Covert Human Intelligence Sources Research Articles

Unmasking the impact: how did the coronavirus pandemic affect police intelligence in the United Kingdom?

ABSTRACT At present, there is no research available that has explored how the coronavirus pandemic affected intelligence work. Understanding this is vital as any factor that may increase the likelihood of intelligence gaps is worthy of examination because they are frequently identified as a major causal factor of the more harmful issue of intelligence failures within law enforcement. Recent research (Marani, et al, 2021) states that despite the pandemic abating, the risk of further global incidents remains. Therefore, lessons need to be identified to reduce potential gaps and failures occurring during future pandemics. We seek to achieve this by asking how Covid-19 affected intelligence work within UK policing by interviewing fifteen intelligence personnel from one police service. Using a framework from the practice of knowledge management (KM) we analyze how the pandemic affected the processes, technology, individual and organisational willingness to share intelligence, workloads, location, and structure of intelligence delivery (Abrahamson and Goodman-Delaunty, 2014). Findings indicate that all were negatively impacted by changes in working priorities, increased demand on analysts, and the ability of the police to gather intelligence from covert human intelligence sources and partner agencies. Such implications are discussed in the context of wider intelligence literature and future preparedness.

Значение оперативно-розыскных способов выявления коррупционных преступлений в сфере госзакупок

Introduction: Economic development of the country, its security, implementation of national programmes are ensured by the state and municipal orders. Transactions involving the expenditure of significant amounts of budget funds in the sphere of public procurement constitute favourable conditions for the commitment of various corruption offences. Thus, the state takes control over them and, if necessary, take measures to suppress such crimes. Criminals use a wide range of methods. They formally comply with the rules and procedure of tendering to achieve self-interested personal goals. Identification of such dishonest customers can be done by means of control measures, both public (in the form of scheduled and unscheduled checks) and covert.
 Methods. Public control in the public procurement sphere is not enough to protect the economic interests of the country. Law enforcement intelligence, utilizing covert human intelligence sources, provides timely and efficient acquisition and the use of information being necessary to prevent, suppress and solve non-obvious, latent and covert corruption offences. The use of covert law enforcement intelligence against unlawful acts in the system of the state and municipal procurement appears to be crucial for the proper functioning of this system.
 Results. The present-day practice reveals that in order to effectively tackle corruption in public procurement, it is necessary to use a comprehensive approach involving the application of administrative legal measures and law enforcement intelligence.

Children as Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Spies First, Children Second

The Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 empowers the police, and other authorities, throughout the United Kingdom to use children as Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) and to authorise these children to engage in criminality, with no criminal liability, in return for information. In this article, we analyse the risk of severe physical and emotional harm that children face when acting as a CHIS and engaging in criminal behaviour to preserve their cover. This practice of using a child as a CHIS and encouraging children to engage in criminal conduct also runs counter to the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales’ ‘Child First’ vision of a youth justice system that respects children rights and operates in children’s best interests. Throughout the article we argue that, despite the existing safeguards, the emphasis should be on helping children to escape a criminal lifestyle, rather than entrenching them further in a life of criminality by encouraging them to act as a CHIS.

The use of self-disclosure to build rapport with mock covert human intelligence sources (CHIS)

ABSTRACT The use of covert human intelligence sources for the protection of national security is an important but under-researched area. In light of increased globalisation, and technological developments, examining covert intelligence gathering online may have operational relevance. This study examined the use of similarities in self-disclosure to develop rapport with mock covert human intelligence sources online. A sample of 66 participants were asked to assume the role of a CHIS, listen to an audio recording of a meeting of the criminal network they are part of, and strike a balance between being forthcoming to their handler while at the same time not revealing all information they possessed. They were then interviewed online by a mock handler who opened the conversation in one of three ways: self-disclosing information that highlighted similarities between herself and the CHIS, self-disclosing information that highlighted dissimilarities, or control (no disclosure). Participants completed a follow-up rapport questionnaire based on their interaction with the handler. The study found that mock sources rated rapport higher in the similarities condition in comparison with other conditions; however, it did not translate into a significant difference in the intelligence reported. The findings of this research and its policy and practice implications are discussed.

Authorising Crime: The Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021

The enactment of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 pre‐empted the outcome of the appeal against the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in the so‐called ‘third direction’ case. This legislation article considers the background to the statute in the form both of the (absence of a) legal regime governing informant participation in criminality as revealed by reviews of events within the Northern Irish Troubles and the recent litigation. It analyses the key legal issues raised by the Act and locates it within the modern project of rationalising the law related to national security.

MINORS AS COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF THE POLISH POLICE PART 2

In 1990, due to political changes in Poland, the use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) in combating crime raised controversy. Therefore, the hastily and secretly prepared legislation limited the provisions to merely signalling the possibility of the police using this method of intelligence gathering. Despite further modifi cations of the existing law, the use of CHIS is still only referred to in Act on the Police [1990 Article 22(1)], which states that: “Police can use the help of non-police offi cers to perform their tasks.” The laxity of this provision is particularly evident in the context of precise and understandable regulations in countries such as Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The use of minors’ help is not regulated at the level of internal confi dential police regulations, which makes it diffi cult for police offi cers to fi ght juvenile delinquency. The aim of the research was to determine whether legal conditions in Poland prevent the use of juvenile CHIS. The analysis led to the conclusion that there are no legal obstacles present, but the use of juvenile informants should depend on the fulfi lment of certain conditions.

Licensed to kill…discourse? agents provocateurs and a purposive right to freedom of expression

Undercover police operations have emerged from the shadows and into the spotlight in the United Kingdom as a result of a public inquiry into undercover policing and the enactment of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act. The inquiry has revealed troubling details about the ways intelligence and police services have wielded their powers to infiltrate and undermine political groups and social movements over the course of five decades. The problem is not exclusive to the United Kingdom, but is seen the world over. Yet despite the widescale nature of the problem, the legality of agents provocateurs – undercover officers who infiltrate social and political movements to manipulate their messaging, instigate violent tactics and undermine public perception – has received scant attention in legal scholarship or the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article capitalises on the current spotlight to suggest that agents provocateurs can and should be conceived of as (potential) violations of the right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. A purposive approach is required to ensure protection for not only the means of expression – the exchange of information and ideas – but also the ends – vibrant democratic discourse and meaningful public debate.

MINORS AS COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF THE POLISH POLICE PART 1

In 1990, due to the political changes in Poland, the issue of using Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) in combatting crime aroused controversy. Therefore, in the hastily and secretly prepared police laws, it was limited to provisions which just merely signalled the possibility of the Police using this method of intelligence gathering. Despite further modifi cations of the existing police law, the use of CHIS is still only referred to in the Act on the Police, 1990: Article 22(1). It states that: “While performing its tasks, the Police may be assisted by persons who are not police offi cers”. The laxity of this wording is particularly evident in the context of precise and understandable regulations in countries such as Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The use of minors’ help is not regulated at the level of internal confi dential police regulations, which makes it diffi cult for police offi cers to fi ght juvenile delinquency. The aim of the research has been to determine whether the legal conditions in Poland prevent the use of underage covert human intelligence sources. The analysis led to the conclusion that there are no legal obstacles, but the use of juvenile informants should depend on the fulfi llment of certain conditions.

JUVENILE INFORMERS: IS IT APPROPRIATE TO USE CHILDREN AS COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES?

AbstractRecently, attention has been given to the question as to whether children should be used as covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), aka informers. Being a CHIS is a risky endeavour, particularly when the person is deployed against serious crime, for example, gang violence. Questions arise over the propriety of using adolescents as CHIS, and whether the regulation of covert sources serves to minimise the risk to them. This article considers the regulatory environment. It concludes that the use of juveniles as CHIS can be justified, but that additional safeguards must be put in place to ensure their safety.

Source Handler telephone interactions with covert human intelligence sources: An exploration of question types and intelligence yield

SummaryLaw Enforcement Agencies gather intelligence in order to prevent criminal activity and pursue criminals. In the context of human intelligence collection, intelligence elicitation relies heavily upon the deployment of appropriate evidence‐based interviewing techniques (a topic rarely covered in the extant research literature). The present research gained unprecedented access to audio recorded telephone interactions (N = 105) between Source Handlers and Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) from England and Wales. The research explored the mean use of various question types per interaction and across all questions asked in the sample, as well as comparing the intelligence yield for appropriate and inappropriate questions. Source Handlers were found to utilise vastly more appropriate questions than inappropriate questions, though they rarely used open‐ended questions. Across the total interactions, appropriate questions (by far) were associated with the gathering of much of the total intelligence yield. Implications for practise are discussed.

The impact of rapport on intelligence yield: police source handler telephone interactions with covert human intelligence sources

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) provide unique access to criminals and organised crime groups, and their collection of intelligence is vital to understanding England and Wales’ threat picture. Rapport is essential to the establishment and maintenance of effective professional relationships between source handlers and their CHIS. Thus, rapport-based interviewing is a fundamental factor to maximising intelligence yield. The present research gained unprecedented access to 105 real-life audio recorded telephone interactions between England and Wales police source handlers and CHIS. This research quantified both the rapport component behaviours (e.g., attention, positivity, and coordination) displayed by the source handler and the intelligence yielded from the CHIS, in order to investigate the frequencies of these rapport components and their relationship to intelligence yield. Overall rapport, attention and coordination significantly correlated with intelligence yield, while positivity did not. Attention was the most frequently used component of rapport, followed by positivity, and then coordination.

Pitched! Informants and the covert policing of football fans in Scotland

ABSTRACT This paper offers a new perspective on the policing of football fans by exploring the recruitment and use of ‘informants’, or ‘Covert Human Intelligence Sources’ (CHIS), in this area of police practice. Drawing upon semi-structured interviews with both football fans and police officers in Scotland we foreground fan experiences against a backdrop where intensive police surveillance has become a routine feature of football events. In particular, our research uniquely provides accounts of fans whom the police sought to recruit as informants, a process known colloquially in policing as being ‘pitched’. In doing so we highlight the impact this tactic has on football fans, both individually and collectively. In understanding police perspectives, we note how the use of informants in football policing is frequently justified as a ‘legitimate’ means to provide intelligence to prevent violence and disorder amongst fans. Cautioning upon the dangers of further ‘surveillance creep’, we highlight that the use of informants in the policing of football fans and events raises both practical and ethical issues. In particular, we argue that the use of informants in the covert policing of football fans, if this tactic is to be used, must be grounded in a clearly articulated threat of violence and disorder that is accepted by football fans and the wider community. In the absence of this, the use of such tactics is likely to be considered unnecessary and disproportionate by football fans, feeding a wider narrative of criminalisation and a perception of illegitimate and disproportionate forms of policing.

Eliciting human intelligence: police source handlers’ perceptions and experiences of rapport during covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) interactions

Rapport is an integral part of interviewing, viewed as fundamental to the success of intelligence elicitation. One collection capability is human intelligence (HUMINT), the discipline charged with eliciting intelligence through interactions with human sources, such as covert human intelligence sources (CHIS). To date, research has yet to explore the perceptions and experiences of intelligence operatives responsible for gathering HUMINT within England and Wales. The present study consisted of structured interviews with police source handlers (N = 24). Rapport was perceived as essential, especially for maximising the opportunity for intelligence elicitation. Participants provided a range of rapport strategies while highlighting the importance of establishing, and maintaining, rapport. The majority of participants believed rapport could be trained to some degree. Thus, rapport was not viewed exclusively as a natural skill. However, participants commonly perceived some natural attributes are required to build rapport that can be refined and developed through training and experience.

Mind the grass! Exploring the assessment of informant coverage in policing and law enforcement

ABSTRACTThe use of informants, or Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), has become a mainstay of contemporary policing and law enforcement in the United Kingdom as police, security and enforcement agencies seek to tackle a range of crimes. Recognising the relative paucity of enquiry on this subject, and addressing the associated requirement for further empirical research, this paper explores how ‘informant coverage’ – the extent to which informants can provide information on targets, suspects, crimes, and criminal conspiracies – is assessed in policing and law enforcement in Scotland. It is principally informed by qualitative research conducted in 2017 and 2018, comprised of semi-structured interviews with 19 participants. Drawing upon a thematic analysis of the resultant data, and enriched by the author's prior experience as a practitioner in this field, this paper identifies the strengths and limitations of established practices. Additionally, this paper highlights the emerging role of analysis, and the contribution of the intelligence analyst, in this specialist area of intelligence work. It concludes that if analysis is to make a valuable and continuing contribution to the effective use of informants in future practice then sustained proactive leadership will be required to support such innovative approaches.

Book Review: Covert Human Intelligence Sources: The “Unlovely” Face of Police Work

Book Review: Covert Human Intelligence Sources: The “Unlovely” Face of Police Work

Covert Human Intelligence Sources: The “Unlovely” Face of Police Work

Covert Human Intelligence Sources: The “Unlovely” Face of Police Work

Book Review: Covert human intelligence; a view from the police

More than 20 years ago Gary Marx broke ground with his foray into the sociology of undercover policing. His view was, and still is, that these policing tactics are essentially a necessary evil, but that they are a double-edged sword and that it is conceivable that such methods can, in principle, be regulated and controlled in order that the worst excesses and least desirable (unintended) outcomes are avoided. In his review of the original book, the European criminologist Cyrille Fijnaut basically agreed, but he also signaled his awareness of the corrupting potentiality of police undercover practices and of the need to bring them under the cover of law and legality. Covert policing tactics raise troubling questions that are with us still. Roger Billingsley’s slim edited collection is a recent addition to this literature and, although under theorized and largely descriptive, it will be a useful resource to academic criminologists and other scholars who are interested to explore and understand the latest developments. Whilst mainly focused on the contemporary situation in the United Kingdom, the contributions in the book (mostly penned by former or currently serving police officers or lawyers) offer many useful insights into one crucial tactic in the broad array of covert policing practices: the use of clandestine informers. The book is divided into three sections. The first deals with legal issues: the perspective of defense lawyers, the administrative regulation of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), the use of promises of immunity in informant handling, Crime Law Soc Change (2010) 53:205–206 DOI 10.1007/s10611-009-9218-9

Duty of Care for Informers

This article considers the use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or informers, by law enforcement agencies and examines whether sufficient ‘duty of care’ is being afforded them. It reflects on the implications of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which provide stringent controls and inspection processes for the management and use of informers by public authorities. The article examines those criminal cases of relevance, especially relating to the civil law of tort, to determine whether law enforcement agencies could have claims made against them for a lack of duty of care, or negligence. The use of a transparent risk management process is recommended, and the article provides examples of some areas of improvement considered necessary, including the use of an independent and objective inspections body. The policeman does not care about the informant's reputation among his fellows, except as it effects the work of the policeman. (J. H. Skolnick, 1966, Justice Without Trial. New York: Wiley, 132.)