Countervailing Measures Research Articles

Indonesia's Regulation and Implementation of Subsidies in View of Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1995-WTO

<em><span lang="IN">Regulation and implementation of subsidies in Indonesia is in the form of financial assistance provided by the government either directly or indirectly to companies, industries, industrial groups or exporters. With the aim of increasing export activities and reducing import activities for the welfare of the people and not violating the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, as the definition of subsidies is explained in the PP. Number 34 of 2011 concerning Anti-Dumping Measures, Compensatory Measures and Trade Security Measures Article 1 paragraph 8. In the Indonesian Government's policy, subsidies are given as long as they are to achieve people's welfare, and do not violate the order in the 1945 Constitution. However, in terms of government policy to improving people's welfare and protecting the domestic economy, often causing problems in the scope of international trade. This article aims to examine and understand how subsidies are regulated and implemented in Indonesia in terms of the Agreement On Subsidies And Countervailing Measures 1995-WTO. This research is normative legal research which examines written law based on applicable laws and regulations. The results of this research are that based on the policy issued by the Indonesian government, subsidies are given in order to realize the domestic economy, so based on this policy, basically the Agreement On Subsidies And Countervailng Measures 1995-WTO limits subsidies, so that their use does not cause harm to other countries' industries.</span></em>

International economic law and the reinvention of industrial policy: Opportunities, limitations and risks

BACKGROUND: Many studies are focused on traditional (old) or modern (new) industrial policy. There are insufficient studies linking the emergence of the knowledge economy and the institutional requirements to underpin inclusive social and economic development in developed or developing countries. OBJECTIVE: This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the knowledge economy and the institutional requirements for more inclusive and sustainable socio-economic developments. Constraints of the international economic law in its current form for more inclusive and sustainable industrial policy in developed and developing countries will be put forward. The inclusive knowledge economy requires not only innovative advanced firms but also innovative and creative public sector employees capable of supporting and disseminating opportunities of the knowledge economy to the entire society. Moreover, the inclusive knowledge economy requires lifelong learning processes of the workforce in developed and developing economies. Therefore, a human dimension, broad participation, and shaping of modern development strategies a key to developing an inclusive and sustainable knowledge economy. Institutional constraints of the international economic framework are currently not adequately supportive of such a structural shift. The objective of this study is to show the possible adjustments at the international and national levels to support the development of an inclusive knowledge economy. The human dimension (participation, creativity, imagination) of the public and private sector goes hand in hand with institutional innovations. METHODS: The normative and institutional analysis, embedded in the historical context of industrialization patterns in the selected countries, will provide insights into the institutional requirements for an inclusive knowledge economy. RESULTS: The result of the conceptual and normative as well as empirical comparative analysis will provide insights into the possibilities and needs for institutional innovations at the regional, national, and supranational levels of polity while embracing the need for a more supportive international normative context. Several possible institutional innovations at the national levels, such as regional public venture funds, decentralized support, and training centers, are provided. A reform of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to better delineate between potentially productive and harmful subsidies at the international level can be seen as a reform proposal at the international level. CONCLUSIONS: Industrial policies in developed and developing countries will not be able to address the social and economic divides between advanced and stagnating sectors of the economy without addressing the requirements for institutional innovations at all levels of the international polity.

Legal Analysis of Export Subsidies under the Agreement of Subsidy and Countervailing Measures

Export subsidies, for several decades now, have attracted significant attention due to their undesirable impacts on international trade. In the Uruguay Round 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) generated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) which contains global rules to regulate the different types of subsidies and to offset their adverse effects on other WTO Members. This paper, through its three sections, therefore aims to provide a legal analysis of the provisions of export subsidies contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the ASCM. By doing so, this paper answers the question of whether the ASCM is sufficient to cease the distortive effect of the export subsidy. To that end, doctrinal legal research has been conducted through analysis of the black letter of law and the case laws. In conclusion, the ASCM succeeded in giving the export subsidies per se prohibited nature, either in law or in fact. Unfortunately, the mere repayment of the amount of the subsidy is not always a sufficient remedy. As such, punitive countermeasures must be introduced to implement remedial provisions and to deter export subsidies.

On the Change of the Legal Standards for “Public Body” in the WTO Subsidy and Countervailing Agreement

The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) defines a subsidy as having four elements, of which the "public body determination criterion" is designed to ascertain whether a state-owned enterprise (SOE) constitutes the subject of a subsidy, and is an important prerequisite for confirming the establishment of a subsidy. However, neither the WTO nor other international organizations have clearly specified this concept. In DS437, one of the points of contention was the criteria for determining a "public body". On 16 June 2019, the WTO published the Appellate Body (AB)'s report, whose explanation of the "public body" determination substantially rejects China's argument and to some extent supports U.S. claim. This ruling shows that the risk of China's SOEs being recognized as public bodies will continue to exist, leaving room for other countries' countervailing agencies to investigate. In this regard, China should further promote the "governmental authority Theory", while continuing to deepen the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs, so as to get out of the predicament of SOEs participating in international competition.

Regulating SOEs Through the SCM Agreement: Utilizing the ‘Public Body’ Jurisprudence to Cover SOEs

In January 2020, trade ministers from the EU, the US, and Japan proposed several amendments to the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. One of the proposals was to examine whether to incorporate state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into the definition of the public body in the SCM Agreement. A similar approach was adopted in the EU’s white paper of June 2020. These proposals present that the current WTO jurisprudence is not adequate to regulate financial contributions by SOEs. On the other hand, recent international trade agreements suggest another type of SOE regulation by providing a set of independent norms on SOEs. As such, there are two options for regulating subsidization by SOEs in the current international trade regime: a combined scheme and a separate scheme. This article argues that a combined scheme that regulates SOEs through public body concept in the WTO SCM Agreement is a more adequate formula than a separate one. Considering aggravating trade disputes among major trading partners surrounding the SOEs a better method to regulate SOEs in a single and coherent WTO SCM Agreement is suggested. state-owned enterprises, SCM Agreement, subsidization, public body, governmental authority, combined scheme, separate scheme

Analysis Of The Foreign Subsidies Regulation From An International Trade Law Perspective On Trade In Goods

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation contains provisions enabling the Commission to launch ex officio investigations into foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. The legislation is designed to be complementary to existing anti-subsiding rules and follows a logic that is reminiscent of the European competition law. This article discusses its applicability in the field of trade in goods and the risks of inconsistency with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Foreign Subsidies Regulation, Foreign subsidies, Industrial subsidies, Basic anti-subsidy regulation, World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Multilateralism, Trade

The EU’s new Foreign Subsidy Regulation on collision course with the WTO

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly concerned about government-dominated economies that provide financing for companies engaging in commercial activities in the EU. The concern is that companies receiving these so-called foreign subsides gain an unfair advantage over their European competitors. With astonishing unity and speed, the EU, therefore, has created an ambitious piece of legislation, Regulation 2022/2560, commonly referred to as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR).The FSR allows the European Commission (EC) to take unilateral action against foreign subsidies that are presumed to distort the internal market. The EU’s plan represents a far-reaching change in the EU’s foreign trade policy and creates a field of tension with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Whilst there is legal uncertainty about the scope of theWTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), some of the practices now regulated by the FSR most likely fall under the SCMAgreement which was incorporated into EU law by Regulation 2016/1037 (Anti-Subsidy Regulation).The FSR provides for a conflict rule establishing the supremacy of WTO law in such situations. However, considering the EU legislator’s interpretation of the SCM Agreement, there are considerable doubts as to whether this mechanism will effectively prevent the EC from taking unilateral action in an area that is actually subject to WTO law. In the area of overlaps, the FSR may, therefore, violate the supremacy of WTO law which would lead to the illegality of the FSR. This article addresses this risk and provides an outlook on how the EU could ensureWTO compliance by not applying the FSR if the regulated practice also falls under the SCM Agreement. Subsidy, Foreign Subsidies Regulation, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, SCM Agreement, Anti-Subsidy Regulation, WTO Legality, Foreign Direct Investment, 301 US Trade Act 1974

Article: Are There ‘Exceptions’ to the SCM Agreement? Applicability of the GATT Exceptions Vis-à-Vis the International Rules on Subsidies

The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’) regulates the use of subsidies by Members of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) to prevent distortions of international trade. With the rise of new types of subsidies, however, the subsidies disciplines in the SCM Agreement are considered to be insufficient. More and more WTO Members invoke exceptions as demanded by the geopolitical imperatives to justify their measures, but the SCM Agreement itself does not contain any exceptions that remain effective as of today. The WTO’s general rules on subsidy can be found not only in the SCM Agreement but also in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’). The exceptions set forth in Articles XX and XXI of the GATT (collectively, ‘GATT Exceptions’) can justify any breach of the GATT. The question would thus be: whether and to what extent the GATT Exceptions can justify a breach of the SCM Agreement. After briefly introducing debates over the applicability of the GATT Exceptions to the SCM Agreement, this paper observes the interpretative relationship between the GATT and the SCM Agreement. Thereafter, this paper proposes certain interpretative rules on the application of the GATT Exceptions vis-à-vis the SCM Agreement.

China-US Currency Subsidy Dispute from WTO Perspective: Review and Response

Since the new countervailing regulations came into effect, the U.S. Department of Commerce has conducted various countervailing investigations on Chinese enterprises for undervalued currency. This paper analyzes the core legal issues of undervalued currency subsidies, determines whether the exchange rate is undervalued and determines the elements and specificity of subsidies according to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the WTO dispute settlement judicial mechanism, and proposes countermeasures in the face of the U.S. Department of Commerce's investigation.

Supporting the Transition to Climate-Neutral Production: An Evaluation Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

ABSTRACT To reach climate neutrality, carbon emissions from the production of basic materials need to be curtailed. When governments encourage this transition by adopting support measures, the measures must comply with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This article analyzes three selected support schemes under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: (i) free allocation under emissions trading systems to operators of installations at risk of carbon leakage; (ii) the combination of a charge on carbon-intensive materials with free allocation; and (iii) carbon contracts for difference, under which governments cover the incremental costs of climate-neutral production processes relative to conventional processes. The analysis reveals that the current regime of free allocation is vulnerable to challenges under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. By contrast, the combination of free allocation and a charge on carbon-intensive materials would ensure consistent carbon pricing and thus would not amount to a subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In a similar vein, the carbon contracts for difference could be designed so that they would not confer a benefit and hence not constitute a subsidy.

International Regulation of Industrial Subsidy

ABSTRACT Subsidies are frequently used by states as an instrument of industrial policy for promoting economic growth, and are a major reason for international trade frictions. Existing industrial subsidy rules, especially the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), appear insufficient for effective international subsidy regulation. Subsidy rules reform has been initiated in and outside the World Trade Organization (WTO). Though subsidies are not a China-specific issue, China is an implied target and a major stakeholder of the reform, given the profound impact of its state-led economy. The reform faces a difficult situation: states are tempted to use subsidies to meet various challenges, whereas multilateral efforts in the WTO seem unpromising due to the different positions of world leading economies, and plurilateral efforts led by the trilateral group also face an unclear prospect of multilateralization. Improving international subsidy regulation calls for both rule-making efforts and political consensus and international cooperation, especially from world leading economies.

Assessing the Impacts of Non-Tariff Measures on the Export of Vietnam’s Main Agricultural and Seafood Products

With the development of free trade agreements, tariff barriers are gradually removed, and non-tariff measures are playing an important role in the trade policies of countries. However, studies on the effects of non-tariff measures on trade show a great disparity in results and both negative and positive influences can be found when non-tariff measures are imposed in different contexts. The heterogeneity in the result is often hypothesized to be the consequence of intrinsic characteristics related to products and countries; therefore, arguably, unbiased and reliable estimation of non-tariff measure effect on trade should be analyzed in product level data for a specific country. Hence, the study attempts to use the gravity model and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation (PPML) to quantify the effects of non-tariff measures on the export of some agricultural and seafood products of Vietnam to certain main markets including the United States (US), European Union (EU), China, and Japan. The research findings show that from a national perspective, non-tariff measures mostly have a negative impact on agricultural exports, especially sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPM), and countervailing measures (CM). In terms of commodities, coffee and seafood are particularly sensitive to non-tariff measures, while other key agricultural product groups are mostly affected by tariff measures.

How “safe” is the WTO “safe haven”? A need to modernise disciplines for officially supported export credits

PurposeThis paper aims to draw attention to an urgent need for reform of the regulatory framework of the broader export credit system to ensure a new and comprehensive “safe haven” for officially supported export credits. The purpose is to analyse the complex debate on disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), creating a point of reference for future analysis of and debates around the “carve-out clause” of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and a “safe haven” in a broader sense.Design/methodology/approachThis paper takes inspiration from legal, economic and political science literature on subsidies and officially supported export credits, as well as on legal documents related to the WTO and the OECD. It examines the WTO subsidy and the OECD export credits framework, focusing on main legal and economic governance aspects. Then, it gives a critical analysis how “safe” a “safe haven” in a broader sense might be, assessing frictions of and solutions for the fundamentally different set of disciplines, limitations, financial instruments not covered by OECD regulations, as well as new challenges related to climate finance.FindingsAfter assessing the challenges regarding the “carve-out clause” of the WTO subsidy framework and two tracks aiming to create a new “safe haven”, requirements for comprehensive disciplines for officially supported export credits are pointed out. Furthermore, several misunderstandings and mistakes appearing in the debate are clarified.Research limitations/implicationsDesktop research rather than empirical field work.Practical implicationsThis paper creates awareness for governments and exporters how to deal with a complex system of interrelated disciplines. The question, how “safe” a “safe haven” in a broader sense can be, has not been resolved yet. Some authors focus on the WTO disciplines not taking into account the need for an effective matching procedure of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the Arrangement). Furthermore, the introduction of several new pre-export financing programmes and the growing significance of climate finance-related instruments for export credit agencies creates both opportunities and challenges. This paper can serve as a reference point for the academic debate and further research. This paper also offers newcomers to the topic a comprehensive overview.Originality/valueAlthough the “carve-out clause” and the Arrangement have been much discussed, there is limited literature review structuring both existing and new aspects of the debate, assessing (dis)advantages of arguments and interpretations. This paper both adds to the corpus of literature about the ASCM, as well as the Arrangement, and takes this corpus as the object of its analysis.

Export Rebates and the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: WTO Law and Environmental Objections

The EU proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’) has triggered a lively academic and policy debate. In June 2022, the European Parliament put forward amendments regarding the potential introduction of export rebates under the EU Emission Trading System (‘ETS’) and the CBAM. This article focuses on this specific proposal, enquiring into the WTO law compatibility of ETS/CBAM export rebates. First, it enquires whether the ‘pecuniary burden’ associated with compliance with the CBAM would qualify as a ‘charge’ that is ‘equivalent to an internal tax’ and that is ‘imposed consistently with Article III:2 GATT’. Second, it suggests that the ‘pecuniary burden’ associated with compliance with the ETS/ CBAM is unlikely to qualify as an adjustable product tax; the analysis draws on a close examination of relevant provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCMA’). Finally, the article develops some brief considerations on the detrimental environmental effects of export rebates. As the article concludes, the regulatory design of the CBAM is not perfect; export rebates, however, would make this scheme considerably worse. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, Carbon Border Measures, Export Rebates, Border Tax Adjustment, Tax, Charge, GATT 1994, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Emission Trading System

Fiscal incentives in Kenya's free zones: To what extent are they consistent with the WTO rules on subsidies?

In Kenya, free zones take the form of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and are offered a myriad of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives. At the same time, Kenya, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is a signatory to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), which prohibits subsidies that are contingent on export performance or use of domestic over imported products. Although free zones are not mentioned specifically, fiscal incentives constitute subsidies since they are financial contributions, incomes or price supports given by the government or their agencies which confer benefits. In this regard, the article examines whether the fiscal incentives offered in Kenya's free zones meet the specificity test and are therefore consistent with the provisions on prohibited and actionable subsidies under the ASCM. The conclusion is that though the fiscal incentives offered in Kenya's free zones constitute financial contributions, they meet the specificity test and are consistent with ASCM rules on subsidies contingent on export performance and use of domestic over imported products, given that Kenya is allowed to grant export subsidies and none of the subsidies offered under the EPZs Act and SEZs Act require the use of domestic over imported products.

Playing the Game: The EU’s Proposed Regulation on Foreign Subsidies

The objective of ‘level playing field’ has become increasingly more present in international trade affairs. The European Union (EU) has recently embarked on a quest to promote and protect the level playing field within and outside the borders of the internal market. The most recent manifestation of this objective is the regulation of foreign subsidies, i.e., subsidies provided by non-EU countries to undertakings operating within the EU. The European Commission issued its proposal for a new Regulation with the goal of tackling distortions to the level playing field caused by foreign subsidies. The present article introduces the major concepts of the Proposal and provides a comparative analysis with EU State Aid law and the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Further, it pursues an economic analysis of the anticipated impact of the Proposal with a view of examining whether the Proposal is capable of addressing global distortions caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field. Lastly, the article examines the compatibility of the Proposal with Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. Trade Remedies, WTO Law, Subsidies, Treaty Interpretation, EU Law, International Trade Law

Analysis of the Legality of EU’s Countervailing Measures on ‘Transnational Subsidies’ : Focused on Territorial Scope and Attribution

중국이 일대일로 계획에 기초하여 적극적인 해외 진출 사업을 전개하고 있는 가운데 최근 EU는 중국이 제3국 진출 기업에 공여한 소위 ‘초국경 보조금’에 대해 상계관세를 부과하는 관행을 확립해 가고 있다. EU로서는 제3국을 우회하여 지급되는 새로운 형태의 보조금에 대처하기 위해 상계조치가 불가피하다는 입장이나 이 같은 조치가 현존 국제법상 타당한 것인지에 대해서는 별도의 분석이 필요하다.BR 이와 관련하여 본 고에서는 두 가지 쟁점에 주목하여 논의를 진행한다. 첫째, 현행 WTO 보조금 협정상 초국경 보조금이 허용되는지와 관련하여, WTO 보조금 협정의 문언 및 문맥, 관련 WTO 판정례 등을 검토하고, 보조금 각 구성요소의 영토적 범위를 확인한다. 이로써 WTO 보조금 협정은 보조금 공여국과 수출국이 동일한 경우를 상정하며, 수출국의 역외에 존재하는 국가가 수출국 영토 내의 기업에 공여하는 초국경 보조금까지 규율 대상으로 하는지에 대한 답이 회의적임을 확인한다. 둘째, EU는 국가책임법 제11조를 원용하여 중국의 보조금 공여 행위를 수출국에 ‘귀속’된다고 판단하였는데, 이 같은 판단이 타당한 것이었는지 국가책임법 제11조의 문언 및 주석의 내용, 국제재판소 판결 등에 비추어 검토한다. 이를 통해 국가책임법 제11조를 원용하여 타국의 행위를 귀속시키려면 ‘승인 및 채택’의 의사에 대한 추론을 정당하게 하는 분명한 근거가 제시되어야 하며, 승인에서 채택에 이르는 과정이 국가의 행위를 통해 명확히 확인될 수 있어야 할 것임을 확인한다.BR 미-중 전략경쟁이 심화되고 있는 오늘날 국제통상환경에서 주요국들은 공급망 재편 및 해외투자 문제에 대한 개입의 강도를 높여 가고 있다. 이러한 상황에서 초국경 보조금 규제는 자칫 국제사회에 보편화된 해외투자를 규제의 대상으로 전락시킬 소지가 있음을 주지할 필요가 있다. 초국경 보조금 규율의 필요성과 규율 가능성, 그리고 구체적인 규범방향에 대해 보다 근본적인 고민이 필요한 것으로 보인다.

Is Currency Undervaluation a Subsidy: US Law and Practice and the WTO Compatibility

On 4 February 2020, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) adopted revised Regulations Regarding Benefit and Specificity in Countervailing Duties Proceedings after reviewing solicited comments. Soon after, the Commerce initiated countervailing investigations against Vietnamese passenger vehicle tires and Chinese twist ties, and for the first time imposed preliminary countervailing duties (CVDs) against these two countries based on currency undervaluation. This article considers the revised regulations, two CVD investigations and their WTOcompatibility. We argue that views on whether or not currency undervaluation constitutes a subsidy reflect divergences between the US and other negotiating parties during the Uruguay Round on the definition of a subsidy. Whereas currency undervaluation does confer benefits to producers and exporters, it does not fulfill the criteria of ‘financial contribution’ and specificity as laid down in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement; thus the CVD decisions of the Commerce are WTO-incompatible. Currency undervaluation, Countervailing duties, subsidy, specificity, financial contribution

Inadequacy of SCM Rules of Benefit Determination in the Context of Non-market Economies

China’s decision to withdraw from the dispute pertaining to its Non-Market Economy (NME) status has bolstered the Member States’ intentions of resorting to stronger disciplinary actions against China and other NMEs. While anti-dumping measures have traditionally been pursued against NMEs, in recent years Member States have resorted to anti-subsidization measures as well. Even though the Appellate Body has warned against double counting, Member States continue to undertake Countervailing Duties (CVD) investigations against NMEs in addition to Anti-Dumping Duties (ADD) investigations. This article moves beyond the conventional discussions around double counting and attempts to determine whether the emphasis on antisubsidization measures against NMEs is justified. The paper focusses on the specifics of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, particularly the rules on benefit determination. There have been instances where the Appellate Body has adopted innovative methods of benefit determination to deal with situations where governments’ actions have distorted the markets. Can these same rules be applied against NMEs? And if so, are they effective and do they factor in all aspects of market distortions in NMEs? This article attempts to answer these questions by relying on China as an example. SCM Agreement, Benefit Determination, NME, NME Methodology, Alternative Benchmarks

Leveling the Playing Field: Industrial Policy and Export-Contingent Subsidies in India–Export Related Measures

AbstractIn India–Export Related Measures, the United States challenged a range of Indian measures as prohibited export-contingent subsidies, and a WTO panel largely agreed. This article examines the factors at play in the United States’ decision to bring the challenge. At the level of policy, the United States case reflects India's graduation from the protections afforded developing nations’ export-contingent subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. A closer examination, however, shows that India ramped up its export-contingent subsidies just as the SCM Agreement required it to wind those subsidies down. Moreover, the expanded Indian subsidies led to increased import competition with the politically influential metals and pharmaceutical sectors in the United States, which pushed the US challenge. We reflect on the larger implications of the challenge for the future of trade rules on industrial policy. In particular, we note that the United States pursued a trade enforcement policy that would have the effect of increasing pharmaceutical prices in the United States, by reducing subsidies for imported generic drugs, at a time when the Trump administration allegedly was trying to reduce the price of prescription drugs. This disconnect suggests the need for both greater transparency in trade policy and greater governmental coordination on the connection between trade policy and other policy priorities.