Contract-level Data Research Articles

Equity in government contracting: Analyzing the performance of small disadvantaged businesses

AbstractSet aside programs, which preference disadvantaged businesses, have long been among the largest government equity programs in the United States. Set asides ensure government revenues spur economic growth in firms and communities that have traditionally lacked representation in systems of power. However, there has been skepticism about whether set aside programs are compatible with the efficiency objectives of government contracting. Few empirical studies have assessed the comparative performance of small, disadvantaged businesses and other firms to determine if there are differences. Using contract level data from the Federal Procurement Data System: Next Generation, we test whether set aside contracts are associated with a reduction in the government's ability to secure “best value.” We find few performance differences between small, disadvantaged businesses, and other vendors across a range of goods and services, suggesting mutual benefits and no outsized risks when governments engage in contracts with disadvantaged firms.

Bidder asymmetries in procurement auctions: Efficiency vs. information – Evidence from railway passenger services

We estimate a structural model of procurement auctions with private and common value components and asymmetric bidders using detailed contract-level data on the German market for railway passenger services. Exploiting exogenous variation in the procurement design, we disentangle the asymmetries in private costs from asymmetries in information about the common value. While each asymmetry can rationalize a firm’s dominance, understanding its source is crucial for evaluating the auction design as welfare and revenue implications depend on the source of dominance. Our results indicate that the incumbent is slightly more cost-efficient and has substantially more precise information about the common value component. If the bidders’ strategic response to the common value asymmetry were eliminated, the average probability of selecting the efficient firm would increase by 43%-points.

Do real estate values boost corporate borrowing? Evidence from contract-level data

Ample literature builds on the notion that real estate values boost corporate secured borrowing (“collateral channel”). A comprehensive contract-level database allows us to observe the value, location, and end-use of firms’ real estate holdings in the US and all debts raised against those assets over the 2000–2017 period. Firms raise new debt following an increase in the value of their real estate but use unsecured rather than secured borrowing. We rationalize these findings with a model where firms’ choices between secured and unsecured debt reflect the systematic risk exposures of the assets on their balance sheets. While secured debt may be seen as a safer claim than unsecured debt contractually, we demonstrate that it can be riskier from an economic perspective. Our analysis adds new insight into how firms set their debt structure.

Controlling Corruption in Development Aid: New Evidence from Contract-Level Data

Following scandals about corruption in foreign aid, and in a political climate that increasingly questions the legitimacy of development assistance, donors are under pressure to better control how their funds are spent. However, there is little evidence on precisely how to control corruption in development aid. This article assesses under which conditions donor regulations are successful in controlling corruption in aid spent by national governments through procurement tenders. The article analyses data on donor-funded procurement contracts in 100+ countries in 1998–2008 and uses ‘single bid submitted in a competitive tender’ as a corruption risk indicator. Applying a contract-level propensity score matching and regression analysis, it finds that an intervention which increases donor oversight and widens access to tenders is effective in reducing corruption risks: lowering single bidding on competitive markets by 3.6–4.3 percentage points. This effect is greater in countries with low-state capacity.

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

Abstract To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better eco- nomic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) time delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.

The Long and Short of It: The Post-Crisis Corporate CDS Market

The authors establish key stylized facts about the post-crisis evolution of trading and pricing of credit default swaps. Using supervisory contract-level data, they show that dealers became net buyers of credit protection starting in the second half of 2014, both through reducing the amount of protection they sell in the single-name market and switching to buying protection in the index market. More generally, they argue that considering simultaneous positions in different types of credit derivatives is crucial for understanding institutions’ decisions to participate in these markets and how these decisions affect prices.

The Impact of Information Sharing on the Use of Collateral versus Guarantees

Abstract This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees, in particular for riskier borrowers. Among repeat borrowers, both collateral and guarantee requirements decline in proportion to the length of the lending relationship. These results suggest that information sharing can both reduce adverse selection among new borrowers and hold-up problems among repeat borrowers.

The Long and Short of It: The Post-Crisis Corporate CDS Market

The authors establish key stylized facts about the post-crisis evolution of trading and pricing of credit default swaps. Using supervisory contract-level data, they show that dealers became net buyers of credit protection starting in the second half of 2014, both through reducing the amount of protection they sell in the single-name market and switching to buying protection in the index market. More generally, they argue that considering simultaneous positions in different types of credit derivatives is crucial for understanding institutions’ decisions to participate in these markets and how these decisions affect prices.

Political Bureaucratic Cycles: How Politicians’ Responses to Electoral Incentives and Anti-Corruption Policies Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery around Elections

A vast literature has studied political cycles in economic outcomes and economic policy tools (political business and political budget cycles, respectively). I identify a related phenomenon, which I call political bureaucratic cycles: electoral cycles in the hiring and firing of bureaucrats and in the activities of public employees, which emerge as a result of the combination of electoral incentives and legal rules imposed to limit the use of public employment for electioneering. Empirically, I leverage administrative, identified, contract-level data on the universe of municipal employees in Brazil between 2002 and 2016 to measure political bureaucratic cycles. Hires and dismissals of municipal personnel show markedly cyclical patterns around elections, which are shaped by both incumbents’ electoral incentives and their reaction to well-meaning anti-corruption policies that constrain hiring and firing around elections. Cycles are most pronounced for temporary bureaucrats but are also detectable for civil service bureaucrats, which counters the received wisdom that civil service regimes isolate bureaucrats from political dynamics. Hiring and firing around elections are targeted at less educated people, which is consistent with political bureaucratic cycles partly responding to clientelistic strategies. Consistent with the clientelistic use of public employment, and the legal rigidities imposed on hiring around elections, pre-natal check-ups (a key output of the healthcare bureaucracy) are systematically lower around elections. Findings are grounded on, and complemented with, in-depth interviews with prosecutors, politicians and bureaucrats conducted in 7 states. The paper contributes to bridging the gap between the literatures on political budget/business cycles and on clientelism, two fields that have rarely been linked before.

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

Abstract To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).

Long-Term Contracts and Repeated Interaction: Evidence from the Costa Rican Coffee Market

We use contract-level data from the Costa Rican coffee industry to explore the relationship between formal and relational contracts–in particular, the relationship between long-term contracting and...

Controlling Corruption in Development Aid: New Evidence from Contract-Level Data

Following scandals about corruption in foreign aid, and in a political climate that increasingly questions the legitimacy of development assistance, donors are under pressure to control how their funds are spent. At the same time, they also face pressure to trust recipient governments to disburse project funds themselves, so as to build capacity in developing countries. This paper assesses under which conditions donor regulations are successful in controlling corruption in aid spent by national governments through procurement tenders. By mining procurement contracts funded by the World Bank in 100 countries over the period 1998-2008 for corruption “red flags”, we create a dataset that provides an unprecedentedly accurate picture of corruption risks in the spending of aid across the developing world. Through propensity score matching and regression analysis, we find that the 2003 World Bank regulatory reform aiming to control corruption was effective in reducing corruption risks: lowering single bidding on competitive markets by 3.8-4.3 percentage points. This effect is greater in countries with low state capacity.

Mutual Funds As Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns

Using novel contract-level data, we study the recent trend in open-end mutual funds investing in unicorns—highly valued, privately held start-ups—and the consequences of mutual fund investment for corporate governance provisions. Larger funds and those with more stable funding are more likely to invest in unicorns. Compared to venture capital groups (VCs), mutual funds appear to have weaker cash flow rights and to be less involved in terms of corporate governance, being particularly underrepresented on boards of directors. Having to carefully manage their own liquidity pushes mutual funds to require stronger redemption rights and eschew “pay-to-play” provisions, suggesting contractual choices consistent with mutual funds’ short-term capital sources.

The Impact of Information Sharing on the Use of Collateral versus Guarantees

We exploit contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees, in particular for riskier borrowers. Among repeat borrowers, both collateral and guarantee requirements decline in proportion to the length of the lending relationship. These results suggest that information sharing can both reduce adverse selection among new borrowers and hold-up problems among repeat borrowers.

Enforcing Public-Private Partnership Contract: How do Fiscal Institutions Matter?

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have increased rapidly in emerging and developing countries, creating both opportunities and fiscal challenges. One of the main challenges is that while governments have increased commitments in guarantees and direct subsidies to promote PPPs, contractual disputes remain high with significant costs. This paper examines how fiscal institutions affect the selection of PPP contracts and the probability of contract disputes using about 6,000 PPP contract-level data. The analysis shows that larger government financing needs, lower budget transparency and bureaucratic efficiency are associated with higher probability for governments to offer guarantees. Propensity score matching results show that disputes are more common for guaranteed contracts due to adverse selection and contingent liability effects. PPP management quality and budget transparency are found to be key determinants for a longer survival of PPPs.

Enforcing Public-Private Partnership Contract: How Do Fiscal Institutions Matter?

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have increased rapidly in emerging and developing countries, creating both opportunities and fiscal challenges. One of the main challenges is that while governments have increased commitments in guarantees and direct subsidies to promote PPPs, contractual disputes remain high with significant costs. This paper examines how fiscal institutions affect the selection of PPP contracts and the probability of contract disputes using about 6,000 PPP contract-level data. The analysis shows that larger government financing needs, lower budget transparency and bureaucratic efficiency are associated with higher probability for governments to offer guarantees. Propensity score matching results show that disputes are more common for guaranteed contracts due to adverse selection and contingent liability effects. PPP management quality and budget transparency are found to be key determinants for a longer survival of PPPs.

Contracting for technology transfer: patent licensing and know-how in Brazil

Using contract-level data, we study the relation between the inclusion of know-how in cross-border patent licensing agreements and the contractual terms used by firms to deal with moral hazard risks. We use official data on international technology contracts with patent licensing terms registered by affiliated and unaffiliated parties before the Department of Technology Transfer of the National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. We find that contracts between unaffiliated parties involving know-how transfer show distinctive contractual and technology features compared to the rest: (i) they involve younger but lower quality technologies (compared to contracts without know-how); (ii) they are more prone to up front lump-sum payments than royalty or combined payments (royalty and fixed); and (iii) they are more likely to be accompanied by the licensing of other IPRs, in addition to patents, such as trademarks.

Cost efficiency in Swedish public transport

Over the last couple of years, costs in Swedish public transport have increased substantially, and there is little knowledge in what affects cost efficiency. This study aims at determining how different contractual and environmental factors affect cost efficiency, and whether cost efficiency differs between Public Transport Authorities (PTA). A stochastic frontier analysis is conducted using contract-level data for the 21 PTAs and year 2013. The main findings are that cost efficiency is lower if a contract is operating in areas with high population density, or if the traffic is supplied by a publicly owned operator without using competitive tendering. Furthermore, no major differences in cost efficiency are found across PTAs, with the exception of the counties of Stockholm and Skåne, both counties with high population density, and the county of Västmanland, where all public transport is provided without competitive tendering. The finding of lower cost efficiency in high-density areas calls for further investigation into why this is. Potential explanations are the need for higher peak capacity, or more complex transportation systems. Finally, usage of direct-awarding of public transport should be clearly motivated, as this affects cost efficiency negatively.

Assessing Cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Interactions between the CRP and Crop Insurance

We examine the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) enrollment design while accounting for the CRP’s interactions with the federal crop insurance program. We find that the current CRP is not cost-effective despite its intent to balance benefits and costs. Based on CRP contract-level data, we show that adopting a cost-effective enrollment design and incorporating crop insurance subsidies into the CRP’s Environmental Benefits Index would significantly increase the CRP acreage, environmental benefits, and savings on crop insurance subsidies, while leaving government outlay unchanged. Large geographical redistributions of CRP acreage would also occur. We further investigate the cost-effective design’s robustness to CRP benefit misspecifications.