Epistemological Contextualism Research Articles

The development of strategic industrial sectors of Ukraine in the context of national economic security: theoretical foundations

The article demonstrates the need to identify strategic sectors of industry for the social and economic development of the state, which allows focusing the attention and limited resources of the state on supporting the development of those sectors that ensure national economic security. Within the epistemological contextualism, the concept of "strategic sector" is defined. To classify an industry sector as strategic, proposed criteria are outlined based on objective, sustainable circumstances in the country's economy, and within the context of national economic security. The definition of "national economic security" is provided. The criteria for recognizing the strategic nature of an industrial sector within the context of national economic security are determined by operationalizing constructs derived from the proposed definition of a "strategic industrial sector". Quantitative indicators are proposed to quantitatively describe the degree (intensity) of the criterion for recognizing the strategic nature of an industrial sector within the context of national economic security. The development of the strategic sector of the industry in the context of national economic security is ensured by critical enterprises in the industry. To recognize enterprises in strategic industrial sectors as critical for the industry's development in the context of national economic security, a number of criteria have been proposed. The development of critical enterprises in the industry should be security-oriented in nature. Support and regulation of security-oriented development of enterprises in the strategic industrial complex of Ukraine, which are to include recognized strategically important industries based on proposed criteria for national economic security, should be carried out using a comprehensive mechanism of state regulation of the country's strategic industrial complex. An important element of the comprehensive mechanism of state regulation of the country's strategic industrial complex is the mechanism of state support, which is implemented through various tools distributed among the components of the mechanism.

The paramedic experience of return to clinical practice: A reflexive thematic analysis

Background: The Australian paramedic workforce has significantly expanded and evolved in the past few decades. Professionalisation, increasing demand and evolving clinical practice have contributed to pressure on paramedics to meet community expectations of service delivery. Returning to clinical practice after an absence presents a substantial challenge for paramedics who will need to navigate this transitional phase while readjusting to the fast-paced environment of pre-hospital care. This study aims to explore and understand the experience of paramedics returning to clinical practice. Methods: Paramedics were invited to discuss their experiences returning to clinical practice in ambulance services within Australia. A qualitative reflexive thematic analysis was conducted utilising an inductive approach, underpinned by the theoretical framework of the organisational support theory. An experiential orientation was supported by a critical realist ontology, which intersected and overlapped with epistemological contextualism. Results: Three major themes were identified: (1) perceived organisational support, (2) the reality of flexible work, and (3) clinician identity. Theme one was further broken down into three sub-themes relating to structure, work engagement, and clinical support. Conclusions: Our findings provide insight into the lived experiences of paramedics returning to clinical practice. These experiences and challenges should inform the application of organisational policy and resource allocation to better support returning paramedics in the future. Strategies should include enhanced leadership capability, flexible work, robust clinical education, and structured programmes with in-built flexibility to reintegrate staff with an emphasis on communication and support.

Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge

Epistemological contextualism states that propositions about knowledge, expressed in sentences like “S knows that P,” are context-sensitive. Schaffer (2005) examines whether one of Lewis’ (1996), Cohen’s (1988) and DeRose’s (1995) influential contextualist accounts is preferable to the others. According to Schaffer, Lewis’ theory of relevant alternatives succeeds as a linguistic basis for contextualism and as an explanation of what the parameter that shifts with context is, while Cohen’s theory of thresholds and DeRose’s theory of standards fail. This paper argues that Schaffer’s analysis is unsatisfactory since it fails to show that thresholds and standards cannot cope with skepticism, as it is ultimately the conversation participants who control how the conversation plays out. Moreover, Schaffer fails to show that gradability is of no importance in inquiries.

Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem

The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.

Kuhn the Contextualist?

According to Kuhn’s account of the nature of scientific paradigms, how one experiences the world varies drastically from one context to another depending on the accepted paradigm of the context in question. In other words, one’s pre-existing conceptual structure concerning the world not only acts as an epistemological framework for its possible understanding, but also fundamentally affects the phenomenological observations of the world as something; this latter function of the conceptual structure motivates the view that mature scientific paradigms/theories and the data of scientific observation/experimentation are essentially two sides of the same coin. What is interesting, then, is that even between different historical eras that generally regarded the world in clearly incompatible ways, albeit still informed by paradigms, Kuhn still attributes scientific knowledge to each. To make sense of this, the explanatory resources of epistemological contextualism are used to specify potentially one way in which epistemic standards for knowledge must change between different historical eras for one to justifiably claim scientific knowledge within these different contexts. As we shall see, the argument for Kuhn’s account of paradigm being contextualist in character is apparently best made through the notion of doubt-driven context-shifts as actualising change in the form of P between different contexts in which “S knows that P” is asserted. As such, this paper first explores Kuhn’s account of scientific knowledge and paradigms before considering how the account can be considered contextualist in nature. Moreover, other context-concerned systems, such as Traditional, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, are briefly investigated to substantiate claims of what cannot be accurately ascribed to Kuhn’s epistemology.

Practising innovation in the healthcare ecosystem: the agency of third-party actors

PurposeOver recent years, few industries have seen such dramatic changes as the healthcare industry. The potential connectivity of digital technologies is completely transforming the healthcare ecosystem. This has resulted in companies increasingly investing in digital transformations to exploit data across channels, operations and patient outreach, by building on a practice approach and actor-network theory and being informed by service-dominant logic, this study aims to contribute by advancing the agential role of third-party actors to prompt innovation and shape service ecosystems.Design/methodology/approachThis research is grounded in an epistemological contextualism. To gain situated knowledge and address the role of context in knowledge, understanding and meaning the authors adopted a qualitative methodology to study actors in their different contexts. The empirical research was based on case theory. The authors also took guidance from practice scholars about how to investigate actors’ practices. The unit of analysis moves from dyadic relationships to focus on practices across different networks of actors.FindingsThis study expands on the conceptualization of triad as proposed by Siltaloppi and Vargo (2017) by moving from the form of triadic relationships – brokerage, mediation and coalition – to the agency of e-health third-parties; and their practices to innovate in the healthcare ecosystem. This study focuses on the actors and the performativity of actions and grounding the conceptual view on an empirical base.Practical implicationsThird-party actors bring about innovative ways of doing business in the healthcare ecosystem. Their actions challenge the status quo and run counter to long-time practices. Third-parties support the complex set of interconnections between different healthcare actors for the provision of new service co-creation opportunities. Considering how these e-health third-parties performs has implications for health managers, patients and other actors.Originality/valueThis study focuses on the actors and the performativity of actions and grounding the conceptual view on an empirical base. The agency of third-party actors is their ability to act among others and to connect multiple social and material structures to boost innovation. They prompt innovation and shape service ecosystems by brokering, mediating and coalescing among a great variety of resources, practices and institutions.

Williams’ contextualism as a critique of epistemological realism

Although Williams? contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams? position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed.

How Lewis Can Meet the Integration Challenge

We show that Lewis’s modal realism, and his serviceability-based argument for it, cohere with his epistemological contextualism. Modal realism explains why serviceability-based reasoning in metaphysics might be reliable, while Lewis’s contextualism explains why Lewis can properly ignore the possibility that serviceability isn’t reliable, at least when doing metaphysics. This is because Lewis’s contextualism includes a commitment to a kind of pragmatic encroachment, so that whether a subject knows can depend on how much is at stake with respect to whether the belief is true or false. Accordingly, we suggest that Lewis can count as knowing that serviceability is a reliable guide to truth in metaphysics, since the stakes are generally low there, and so can be justified in believing that modal realism is true based on its serviceability.

Epistemological Contextualism from a Logical Point of View

This paper aims at presenting a logical framework capable of expressing epistemological contextualism. Epistemological contextualism relies upon the possibility of an indexical interpretation of the knowledge operator, according to which the truth conditions of knowledge attributions exhibit a contextual variability in such a way that knowledge in one context does not entail knowledge in every context. By means of a notion of epistemic context defined on the basis of the notion of context developed by McCarthy and Buvaˇc in artificial intelligence, I show how an indexical interpretation of the knowledge operator can be formally modeled through a natural deduction system that enables classical reasoning among contexts governed by different concepts of knowledge.

Semantic (in)sensitivity: The relevance of Cappelen and Lepore’s linguistic tests in the debate about the contextualist thesis on the meaning of the concept of knowledge

The emergence of contextualism in epistemology has set off a philosophical debate over the semantic nature of the concept of knowledge, that is to say over whether the meaning of that concept is invariant or context-sensitive. While some proponents of contextualist view defend the notion that the meaning of knowledge is indexical in its nature, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore argue that there exist only a few expressions which possess this semantic trait, and that knowledge expressions are not among them. Evidence in support of their position, according to the authors, is provided by linguistic tests. In this article we examine whether linguistic tests provide a reliable indicator of the semantic nature of the concept of knowledge.

REPRESENTATION PROBLEMS OF TRANSACTIONAL COSTS IN ENTERPRISE ACCOUNTING

UDC 658.012
 
 Yurii Pohorelov, D. Sc. (Economics), assistant professor. Hanna Kozachenko, D.Sc. (Economics), professor. Anastasiia Bilousova, PhD (Economics), assistant professor. Poltava National Technical Yurii Kondratiuk University. Representation Problems of Transactional Costs in Enterprise Accounting. There is notion of “transactional costs” considered basing on the positions of epistemological contextualism. There is built in the article classification of transactional costs. There is managerial collision found about fact that not all kinds of transactional costs that are considered in cost management can be shown in accounting according to existing methodology of accounting. Taking into account regulatory framework of accounting there are three approaches suggested about accumulation of information about enterprise transactional costs. The authors analyzed advantages and limitations of suggested approaches about accounting transactional costs.
 
 Keywords: enterprise, costs management, transactional costs, classification, accounting, representation criteria, approach for information accumulation.

Contextualism in Epistemology

Contextualism in Epistemology

Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism

This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of the criterion proposed by Roderick Chisholm, which is based on epistemological particularism. After sketching Chisholm’s approach, a response to epistemic relativism is presented which combines Chisholm’s particularism with epistemic naturalism and reliabilism. A number of objections to the position are then considered. The paper ends with remarks about the relationship between particularism and the naturalistic response proposed to epistemic relativism.

Pragmatic Contextualism

Contextualism in epistemology has traditionally been understood as the view that “know” functions semantically like an indexical term, encoding different contents in contexts with different epistemic standards. But the indexical hypothesis about “know” faces a range of objections. This article explores an alternative version of contextualism on which “know” is a semantically stable term, and the truth-conditional variability in knowledge claims is a matter of pragmatic enrichment. The central idea is that in contexts with stringent epistemic standards, knowledge claims are narrowed: “know” is used in such contexts to make assertions about particularly demanding types of knowledge. The resulting picture captures all of the intuitive data that motivate contextualism while sidestepping the controversial linguistic thesis at its heart. After developing the view, the article shows in detail how it avoids one influential linguistic objection to traditional contextualism concerning indirect speech reports, and then answers an objection concerning the unavailability of certain types of clarification speeches.

On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.

Epistemological Contextualism and Cultures of Knowledge

Abstract : My first aim in this article is to describe the origin of the notion of culture of knowledge due to the research activities carried out at the University of Frankfurt by the Research Group Culture of Knowledge and Social Change since 1999. In this context we examined the relation between knowledge and society and proposed the notion of culture of knowledge as a key-concept to emphasize that knowledge does always appear in a specific historical form, and can be investigated only as a social practice. This key-concept turned out to be a helpful heuristic construct and had therefore a widespread diffusion as a general and extremely flexible category which can shed light on mutual relations between knowledge and culture in several historical contexts. Secondly, I will compare the approach taken in the culture of knowledge with other contextualist approaches of contemporary research areas like History of Science and Theory of Culture to show that it is particularly helpful in terms of connecting different fields. Finally, I will drive attention to a basic question concerning the approach of the culture of knowledge which remains still unanswered. The Frankfurter Research Group considered it as a model of knowledge alternative to all those positions in History of Science and Theory of Culture that assume the universal, trans-historical, and trans-cultural validity of fundamental forms of knowledge and cognitive abilities. I will discuss whether and to what extent these positions are really alternative, and for this purpose I will focus on a central point: whether the thesis of a radical historicity of knowledge undermines the very idea of universal rationality and to what extent. Keywords: Cultures of Knowledge; Contextualism; History of Science; Epistemology; Models of Knowledge Il contestualismo epistemologico e le culture epistemiche Riassunto: In questo articolo intendo illustrare la nascita della nozione di cultura epistemica nell’ambito delle indagini svolte presso l’Universita di Francoforte dall’unita di ricerca Cultura epistemica e mutamento sociale a partire dal 1999. In questo contesto si e indagato il rapporto tra sapere e societa e proposto la nozione di cultura epistemica come concetto-chiave per sottolineare come il sapere compaia sempre in una forma storica specifica, e come questo stesso possa essere indagato solo come pratica sociale. Questo concetto-chiave si e rivelato un concetto euristicamente fruttuoso e percio nel frattempo ha conosciuto ampia diffusione come categoria generale ed estremamente flessibile per gettar luce sui reciproci rapporti tra sapere e cultura in diversi contesti storici. Inoltre, intendo comparare l’approccio delle culture epistemiche con altri approcci propri della ricerca contemporanea in arre come la storia della scienza e la teoria della cultura per mostrarne l’utilita nel relazionare tra loro campi diversi. Infine, voglio portare l’attenzione su un problema di fondo, ancora aperto, che riguarda l’approccio delle culture epistemiche . L’unita di ricerca francofortese ha inteso questo approccio come modello di conoscenza alternativo a tutte quelle posizioni nella storia della scienza e nella teoria della cultura che assumono la validita universale, trans-culturale e trans-storica, delle forme fondamentali del sapere e delle capacita cognitive. Intendo discutere se e fino a che punto queste posizioni siano realmente alternative. Per questo mi concentrero su un elemento centrale: se e fino a che punto con la tesi della radicale storicita del sapere venga intaccata l’idea stessa di una razionalita universale. Parole chiave : Culture epistemiche; Contestualismo; Storia della scienza; Epistemologia; Modelli della conoscenza.

認識論的観点からの実在論論争

The debate over scientific realism is one of the traditional topics in philosophy of science. Today there are various types of realism and anti-realism, including entity realism, (epistemic/ontic/moderate) structural realism, semirealism, eclectic realism, and constructive empiricism. However, the main point of the dispute, which is the validity of inference from observable evidence to unobservable events, seems to have been set aside in the recent debate. To improve this situation, I propose a new approach to the scientific realism issue that utilizes the epistemological positions. As an example, I also demonstrate an analysis of the debate based on contextualism in epistemology.

VIRTUES, SOCIAL ROLES, AND CONTEXTUALISM

Abstract: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of “knows.” When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH CONTEXTUALISM?

This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest-dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers some considerations in favour of attributor contextualism over ‘subject-sensitive invariantism’, both in epistemology and in moral theory. But here we note an interesting result: the very considerations that support contextualism as a semantic thesis, threaten to rob that position of its anti-sceptical force.

Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I claim that the argument therefore fails.