Costs Of Voting Research Articles

Exploring voter turnout dynamics in polarized elections: A group-rule utilitarian framework

Do differentiated policies encourage higher voter turnout than centrist policies? This paper uses the citizen-candidate model and group-based utilitarian approach of costly voting to study how political polarization affects voter turnout under positive voting costs. Two parties enter the electoral competition with a pre-commitment on the platforms, and the winner implements their ideal policy. Comparative statistics results demonstrate that under positive voting costs, the expected turnout is always positive in the presence of political polarization and is only zero when the policies converge. In addition, the expected turnout rises with increased polarization and decreases with voting costs. This study exhaustively demonstrates that positive voter turnout is feasible only when policy differentiation exists.

Using Cell-phone Mobility Data to Study Voter Turnout

AbstractStudies of voting behavior in some settings may be hampered by poor data availability or unsuitably large units of aggregation for reported turnout. We propose and demonstrate a practical big-data solution to these kinds of challenges, using fine-grained cell-phone mobility data on millions of GPS locations for more than 300,000 eligible voters in Tokyo. Our approach uses the geolocations of polling stations, combined with GPS data points recorded on election day and a reference day, to measure patterns in individual-level (but anonymized) voting behavior. We first test the validity of the measure by comparing it to official aggregated data on turnout, and then illustrate its substantive utility with an application exploring the well-known relationship between turnout decisions and the cost of voting, proxied by the distance between a voter’s residence and the polling station. Finally, we discuss the potential limitations of the approach and provide step-by-step instructions for other researchers.

Cost of Voting in the American States: 2024

Cost of Voting in the American States: 2024

The Costs of Voting and Voter Confidence

We revisit the effect of ballot access laws on voter confidence in the outcome of elections. Previous research found weak or no relationship between voter confidence and election laws regulating ballot access. We argue this non-finding is conditioned by partisanship. Democrats and Republicans view election laws through a partisan lens, which is especially triggered when coalitions lose. Republican voters see ballot restrictions as a means of securing the vote against fraud; Democratic voters see ballot restrictions as voter suppression. We maintain that the conditional partisan effect that election laws have on voter confidence is triggered or attenuated when partisans’ candidates lose elections. We find that in states where ballot access is costly, voter confidence among partisans and supporters of the losing Presidential candidate is significantly higher for Republicans and significantly lower for Democrats than their counterparts in states with less costly ballot access laws. These effects are greater for Republican than Democrats. We discuss the implications of our findings on election ecosystems and voter confidence.

Who Pays the Price for the Cost of Voting

This paper will explore the combined effect of restrictive voting policies­ as measured by the Cost of Voting Index (COVI), a measure developed by political scientists associated with States United Democracy Center and Northern Illinois University—on voter turnout in Presidential elections, paying specific attention to the impact of such policies on minority populations. It will explore the state-level relationships between the cost associated with voting policies and the voter turnout rate of racial groups in presidential elections over the period of 1996 to 2016, examining the question of how voting rights policies influence the turnout rate of minority voters in U.S. presidential elections.

In-person or convenience voting? The role of the direct costs in explaining preferences for voting modalities

High turnout is crucial for political legitimacy. By reducing the direct costs of voting in person, such as queuing and taking time off work, convenience voting modalities are expected to increase turnout. Yet, little is known about the role these costs play in explaining how citizens want to vote. This paper investigates whether perceptions of the direct costs of voting influence individual preferences for in-person compared to convenience forms of balloting such as voting by mail, or absentee voting. Using original cross-sectional data and a preregistered survey experiment encompassing the 2022 US midterm elections, I find that higher direct costs reduce individual preferences for in-person voting. Importantly, this reduction is not compensated by higher preferences for convenience modalities.

Causes And Solutions for Low Turnout Rates in Chinese Local Elections: From A Plebeian Perspective

There have been ample academic efforts discussing prospects of liberalizing the authoritarian regime in China, but most of them primarily addressed possible institutional reforms by the party and to some extent overlooked importance of the mass. Therefore, this article attempts to identify factors that dissuade or refrain Chinese citizens from voting in local elections and devise corresponding solutions, for their political enthusiasm to be improved independently of state sanctions, while the finding may provide a novel theory regarding weak correlation between the level of political freedom and turnout rate in liberal democracies. By considering subjects as economic agents in cost-benefit analysis, the combination of underestimated benefits and overestimated costs of voting is highlighted as one fundamental reason for non-voting, which comprises of antiquated cultural norms, aloof social relations and inappropriately handled class struggles. In response to phenomenon of apoliticism, political cynicism or political inactiveness, this paper suggests eligible voters to keenly defend their interests, for instance studying publicized government information, participating in trade unions and respecting their suffrage, as the prerequisite for becoming genuinely and consistently active in political affairs.

The effect of education on voter turnout in China's rural elections

Conventional wisdom and evidence from democracies suggest that more education should increase voter turnout. This paper revisits this issue by analyzing turnout in China's rural elections. Employing an instrumental variable strategy, I find that more education reduces turnout in rural elections. I provide suggestive evidence that more educated people may face higher opportunity costs of voting, which explain about a quarter of cross-province variation in education-turnout links. I also discuss the role of other factors, including Confucian culture and election stakes.

The effect of split-ticket voting cost on effective enfranchisement

The features of electoral systems affect electoral outcomes even for fixed societal preferences. We analyze a quasi-experiment around a change in voting technology that reduces the cost of split-ticket voting. We find that the reform increases split-ticket voting, has no impact on vote shares in executive races, and benefits small parties in multiple-seat races, resulting in higher political fragmentation. This suggests that voters prioritize executive races and that, when the costs to split the ticket are large, straight-ticket voting is incentivized and decisions on the executive race drive decisions on other races. In particular, strategic voting on the single-seat race has spillovers to races with a proportional representation system, where strategic incentives are less prominent. The reform reduces the costs of disassociating executive from legislative races and allows voters to more easily express their preferences.

Which States Adopt Election-Subversion Policies?

Research highlights a growing divergence among U.S. states in their costs of voting, the partisan balance of their legislative districts, and the responsiveness of state policy to public opinion. Less is known, however, about a new and acute threat to democracy at the state level: policies that increase the states’ vulnerability to election subversion. In this article, we investigate recent trends in state legislation that transfer election administration authority from independent to partisan actors, making it more likely that a losing presidential candidate could take office over the will of the electorate. We find that Republican control of state legislatures and the closeness of the 2020 presidential election are associated with these policies. Interestingly, these policies are mostly uncorrelated with gerrymandering and voter suppression policies that were enacted in the 2010s. We conclude with a discussion of how a recent Electoral Count Act reform in Congress partly mitigates the risk of election subversion.

Certificateless ring signature from NTRU lattice for electronic voting

Number theory research unit (NTRU) lattice has small storage space, high execution efficiency and anti-quantum security. To obtain the quantum immunity and high efficiency in electronic voting, we devise certificateless ring signature from NTRU lattice (NTRUL-CLRS) for electronic voting in this article. Security of NTRUL-CLRS relies on the small integer solution on ring (R-SIS) assumption. Rejection sampling technique is used to generate the ring signature and so the signature speed is greatly improved. NTRUL-CLRS has the quantum immunity, unconditional anonymity and unforgeability; it is suitable for application in electronic voting system because it simplifies the electronic voting process and reduces the electronic voting cost.

Polls of fear? Electoral violence, incumbent strength, and voter turnout in Côte d’Ivoire

How, and under what conditions, does electoral violence influence voter turnout? Existing research often presumes that electoral violence demobilizes voters, but we lack knowledge of the conditions under which violence depresses turnout. This study takes a subnational approach to probe the moderating effect of local incumbent strength on the association between electoral violence and turnout. Based on existing work, I argue that electoral violence can reduce voter turnout by heightening threat perceptions among voters and eroding public trust in the electoral system, thereby raising the expected costs of voting and undermining the belief that one’s vote matters. Moreover, I propose that in elections contested across multiple local rather than a single national voting district, the negative effect of electoral violence on turnout should be greater in districts where the incumbent is stronger. This is because when the incumbent is stronger, voters have lesser strategic and purposive incentives to vote than voters in localities where the opposition is stronger. I test the argument by combining original subnational event data on electoral violence before Côte d’Ivoire’s 2021 legislative elections with electoral records. The results support the main hypothesis and indicate that electoral violence was associated with significantly lower voter turnout in voting districts where the incumbent was stronger, but not where the opposition was stronger. The study contributes new knowledge on the conditions under which electoral violence depresses voter turnout, and suggests that voters in opposition strongholds can be more resilient to electoral violence than often assumed.

The Cost of Voting and the Cost of Votes

In new democracies, political parties often use clientelist strategies to mobilize voters during elections. In this article, we show that political machines systematically use vote buying to target voters with low costs of voting. We employ a geocoded survey of 3,192 respondents collected immediately after the municipal elections of 2016 in South Africa. We combine the survey data with administrative data on the geographical location of more than 22,600 polling stations. Our identification strategy exploits discontinuities in distances to vote generated by voting district boundaries in South Africa. This allows us to proxy the cost of voting with distance to the polling station and estimate the causal effect of the cost of voting on parties’ use of vote buying. The results have important implications for core assumptions concerning parties’ targeting strategies and for how electoral institutions shape the linkage strategies parties use to mobilize political support.

Costs of voting and firm performance: Evidence from RegTech adoption in Chinese listed firms

Employing the 2014 mandatory adoption of online shareholder voting in China, we show that the reduction of voting costs through online voting is positively related to participation in shareholder meetings and future firm performance. Our mechanism analysis suggests that the improved firm performance is mainly driven by the enhanced governance role played by informed investors and institutional investors. Further analysis shows that online shareholder voting makes the firms more attractive to mutual fund managers who are far away from the firms. Moreover, we find that the improved firm performance is concentrated in firms with low controlling shareholder ownership, and that online shareholder voting is associated with an increased likelihood of vetoing proposals and lower tunneling.

Mitigating the Turnout Effects of Bad Weather With Early Voting: 1948–2016

We identify in-person early voting and no-excuse mail voting as antidotes for the depressing effect inclement weather has on voter turnout and the Republican dividend that accompanies rain and snow on Election Day. We offer and test an explanation for how voters utilize early voting to anticipate and avoid the costs of voting in bad weather. Replicating and extending Gomez et al (2007) analysis through the 2016 election, we confirm the remedial effect in-person early voting and to a lesser degree no-excuse mail voting has on turnout and the Republican advantage when bad weather coincides with Election Day. Our work makes an important contribution to understanding how election laws effect voter participation. We discuss how taking seriously treatment effect heterogeneity both in theoretical and empirical analyses might contribute to our understanding of the effects of election laws on voter participation.

Large elections and interim turnout

We examine the effect of the interim release of turnout information on elections in a model of a large electorate with a common voting cost, private values, and two alternatives. We consider that (i) one group of citizens votes before the rest and that (ii) the individuals of the second group know the first group's turnout—but not the vote tally—before they vote. The alternative with more votes in total is implemented. Our main result is that there is an equilibrium in which the ex-ante probability that each alternative is implemented is one half and, hence, the same as when no information about turnout is released. We also show several equilibrium properties of our political game which both broaden our theoretical understanding of the costly-voting paradigm and provide testable hypotheses about elections. Our insights remain valid for some extensions of our baseline setup.

Cost of Voting in the American States: 2022*

Cost of Voting in the American States: 2022*

Does Voting in One Election Reduce the Expected Cost of Voting in Subsequent Elections?

AbstractThe decision to vote is partly based on the expected cost of voting. We test the hypothesis that voting in one election reduces the expected cost of voting in the following election, as voters learn that the cost of voting is low. Using three different datasets—the National Electors Study conducted during the 2019 Canadian federal election; a two-wave YouGov survey in British Columbia and Quebec in 2008 and 2009, at the time of the federal and subsequent provincial elections; and a five-wave survey conducted for the Making Electoral Democracy Work project in Bavaria in 2013 and 2014, before and after the Land, federal and European elections—we find that voters who voted in a previous election perceive it will be easier to vote in a subsequent election. We also find evidence that voting leads to more accurate estimates of how little time it takes to vote.

Voter Turnout and Preference Aggregation

We study how voter turnout affects the aggregation of preferences in elections. Under voluntary voting, election outcomes disproportionately aggregate the preferences of voters with low voting cost and high preference intensity. We show identification of the correlation structure among preferences, costs, and perceptions of voting efficacy, and explore how the correlation affects preference aggregation. Using 2004 US presidential election data, we find that young, low-income, less-educated, and minority voters are underrepresented. All of these groups tend to prefer Democrats, except for the less educated. Democrats would have won the majority of the electoral votes if all eligible voters had turned out. (JEL D12, D72)

Real and perceived voting costs: Lithuanian emigrants’ discourses on external voting difficulty

AbstractDue to international migration, increasing numbers of eligible voters are abroad when their home countries hold elections. Employing the theory of voting costs and benefits and focussing on a case of Lithuania, this article presents an unprecedented qualitative enquiry into difficulties behind emigrant (non)voting. Besides real voting costs, interviews with Lithuanian emigrants reveal importance of perceived voting costs when one decides whether to vote—thereby also introducing to the field a novel theoretical framework for examining voting costs and benefits both in and beyond migration context. The paper demonstrates that in addition to implementing adequate provisions for external voting from the home country's side, it is crucial for the authorities to raise awareness of these accommodations—and of the associated conditions, such as registration terms and postal voting deadlines—in order to yield as high as possible participation levels among those emigrants who are willing to vote.