Cooperative Behavior In Social Dilemmas Research Articles

The Impact of Praise on Cooperative Behavior in Three-Player Public Goods Games and Its Gender Differences.

Previous research has primarily focused on static factors influencing cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, with less attention given to dynamic factors within group social interactions, such as positive feedback received during interactions, i.e., praise. This study, through a between-subjects online experiment with a single-factor, two-level design (praise: public praise/no praise), investigates the impact of praise on cooperative behavior changes across two rounds of a three-player public goods problem. Results revealed the following: (1) A positive correlation between individuals' contributions across two rounds and a negative correlation with the number of correct answers in rule comprehension questions were evident; for men, a correlation between rule comprehension and first-round contributions was observed. (2) Multilevel model results showed that praise, role, and rule comprehension significantly positively affected contribution changes across two rounds; gender did not significantly affect contribution changes. Specifically, under public-praise conditions, contribution changes were greater. Publicly praised individuals showed positive or negative behavior changes, while those not praised in the same group showed positive changes. Men contributed significantly more in the first round than women, with no gender difference found in contribution changes. Rule comprehension positively predicted contribution changes, indicating that more correct answers led to greater positive changes in contributions. These results not only support the inferential social learning perspective, suggesting that through praise, individuals can infer external world perceptions and self-evaluations, affecting both the praised (positively or negatively) and positively influencing non-praised individuals in the same group, but also provide a theoretical basis and intervention strategies for team and organizational management in groups.

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

To address issues like the tragedy of the commons, reputation mechanisms prove effective in promoting the emergence of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Previous research assumed that the increment of reputation is a fixed constant, however, the historical behavior of individuals with time preferences affects their reputation fluctuations on different scales. Inspired by this, we propose a framework for spatial public goods game that incorporates a reputation discount accumulation model with time preferences. In this model, players are classified as either long-sighted players or short-sighted players based on the significance of their historical behavior. Compared with short-sighted players, long-sighted players are more concerned with the impact of historical behaviors on the next game. Simulation results show that long-sighted cooperative players can resist the invasion of short-sighted defectors, and short-sighted defection strategies are eventually replaced by long-sighted cooperative strategies. This indicates that a higher discount factor facilitates the generation and maintenance of cooperation.

Evolution of cooperation in multi-population

Cooperative behavior is key to the survival of species in ecosystems. Here, we extend the traditional prisoner's dilemma game by proposing a multi-population model in which players can obtain a lower payoff via interactions with neighbors belonging to different populations than interactions within the same population. Then we study novel spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation among multi-populations and find that fascinating pattern forms and spatiotemporal dynamic emerges, accompanied by the self-organization of populations. In particular, under favorable conditions, the system with fewer populations maintains cooperative behavior stability. While under adverse conditions the cycle between populations tends to collapse, leading to a lower level of cooperation. These observations highlight and explain why multi-populations greatly promote cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.

Thermodynamic susceptibility as a measure of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.

The emergence of cooperation in the thermodynamic limit of social dilemmas is an emerging field of research. While numerical approaches (using replicator dynamics) are dime a dozen, analytical approaches are rare. A particularly useful analytical approach is to utilize a mapping between the spin-1/2 Ising model in 1D and the social dilemma game and calculate the magnetization, which is the net difference between the fraction of cooperators and defectors in a social dilemma. In this paper, we look at the susceptibility, which probes the net change in the fraction of players adopting a certain strategy, for both classical and quantum social dilemmas. The reason being, in statistical mechanics problems, the thermodynamic susceptibility as compared to magnetization is a more sensitive probe for microscopic behavior, e.g., observing small changes in a population adopting a certain strategy. In this paper, we find the thermodynamic susceptibility for reward, sucker's payoff, and temptation in classical Prisoner's Dilemma to be positive, implying that the turnover from defect to cooperate is greater than vice versa, although the Nash equilibrium for the two-player game is to defect. In the classical hawk-dove game, the thermodynamic susceptibility for resource suggests that the number of players switching to hawk from dove strategy is dominant. Entanglement in Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma has a non-trivial role in determining the behavior of thermodynamic susceptibility. At maximal entanglement, we find that sucker's payoff and temptation increase the number of players switching to defect. In the zero-temperature limit, we find that there are two second-order phase transitions in the game, marked by a divergence in the susceptibility. This behavior is similar to that seen in type-II superconductors wherein also two second-order phase transitions are seen.

社会困境中的合作行为研究概述

社会困境中的合作行为研究概述

Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

Dynamic influences on cooperation in a social dilemma: How type of experience and communication affect behavioral spillovers.

In many work and decision situations, realizing cooperation among individuals is important. However, decision making environments of individuals are far from stable, resulting in changes in task complexity and the social settings they encounter. We argue that past experiences with cooperative behavior can result in different cooperative norms and expectations about the behavior of others and will have an effect on an individual’s subsequent behavior in new situations. This study experimentally investigates these dynamics of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas and addresses the role of communication to provide empirical evidence about a cognitive mechanism that may lead to these spillovers. Specifically, the experimental design randomly assigns subjects to one type of repetitive interactions in the first social dilemma (single partner or different partners) and we then examine how this impacts the propensity to behave cooperatively in subsequent social dilemmas with unfamiliar partners (either single or different). Because of the variety in complexity of decision-making environments in practice, we do so by examining behavioral spillovers across three different social dilemmas that vary in difficulty to make cooperation successful. Our findings show that individuals cooperate more during initial interactions with a single partner. More importantly, this has positive spillover effects for subsequent behavior and communication, even to settings without repeated interactions with a single partner. However, environmental conditions affect the ability to transfer established norms of cooperation to subsequent interactions, as an initially learned cooperative norm is gradually replaced by a more competitive attitude when individuals start to interact with unfamiliar others in a setting in which cooperative success is more difficult to achieve. Our findings illustrate the power of repeated interactions for establishing and sustaining cooperation in other settings and enhance understanding of how cooperative decisions can be shaped by both incentives and the broader behavioral context of individuals.

Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is only one kind of a more general class of behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes reciprocity, respecting others' property, honesty, equity, efficiency, as well as many others. Inspired by these experimental works, we here open up the path towards studying other forms of moral behavior with methods of statistical physics. We argue that this is a far-reaching direction for future research that can help us answer fundamental questions about human sociality. Why did our societies evolve as they did? What moral principles are more likely to emerge? What happens when different moral principles clash? Can we predict the break out of moral conflicts in advance and contribute to their solution? These are amongst the most important questions of our time, and methods of statistical physics could lead to new insights and contribute towards finding answers.

Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is only one kind of a more general class of behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes reciprocity, respecting others' property, honesty, equity, efficiency, as well as many others. Inspired by these experimental works, we here open up the path towards studying other forms of moral behavior with methods of statistical physics. We argue that this is a far-reaching direction for future research that can help us answer fundamental questions about human sociality. Why did our societies evolve as they did? What moral principles are more likely to emerge? What happens when different moral principles clash? Can we predict the break out of moral conflicts in advance and contribute to their solution? These are amongst the most important questions of our time, and methods of statistical physics could lead to new insights and contribute towards finding answers.

Leadership Selection and Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas: An Empirical Exploration of Assigned versus Group‐Chosen Leadership

AbstractThis research explores the leadership selection process as an antecedent to group cooperation. We compare group‐chosen and assigned leaders and explore their resulting influence upon the group process and outcome in a social dilemma context. In three empirical studies, we predict and provide support for the idea that group‐chosen leaders will attend more to the social aspects of the group's interaction as opposed to the economic (bottom‐line) ones than will assigned leaders. Additionally, we found that those groups with group‐chosen leaders had more overall group cooperation (i.e., less economic self‐interest), greater trust in one another and in the leader, and had leaders who displayed more socially oriented leadership behaviors.

Evaluating the role of personality trait information in social dilemmas

We investigate whether cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is conditional on information about a partner's personality traits. Using a repeated one-shot continuous strategy Prisoner's Dilemma (two person Public Goods game), we test how information on personality traits of partners influences cooperative actions. Before each game we provide subjects with the rank-order of their partner (relative to all subjects in the session) on one of the personality traits of the Big Five Inventory. Using a within-subjects design we find that subjects are more cooperative when informed that their partner is more ‘Agreeable’ or ‘Open to Experience’. The primary reason for more cooperative behavior is the expectation that partners will give more to the public good.

Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas

In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. But a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner's Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Traveler's Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game.

Characteristics of affected third parties and cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

ABSTRACTThe studies described in this article explore the influence of an under-emphasized determinant of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas: affected third parties. Two experiments examined the effect of characteristics of third parties on individual cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, and identified mechanisms associated with these relationships. Study 1 demonstrated that third-party need affects individual cooperative behavior, and tested prosocial motivation and intra-group trust as mediators of this relationship. Study 2 provided further elaboration by demonstrating that individual cooperative behavior was reduced when a needy third party was low on reliability, and by showing that prosocial motivation and intra-group trust mediated this relationship. This research connects the literatures on individual cooperation in social dilemmas and relational job design, and demonstrates why third parties influence individuals’ cooperative behavior.

Priming Effects on Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Considering the Prime and the Person

ABSTRACT.We test whether people with a relatively more intrinsic vs. extrinsic value orientation (RIEVO) are particularly likely to enact cooperative behavior in resource dilemmas when they are primed with relatedness goals. In Study 1, high RIEVO participants primed with relatedness exhibited more restrained fishing behavior in a resource dilemma than their unprimed counterparts or participants low in RIEVO. Study 2 replicated this effect and further showed that the prime must signal the possibility of satisfying a valued goal (relatedness satisfaction) in order to elicit the value-consistent behavior. We discuss these results in the context of recent process models of goal priming, and also discuss how these findings contribute to our understanding of cooperative behavior and the predictive power of value constructs more broadly.

Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas

In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass 2013 call Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player does not affect the strategies used by other players. But a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner's Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Traveler's Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game.

How Evolutionary Dynamics Affects Network Reciprocity in Prisoner’s Dilemma

Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been addressed by many, but theoretical studies have yielded contradictory results so far---as the problem is very sensitive to how players adapt their strategy. However, recent experiments with the prisoner's dilemma game played on different networks have shown that humans do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions, and that the network structure does not influence the final outcome. In this work we carry out an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players' strategies, showing that the absence of network reciprocity is a general feature of those dynamics that do not take neighbors' payoffs into account. Our results, together with experimental evidence, hint at how to properly model real people's behavior.

Social Value Orientation and information search in social dilemmas: An eye-tracking analysis

Previous work has demonstrated that Social Value Orientation (SVO) is related to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. However, little is known concerning the underlying processes. In two eye-tracking studies investigating decisions in money allocation tasks (Experiment 1) and Public Good Dilemmas (Experiment 2), we show that differences in SVO are accompanied by consistent differences in information search. Decision time, number of fixations, the proportion of inspected information, the degree of attention towards the others’ payoffs, and the number of transitions from and towards others’ payoffs gradually increase with absolute SVO deviation from a pure selfish orientation. Overall these effects seem to be similar for individuals caring positively (i.e., cooperative) or negatively (i.e., competitive) about others. The fact that changes are gradual instead of abrupt indicates that differences in SVO seem to be related to gradual changes in weights given to outcomes for self and others.

Inequality and Procedural Justice in Social Dilemmas

This study investigates the influence of resource inequality and the fairness of the allocation procedure of unequal resources on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. We propose a simple formal behavioral model that incorporates conflicting selfish and social motivations. This model allows us to predict how inequality influences cooperative behavior. Allocation of resources is manipulated by three treatments that vary in terms of procedural justice: allocating resources randomly, based on merit, and based on ascription. As predicted, procedural justice influences cooperation significantly. Moreover, gender is found to be an important factor interacting with the association between procedural justice and cooperative behavior.

Testing Various Types of Cooperation Rewards in Social Dilemmas

Research on the rewarding of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has shown that very different types of reward strategies each seem to be effective at inducing high rates of cooperation in group members. This makes it difficult to determine how a cooperation reward motivates cooperation. This study systematically examined various components of cooperation reward schemes so as to help identify the general properties of an effective cooperation reward. Specifically, three features of a cooperation reward were manipulated: the number of group members who can receive the reward; when the reward is given; and whether reward reception is contingent upon performance. Four major effects emerged. First, performance-contingent, per-trial rewards produced high rates of cooperation. Second, competitive, performance-based rewards effectively maintained cooperation across trials. Next, a competitive, performance-based, per-trial reward scheme outperformed any other reward scheme in terms of rate of cooperation induced. Finally, rewards that were provided for simply participating in the group had an inhibitory effect on cooperation, producing a lesser rate of cooperation than baseline.

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma—where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma— where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research.