People have been found to experience pain when spending money, which can help regulate spending. For some, pain levels are optimal for managing spending (‘unconflicted’), but for others these levels are too low (‘spendthrifts’) or too high (‘tightwads’). We evaluate the effect of spending reminder nudges across subjects with different levels of pain of paying. To do so, we use a laboratory spending task where we vary the market context through treatments with different availability of product quality information (full, opt in, no information), and nudges designed to encourage rational spending (an opportunity cost reminder, an arbitrage reminder, no reminder). Two key results emerge. First, reminder nudges have undesired welfare effects. Tightwads, who already spend too little, significantly reduce their spending when reminded of opportunity costs, while spending by spendthrifts, who spend too much, is unaffected. Opportunity cost reminders therefore exacerbate the predisposition of tightwads to feel too much pain of paying, rather than encourage all types to make more rational decisions. Arbitrage reminders have similar effects, but results are mixed and weaker. Second, the context most helpful in reducing pain of paying for tightwads and increasing pain of paying for spendthrifts is the standard condition of an efficient market: fully-provided, costless information and no spending nudges.