Abstract Quantum private query (QPQ) is the quantum version for symmetrically private information retrieval. However, the user privacy in QPQ is generally guarded in the delayed and cheat-sensitive way. That is, the dishonest database holder Bob's cheating to elicit user privacy can only be discovered after the protocol is finished (when the user finds some errors in the retrieved database item). Such delayed detection may cause very unpleasant results for the user Alice in real-life applications. Without the realtime conscious of privacy leaking, Alice may make faulty decisions according to the received faulty item and suffer great loss. Worse yet, it is difficult for Alice to accuse a dishonest database to any one else though she can detect the cheating. Current efforts to protect user privacy in realtime in existing QPQ protocols mainly use two techniques, i.e., adding an honesty checking on the database or allowing the user to reorder the qubits. We reexamine these two kinds of QPQ protocols and find neither of them can work very well. We give concrete cheating strategies for both participants and show that honesty checking of inner participant should be dealt more carefully in for example the choosing of checking qubits. Finally, we give an idea to realize realtime detection of dishonest database in QPQ of blocks (i.e., multi-bit database items).
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