Counter-inflation Policy Research Articles

The Treasury and the New Cambridge School in the 1970s

With the release of Treasury papers from the 1970s under the 30-year rule we have a much more complete picture of the dispute in the 1970s between the Treasury and the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG), especially given the role of three Cambridge economists—Nicholas Kaldor, Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps—as ministerial advisers at the time. The records show some eventual closing of the gap between the Treasury and the CEPG regarding the latter’s proposition of stable private-sector NAFA (where NAFA stands for net acquisition of private sector assets) and its implications for demand management and the balance of payments. In contrast, the initial differences on counterinflation policy and, above all, on import controls versus free trade were wider at the end of the decade than at the start of it.

The Nature and Role of Monetary Policy when Money is Endogenous

This paper considers the nature and role of monetary policy when money is envisaged as credit money endogenously created within the private sector (by the banking system). Monetary policy is now based in many countries on the setting (or targeting) of a key interest rate, such as the Central Bank discount rate. The amount of money in existence then arises from the interaction of the private sector and the banks, based on the demand to hold money and the willingness of banks to provide loans. Monetary policy has become closely linked with the targeting of the rate of inflation. In this paper we consider whether monetary policy is well-equipped to act as a counter-inflation policy and discuss the more general role of monetary policy in the context of the treatment of money as endogenous. Currently, two schools of thought view money as endogenous. One school has been labeled the new consensus and the other the Keynesian endogenous (bank) money approach. Significant differences exist between the two approaches; the most important of these, for the purposes of this paper, is in the way in which the endogeneity of money is viewed. Although monetary policy - essentially interest rate policy - appears to be the same in both schools of thought, it is not. In this paper we investigate the differing roles of monetary policy in these two schools.

Inflation uncertainty, inflationary shocks and the credibility of counterinflation policy

This paper assesses the contributions of price shocks, general price variability, and the credibility of counterinflation policy to changes in inflation uncertainty in the U.K. Uncertainty is measured by the root mean square error of consumer inflation forecasts. In contrast to the assumptions of much theory, uncertainty is not significantly affected by noise in individual or aggregate inflation rates. Factors which determine policy credibility are more important — the political party in government, the proximity of elections, and, under fixed exchange rates, the rate of inflation itself. However, government initiatives to increase credibility, through incomes policies and monetary targets, have failed to reduce uncertainty.

On evaluating and extending the target zone proposal

This article examines the target zone proposal for exchange-rate management by presenting the results of simulations performed on both a large macroeconometric model and a small analytical model. The main conclusions derived from the large model are: (1) that exchange-rate-oriented monetary policy could have curbed misalignments without undermining counterinflation policy, but (2) a major impact on current balances would have required compensatory fiscal policy as well. The small model suggests the value of assigning world interest rates to the pursuit of a (flexible) world nominal income target and fiscal policy to national nominal income targets, if interest rate differentials are assigned to exchange-rate management.

INCOMES POLICY: Government Contracts and Counter Inflation Policy

INCOMES POLICY: <i>Government Contracts and Counter Inflation Policy</i>

How Insolvent are We?

As we grapple with the problems of conducting non-life insurance in a world of high inflation, we should perhaps pause for a moment to look for historical analogies for our present predicament. Let us, then, look back at a distressing period many years ago in the history of the Kingdom of Carmania.Inflation was by no means new to the citizens of Carmania. Year after year, all prices and incomes had been rising at a steady rate of 5% per annum. The economy functioned quite well, albeit in a rather uninteresting way, and the people were accustomed to the idea that the purchasing power of the Carmanian dollar would fall by roughly 5% every year. There were, however, some economists who argued that inflation was both undesirable and unnecessary, and prevailed upon the King to adopt some measures which, they assured him, would quickly reduce the rate of inflation to zero. The measures were adopted, and the following year the rate of inflation rose to 10%.At this point a rival group of economists explained that this unfortunate development was simply what should have been expected, and they set out an alternative policy which would undoubtedly reverse the trend and bring inflation quickly under control. Convinced by the weight of their arguments, the King introduced what became known as Phase 2 of the counter-inflation policy. By the next year, the rate of inflation had risen to 20%.

Chapter I. The Home Economy

The February issue of the Review was affected by the energy situation as to both length and the need for special treatment of the oil situation. Much material of the kind normally included in the pre-Budget issue was therefore omitted. For this reason the current issue contains rather more material than usual on the domestic economy in the form of a review of economic events over the last 12-18 months. A general review (pages 9-14) is followed by an assessment of various forecasts of the economy in 1973 (page 14) and then some discussion of the behaviour of prices and incomes since the introduction of the counter-inflation policy in November 1972 (page 17). Balance of payments developments are discussed on page 22. An analysis of trade and other developments since the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC begins on page 24 and the normal short-term forecast appears on pages 28-45.