Payment Contract Research Articles

Cooperation mode selection strategies in platform ecosystems: analyzing brand value, cross-selling, and platform empowerment

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the vertical cooperative relationship between the core enterprise and the manufacturer within the platform ecosystem, specifically analyzing the optimal decision-making processes of both parties under the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and original brand manufacturer (OBM) modes. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses game theory to analyze the problem, considering factors such as brand value difference, cross-selling and platform empowerment. It constructs the game models for both OEM and OBM modes and discusses the selection strategies for the cooperation mode. Findings The results indicate that the choice of cooperation mode by the manufacturer and the core enterprise depends on the relative size of their brand values. In cases of inconsistent choices, cooperation can be improved by designing a transfer payment contract. When the brand value is constant, the product price is comprehensively affected by cross-selling revenue, price elasticity coefficient, cost coefficient of sales effort and cost coefficient of platform empowerment. The enterprise reduces the price only when the potential revenue brought by increasing product sales exceeds the marginal profit brought by increasing product pricing; otherwise, it raises the sales price. Originality/value The platform ecosystem is emerging as a future direction for business mode development. However, there is a paucity of research on the cooperation modes between manufacturers and core enterprises within the platform ecosystem.

Contingent payments in procurement interactions: Experimental evidence

A primary objective of creating competition among suppliers is the procurement of higher quality goods and services at lower prices. When procuring non-standard goods, it is often difficult to write a complete specification of desired quality in the contract. Thus, payments to suppliers cannot be perfectly conditioned on the quality provided. We develop a simple model to distil several real-world features and illustrate how contract structure within price priority competition jointly affects bid aggression and incentives for the provision of surplus-enhancing quality. We implement the contingent payments as probabilistic. The selected supplier’s payment is, according to a fixed probability, either their bid or a quality contingent amount that depends on the bid and an exogenous norm for allocating social surplus. We use a lab experiment to show that there is a ‘Goldilocks’ region for high quality in which the probability of quality contingent payment is large enough to incentivize provision, but not so large as to induce overly aggressive bidding. This implementation only relies upon preferences for maximizing one’s own profit and the rationality of backward induction. An experimental finding not predicted in our setting is that suppliers earn positive economic profits inside the Goldilocks region, which can be explained by suppliers’ risk aversion. The results have implications for the effective design of contingent payments in contracts.

Analysis of Halal Certification in Small and Medium Industries in the Development of Halal Tourism in Tourism Areas in North Sumatra

Halal Certificate is an important thing for Small and Medium Industries to have in terms of marketing their products and for the economic welfare of the people. Likewise, for Small and Medium Industries located in Tourism Areas where it can develop Halal Tourism in these tourist areas. However, in reality there are many obstacles faced by Small and Medium Industries in terms of issuing these halal certificates. This study uses the Mix Methode research method where the authors conduct Indept Interviews with experts and business people then provide questionnaires to business people regarding the process of making halal certificates for the businesses they run. The procedures for making halal certification for Small and Medium Industries (SMIs) in the development of Halal Tourism in Tourism Areas in North Sumatra include: understanding halal certification requirements and attending halal assurance system (SJH) training, implementing a halal assurance system (SJH), preparing halal certification documents, registering halal certification (uploading data), conducting preaudit monitoring and payment of certification contracts, conducting audits, conducting post-audit monitoring, obtaining halal certificates. The results of this study indicate that only 50% of SMEs understand about halal certificates and procedures for making them. The obstacles in making halal certificates are not believing in the importance of halal certification for their business, not believing in the importance of halal certification for their business. For SMEs that have succeeded in having a Halal Certificate after a simple Linear Regression Test the results show that Halal certificates have a positive and significant effect on SME income of 77.7%.

Senior-Focused Primary Care Organizations Increase Access For Medicare Advantage Members, Especially Underserved Groups.

Population-based payment in Medicare Advantage (MA) can foster innovation in care delivery by giving risk-bearing providers flexibility and strong incentives to enhance care and engage patients. This may particularly benefit historically underserved groups for whom payments often exceed costs. In this study, using data from Humana MA plans, we examined "senior-focused" primary care organizations that are supported predominantly by population-based payments in contracts with MA plans. We explored whether such organizations supported by such payment are associated with better care and improved equity compared with other primary care organizations receiving other forms of payment in MA. Analyses of data from 462,872 MA beneficiaries in 2021 showed that senior-focused primary care organizations served more Black and dually eligible beneficiaries than other primary care organizations serving MA beneficiaries, and regression-adjusted analysis showed that senior-focused primary care patients received 17percent more primary care visits. Differences were largest among Black and dual-eligible beneficiaries. These findings suggest that risk-bearing organizations in MA are responding to current payment dynamics and providing enhanced care and access to patients, particularly historically underserved populations.

EXPRESS: Influencing Primary Care Antibiotic Prescription Behavior Using Financial Incentives

Antibiotic resistance is an ongoing public health crisis fueled by overuse and misuse of antibiotics. The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of action-based incentive payments on reducing inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions in primary care, where thirty to fifty percent of antibiotic prescriptions are inappropriate. Various financial incentive programs to reduce the rate of inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions have been implemented and studied empirically. However, there have not been analytical studies to evaluate payment model contract design features and the potential for payment models to impact diagnosis decision making. We develop a stylized physician compensation model to study the interaction between a payer and a provider. The payer offers a payment contract, with a bonus tied to the prescription, to maximize social welfare, considering total costs of providing care and social harm from antibiotic resistance. Given the contract offered and their own opportunity cost associated with factors such as fear of misdiagnosis and time spent explaining to patients why antibiotics are not indicated, the provider chooses whether or not to prescribe antibiotics to patients for whom antibiotics are not clinically indicated. We consider four cases: when diagnostic accuracy relies on symptom presentation vs. additional diagnostic testing and when the opportunity cost of not prescribing antibiotics is public vs. private information of the provider. When there is no information asymmetry, an action-based incentive payment can coordinate care and achieve the first-best policy, decreasing the rate of inappropriate prescribing, even when incentive payments can affect the diagnosis behavior. However, when the diagnosis depends on additional testing, the first-best policy results in fewer inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions, when the test has high specificity. Therefore, when an accurate technical diagnostic is available, a simple to implement action-based incentive payment can be effective in reducing inappropriate antibiotic prescribing. In the realistic setting where the provider’s opportunity cost is private information, an action-based incentive payment cannot eliminate inappropriate antibiotic prescribing. In these settings, the introduction of point of care diagnostics to aid in objective diagnostic criteria will reduce the unintended consequences of the contract.

Hajj Financing Models: Fiqh Analysis of Payment Contracts for Hajj Funds at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Indonesia

Hajj is the perfecting of the pillars of Islam of a Muslim, the fifth pillar of Islam, and is carried out for those who are able. In Indonesia, the hajj is organized by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) in Jakarta and the regional offices of MORA throughout Indonesian provinces. To repay funds, prospective pilgrims do so at the bank receiving the BPS-BPIH hajj deposit. The contract used when registering prospective Pilgrims is a wakalah contract. However, when they come to the bank, the bank will ask them what contract will be applied, whether wadi'ah or murabahah. This research aims to disclose the Payment of Funds for prospective Hajj Pilgrims and analyze the principles of the contract applied in the repayment of funds for prospective pilgrims. The type of research used is field research with qualitative methods using descriptive analysis. The data sources in this study are primary and secondary data, then use descriptive data analysis as material for research findings. There are two findings in this study. The first is the agreement on the repayment of the Hajj Pilgrim Candidate Fund, which starts from the Wakalah contract between prospective Pilgrims with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, then the Wadi'ah and or Mudharabah Contract between prospective Hajj Pilgrims with BPS-BPIH, and the Ijarah Mausufah fi Dzimmah agreement between prospective Pilgrims represented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and BPKH as the Hajj fund manager. Second, the fiqh analysis of the principle of the contract applied to the Repayment of The Hajj Pilgrim Candidate Fund is Wakalah and is appropriate as it should be, but what needs to be considered is the understanding of prospective Pilgrims for the contracts that have been applied.

How Do Developers Influence the Transaction Costs of China’s Prefabricated Housing Development Process? An Investigation through the Bayesian Belief Network Approach

The implementation of prefabricated housing (PH) has become prevalent in China recently due to its advantages in enhancing production and energy-saving efficiency within the construction system. However, stakeholders may not always fully realize the benefits of adopting PH due to the emergence of transaction costs (TCs) in the development process of such projects. This study investigated the strategies for developers to make rational choices for minimizing the TCs of the PH project considering their own attributes and external constraints. A Bayesian Belief Network model was applied as the analytical method, based on surveys conducted in China. A single sensitivity analysis indicated that developers influence the TCs of PH through the following three most impactful factors: prefabrication rate, PH experience, and contract payment method. Integrated strategies are recommended for developers in various situations based on a multiple sensitivity analysis. Developers facing challenges due to high prefabrication rates are advised to reduce the risks by procuring highly qualified general contractors and adopting unit-price contracts. For developers with limited PH experience, adopting the Engineering–Procurement–Construction procurement method is the most efficient way to reduce their TCs in the context of China’s PH market. This study contributes to the current body of knowledge concerning the effect of traders’ attributes and choices on TCs, expanding the application of TC theory and fulfilling the study on the determinants of TCs in construction management.

Recycling, pricing decisions, and coordination in the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain: A dynamic perspective

As the “Internet+” mode promotes transforming and upgrading the traditional recycling industry, dual-channel recycling has become the focus of commercial activities. Based on such background, this paper constructs the differential game models of the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (DCCLSC) system in the complete non-cooperation (DN), incomplete cooperation (D), and complete cooperation (C) scenarios by applying game theory. The novelty is that recycling and pricing decision problems are investigated for the DCCLSC system from a dynamic perspective. A cost sharing-transfer payment contract is designed to realize the perfect coordination of the DCCLSC system. Moreover, the extended models with government intervention and inventory management are proposed. Finally, the numerical examples are used to verify the feasibility and validity of the addressed results. The results show that 1) online retail price is higher than offline retail price when μ>μN; 2) The retail price in the DN model is always lower than the D model, and their comparative relationship with the C model is closely related to the ratio of recoverability rate; 3) The recoverability rate and the profit of DCCLSC system are highest in the C model; 4) Competition and government intervention can create a win-win situation with improving environmental and economic benefits.

Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization

AbstractGiven the rapid prevalence and advancement of patent commercialization, tacit knowledge sharing during this process is increasingly being scrutinized. To explore the factors affecting tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization, this paper constructed a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model to analyze the complex game interaction between inventors, enterprises, and patent intermediaries. Due to uncertainty in the external environment, Gaussian white noise was introduced into replicator dynamic equations, and numerical simulation was used to describe the tripartite dynamic evolution. The results showed the following: (1) inventors and enterprises with similar levels of relevant capabilities are more likely to achieve better results in sharing tacit knowledge. (2) The implementation of an effective market reputation evaluation system has the potential to enhance implicit knowledge sharing in the realm of patent commercialization. (3) The percentage of payments of the two‐stage payment contract will affect the behavior of inventors and enterprises. (4) The stability of the equilibrium solution is closely tied to the intensity of Gaussian white noise, which can lead to deviations from the original trajectory of equilibrium strategies. Greater external uncertainty makes tacit knowledge sharing more challenging. This study will provide constructive suggestions for promoting tacit knowledge sharing among participants in patent commercialization.

The impact of delayed fixed-price payment in the decentralised project supply chain

This paper investigates the impact of the non-delayed and delayed fixed-price payment contracts in a two-stage decentralised project supply chain consisting of a supplier with stochastic production and delivery time and a manufacturer with stochastic on-site task processing time. We consider a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer acts as the leader to determine the buffer time with forbidden early delivery while the supplier acts as the follower to determine when to start production. We find that the delayed payment contract can postpone the production start time when the buffer time is constant compared to the non-delayed one. However, this finding does not always hold when the buffer time is a decision variable. Besides, in contrast to our intuition that the supplier prefers the non-delayed payment contract while the manufacturer prefers the delayed one, our result shows that there is no specific dominant contract for either the supplier or the manufacturer. It is also found that the basic centralised model yields a higher probability of on-time delivery, but not necessarily a lower cost, than our proposed decentralised models. Furthermore, not all equilibrium decisions derived from the basic model remain robust in the N ( N > 1 ) suppliers’ model.

On the organization of prosecutorial and supervisory support for the implementation of the national project “Ecological Well-Being”

The author examines the relations between the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation and supervisory support in the field of implementation of a national project in the field of ecology. The subject of the research is the practice of the prosecutor's offices of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the case law of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the legislation of the Russian Federation and organizational and administrative documents of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, the works of scientists related to the topic of research. The methodological basis of the research includes the dialectical method; system method; methods of analysis, synthesis, analogy, deduction, induction, observation, modeling, historical, comparative legal, statistical and other methods. The author examines the organization of supervisory support for national projects, in particular, the problems that arise during work with sources of information about violations of laws, the organization of systemic information interaction with the objects being inspected, the distribution of responsibilities among prosecutors, the formation of departmental reporting, interaction with specialists (experts) during inspections, as well as during inspections at various stages of implementation of national projects. The work classifies typical violations and analyzes specific examples at various stages of national project implementation, such as: organizing and conducting procurement; implementation of government contracts; payment of government contracts and other expenditure of budget funds; organization and implementation of subsequent maintenance of purchased equipment and constructed facilities. The author also substantiates the need to create a single expert institution in the Russian Federation.

An analysis of fellowship training of kidney transplant surgeons in a Brazilian state.

The lack of specialized professionals potentially contributes to the inability to meet the demand for kidney transplantations. Moreover, there is no universal proposal for the training process of transplantation surgeons. We aimed to explore the characteristics of the training program and professional activities of kidney transplantation teams in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. We invited the surgeons of all 19 active kidney transplantation centers in Minas Gerais to participate in this cross-sectional study. Demographic and professional training data were compared using linear and logistic regression models. The response rate among the centers was high (89%); half of the surgeons answered the survey (39/78). Most of the centers were public teaching institutions, under a production-based payment contract, with a mean of 6 ± 2.4 surgeons/team; 94.2% of the centers had urologists. The surgeons were 95% male (age of 46.3 ± 9.7 years) and 59% were urologists. Most were involved in organ procurement and transplantation; only one surgeon worked exclusively with transplantation. The mean period since training was 13 ± 9.4 years, with a mean of 10 ± 9.7 years as part of the transplantation team. Only 25.6% had specialized or formal training in transplantation, with only one completing a formal medical residency for kidney transplantation. The lack of training programs was the most frequently cited reason. Kidney transplantation surgeons are not exclusive and most have not completed a formal fellowship program in transplantation because they are not available. These data indicate the need to improve training programs and facilitate the formation of new kidney transplantation teams.

Microfinance from the Perspective of Islamic Economics and its Importance for Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, Islamic microfinance stands as a pivotal solution in combating poverty and fostering socio-economic development. This integral financial mechanism extends essential financial services and modest loans to economically vulnerable segments and small enterprises. Its multifaceted approach incorporates diverse strategies including profit-sharing partnerships like Musharakah, Mudaraba, Muzarah, and Musaqah, as well as sale and debt-based contracts such as Murabaha, Salam, Ijarah, deferred and installment payment contracts, Istisna'a, and Tawarruq. Moreover, it integrates righteousness and charity-based models such as Qard-al-hassan, Zakat, Waqf, Hiba, Takaful, and Wasyyah.
 Setting itself apart from traditional microfinance, Islamic microfinance staunchly opposes usurious practices and deceit, prioritizing Islamic principles that emphasize moral virtues like honesty and sincerity in individuals. These ethical benchmarks, deeply rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, are considered fundamental across various domains, spanning from economic affairs to matters of governance.

Carbon emission reduction and precision marketing decisions of a platform supply chain

Precision marketing is useful for understanding consumers' low-carbon awareness (CLA). Considering a consignment contract and a reselling contract with a fixed wholesale price, we develop Stackelberg game models between the manufacturer and the platform under different sales contracts. We investigate how precision marketing and contract format impact supply chain members' decision-making and consumer surplus. We find, in any case, the optimal decisions of supply chain members increase with CLA and the manufacturer’s emission reduction efficiency. However, the impact of the mean efficiency and accuracy efficiency of precision marketing and the precision marketing efficiency on the companies' decisions depends on the contract format and production costs. Precision marketing is beneficial for both the platform and consumers under each contract, but it is not always beneficial for the manufacturer. Regardless of whether precision marketing is used, both the platform and the manufacturer prefer the reselling contract if the wholesale price is moderate; otherwise, a transfer payment contract is needed for them to reach an agreement on which contract should be adopted. Precision marketing increases total carbon emissions under the reselling contract, while it decreases total carbon emissions under the consignment contract. Precision marketing increases social welfare under both contracts. With precision marketing, social welfare is greater under the reselling contract than under the consignment contract. This paper is the first to investigate the platform supply chain’s decision-making with different sales contracts considering the impact of precision marketing on both the mean value and accuracy improvement of uncertain market demand under low-carbon environment.

The characteristics of the contract regarding the payment of the maintenance pension compared to the annuity contract

In the content of this article, I have presented the legal features of the contract regarding the payment of the maintenance pension in a comparative aspect compared to those of the annuity contract. Both in the case of the contract regarding the payment of the maintenance pension and in the case of the annuity, the parties to the contract are natural persons, who have full exercise capacity, parties to the contract are natural persons, who have the capacity to exercise, respectively parties to the annuity contract can also be legal persons. In the first case, the object of the contract is the maintenance of the creditor who is always related to the debtor of the obligation, while in the case of the annuity contract, the relationship is not an essential condition of the legal relationship of maintenance. It should be noted that both types of contracts are regulated in civil law, so that execution, modification, termination and declaration of nullity are carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. The selection of the maintenance pension payment contract or the annuity contract is not optional, emerging from the limited circle of subjects regarding the maintenance obligation regulated by the Family Code.

SaaSC: Toward Pay-as-You-Go Mode for Software Service Transactions Based on Blockchain's Smart Legal Contracts

Usage-based pricing or Pay-as-You-Go is a relatively new SaaS business model that may provide customers the option to pay for only what they use. Yet, it is more challenging to implement than traditional Pay-before-Use subscriptions considering that it need not only realize financial payment on consumption-based behaviors, but also regulate the rights and obligations among the providers, consumers, and platforms in a legal form. To address these challenges, in this paper Smart Legal Contract (SLC) is integrated into a service computing platform by introducing a new architecture, called Service as a Smart Contract (SaaSC). On the aspect of service legalization, through combining SaaS and SaaSC, we establish three kinds of terms in SLC-based software subscription contract to support service's registration, discovery and customization, so that a complete transaction procedure can be regulated in terms of service states, transaction process, and interactions among contracting parties. On the aspect of service financialization, we propose a new scheme of service interface declaration in the SLC-based SPESC contract. By automatically executing smart contracts and checking the terms, the pay-as-you-go billing form can be made fine-grained payment after using service interface calls. Moreover, we take weather forecast service as a case to implement and analyze the acquisition, delivery, and contractual payment of software service on Blockchain smart contract. The experimental results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed SaaS+SaaSC architecture so that it provides a practicable approach for contractual software service.

Payer reimbursement practices and incentives for improving interpretation of germline genetic testing.

Germline genetic testing for inherited cancer risk has shifted to multi-gene panel tests (MGPTs). While MGPTs detect more pathogenic variants, they also detect more variants of uncertain significance (VUSs) that increase the possibility of harms such as unnecessary surgery. Data sharing by laboratories is critical to addressing the VUS problem. However, barriers to sharing and an absence of incentives have limited laboratory contributions to the ClinVar database. Payers can play a crucial role in the expansion of knowledge and effectiveness of genetic testing. Current policies affecting MGPT reimbursement are complex and create perverse incentives. Trends in utilization and coverage for private payers and Medicare illustrate opportunities and challenges for data sharing to close knowledge gaps and improve clinical utility. Policy options include making data sharing (i) a condition of payment, and (ii) a metric of laboratory quality in payment contracts, yielding preferred coverage or enhanced reimbursement. Mandating data sharing sufficient to verify interpretations and resolve discordance among labs under Medicare and federal health programs is an option for the US Congress. Such policies can reduce the current waste of valuable data needed for precision oncology and improved patient outcomes, enabling a learning health system.

OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS

AbstractIn buyer–seller relationships, offering trade credit to buyers fosters long‐term collaboration but seller provision varies systematically as relationships evolve. We study the optimal provision dynamics of trade credit when the seller's information about the buyer is incomplete. We show how the interaction of self‐enforcing relational contracts and formal contracts determines optimal payment contract choice. We find that payment contracts can be interpreted as screening technologies and imply distinct learning opportunities about the buyer's type. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts that all transitions between payment terms lead to seller trade credit provision in the long run.

A STUDY ON CUSTOMER’S SATISFACTION ON E-BANKING SERVICES

When each day may be a race against time in our frenzied lives, we search for ways to spare time as much as ready to. E-Banking is one of the innovation headways that offer assistance customers to perform their monetary exchanges on a secured stage from a retail or computerized bank, credit union, or any monetary institution. E-Banking, moreover known as electronic keeping money, is the computerized dispersion of modern managing an account administrations and products to customers specifically through electronic, intuitively contact systems. When restricted to customary keeping money, it offers numerous focal points and qualities to clients. E-Banking could be a straightforward and helpful way to get 24-hour get to to your bank employing a smartphone. E-Banking makes use of the web as a dissemination instrument for banking transfers. E-Banking administrations have made bank exchanges a thing of the past when it comes to ordinary errands. Since online banking is one of the foremost well known administrations given by banks, it is additionally an awfully steady stage. Encryption frameworks are frequently utilized by banks to guarantee that all client data is secure which no information breaches happen. It secures you from online extortion and account control within the end. Electronic keeping money, too known as electronic reserves exchange (EFT), is essentially the utilize of electronic International Scientific Journal of Engineering and Management ISSN: 2583-6129 Volume: 02 Issue: 04 | April – 2023 DOI: 10.55041/ISJEM00232 www.isjem.com An International Scholarly || Multidisciplinary || Open Access || Indexing in all major Database & Metadata © 2023, ISJEM (All Rights Reserved) | www.isjem.com | Page 2 means to exchange stores specifically from one account to another, instead of by cheque or cash. You can utilize electronic stores exchange to: • Have your paycheck kept specifically into your bank or credit union checking account. • Pull back cash from your checking account from an ATM machine with a personal identification number (Stick), at your comfort, day or night. • Educated your bank or credit union to naturally pay certain month to month bills from your account, such as your auto credit or your contract payment. • Have the bank or credit union exchange stores each month from your checking account to your shared support account. • Have your government social security benefits check or your charge discount deposited directly into your checking account. • Purchase basic supplies, gasoline and other buys at the point-of deal, employing a check card rather than cash, credit or a individual check.

Dynamic Federated Learning-Based Economic Framework for Internet-of-Vehicles

Federated learning (FL) can empower Internet-of-Vehicles (IoV) networks by leveraging smart vehicles (SVs) to participate in the learning process with minimum data exchanges and privacy disclosure. The collected data and learned knowledge can help the vehicular service provider (VSP) improve the global model accuracy, e.g., for road safety as well as better profits for both VSP and participating SVs. Nonetheless, there exist major challenges when implementing the FL in IoV networks, such as dynamic activities and diverse quality-of-information (QoI) from a large number of SVs, VSP's limited payment budget, and profit competition among SVs. In this paper, we propose a novel dynamic FL-based economic framework for an IoV network to address these challenges. Specifically, the VSP first implements an SV selection method to determine a set of the best SVs for the FL process according to the significance of their current locations and information history at each learning round. Then, each selected SV can collect on-road information and propose a payment contract to the VSP based on its collected QoI. For that, we develop a multi-principal one-agent contract-based policy to maximize the profits of the VSP and learning SVs under the VSP's limited payment budget and asymmetric information between the VSP and SVs. Through experimental results using real-world on-road datasets, we show that our framework can converge 57% faster (even with only 10% of active SVs in the network) and obtain much higher social welfare of the network (up to 27.2 times) compared with those of other baseline FL methods.