Tradition, in the popular imaginary, refers to the cultural practices, rituals, artifacts, symbols, emblems, narratives, etc., that individuals both instantiate and appropriate within their own experience, through which they become insinuated within an historical community, and through which historical communities as a whole come to define and maintain a sense of something like their identity. In this sense then, tradition is something like the locus of interaction between individuals and their historical communities; the point of contact between individual experience and socio-historical continuity. Tradition is also an event of repetition; it is that which is repeated and reaffirmed across socio-historical communities. Tradition thus implies a fundamental spatio-temporal continuity, with the obvious caveat that traditions in their various elements and practices do become altered and transformed, side by side with the alterations and transformations that take place within historical communities themselves.1 For both Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger, tradition, far from being a simple medium of social and historical continuity and point of contact between individual and community, is a process fraught with peril, and the course of industrial modernity had only magnified its problematic nature. Both accept the most fundamental element of tradition to be transmission; a handing over of the past to the present through something like an event-engaging in a cultural practice, experiencing an historical artifact, etc.2 However, hand in hand with their dual criticisms of the notions of linear, homogeneous, empty time, and of narrative, progressive history, both Heidegger and Benjamin emphasized elements of discontinuity and fragmentation as central to the process of traditional transmission, exposing the notion of a relatively seamless continuity as the product of imaginary and calcified representations of past, present, and future that are drawn within tradition-tradition itself tends to paint a patina of continuity over the ruptures and ruinations that constitute the process of transmitting the past to the present.3 I argue that for both Heidegger and Benjamin, peeling back this patina shows us two things. First, following Howard Caygill, that even the seemingly uncomplicated event of traditional repetition is, in a sense, a destructive process, insofar as in being repetitively handed over to the present, the past must be destroyed. It must be made the past; the no longer, the dead and gone, fixed and calcified into a representation. Second, the event of traditional transmission involves, crucially, a point of potential crisis for individuals and communities, within which something like their identity and destiny become questions-more or less urgent, according to the spirit of the times-questions that provoke a decision concerning the ground and destiny of a community.5 If this point of crisis within the process goes unnoticed, then tradition truly suffers the fate of being swallowed by a conformism that is always about to overpower it-to borrow a phrase from Benjamin that Heidegger could not have agreed with more. During the course of industrial modernity, the potential crisis at the core of traditionthe question tradition constantly opens up, and the decision it provokes-has had its urgency stifled and muted, to greater or lesser extents for Benjamin and Heidegger: the crisis has become ignored in yawning indifference, or rendered illegible; the question forgotten; the decision deferred in various ways. The manner in which the two analyze both this process of the stifling of the crisis of tradition within modernity, and, most significantly, the possibility for reinvigorating our sense of crisis presented by the work of art, offers instructive points of contrast for understanding Heidegger's and Benjamin's more general projects of reconfiguring our notions of history, memory, and time. Developing an analysis of the particular relationships between the two thinkers' readings of tradition and the latter general projects, will be beyond the scope of this brief essay. …
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