Contingent Pacifism Research Articles

Utilitarian Contingent Pacifism and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

For the role of utilitarianism in the ethics of war and peace, Shaw suggests there is a Utilitarian War Principle (UWP) and argues that the principles of the just war theory should be treated as intermediate principles that are subordinated to UWP. He also argues that the state should be the primary legitimate authority to wage war and holder of the right of national defense. I argue that the utilitarian approach should be specifically linked with contingent pacifism, a new understanding of pacifism from within the just war tradition, and the utilitarian contingent pacifism only endorses individual self-defense but not national defense. This finding is not only theoretically important but has practical implications for the debate on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Utilitarian contingent pacifism supports the idealist position that Article 9 is morally significant because it makes Japan a pioneer of the new kind of pacifism.

Conditional and contingent pacifism: the main battlegrounds

ABSTRACTAnti-war pacifism rejects modern war as a means of attaining peace. This paper outlines two varieties of theoretical anti-war pacifism: conditional pacifism (war is conditionally unjustifiable due to the harm it causes to innocent persons) and contingent pacifism (war is justified if certain criteria are met but contingent facts about modern war mean that few, if any, actual wars meet these criteria). It elucidates the main points of contention at which these positions intersect with other war institution preserving theories, and each other, and defends them as plausible positions that can add significant value to the critical studies and international relations conversations on war.

ISLAMIC JUST WAR PACIFISM

It is common to contrast pacifism with just war theory. Pacifism holds that all wars are wrong, while just war theory holds that under certain conditions, war is just. However, pacifism has also been interpreted as a commitment to peace and a rejection of war except in some but not all cases of self-defense or humanitarian intervention. The term "just war pacifism" or "contingent pacifism" has been used to describe the view that under the conditions of modern warfare, it is morally wrong to engage in war. It is generally recognized that in Islamic traditions of legal, political, and moral thinking, something analogous to the Western just war theory is prominent. In this paper, a comparison is made between Western and Islamic just war conditions. It is then argued that under current conditions, the criteria needed to provide a moral justification for just war in Islam fail to obtain for an important range of armed conflicts, and that this conclusion may be considered an argument for a conditional Islamic just war pacifism. The extent and limitations of this kind of argument are also briefly discussed. Finally, the example of Zaynab, the daughter of Imam 'Ali (peace be with them), is given as indicating the kind of resistance to oppression in harmony with the just war pacifism outlined in the paper.

Contingent Pacifism and Contingently Pacifist Conclusions

Contingent Pacifism and Contingently Pacifist Conclusions

Morally Heterogeneous Wars

According to “epistemic-based contingent pacifism” a) there are virtually no wars which we know to be just, and b) it is morally impermissible to wage a war unless we know that the war is just. Thus it follows that there is no war which we are morally permitted to wage. The first claim (a) seems to follow from widespread disagreement among just war theorists over which wars, historically, have been just. I will argue, however, that a source of our inability to confidently distinguish just from unjust wars lies in how we evaluate “morally heterogeneous” wars—i.e., wars with just and unjust aims. Specifically, the practice of reaching a univocal evaluation of a morally heterogeneous war as a whole by aggregating the evaluations of that war’s just and unjust aims is wrongheaded, because it undermines the action-guiding character of jus ad bellum. We ought instead to adopt what I call the “disaggregate approach” to jus ad bellum, according to which we evaluate the various aims of a war individually, without aggregating them into an evaluation of the war as a whole. Adopting this approach will eliminate a source of our disagreement over which wars have been just, and will ipso fact eliminate a basis for epistemic-based contingent pacifism.

Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War

This article begins by briefly discussing the general idea of jus post bellum norms before turning to discuss some of Michael Walzer's ideas about jus post bellum, particularly what he says, or could be construed to infer, about post-war proportionality. It also re-examines Walzer's discussion of the problems of post-war retribution and reconciliation. The article seeks to formulate and defend a post-war principle of proportionality, discussing how it relates to other proportionality principles, as well as to other jus post bellum principles. This leads to an examination of the fog of war, especially concerning Robert McNamara's calculations about the application of the principle of proportionality to the firebombing of Tokyo. I outline a general account of contingent pacifism that seems to me to follow from careful consideration of the jus post bellum principle of proportionality. The article closes by initiating a discussion of the prospects for the end of war in light of considerations about the justice of how particular wars should end.

Contingent Pacifism and Selective Refusal

Contingent Pacifism and Selective Refusal

PACIFISM AND MORAL THEORY

There is a nonabsolute or “contingent” form of pacifism that claims that war in contemporary conditions inevitably involves the killing of innocent people on a scale that is too great to be justified. Some contingent pacifists argue that war always involves a risk that virtually everyone that one might kill is innocent – either because one can never be sure that one’s cause is just or because even most of those who fight in wars that lack a just cause are nevertheless not culpable and are therefore innocent in the relevant sense. Others argue that there is no just cause for war that is sufficiently important to justify the large-scale killing of innocent civilians that is unavoidable in war. I seek to refute contingent pacifism by arguing that its theoretical presuppositions are untenable.

From Pacifism to War Resistance

Pacifism is often interpreted as an absolute moral position that claims it is always wrong to go to war. As such, it is often rejected on the grounds that it excludes or overlooks other moral considerations, such as an obligation to resist aggression or defend fundamental human rights. Vocational pacifism, restricted to those who choose nonviolence as a way of life, is one version of pacifism that might overcome some of the objections connected to its moral absolutism. Contingent pacifism, on the other hand, acknowledges the complexities of moral reasoning connected to decisions concerning the use of armed force while retaining pacifist objections to war and preparations for war. Even contingent pacifism is limited by its individualism or voluntarism as a moral position, however. War resistance contributes its analysis of the political or structural factors responsible for war or preparations for war while retaining pacifism's moral impetus for action.