Copyright Protection For Computer Software Research Articles

<i>Google v. Oracle</i> Amicus Certiorari Stage Brief: Vindicating IP’s Channeling Principle and Restoring Jurisdictional Balance to Software Copyright Protection

The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Oracle v. Google conflict with this Court’s seminal decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), misinterpret Congress’s codification of this Court’s fundamental channeling principle and related limiting doctrines, and upend nearly three decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits on the scope of copyright protection for computer software. Based on the fundamental channeling principle enunciated in Baker v. Selden, as reflected in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the functional requirements of APIs for computer systems and devices, like the internal workings of other machines, are outside of the scope of copyright protection even as non-merged aspects of the implementing code for APIs are protectable. Google independently implemented the functional specifications of the 37 APIs at issue and hence did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights. By way of brief illustration, copyright protects artistic and literary works, such as a creative metal sculpture or haiku. Nonetheless, the proprietors of those works cannot complain when third parties replicate elements of that expression that are essential to the operation of a particular machine. For instance, a car manufacturer could secure the ignition switch for its automobiles via a metal key with an original cut pattern on the blade. Although that pattern might be protected as a modern sculpture, the car manufacturer could not use copyright law to prevent others from utilizing the same expression for the purpose of starting the car. The same consideration applies to a car manufacturer that secures a digital ignition switch via entry of a haiku. Copyright law does not bar third parties from utilizing the necessary expression of that otherwise protectable literary work for the purpose of starting the car. The computer program implementing that digital key may be protected by copyright law, but the law places no bar on copying the essential functional elements needed to operate the ignition switch — the haiku text and any other indispensable functional features of the computer program. As Baker v. Selden recognized, copyright law’s limiting doctrines implement a constitutional and statutory balance intended to promote progress by channeling functional features exclusively to the utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect separable expressive features, such as surface ornamentation of an ignition key or non-merged implementing code of a digital ignition key, it does not bar the use of functional specifications — the essential technological elements. Only utility patent law can protect those features.

Google v. Oracle Amicus Merits Stage Brief: Vindicating IP’s Channeling Principle and Restoring Jurisdictional Balance to Software Copyright Protection

The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Oracle v. Google conflict with this Court’s seminal decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), misinterpret Congress’s codification of this Court’s fundamental channeling principle and related limiting doctrines, and upend nearly three decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits on the scope of copyright protection for computer software. Based on the fundamental channeling principle enunciated in Baker v. Selden, as reflected in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the functional requirements of APIs for computer systems and devices, like the internal workings of other machines, are outside of the scope of copyright protection even as non-merged aspects of the implementing code for APIs are protectable. Google independently implemented the functional specifications of the 37 APIs at issue and hence did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights. By way of brief illustration, copyright protects artistic and literary works, such as a creative metal sculpture or haiku. Nonetheless, the proprietors of those works cannot complain when third parties replicate elements of that expression that are essential to the operation of a particular machine. For instance, a car manufacturer could secure the ignition switch for its automobiles via a metal key with an original cut pattern on the blade. Although that pattern might be protected as a modern sculpture, the car manufacturer could not use copyright law to prevent others from utilizing the same expression for the purpose of starting the car. The same consideration applies to a car manufacturer that secures a digital ignition switch via entry of a haiku. Copyright law does not bar third parties from utilizing the necessary expression of that otherwise protectable literary work for the purpose of starting the car. The computer program implementing that digital key may be protected by copyright law, but the law places no bar on copying the essential functional elements needed to operate the ignition switch — the haiku text and any other indispensable functional features of the computer program. As Baker v. Selden recognized, copyright law’s limiting doctrines implement a constitutional and statutory balance intended to promote progress by channeling functional features exclusively to the utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect separable expressive features, such as surface ornamentation of an ignition key or non-merged implementing code of a digital ignition key, it does not bar the use of functional specifications — the essential technological elements. Only utility patent law can protect those features.

Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software

After a decade of bruising legal battles, the courts and software industry norms largely resolved the costly war over the scope of copyright protection for computer software. By the mid 1990s, freedom to develop interoperable devices, systems, and software triumphed over broad copyright protection for network features of computer software. Copyright peace prevailed throughout the software industry for the next 15 years. But in 2010, Oracle reignited the smoldering embers of that war when it brought suit alleging that Google infringed copyright in the Java application program interface packages (APIs)... This article updates and expands upon an earlier “epitaph” for copyright protection of network features of computer software to address the second API copyright wave. As background, Part I reviews the first wave of API copyright legislation and litigation. Part II examines the Oracle v. Google litigation, tracing the development of Java and Android and the subsequent (and still ongoing) battle over the scope of copyright protection for APIs. Part III critically analyzes the Oracle v. Google decisions. It explains that copyright law’s fundamental exclusion of protection for functional features dictates that the labeling conventions and packaging of functions within interface specifications generally fall outside of the scope of copyright protection even as implementing code garners thin copyright protection. This interpretation of copyright law comports with fundamental principles channeling protection among the modes of intellectual property. It also serves the larger goals of intellectual property law and competition policy.

Revisiting the Manifesto and Rolling Back Computer Software Copyrights

During the 1990s, courts and legislatures worldwide extended copyright protection to software code as a form of literary work. At the time this was understandable given the perceived need for legal protection to promote innovation in a fledgling industry in the wake of the personal computer revolution. However, many criticized this approach as paradoxically contributing to both over-protection and under-protection in the computer software industry. The ensuing decade has shown these criticisms to have been well-founded, both due to concerns that were apparent at the time, and now to more recent developments in programming methodology and digital copyright law. This article suggests that there is today a pressing need to revisit the question of copyright protection for computer software with a view to abolishing such protection. Factors that contribute to this suggestion include: (a) important developments in programming methodology in recent years including object-oriented approaches to programming; (b) the advent of effective contractual and digital rights management (DRM) measures to protect computer code; and, (c) the impact of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) on digital copyright law and practice. This article suggests that copyright protection for software code is no longer necessary in the 21st century and potentially chills innovation. It should therefore be discontinued. Other more appropriate legal and technological protections are now available for software code outside the copyright context.

The role of standardization and interoperability in copyright protection of computer software

Copyright protection for computer software often presents a contradiction between law and the desired public policy that is the law's inspiration. The law provides incentives to individuals to create intellectual property by protecting authors through monopolistic controls on copying and distributing the authors' work. Conferring too much protection, however, may reduce incentives to create competitive products in the same market, defeating the law's constitutional purpose of encouraging the “Progress of Science and the useful Arts.” Two characteristics of computer software, technical standards and interoperability, compound this contradiction. Using economic literature on standards and the recent line of Lotus v. Borland cases, this article examines the role of standardization and interoperability in copyright protection of computer software, and suggests a part for the fair‐use defense in such cases.

The Last Place in the World - Copyright Protection for Computer Software in New Zealand

Computer technology - whether it is hardware, software or the internet - is the headache that just won't go away for anyone grappling with the law of intellectual property. With the Copyright Act 1994, the New Zealand legislature attempted to meet some of the challenges but it largely avoided the issue, passing the headache onto the judiciary should any tricky issues arise. One such issue is copyright protection for computer programs. The Copyright Act 1994 makes it clear that computer programs are protected as a literary work but how far does that protection extend (or how far do we carry the fiction that a computer program is literary work)? This article attempts to second guess what level of protection our courts might provide. It argues that New Zealand has shown a willingness to protect functional items and would protect the "look and feel" of a program, providing a level of protection which courts in the United States have considered undesirable.

Economics of intellectual property protection for software

AbstractThis paper provides an economic analysis of the proper role of copyright protection forcomputer software. We begin by identifying key economic conditions in the software market.Besides its public good characteristics, software generates network externalities through increasedsales of programs and through production of complementary hardware and software. Assignmentof intellectual property rights should be limited to take full advantage of the efficiencies availablein this market.First, we demonstrate that copyright protection of de facto standards should not be grantedto the original developer of a software package. The monopoly created in the process leads topricing that fails to achieve efficient dissemination of the software and fails to reward othersponsors who have invested in the de facto standard. Next, we argue that software interfacespecifications also should not be copyrightable since it would permit extension of market powerto complementary software and to later improvements. Finally, we favor reverse engineeringfor the purpose of achieving interoperability since it enables firms to efficiently designcompatible programs and to guard against unwarranted abuse of copyright protection.In most instances, recent case law is consistent with these principles. Importantly,copyright law has devised a merger doctrine that denies protection whenever a product is the(nearly) unique expression of uncopyrightable idea, a principle that implements our proscriptionsof software copyrights. Nevertheless, several recent court decisions have retreated from thisposition. Copyright protection should be granted to software programs only when theunwarranted grant of monopoly is de minimis. This prescription achieves a balance between theneed to reward innovative developers of software programs and the need to encourage suppliersof complementary and substituted products to build upon and advance prior work.

New Developments in Copyright Protection of Computer Software

The scope of copyright protection for computer programs has proven to be a vexing issue for the courts. Over the past year, several courts focused on the issue and reached different results. This article will give background and then review and comment upon the newest decisions.

Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software

Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software

The problems and perspectives of copyright protection for computer software in English law

The problems and perspectives of copyright protection for computer software in English law