Cost Of Cheating Research Articles

Strategies for Detecting Infidelity: An Explorative Analysis

People frequently adopt extra-pair mating strategies, which could be potentially harmful for their legitimate partners. In order to protect themselves from the costs of cheating, people need first to detect infidelity, and for this purpose, they employ specific infidelity-detection strategies. By using a combination of qualitative research methods, we identified 47 acts that people perform in order to detect their partners’ infidelity. Using quantitative methods, we classified these acts into six broader strategies for detecting infidelity. Participants indicated that they were more likely to employ the “Observe changes in her/his behavior,” followed by the “Ask and observe her/his reactions,” and the “Check where she/he is” strategies. Almost 58% of the participants indicated that they would use three or more strategies in order to detect their partners’ infidelity. We also found that higher scorers in Machiavellianism and psychopathy were more likely to employ the identified strategies than lower scorers. In addition, sex and age effects were found for most strategies.

Why do scientists cheat? Insights from behavioral economics

Based on a review of the books by Wible (2014), Stephan (2012), and Lanteri and Vromen (2014), I discuss three different ways in which behavioral economics can enrich the understanding of scientific misbehavior. First, behavioral economics suggests that economic theories of scientific misbehavior, such as the one by Wible (2014), should consider moral costs of cheating, i.e. costs that arise from an individual’s desire to do the “right thing.” Second, behavioral economics demonstrates several ways in which the features of the reward scheme in science,as described by Stephan (2012), can favor cheating. Her conclusion that shirking is rarely an issue in science seems optimistic. Third, behavioral economics indicates that individual characteristics matter for cheating. According to Lanteri and Vromen (2014), economists possess different characteristics than other researchers. Hence, the reaction to incentives may differ across disciplines. Considering these insights is important to assess how a goal such as the pursuit of truth can be achieved efficiently.

Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs

AbstractMost research in contract theory concentrated on the role of incentives in shaping individual behavior. Recent research suggests that social norms also play an important role. From a point of view of a mechanism designer (a principal, a government, and a bank), responsiveness of an agent to the social norms is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it provides the designer with extra instruments, while on the other it puts restrictions on how these new and the more conventional instruments can be used. The main objective of this paper is to investigate this trade-off and study how it shapes different contracts observed in the real world. We consider a model in which agent’s cost of cheating is triggered by the principal’s show of trust. We call such behavior a norm of honesty and trust and show that it drives incentives to be either low powerful or high powerful, eliminating contracts with medium powerful incentives.

Litigation Cost Allocation Rules, Judicial Detection Skill, and the Propensity to International Trade

The paper analyzes the effects of different litigation cost allocation rules, detection skill of judges (judicial errors), and the mode of enforcement of foreign judgments on the home bias in trade and sheds a new light on the so-called border-effect puzzle. In our model the border effect or home bias is due to a violation of the contractual compliance constraint. Three types of transaction costs play a role in this context: costs of opportunistic suits (litigation opportunism), costs of legitimate suits and costs of cheating (contractual opportunism). Two rules of international procedural law regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments are considered: automatic enforcement of foreign judgments and enforcement after a judicial review. Our theoretical analysis suggests that both the British as well as the American rule of litigation cost allocation can, in principle, induce bilateral contractual compliance, but only if judges possess positive detection skill. It depends on the specification of the parameters of the international legal order and the features of a transaction which rule is the better one. Finally, the paper discusses a recent empirical study and data from a report by the World Bank which are consistent with the paper’s theoretical findings.

Information Sharing on Examinations

Given the right incentives, individuals may share valuable information even when such sharing would not otherwise be in their self-interest. For example, consider examinations administered to multiple sections of the same course. Short of drafting a new exam for each section, instructors often make exam-specific information less valuable (e.g., scrambling responses or changing problems), remind students of the inherent cost of sharing information (e.g., grading on a single curve), or raise the cost of cheating by implementing severe punishment for such actions. Yet, the incentives for sharing exam information seem compelling for many students. These incentives may include the psychic utility of being a good friend, peer pressure, coercion, and the promise of bilateral backscratching. The pervasiveness of information sharing on examinations is difficult to measure without direct observation, so we conducted the following experiment. During the Fall semester, 2006, one of the authors taught three back-to-back classes in Principles of Finance. Enrollment in each class was about 50. On the first of the course’s exams, the same test was administered to each section. The test included 25 multiple choice questions of varying difficulty, testing mastery of concepts as the more quantitative material came later in the course. The tests had not been used before. Notes were not allowed. Means for the three sections were 70.5%, 76.6%, and 76.3%, respectively. Consistent with sharing, the later classes out-performed the first class, although it could be that sections differed in ability and effort. To control for such factors, we Atl Econ J (2007) 35:503–504 DOI 10.1007/s11293-007-9085-7

Consumer Perceptions and Reality of Cheating by Sellers in Food Markets in Ukraine

In developing markets the degree of regulation of weights and measures is often at a low level. In such an environment consumers frequently believe themselves to be the victims of unscrupulous sellers. Markets in the Ukraine fit such a pattern. In an effort to assess the costs of cheating, two studies were undertaken. First, consumers were surveyed to assess their perceptions and defenses against cheating. Second, purchases were made in the market to assess the actual degree of cheating. In general, consumers believe that they are almost always cheated and have no recourse. However, based on purchases, on average, sellers do not cheat consumers.

Collusion and Price Wars in the Australian Coal Industry during the Late Nineteenth Century

This essay examines the behaviour of coal mining companies in late nineteenth-century Australia in light of recent research on strategic firm behaviour. The Northern Collieries vend explored a number of institutional arrangements designed to increase the amount of public information and raise the costs of cheating. Output apportioning and profit redistribution schemes were employed to increase the costs to any individual firm of over-production. Wage contracts between the coal mining union and collieries included a sliding-scale component linked to the cartel price; the union was an important monitoring agent increasing the amount of public information on firm behaviour. Periodic price wars involved chiselling on the cartel price and bargaining behaviour to influence future agreements.

A Test for Conspecific Egg Discrimination in Three Species of Colonial Passerine Birds

Abstract Naturally occurring populations of three species of colonial passerine birds, the Piñon Jay (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus), Great-tailed Grackle (Quiscalis mexicanus), and Barn Swallow (Hirundo rustica), were tested for conspecific egg discrimination and the presence of intraspecific brood parasitism that such discrimination would imply. Current theory predicts that intraspecific brood parasitism, or cheating, might occur when a brood parasite's fitness is enhanced relative to a nonparasite's. Due to the high cost of parental care in altricial birds, selection for defenses against such cheaters should also be intense. Egg rejection is the most common selection mechanism against interspecific brood parasites, and I tested for the presence or absence of this mechanism. Single eggs were switched between pairs of 19 Piñon Jay nests, 15 Great-tailed Grackle nests, and 14 Barn Swallow nests, and a fifth egg was added to each of 8 Piñon Jay nests. No significant level of rejection of introduced eggs was found, possibly either because the cost of cheating is too great or because egg discrimination and rejection are not the mechanisms of selection against cheaters in the populations tested.