Cost Of Public Good Provision Research Articles

Grants and marginal cost of public funding: Empirical evidence for local governments in Brazil

This paper documents empirical evidence on price-effect caused by lumpsum grants for local governments in Brazil between 2006 to 2010. Dahlby (2011) demonstrates theoretically that lump-sum grants can reduce the cost of public goods provision (price-effect), in addition to the traditional income effect. Our contributions are threefold. First we estimated semielasticity of the effects of tax rate changes on tax base (−0.016). Second, we calculate the MCF of the local tax imposed on the supply of services (ISS) for Brazilian municipalities (average of 0.04). Finally, we estimate the priceeffect estimation for ISS tax. Our results suggests that for the entire sample, that an increase in R$ 1.00 in per capita unconditional transfers reduces the local price effect (MCF) around 0.07%, but this result is not consistently estimated across all subsamples.

Shaping the Size of Nations: A Test of the Determinants of Secessions

Little is known about the empirical determinants of state formation and dissolution, despite a rich theoretical literature on the subject. This paper attempts to fill that gap by treating the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a historical experiment in state breakup. I exploit regional variation in separatist protests across the 184 provinces of the Union to measure a demand for secession. This allows for a test of economic theories predicting that the incentive to secede should be determined by the trade-off between the cost of public goods provision and preference heterogeneity. I find strong evidence for the existence of this trade-off in shaping demand for secession. Similarly, I find that economic theory is to some extent able to predict the extent to which regional elites are actually pursuing a separatist policy. However, I also show that the popular demand for secession had little causal effect on actual separatist policy once exogenous variation in the propensity to protest is taken into account.

Social Security Transfers and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds

Recent estimates of the marginal cost of public funds differ substantially. Some studies argue that the efficiency cost of taxation counter the welfare gain connected to redistribution of income. Hence, the efficiency cost of taxation should not be included as a cost of public goods provision. Kleven and Kreiner (2006), however, argue that the cost of public goods provision may double in countries with a large welfare state due to exit from the labor market. This study shows that the cost of public goods provision should be increased with less than 15 percent when categorical transfers redistributed income even though taxation may lead to exit from the labor market.

Ramsey, Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents, and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities

AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of nonatmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second‐best level of public good provision to exceed the first‐best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, the second‐best commodity tax rate may fall short of the first‐best rate. Moreover, in this case, heterogeneity may imply an equity‐efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the nonatmospheric type.

Ramsey, Pigou, Heterogenous Agents, and Non-Atmospheric Consumption Externalities

This paper analyzes the effects of non-atmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second-best level of public good provision to exceed the first-best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, heterogeneity may imply an equity-efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the non-atmospheric type.

RESOURCE CURSE, POLITICAL ENTRY, AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”

Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem

This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule, which takes not only the marginal costs of public funds into account but also the desirability of preference revelation. Under a linear income tax more able individuals suffer from a larger utility loss if taxes are raised to cover the cost of public good provision. This implies that these individuals are tempted to understate their valuation of the public good. Likewise, less productive individuals are inclined to exaggerate their valuation. These incentive concerns require the use of excessive taxes. They ensure a truthful revelation of preferences for the public good. Under an optimal utilitarian tax constitution, individuals are not granted influence on public good provision if the taxes needed to induce informative behavior are prohibitively high.

Cost-Benefit Rules for Public Good Provision with Distortionary Taxation

The paper shows that a comparison of the appropriately-weighted sum of households’ marginal willingness to pay for a public good with the net effect of the increased supply of the public good on shadow, as distinct from actual, government revenue is a generally valid rule for public good provision. This rule does not depend on any assumption that existing policy is optimal. The practical problems in measuring the true social cost of additional public good provision involve the need to estimate shadow prices of non-traded goods and goods which are not traded at given world prices The marginal cost of public funds is not required in order to measure the social cost of public good provision.