Control Of Market Power Research Articles

Diagnóstico al fomento de la economía popular y solidaria realizada en las cadenas supermercados grandes y medianas de la ciudad de Calceta

La presente investigación se centra en diagnosticar el nivel cumplimiento de la regulación y control de poder de mercado y su impacto en las prácticas comerciales para el sector de bienes de consumo alimenticio en cadenas de supermercado grande y mediano de la ciudad de Calceta y proveedores de Manabí pertenecientes a la micro y pequeñas empresas de la economía popular y solidaria. Los métodos de investigación deductivo, inductivo, analítico, sintético, estadístico y comparativo permitieron sistematizar la información y establecer el estado actual de las prácticas comerciales. Mediante el estudio de campo in situ se aplicaron varios instrumentos, las entrevistas realizada a los dos (2) técnicos de la superintendencia de control y poder de mercado, a los dos (2) gerentes de las cadenas de supermercados que cumplen con el criterio para la investigación de contar con un mínimo de dos cajas y además contar con sucursales, además cuarenta y tres (43) encuestas aplicadas a los proveedores de consumo alimenticio según las categorías como pan y cereales, Azúcar, mermelada, miel, chocolate o dulces de azúcar, sal, especias, hierbas culinarias pertenecientes a la economía popular y solidaria mediante el muestro estratificado se permitió conocer la manera en que los operadores económicos realizan sus actividades debiendo cumplir con lo establecido en la norma y su efecto en las prácticas comerciales, reflejando incumplimiento en el marco de la normativa afectando a los micro y pequeños proveedores. La utilización de la técnica Ishikawa facilitó la agrupación de causas y efectos relacionados con los resultados desfavorables detectados; por medio de la matriz 5w+1h se plantearon acciones a superar permitiendo de esta manera mejorar los aspectos con desempeño insuficientes. URL: https://revistas.uta.edu.ec/erevista/index.php/bcoyu/article/view/1067

General Approaches to the Market Structure Control in BRICS Countries

The articles represents a research of general approaches of BRICS countries legislation and legal order to counteraction against such an anticompetitive market strategy and a means of both global and regional governance as abuse of control and dominant market power in legal orders of China, India, Russia and South Africa. The author pays particular attention to current legislation of BRICS countries in the field of competition protection with regard to provisions related to market structure control and restrictions of anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions (further on - M&As) and ‘concentrationʼ of enterprises' market power control fixed by Asian (China and India), Euro-Asian (Russia) and African (South Africa) legal orders. The analysis of substantial contents of laws on competition and monopolies of the abovementioned BRICS countries and relevant case law shows the existence of a number of conventional generally acknowledged (unified) provisions and norms. At the same time there are specific features making them different. These generally acknowledged provisions and peculiarities will be in focus in the article.

Can market power be controlled by regulation of core prices alone? An empirical analysis of airport demand and car rental price

Many firms offer “core” and “side” goods in the sense that side-good consumption is conditional on core-good consumption. Airports are a common example where the supply of runway and terminal capacity is the core good and the supply of various concession services (for example, car rental services) is the side good. While side-good supply can be responsible for a major share in total revenue, monopoly regulation typically concentrates on the control of core-good prices (“core prices” in short). Whether market power can indeed be effectively controlled by the regulation of core prices alone then depends on whether core-good consumption is a function of the price for side goods. This study empirically shows that a one-dollar increase in the daily car rental price reduces passenger demand at 199 US airports by more than 0.36%. A major implication of our findings is that for the case of airports, the effective control of market power may require regulation of both prices for core and side goods.

GENERAL APPROACHES TO DOMINANT MARKET POSITION, PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF MARKET POWER, AND MARKET STRUCTURE CONTROL WITHIN THE BRICS COUNTRIES

The article presents research on the general approaches taken by BRICS countries through their legislation and legal orders to counteract anticompetitive market strategies such as abuse of dominant market power and market structure control, as a means of both global and regional governance in the legal orders ofChina,India,Russia, andSouth Africa. The author pays particular attention to current legislation of the BRICS countries in the field of competition protection with regard to provisions related to (1) the criteria for establishment of a dominant market position and (2) market structure control and restriction of anticompetitive mergers & acquisitions, and 'concentration' of enterprises' market power control fixed by Asian (China and India), Euro-Asian (Russia), and African (South Africa) legal orders and prohibition of abuse of market power. The article argues that our society is interested in the engagement of the population in trade and industrial activity. This is the general rule. Nowadays, however, this rule allows exceptions: restrictions on freedom of trade can be justified by exceptional circumstances in certain cases and under certain circumstances (e.g. an exemption necessary in the interest of security of the state or public interest). The analysis of substantial contents of the laws on competition and monopolies of the abovementioned BRICS countries and relevant case law shows the existence of a number of conventional, generally acknowledged (unified) provisions and norms. At the same time, there are specific features that make them different. These generally acknowledged provisions and peculiarities are a focus of the article.

Lessons from the First Year of Competition Law in Ecuador

Ecuador's competition authority has undertaken a busy agenda in its first full year of practice. Hefty fines, approval of more than a dozen merger control notifications, investigations into the pharmaceutical and other markets, enactment of several industry specific directives have been the main focus.Ecuador’s commercial and legal culture is undergoing a process of self-reflection, analysis, and evolution following the enactment of the Organic Law on Market Power Regulation and Control in October of 2011. The Law provides the first domestic framework on competition in Ecuador and was preceded by the application of Andean Community general norms on competition.2 Pedro Paez’s designation as first Superintendent for Market Power Control in September of 2012 signaled the beginning of the official practice. This paper seeks to provide an account of the exercise of powers granted to the Superintendency in the first year, as viewed from the standpoint of private legal practice, as well as to note some major areas of confusion that have been detected. The publication of this article comes shortly after the Authorities’ first decision and completed investigation which resulted, on February 7, 2014, in a fine imposed on America Movil’s Ecuadorean subsidiary, telecoms operator Conecel/Claro, of $138M for abuse of dominance.

Market Failures and Public Policy

Industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power. To this purpose, it builds models that capture the essence of the situation. The predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field. In the end, the reasonableness of, and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision-makers for intervention, and to companies for the design of their business model. Industrial organization has a long tradition: first theoretical, with the work of French “engineer-economists” Antoine Augustin Cournot (1838) and Jules Dupuit (1844); then policy-oriented with the enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and subsequent legislation; then descriptive with the studies of the Harvard school (“Structure-Conduct-Performance”) comforting and refining the antitrust drive; and finally skeptical with the Chicago school. The Chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice. It however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine, perhaps because

Market Structure Control and Restriction of Anticompetitive M&As and 'Concentration' of Enterprises' Market Power in BRICS Countries: General Approaches (Asia - China and India, Euro-Asia - Russia and Africa - South Africa - In Focus)

The articles represents a research of general approaches of BRICS countries legislation and legal order to counteraction against such an anticompetitive market strategy as abuse of dominant market power in legal orders of China, India, Russia and South Africa. The author pays particular attention to current legislation of BRICS countries in the field of competition protection with regard to provisions related to market structure control and restrictions of anticompetitive mergers & acquisitions (further on - M&As) and “concentration” of enterprises' market power control fixed by Asian (China and India), Euro-Asian (Russia) and African (South Africa) legal orders. The analysis of substantial contents of laws on competition and monopolies of the above mentioned BRICS countries and relevant case law shows the existence of a number of conventional generally acknowledged (unified) provisions and norms. At the same time there are specific features making them different. These generally acknowledged provisions and peculiarities will be in focus in the article.

A Critical Assessment of Electricity and Natural Gas Deregulation

Economic deregulation of electric and gas utilities has failed to achieve its proposed objectives of lowering price, promoting greater consumer choice, constraining market power, and improving infrastructure performance. Concentration has grown, deregulated price increases exceed prices where regulation was maintained, and supposedly free markets do not assure control of market power or cost effectiveness in achieving environmental protection. An agenda for re-regulation is proposed. These reforms would continue the work of Institutional economists in the field of public utility economics.

The Control of Market Power in ITQ Fisheries

The notion of restricting the amount of quota shares that can be owned by a single entity (sometimes called excessive share limits or ownership caps) is almost universal in fisheries managed with ITQs. While there is no general agreement on exactly what this means, the focus is normally on monopoly power and the attainment of management objectives or equity goals. This paper addresses the monopoly power issue and derives a formula for determining the maximum percentage any one entity can control before incentives to withhold production become operative. Implications for general and specific policy analysis are provided.

The Ex Ante Auction Model for the Control of Market Power in Standard Setting Organizations

RAND commitments — i.e., promises to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms — play a key role in standard setting processes. However, the usefulness of those commitments has recently been questioned. The problem allegedly lies in the absence of a generally agreed test to determine whether a particular license satisfies a RAND commitment. Swanson and Baumol have suggested that the concept of a 'reasonable' royalty for purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and implemented by reference to ex ante competition. In their opinion, a royalty should be deemed reasonable when it approximates the outcome of an ex ante auction process where IP owners submit RAND commitments coupled with licensing terms and selection to the standard is based on both technological merit and licensing terms. In this paper we investigate whether the ex ante auction approach proposed by Swanson and Baumol is likely to deliver efficient outcomes, both from static and dynamic standpoints. We find that given the peculiar characteristics of some of the industries where standardization takes place, in particular the many different business models adopted by innovating companies in those industries, the ex ante auction approach proposed by Swanson and Baumol may not always deliver the right outcomes from a social welfare viewpoint.

Control of Market Power in Electricity Auctions

In auction spot markets, suppliers with a relatively small percentage of total capacity have been able to exercise extreme market power during high-demand periods. One remedy is a system that prevents suppliers with the capacity and incentive for exercising such unilateral power from having any role in setting the market-clearing price.

Heresy? The Case Against Deregulation of Electricity Generation

California's problems should make us face the facts that deregulation is an inherently risky course, that it increases capital costs, that control of market power and efficient transmission capacity expansion are still unsolved problems, and that governments are no more fit to deregulate than they are to regulate.

EU competition policy and market power control in the mediamatics era

This paper addresses the controversial subject of convergence in the communications sector and analyzes its regulatory implications for European competition policy with special emphasis on market power control. We start with a brief description of the changed societal communications system of the information society, called mediamatics (media and telematics). We will then turn to the analysis of competition policy and market power issues, applying an integrated mediamatics approach. First, we highlight some major characteristics of the European competition policy framework. Subsequently, our analysis concentrates on the challenges posed by convergence and we offer some conclusions regarding the reform of these policy fields.

Different Approaches and Problems in Dealing with Control of Market Power: A Comparison of German, European, and U.S. Policy towards Market-Dominating Enterprises

Different Approaches and Problems in Dealing with Control of Market Power: A Comparison of German, European, and U.S. Policy towards Market-Dominating Enterprises

Horizontal Mergers and the Control of Market Power in the U.K.

Horizontal Mergers and the Control of Market Power in the U.K.