I argue that the collaboration between foreign and local media professionals is sometimes marked by identity-prejudicial credibility deficit granted to local media professionals because of their affective proximity to the events they cover. This epistemic injustice mirrors other power vectors and the dominant journalistic professional ideology that values disinvolvement, distance, and detachment. In practice, the (local) media professionals’ affective proximity to their contexts is often appreciated as embodied knowledge beneficial to the nuance, accuracy, and ethics of journalistic practices and outcomes.

Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice

ABSTRACT A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the relations between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimonial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see several limitations of Fricker’s own account of testimonial injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker’s account that Hawley’s criticisms target, focusing on her objections to Fricker’s proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of epistemic objectification and her characterization of testimonial injustice in terms of prejudicial credibility deficits. I also offer an assessment of the potency of Hawley’s objections, concluding that they do point to genuine limitations of Fricker’s account, but that we can appreciate Hawley’s points without adopting her trust-centric approach to testimonial injustice, or her specific commitment-based accounts of trust and trustworthiness. However, in the last section I examine the positive picture of testimonial injustice that emerges from Hawley’s discussion of unequally distributed obstacles to both being trustworthy and maintaining a reputation for trustworthy testimony in her recent book How To Be Trustworthy, considering how this picture contrasts with Fricker’s account and where it might have important affinities with other accounts in the literature.

Colonialism, Environmental Policy, and Epistemic Injustice

This paper explores environmental protection policies and initiatives, such as conservation, through the lens of an orientalist epistemic injustice. This is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when the orientalizing of space and access to sovereign systems of knowledge causes the assigning of an unjust deflated or elevated level of credibility to a knower. Under this framework of orientalist epistemic injustice, the author criticizes the credibility excess assigned to Western subjects that perform conservation efforts in third-world countries and the related credibility deficit assigned to indigenous and local knowledge and conservation practices.

Prejudice, Harming Knowers, and Testimonial Injustice

Fricker‘s Epistemic Injustice discusses the idea of testimonial injustice, specifically, being harmed in one‘s capacity as a knower. Fricker‘s own theory of testimonial injustice emphasizes the role of prejudice. She argues that prejudice is necessary for testimonial injustice and that when hearers use a prejudice to give a deficit to the credibility of speakers hearers intrinsically harm speakers in their capacity as a knower. This paper rethinks the connections between prejudice and testimonial injustice. I argue that many cases of prejudicial credibility deficits do not intrinsically harm speakers. Further, I suggest that prejudice is not necessary for harming speakers. I provide my own proposal on which testimonial injustice occurs when speaker‘s capacity as a giver of knowledge is interfered with in important ways. My proposal does not give prejudice any essential role.

Does the Critical Scrutiny of Drill Constitute an Epistemic Injustice?

Abstract In this paper, I look to draw novel connections between critiques of drill and epistemic injustice by addressing the question of whether the critical scrutiny of drill constitutes an epistemic injustice. I argue that these critiques constitute two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. We see testimonial injustice in how courts and police do not give credibility to drill artists’ testimonies about the storylike nature of their songs, and these credibility deficits are based in racist stereotypes about black criminality and believability. We see contributory injustice in how courts and police, through wilful ignorance, see drill music as violent and criminal rather than expressive and fictional – as drill artists do – which thwarts drill artists’ ability to contribute to shared knowledge.

Analyzing social wrongs

Analyzing social wrongs

Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter

To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.

The Adultification of Black Girls as Identity-Prejudicial Credibility Excess

On Miranda Fricker’s influential account, the central case of testimonial injustice occurs if and only if the speaker receives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice of the hearer. Her critics have taken issue with her view, arguing that cases in which speakers are given more credibility than they deserve, may also amount to testimonial injustice. Furthermore, they argue, these cases cannot be captured by Fricker’s account of objectification as the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice; rather, it is an account of othering that best captures a wide range of epistemic injustices. In this paper, I join Fricker’s critics in advancing a novel case of testimonial injustice through identity-prejudicial credibility excess – the adultification of black girls in testimony-giving settings. When testifying, black girls are likely to receive a credibility excess with respect to adult topics such as sex and consent because they are perceived as older, more self-reliable, and mature than they actually are by the hearers. Nevertheless, when examining the girls’ intersecting social identities defined by age, race and gender, it becomes clear that this constitutes an unjustly and prejudicially inflated estimation of their credibility. These cases also involve hermeneutical injustice since the identity-prejudicial credibility excess denies the victims a meaningful opportunity to make sense of their traumatic experiences of sexual assault. I conceptualize this compounded injustice as testimonial obfuscation, where an identity-prejudicial credibility evaluation (either in excess or deficit) causes an experience to remain unintelligible to the hermeneutically marginalized speaker.

Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice

This essay investigates an underappreciated way in which trust and testimonial injustice are closely connected. Credibility deficit and credibility excess cases both (in their own distinctive ways) contribute to a speaker’s being harmed in her capacity a knower. But moreover, as we will show—by using the tools of a performance-theoretic framework—both credibility deficit and credibility excess cases also feature incompetent trusting on the part of the hearer. That is, credibility deficit and excess cases are shown to manifest qualities of thinkers that are inconducive to trust’s being reliably fulfilled. What this implies is an interesting result about testimonial injustice: to the extent that we want to mitigate against testimonial injustice—one promising way to do so will be to target incompetent trusting of the sort that underlies it. We conclude by outlining and defending what we take to be a promising substantive version of such a mitigation strategy, one which is centred around the cultivation of higher-order trusting competences.

The Responsibility of Social Media to Truth, Reason and Democracy

The rise of social media has given a significant boost to the information and com-munication industry. Prior to now, the common news outlets were the mainstream print and electronic media, domiciled in specific locations, and guided by particular laws of nation states. These laws, for the most part, regulated and enforced decency, compelling practitioners to adhere to the ethics of truth, reason and democracy. But with the rise of social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc., that are used by enormous number of people to communicate, network, and advertise their business-es, the determination of information to be released to the public is no longer under the monopoly of a select few technocrats and entrepreneurs. Once the immediate access to these facile communication channels of social media is set in place, everyone with a basic social skill becomes a communicator of news. This phenomenon has revolution-ized the media industry, giving everyone opportunity to have information at the snap of their fingers. But by the same token, and leveraging on the complexity of formulating regulating laws, the social media circumvents most existing norms, leading to abuse of public trust, credibility deficit and crisis of confidence. This essay makes a foray into the responsibility of social media in what concerns truth, reason and democracy. Using the analytic method, it gauges the current social media practice vis-à-vis the traditional media, and highlights the gray areas that precipitate abuse. The essay concludes by advocating for strict adherence to media ethics that will promote the values of responsi-bility, fairness, truthfulness, accountability and universal democratic ideals.

Citizen journalism reduces the credibility deficit of authoritarian government in risk communication amid COVID-19 outbreaks.

During the outbreak of an epidemic, the success in risk communications to make the public comply with disease preventive measures depends on the public’s trust in the government. In this study, we aim to understand how media audiences update their trust in the government during the COVID-19 outbreak depending on the information they received. We conducted an online survey experiment in February 2020 in Hong Kong (n = 1,016) in which respondents were randomly provided with a government press release and an endorsement either from an official or a non-official source. This study shows that the information from a non-official source enhances the credibility of official government messages. Our findings imply that dictators can actually “borrow credibility” from their citizen journalists and even nondemocratic leaders can make themselves more trustworthy to potential dissenters through citizen journalism. Allowing information flow from non-official sources can be a practical measure for governments to address the problem of a credibility deficit during a pandemic.

Conversational Epistemic Injustice: Extending the Insight from Testimonial Injustice to Speech Acts beyond Assertion

ABSTRACT Testimonial injustice occurs when hearers attribute speakers a credibility deficit because of an identity prejudice and consequently dismiss speakers’ testimonial assertions. Various philosophers explain testimonial injustice by appealing to interpersonal norms arising within testimonial exchanges. When conversational participants violate these interpersonal norms, they generate second-personal epistemic harms, harming speakers as epistemic agents. This focus on testimony, however, neglects how systematically misevaluating speakers’ knowledge affects conversational participants more generally. When hearers systematically misevaluate speakers’ conversational competence because of entrenched assumptions about what speakers know, I call these conversational epistemic injustices. I argue the same epistemic harm in testimonial injustice arises for non-assertoric speech acts, generating conversational epistemic injustices. For across speech acts, deflated knowledge attributions create second-personal harms that prevent speakers from using their knowledge in linguistic exchanges, limiting their epistemic agency. These harms however are not reducible to linguistic harms, (e.g.,) silencing or discursive injustice. This article applies insight from how second-personal epistemic harm arises in testimonial exchanges to conversational exchanges more generally, demonstrating that epistemic injustices arise beyond testimonial exchanges and contexts of inquiry because deflated knowledge attributions undermine general conversational norms requiring participants assume each other’s conversational competence, generating conversational epistemic injustices.

Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice?

ABSTRACT In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Frickerargues that there is a distinctly epistemic kind of injustice, which she calls testimonial injustice, resulting from identity-prejudicial credibility deficit – identity prejudic causing a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word. Sheargues that testimonial injustice is correctable through hearers developing a capacity for self-correcting for it within a virtue-epistemological framework. In this essay, I examine Fricker’s argument, and conclude that Fricker’s exposition of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is sound, but that she has not demonstrated either that testimonial injustice is a distinctly testimonial phenomenon or that identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is a distinctly epistemic phenomenon, or how a virtue-epistemic framework might be successfully employed as a corrective methodology. I further suggest that her conception of testimony as distinctly evidential is too narrow to be applied to everyday instances of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, and should be reconfigured within a broader framework.