Control In Large Corporations Research Articles

Palestinian diplomacy and communication in latin america case Brazil

Diplomacy and soft power relations with worldwide countries have been and continue to be ambitious for an official Palestinian institution. Political and diplomatic outreach, media communication, and opening relations and embassies with countries and regimes increase legitimacy and convey the message to decision-makers. In Latin America, before the digital connectivity boom, letters and speeches helped build public opinion in favor of the recognition of the Palestinian State. Today, Palestinians are increasingly seeking diplomatic and media communication with the international community to gain support for their full sovereignty, the end of apartheid, settlements, and the recovery of rights. Along with institutional relations, new technologies—although under the control of large corporations—have been exploited by Palestinians to break the siege and allow communication as an extension of diplomatic efforts. This article intends to highlight the role of Palestinian diplomatic relations and media communication between them and the Brazilian government, aiming for political recognition of Palestine. To this end, the research adopts two methodological procedures: literature review and content analysis, based on in-depth interviews. Seven people who worked in the Palestinian diplomatic corps in Brazil were interviewed, including ambassadors and media figures who contributed to diplomatic communication and appeared in the Brazilian media to gain recognition.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MAKES COMPANY PERFORM BETTER, DOESN`T IT?

The need for corporate governance comes from separation of powers between ownership and control in large corporations which are built on each other to protect investors` rights by reducing managerial discretion over business decisions. Business flourishment is a basis for countries` proper development in terms of capitalism providing that such prosperity is based on a rational legal system. Affluent nations who were able to form strong institutions to protect property rights and enforce contracts are far too ahead of developing countries that fail to set up such legal instruments to eliminate loopholes in their systems thus not being able to enjoy world market opportunities. The legal systems of the nations, especially those courts who implement law and order among the persons, are said to play an important role in availing or restricting business activities. In the formation of good corporate governance in the developed world, historically common law and civil law practices had a lot to say. This article will discover some peculiarities of both systems.

Board characteristics and life insurance efficiency in South Africa

PurposeIn their role as monitors and advisors, boards are expected to address agency conflicts associated with the separation of ownership from control in large corporations. The ability to effectively perform these functions and enhance corporate outcomes largely depends on their influence in decision-making. This paper aims to examine the effect of corporate governance attributes, in the form of board characteristics, on technical efficiency in the South African life insurance industry.Design/methodology/approachUsing the two-stage data envelopment analysis technique, bootstrapped efficiency scores are estimated for 73 insurers from 2007 to 2014 in Stage 1. The truncated bootstrapping procedure of Simar and Wilson (2007) and the tobit estimation techniques are used to examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics and other insurer level attributes on technical efficiency scores in Stage 2 analysis.FindingsThe findings suggest that life insurers operate with high levels of inefficiency within a highly independent governance structure. The results from Stage 2 analysis identifies audit committee size and independence to improve efficiency while board independence is found to be detrimental to efficiency.Practical implicationsThe findings provide a useful reference point for insurance regulators in developing economies in the formulation of an effective governance mechanism for the efficient operation of the insurance industry.Originality/valueAs far as the authors are concerned, the analysis contained in this paper presents the first empirical assessment of the corporate governance structure and its effects on corporate outcomes in an African insurance market.

Ownership and Control in Closely‐held Family‐owned Firms: An Exploration of Strategic and Operational Control

Much of the existing research into the divorce of ownership and control either focuses on the propensity for the separation of decision functions or upon scrutinizing conceptions, gauges or the practicalities of organizational control in large corporations. Although far from equivocal, such research appears broadly to concur that where ownership is dispersed, de facto control is likely to be exerted by management and that where ownership is closely‐held, de facto as well as legal control is exerted by owners. This study examines this assumption through exploring the nature of control in a closely‐held family firm. In this regard, the focus of this study is not on consequences of divorced ownership and control but rather on exploring the contingencies where ownership and control diverge. This research reveals a case wherein a closely‐held family firm is strategically and operationally controlled by its managers. Case research leads to the development of a range of insights regarding the owner/family and the management characteristics that contribute to this scenario. The paper concludes with a series of implications and conclusions.

Finance Capital and the State: An Analysis of Ownership and Control of Large Corporations in an East Asian Newly Industrializing Country*

This article examines the nature of ownership and control of the top South Korean corporations. It addresses the strategic question of the separation of ownership from control, family, and institutional forms of stock ownership, and whether the capitalist class has gained control of finance capital. These issues are examined within a Marxist theoretical framework so as to understand the transformation of the class structure of South Korea, including changes in the structure of the capitalist class and the role of the state in this process. The article provides an assessment of the nature and degree of control of the state by finance capital and identifies the linkages between the largest corporations and banks through the application of network analysis in the South Korean context.

Executive Compensation and Agency Effects

AbstractThe separation of ownership from control in large corporations can cause agency problems. This study analyzes the effects of the dispersion of corporate ownership on the compensation of the top executives of Fortune 500 companies. The effects are estimated across the executive hierarchy and for different components of the compensation package in contrast to more limited previous studies. The results indicate that there is a significant agency effect on executive pay, though the magnitude is small relative to company size. The effects are greatest for the most liquid form of remuneration, salaries, and are nonuniform across executive categories, with the strongest effect found for the Chairman of the Board.

Corporate Control, Crime, and Compensation: An Analysis of the Consequences of the Separation of Ownership and Control in Large Corporations.

The consequences of the separation of ownership and control in large corporations are examined with respect to the relationship between corporate illegal behavior and managerial compensation. The results indicate a positive association between corporate legal violations and the compensation of top executives in manager controlled but not owner controlled firms.

The Transfer of Control in Large Corporations: 1905-1919

In 1905, Wall Street Journal editor Sereno S. Pratt examined the control of large American corporations and found that, despite its republican form, practical operation, . . . the stock company is subject to autocratic or oligarchical control. The stockholders do not vote-they send proxies that are held by the powers that be.... It is not difficult for a small group of financiers to dominate properties worth billions of dollars, belonging to thousands of investors, who have really no voice in their [Pratt 1905, pp. 6704-5]. Twenty-five years later, A. A. Berle, Jr. and G. C. Means made a similar argument, but suggested that power ultimately (lay) in the hands of management itself, a management capable of perpetuating its own position [Berle and Means 1932, p. 124]. While both Pratt and Berle-Means believed that the inability of owners to effectively exercise ownership rights led to their usurpation by other, better organized forces, they disagreed as to who actually seized control. Berle and Means assumed that managers took control from shareholders. On the other hand, Pratt concluded that shareholders had long lost out to

Kotz on Banker Control

Review of Bank Control of Large Corporations in the U.S. by David M. Kotz. This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website , where most recent articles are published in full. Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States. By David M. Kotz. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. 217. $11.50.

Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States. By David M. Kotz. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. 217. $11.50.

Ownership and Control of Large Corporations Revisited

Ownership and Control of Large Corporations Revisited

The owners' interventions in decision-making in large corporations: A new approach

This paper, which is based on my doctoral dissertation published under the title ‘Propriété et pouvoir dans les grandes entreprises’, presents a new approach for measuring the separation of ownership and control in large corporations. It aims at replacing the usual methodology set up by Berle and Means with a more adapted procedure. In the first part, the conceptual framework is described. The procedure consists mainly of distinguishing between several domains of control according to the types of decisions concerned, as well as between several modalities of the owner's interventions. It leads to a classification of the corporations on a scale consisting of several degrees of separation of ownership and control. In the second part, the paper presents the results of an empirical study applying the procedure to the case of forty large Belgian corporations.

Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class

An "astonishing consensus" exists among academic social scientists concerning the impact of the alleged separation of ownership and control in large corporations on the class structures and political economies of the United States and similar countries. The question is whether this separation is a "pseudofact," which has, therefore, inspired incorrect "explanations," "inferences," and "theories," namely, that the presumed separation has either transformed or eliminated the former "capitalist class" and therefore rendered inapplicable a class theory of the division of the social product, class conflict, social domination, political processes, and historical change. If the separation of ownership and control has not occurred, then "managerial" theories are without foundation. The discrepant findings of numerous studies are reviewedand problems of method and measurement discussed, concluding that the empirical question is quite open. Critical questions are posed for research into the internal differentiation and integration of the dominant ("upper") class in the United States.