Countercyclical Capital Buffer Research Articles

The Effect of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer on the Stability of the Housing Market

AbstractAfter the great turmoil of the latest financial crisis, the criticism of the regulatory frameworks became increasingly stronger. The rules that banks needed to comply with are presumed to be procyclical and unable to prevent and mitigate the extent of strong financial and economic cycles. As a result, Basel III introduced a set of macroprudential tools to overcome these regulatory shortfalls. One tool that strives to counteract the issue of procyclicality is the countercyclical capital buffer ($$CCyB$$ CCyB ). This paper introduces a heterogeneous agent-based model that investigates the implication of the new regulatory measure. We develop a housing and a financial market where economic agents trade residential property that is financed by financial institutions. To examine the macroeconomic performance of the $$CCyB$$ CCyB , we evaluate the dynamics of key stability indicators of the housing and the financial market under four different market conditions: in an undisturbed market and in times of three different structural shocks. Computational experiments reveal that the $$CCyB$$ CCyB is effective in stabilizing the housing and the financial market in all market settings. The new macroprudential tool helps to mitigate economic fluctuations and to stabilize market conditions, especially in the aftermath of a crisis. It is not able to prevent any of the crises tested. However, the extent of the stabilizing effect varies according to market conditions. In the shock scenarios, the $$CCyB$$ CCyB performs better in dampening market fluctuations and increasing banking soundness than in the base scenario.

Cross-border regulatory spillovers and macroprudential policy coordination

We develop a core–periphery model with financial frictions and cross-border banking to assess the magnitude of regulatory spillovers and the gains from macroprudential policy coordination. A core global bank lends to its affiliates in the periphery and banks in both regions are subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation. Following an expansionary monetary policy in the core, a countercyclical response in capital requirements in that region induces the global bank to increase cross-border lending. We calculate welfare gains associated with countercyclical capital buffers under a range of policy regimes, including independent policymaking, full coordination, and reciprocity—a regime in which capital ratios set in the core are imposed on the global bank’s affiliates abroad. One of our key results is that, even when regulatory spillovers are strong, reciprocity can make all parties better off if regulators attach a sufficient weight to financial stability considerations. With a standard, utility-based welfare criterion, reciprocity may also perform better than independent policymaking when regulatory spillovers are weak.

Capital inflow liberalization and bank credit risk

Using a panel of annual data, covering 2207 banks operating in 45 emerging, and developing economies, over the period of 2009–2020, we study the impact of liberalization on capital inflows. Our results indicate that capital inflow liberalization has a robust and positive impact on bank credit risk, as measured by non-performing loans. Upon further examination, we find that the positive effect is more pronounced when bond, money, and financial credit markets, which broaden firms’ financing channels, are liberalized. The liberalization intensifies competition and risk appetite among banks, leading to increased credit risk. The findings suggest that openness reduces banks’ credit growth while improving non-interest income. As expected, this positive effect is mitigated within large and competitive banks, and banks with more assets. Furthermore, we find that tightening macroprudential policies, especially countercyclical capital buffers, can help moderate the positive impact of capital inflow liberalization on bank credit risk.

Basel III countercyclical bank capital buffer estimation and its relation to monetary policy

This paper proposes a new model to estimate the countercyclical bank solvency capital buffer established in Basel III. The model lies in a flexible semi-nonparametric approach to capture the probability distribution of the capital adequacy ratio, but also a stochastic Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process that incorporates components of the cyclical behavior. We measure the risk of breaching the minimum capital threshold that separates the countercyclical capital buffer from other capital components and analyze its relationship with macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, credit levels, and credit-to-GDP gaps. Furthermore, a vector autoregressive model is estimated to test the existence of the bank-capital channel and the risk-taking channel. The application to Germany and the Netherlands shows that countercyclical buffers are more accurate when skewness and kurtosis are considered and the probability of breaching the regulatory threshold is sensitive to macroeconomic signals. Overall, our model seems to be a useful tool for monitoring prudential policy and as a guide to establish countercyclical capital buffers.

On the Macroprudential Policy Stance in an Emerging Economy

ABSTRACT Our paper examines the macroprudential policy stance for the Romanian economy by considering simultaneously, unlike other papers, how borrower (Loan-to-Value Instruments) and capital-based instruments (Countercyclical Capital buffers, or CCyB) can be used together. We propose a forward-looking rule with lagged expectations for the CCyB, which is aligned with the European Systemic Risk Board’s recommendation regarding the moment of decision and implementation. Our paper also contributes to the literature by proposing a shock structure that is able to replicate that financial cycles are more volatile than economic cycles. Our main finding is that policy makers should comprehensively assess the resulting effects when deciding about the macroprudential policy stance.

Effects of COVID‐19 support measures on bank lending: Lessons from the release of countercyclical capital buffer and loan guarantee schemes in Hong Kong

AbstractBased on a panel of banks in Hong Kong, we found that banks with a relatively thin capital buffer and liquidity before the pandemic may constrain their post‐pandemic loan growth. We further found strong evidence that the release of countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) requirements amid the pandemic mitigated the capital constraint to support continued provision of bank credit to the real economy, but mainly to non‐hard hit economic sectors. Nevertheless, the credit flow to hard‐hit economic sectors is found to be well supported by the SME Financing Guarantee Scheme.

The Impact of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer on Credit: Evidence From Its Accumulation and Release Before and During Covid-19

The Impact of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer on Credit: Evidence From Its Accumulation and Release Before and During Covid-19

Calibrating the countercyclical capital buffer using AUROCs

AbstractWhile the setting of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is not an automatic decision, insights from indicators, such as the credit‐to‐GDP gap, are a starting point to inform the policy decision. This paper identifies an optimal rule to map the credit‐to‐GDP gap to the guide to set the CCyB. We use Italian data and follow two alternative procedures. First, we apply the criteria suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Then we depart from the BCBS approach by proposing a procedure based on the maximization of the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. We also explore whether the CCyB, had it been in place, would have mitigated the repercussions of the Great Financial Crisis on the Italian banking system. Based on a stylized exercise, the full release of the CCyB at the outbreak of the crisis would have freed around €40 billion of capital, a value close to the total amount of banks' credit provisions during the 3 following years.

The countercyclical capital buffer and international bank lending: Evidence from Canada

We examine the impact of the recently introduced Basel III countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) on foreign lending activities of Canadian banks. By exploiting the variation in CCyB rates across countries, we overcome the identification challenge associated with limited time-series evidence on the CCyB's use in individual jurisdictions. We show that in response to a 1-percentage-point tightening announcement in a foreign CCyB, the growth rate of cross-border lending between Canadian banks and borrowers abroad decreases by 12-17 percentage points. The direction of this effect is likely driven by the CCyB's unique reciprocity rule, which also subjects foreign banks to domestic regulation.

Reversal interest rate and macroprudential policy

Could a monetary policy loosening in a low interest rate environment have unintended recessionary effects? Using a non-linear macroeconomic model fitted to the euro area economy, we show that the effectiveness of monetary policy can decline in negative territory until it reaches an endogenous turning point, where monetary policy becomes contractionary. The framework demonstrates that the risk of hitting the rate at which the effect reverses depends on the capitalization of the banking sector. The possibility of the reversal interest rate gives rise to a novel motive for macroprudential policy. We show that macroprudential policy in the form of a countercyclical capital buffer, which prescribes the build-up of buffers in good times, substantially mitigates the probability of encountering the reversal rate and increases the effectiveness of negative interest rate policies. This new motive emphasizes the strategic complementarities between monetary policy and macroprudential policy.

Monetary and Macroprudential Policy and Welfare in an Estimated Four‐Agent New Keynesian Model

Monetary and Macroprudential Policy and Welfare in an Estimated Four‐Agent New Keynesian Model

Application of Countercyclical Capital Buffer System and Analysis of Financial Pressure

Application of Countercyclical Capital Buffer System and Analysis of Financial Pressure

Countercyclical Capital Buffers: A Cautionary Tale

AbstractCountercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs) are an old idea recently resurrected. They compel systemically important banks to accumulate capital during expansions to sustain operations during downturns. We compare banks before the Great Depression, when CCyBs existed, and Great Recession, when they did not. Pre‐Depression systemically important banks built capital buffers between 3% and 5% of total assets during booms, nearly twice the maximum modern CCyB, while also reducing risky lending and building cash reserves. These buffers enabled banks at the core of the financial system to continue operations during severe crises while the rest of the financial system collapsed. This analogy indicates that modern countercyclical buffers may achieve their goals of protecting core banks during crises but raises questions about whether they will contribute to overall financial stability.

Global capital flows and the role of macroprudential policy

Can countercyclical bank capital buffers reduce the negative effects of global liquidity shocks? We use the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as a natural experiment to document the role of the banking system as a transmission channel of global financial disturbances to the real economy. Using central bank administrative data, our results suggest that in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse the banking channel is responsible for 1.44% of the aggregate drop in investment and 0.58% of the drop in aggregate employment. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-cyclical macroprudential policies, we model an open-economy with a banking sector. We compare the drop in actual GDP during the 2008 financial crisis against the counterfactual GDP had Basel III style counter-cyclical capital buffers (CCyB) been in place. We find that the GDP drop in the counterfactual scenario would have been 6 p.p. lower than in the data. We also demonstrate the beneficial effects of the CCyB in mitigating tail risk (GDP at Risk). We show that, over a 3–5 year horizon, the GDP distribution with an operational CCyB would have a higher mean and a much thinner left tail when compared to an economy without a CCyB.

Countercyclical capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis

This paper examines how European banks adjusted their lending subsequent to the release of the countercyclical capital buffers (CCyB) during the COVID-19 pandemic. At its onset in 2020Q1, being exposed to a higher ex-ante countercyclical capital buffer led to a reduction in banks’ lending. Yet the relief of the CCyBs removed this negative effect from 2020Q2 onwards. We find that the reduction in CCyBs led to a significant relative increase in the average bank’s lending by about 5.6 percentage points of their total assets. This increase happened mainly in retail mortgage loans and was stronger for poorly-capitalized banks. These results imply that the release of the CCyBs was effective in promoting bank lending during the pandemic.

Policy packages and policy space: Lessons from COVID-19

This paper uses the onset of COVID-19 to examine how countries construct their policy packages in response to a severe negative shock. We use several new datasets to track the use of a large variety of policy tools: announced fiscal stimulus (both above- and below-the-line), monetary policy (through interest rates, asset purchases, liquidity support and swap lines), foreign currency intervention, adjustments to macroprudential regulations (including the countercyclical capital buffer) and changes in capital controls (on inflows and outflows). The results suggest that pre-existing policy space was usually more important than other country characteristics and the extent of “stress” (in economic, financial, and health measures) in determining how a country responded to COVID-19. The notable exception is for fiscal stimulus, for which existing policy space did not act as a significant constraint in advanced economies. This is a sharp contrast to results for earlier episodes—although advanced economies with higher debt levels may have been constrained in how they provided stimulus (with more below-the-line commitments). Moreover, the use of (and space available) for each policy tool usually did not affect a country's use of other policies. This suggests that countries are not coordinating their tools optimally in an integrated framework, especially when policy space is limited for certain tools.

How do markets react to tighter bank capital requirements?

We use hikes in the countercyclical capital buffer [CCyB] to measure how markets react to tighter bank capital requirements. Our identification strategy relies on two unique features of the CCyB institutional framework in Europe. First, all national authorities make quarterly announcements of CCyB rates. Second, these hikes affect all European banks proportionally to their exposure to the country of activation. We show that CCyB hikes translate in lower CDS spreads for affected banks, in particular those poorly capitalised. On the other hand, bank valuations do not react. Markets therefore consider that higher countercyclical capital requirements make banks more stable at no material cost for shareholders. We claim that these effects relate to the capital constraint itself, as opposed to the potential signal conveyed on the state of the financial cycle.

The Cyclical Behavior of Capital Buffer of Indonesian Islamic and Conventional Banks

This paper is aimed at analyzing the cyclical behavior of capital buffer of Islamic and conventional banks in Indonesia. More specifically, this paper has three objectives. First, to test whether capital buffer in Indonesian banking industry as a whole is countercyclical or procyclical. Second, to test whether there is a difference in the level of capital buffer of Islamic banks as compared to the level of capital buffer of conventional banks. Third, to test whether there is a difference in the cyclicality of capital buffer of Islamic and conventional banks. The analysis in this paper is conducted using the standard dynamic system generalized method of moments (system GMM) regressions and includes a panel of 108 banks over the period between 2004 and 2019. From the results, it can be concluded that the capital buffer of Islamic and conventional banks in Indonesia is procyclical. From the results, it can also be concluded that no difference exists in the level of capital buffer of Islamic banks as compared to conventional banks and in the cyclicality of capital buffer in Islamic and conventional banking. If the countercyclical capital buffer is achieved, a policy measure to alter the cyclical behavior of capital buffer of Islamic and conventional banks in Indonesia therefore is a must. Such policy measure needs not to be specified for Islamic or conventional banking industry.

Credit gaps as banking crisis predictors: A different tune for middle- and low-income countries

The aim of this paper is to assess the quality of credit-based variables as early warning indicators of systemic banking crises. The existing literature focuses mainly on developed economies and shows that the best performing indicator is the credit-to-GDP gap computed via one-sided HP filter (the so-called Basel credit gap). The empirical evidence legitimates the use of the credit-to-GDP gap as a key indicator in macro-prudential banking regulation, i.e., in the determination of the countercyclical capital buffer. We take advantage of a new database on bank credit series and credit gaps covering more than 160 countries (Bouvatier, Delatte and Rehault, 2022) to focus specifically on middle- and low-income countries. Our findings suggest that the credit-to-GDP gap remains the single best performing indicator regarding the high-income group while the same does not hold for middle- and low-income countries. This result highlights that a one-size-fits-all approach is not relevant in the design of the operational framework of the countercyclical capital buffer. Further, we show that the credit gap turns to be a fair banking crises predictor when the financial development, captured by the trend’s value in credit-to-GDP ratio, exceeds 20%.

The Effect of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer on the Stability of the Housing Market

The Effect of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer on the Stability of the Housing Market