Cooperative Service Providers Research Articles

Optimal Pricing of Internet of Things: A Machine Learning Approach

Internet of things (IoT) produces massive data from devices embedded with sensors. The IoT data allows creating profitable services using machine learning. However, previous research does not address the problem of optimal pricing and bundling of machine learning-based IoT services. In this paper, we define the data value and service quality from a machine learning perspective. We present an IoT market model which consists of data vendors selling data to service providers, and service providers offering IoT services to customers. Then, we introduce optimal pricing schemes for the standalone and bundled selling of IoT services. In standalone service sales, the service provider optimizes the size of bought data and service subscription fee to maximize its profit. For service bundles, the subscription fee and data sizes of the grouped IoT services are optimized to maximize the total profit of cooperative service providers. We show that bundling IoT services maximizes the profit of service providers compared to the standalone selling. For profit sharing of bundled services, we apply the concepts of core and Shapley solutions from cooperative game theory as efficient and fair allocations of payoffs among the cooperative service providers in the bundling coalition.

The structure of public-private sector collaboration in travel information markets: A game theoretic analysis

In recent years there has been substantial growth in the prevalence of ad-hoc data exchange arrangements between local traffic authorities and commercial traffic information service providers. Although these arrangements are widely regarded as mutually beneficial, in fact to date, no comprehensive analysis exists of the operation of this information market, nor of its consequences for the different market participants involved. To address this gap, this paper presents a new framework which enables the analysis of the long-term outcomes of various collaboration schemes for traffic information service providers, local traffic authorities and network users. The framework is based on a bi-level non-cooperative Nash game in which the upper level represents the data exchange arrangements between local traffic authorities and commercial traffic information service providers and the lower level represents the impact of the provided information services on network users. The framework is flexible and can accommodate a variety of different market structures and commercial behaviours. The game theoretic model is formulated and solved as an equivalent equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. Numerical experiments are undertaken using this framework to explore the consequence of a number of commonly observed real-world data exchange arrangements. This analysis leads to three general conclusions. First, the results suggest that when a local traffic authority seeks only to minimise the total network travel time and offers free collaboration schemes, it should collaborate with all the cooperating service providers in the market. Second, if conversely, a local traffic authority seeks only to maximise its revenue from selling its data to service providers, it should be aware that its revenue does not always increase by selling the data to more service providers, since the willingness of service providers to pay for data declines as more providers are granted access. And finally, if a local traffic authority seeks to establish paid schemes that balance the benefit to network users and its own revenue benefits, then circumstances can easily arise in which these two objectives are in conflict with one another.

Transshipment hub selection from a shipper's and freight forwarder's perspective.

Transshipment hub selection becomes increasingly important to the global logistics community. From the perspectives of shippers and freight forwarders, a selection must align with cost control strategy and sustain service reliability across cooperative service providers. This paper assesses the selection with the options of both sea and air transports, and from the influence of country of origin of the company. Critical factors of transshipment hub selection, both qualitative and quantitative, are identified through focus group discussions. Relative importance of these factors is determined based on collective views of logistics stakeholders. The competitiveness of transshipment hubs is then assessed using an AHP approach. Our analysis is based on the historical implementation of direct transportation link policy between Mainland China and Taiwan. With this empirical work, the finding suggests that even the spawn of other nearby ports with shorter transport distance and closer proximity to cargo sources, there remain overriding factors such as customs regulations & government policies and connectivity that a transshipment hub is preferred.

Privacy Management and Optimal Pricing in People-Centric Sensing

With the emerging sensing technologies such as mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things (IoT), people-centric data can be efficiently collected and used for analytics and optimization purposes. This data is typically required to develop and render people-centric services. In this paper, we address the privacy implication, optimal pricing, and bundling of people-centric services. We first define the inverse correlation between the service quality and privacy level from data analytics perspectives. We then present the profit maximization models of selling standalone, complementary, and substitute services. Specifically, the closed-form solutions of the optimal privacy level and subscription fee are derived to maximize the gross profit of service providers. For interrelated people-centric services, we show that cooperation by service bundling of complementary services is profitable compared to the separate sales but detrimental for substitutes. We also show that the market value of a service bundle is correlated with the degree of contingency between the interrelated services. Finally, we incorporate the profit sharing models from game theory for dividing the bundling profit among the cooperative service providers.

Bottom-up childcare in a top-down welfare state: explaining cooperative organization among Swedish parents

ABSTRACTAlmost all children in Sweden spend at least some part of their early childhood in organized childcare, primarily in the form of preschools. About 10% of all preschools in Sweden are parent cooperatives, which make the childcare area an anomaly in the Swedish welfare state; no other service area has such a significant proportion of cooperative service providers. The parent cooperatives are initiated by the parents themselves, they are social enterprises created from the bottom-up. Why do parents decide to start a parent cooperative preschool in a welfare state where childcare is considered a social right and a responsibility for the state? This article will explore several different motives for starting parent cooperatives in Sweden, with special attention to the role of the public sector and political decisions. The findings are based on an extensive empiric study performed between the years 2003 and 2007.

A Layered Coalitional Game Framework of Wireless Relay Network

The wireless relay network (WRN) has recently emerged as an effective way to increase communication capacity and extend a coverage area with low cost. In the WRN, multiple service providers (SPs) can cooperate to share their resources (e.g., relay nodes and spectrum) to achieve higher utility in terms of revenue. Such cooperation can improve the capacity of the WRN and, thus, throughput for terminal devices (TDs). However, this cooperation can be realized only if fair allocation of aggregated utility, which is the sum of the utility of all the cooperative SPs, can be achieved. In this paper, we investigate the WRN consisting of SPs at the upper layer and TDs at the lower layer and present a game-theoretic framework to address the cooperation decision-making problem in the WRN. Specifically, the cooperation of SPs is modeled as an overlapping coalition formation game, in which SPs should form a stable coalitional structure and obtain a fair share of the aggregated utility. We also study the problem of allocating aggregated utility based on the concept of the Shapley value, which stabilizes the cooperation of SPs in the WRN. The cooperation of TDs is modeled as a network formation game, in which TDs establish links among each other to form a stable network structure. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed distributed algorithm obtains the aggregated utility approximating the optimal solutions and achieves good convergence speed.

Requirement negotiation process for the design of cooperative services

Many manufacturers are focusing more on services provided through products recently, and cooperate with some partner companies to provide competitive services. For the design of those services, it is important to satisfy not only service receivers, but also the cooperating service providers. The authors suggest a method to represent service provider's value and cost of a designed service based on the service design methods of Service Engineering. In addition, the authors suggest a method to adjust the specifications of a designed service in order to fulfil the requirements of both service providers and service receivers simultaneously.

Profiting from value-added wireless services

Energized by the prospect of a mobile commerce era, wireless telecommunication providers have spent hundreds of billions of dollars just to buy radio spectrum rights in auctions around the world. Costs for wireless infrastructure, equipment, and marketing will add hundreds of billions more. Wireless providers do not expect payoffs from such a huge investment any time soon but instead are focusing on rapidly gaining market share before the rollout of third-generation (3G) wireless technology. Many wireless providers are struggling to turn their infrastructure services into a profitable business. By tying with differentiated value-added services, a wireless infrastructure provider can increase its market power and thus its profit. The large size, stability, and long-term presence of wireless infrastructure providers should allow them to overcome inherent constraints on their ability to differentiate products. By continually striving to build up relations with certain types of service providers, they can gain reputations as specialists, even if the cooperating service providers repeatedly change. As a result, wireless infrastructure providers can attract a pool of loyal consumers and use this asset to negotiate favorable contracts with service providers.