Contemporary Virtue Ethics Research Articles

Playing with Virtue: Exploring Musical Expertise Through Julia Annas’s Lens

ABSTRACT In contemporary virtue ethics, virtues are often assimilated to skills. This assimilation suggests that the moral knowledge of virtuous individuals parallels the practical knowledge of experts in a particular skill. According to Julia Annas (2011a, 2011b), virtues function as skills requiring the ability to articulate reasons for one’s actions. These skills are developed through habitual practice over time. For example, a pianist who internalizes piano techniques possesses practical expertise akin to someone who understands their actions, even when performed automatically. Annas argues that to cultivate ethical virtue, we should emulate musical action, viewing it as a habit rather than mere repetition. This analogy aids in understanding virtue acquisition as practical skill-building. Expanding on Annas’s insights, this article contends that musical practice offers profound ethical implications for musicians as potential moral agents. Supported by important neurological and psychological studies on musical expertise, as well as the dynamics of classical music interpretation and professional career development, this argument sheds light on the ethical dimensions of musical agency. These insights into musical expertise could enhance our understanding of ethical expertise overall.

Why Aristotle Isn’t a Virtue Ethicist. Living Well and Virtuously in Aristotelian and Contemporary Aretaic Ethics

Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics—an aretaic life ethics—is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of life is. The major concern of aretaic moral theory, on the other hand, is to provide a criterion of morally right action and hence to define the concepts of the morally right, the impermissible and moral duty in aretaic terms. This shows that contemporary authors assume a primacy of virtue, while Aristotle assumes a primacy of eudaimonia. I illustrate this distinction by addressing the question of how the virtues benefit their possessor.

Target Centred Virtue Ethics

<i>Target Centred Virtue Ethics</i>

The exemplary and the right. Contemporary virtue ethics, action guidance, and action assessment

In this paper, I will account for the importance of the notion of exemplarity within the contemporary virtue-­ethical debate, both in its classic formulation (e.g., Hursthouse 1999) and in the recent exemplarist moral theory advanced by Linda T. Zagzebski (2015;; 2017). Despite their differences, which I will discuss extensively, both theories are centered on a characterization of an exemplary virtuous agent that serves as a standard for determining what, in a given situation, is right, wrong, dutiful and forbidden. The first two sections will be devoted to an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches. In the third, I will propose a different role of radical (i.e., exceptional) individuals, i.e., saints and heroes, within a virtue-ethical theory of right action.

Umjerenost u islamskoj i grčkoj tradiciji i etika vrline Kur'ana / Moderation in Greek and Islamic Traditions, and a Virtue Ethics of the Qur’an

This article looks at some of the salient analyses of the concept of wasaṭīyah (moderation) in the ancient Greek and the Islamic traditions and uses them to develop a contemporary view of the matter. Greek ethics played a huge role in shaping the ethical views of Muslim philosophers and theologians, and thus the article starts with an overview of the revival of contemporary western virtue ethics, in many ways an extension of Platonic-Aristotelian ethics, and then looks briefly at the place of moderation or temperance in Platonic-Aristotelian ethics. This sets the stage for an exposition of the position taken by Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali, which is then used as a backdrop for suggesting a revival of the Qur’an’s virtue ethics. After outlining a basis for its virtue ethics, the Qur’anic view of the virtue of wasaṭīyah is discussed briefly and its position on this virtue’s nature in terms of the individual and the community is presented.

The Unity of Virtue in Contemporary Virtue Ethics

The Unity of Virtue in Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Bodily Pathos and Virtue Ethics: On Miki Kiyoshi’s Logic of Imagination

This paper revisits Miki Kiyoshi’s moral philosophy through the lens of virtue ethics, with a focus on the logic of imagination (構想力の論理). Having paid specific attention to pathos for his philosophy of action (行為の哲学), Miki would proceed to highlight the importance of feeling, pathos or sentiment for morality, which echoes a feature of contemporary virtue ethics. More importantly, Miki constructs his moral philosophy by emphasizing the body in conjunction with pathos. I therefore suggest that the uniqueness of Miki’s moral philosophy lies in the concept of bodily pathos. In order to unpack this claim, I shall begin by first examining why and how pathos plays an indispensable role for morality. Subsequently, I will consider how Miki focuses on the body in particular with respects to pathos. From there, I shall outline the ways in which virtue ethics can help rearticulate Miki’s concept of bodily pathos in a systematic and effective manner. Through exploring this subject, I aim to show that Miki is a pioneer with respects to the emphasis he places on the body for virtue ethics. For Miki, feeling must be exemplified by the body. He views the two as interconnected, and vital for morality. While there is an extensive body of scholarship on Miki’s philosophy of history, religion, humanism and so forth, his work on moral philosophy has been comparatively neglected. Yet, if we peruse his writings, it is easy to notice that many of his works actually include the Japanese terms for morality (dōtoku, 道徳) and ethics (rinri, 倫理), not to mention those concerned with action and poesis. Miki’s moral philosophy is without doubt an area deserving of thorough research, especially with respects to its relationship with virtue ethics.

The Actuality of Aristotelian Virtues

Aristotle defined the ethical and intellectual virtues which are recognized as fundamental even today. Contemporary virtue ethics still takes into account Aristotelian virtues. The modern moral philosophers have tried to find new ethical values in a society in which religions are in decline and the old values lost their meaning. The starting point of their research has been Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” which has remained the most important work in ethics influencing the philosophical thinking until nowadays. This paper seeks to explain the actual importance of the cardinal Aristotelian virtues and how they are seen today.

Where's the Educational Virtue in Flourishing?

AbstractRecent philosophy and theory of education have witnessed considerable attention to the notion of flourishing as a benchmark or guiding principle for educational practice. There can also be little doubt that — while not all recent advocates of flourishing have drawn explicitly on Aristotle — a focus on flourishing has emerged in the wake of latter‐day neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics, and contemporary virtue ethicists have indeed been leading educational advocates of flourishing. However, while focusing more on basic formal features of the concept than on the detail of recent educational accounts, David Carr's main aim in this essay is to show that the notion of flourishing — along with ideas of moral and other virtue and (personal or literary) exemplification with which it has lately been associated — ultimately falls well short of illuminating any significant educational issues or concerns.

Hutchesonian Inspired Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

AbstractFrancis Hutcheson's moral sense theory is the inspiration for both act utilitarianism and a contemporary virtue ethics approach that Michael Slote calls agent‐based virtue ethics. In this essay, I look at other possibilities for ethical theory that spring from Hutcheson's writings and conclude that the landscape of sentimentalist inspired ethics is richer than many realize. I begin this article with a short explanation of Hutcheson's moral sense theory. I explain that Hutcheson proposes and embraces three distinct criteria of moral evaluation, one of which is concerned with the evaluation of motives and two of which are concerned with the evaluation of acts. Act utilitarianism adopts one of the criteria of act evaluation, and Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics adopts the remaining criterion of act evaluation and the criterion of motive evaluation. Then, after pointing out what I believe are shortcomings of Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics, I propose two Hutchesonian inspired theories, each of which is a compromise between act utilitarianism and agent‐based virtue ethics. The first, which I call hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics, adopts two of Hutcheson's three criteria and is similar structurally to a virtue ethics theory articulated by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zabzebski. The second, which, for lack of a better name, I call Hutchesonian hybridism, adopts all three of Hutcheson's criteria and is a hybrid combination of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics and hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics. I argue that both hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics and Hutchesonian hybridism overcome the shortcomings (pointed out earlier in this essay) of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics, and that both of these theories are, therefore, worthy of further consideration.

Thematic Symposium Editorial: Virtue Ethics Between East and West

Virtue ethics is widely recognized as one of three major approaches in contemporary moral philosophy and arguably the most influential normative theory in business ethics. Despite its rich pedigree in Western and Eastern philosophy, most work in contemporary virtue ethics is part of the Western tradition. The purpose of this Thematic Symposium is to foster dialogue between Western and Eastern conceptions of virtue in business and engage them with questions about the nature, justification, and content of the virtues in each tradition. This Editorial offers a brief introduction to the problem, a summary of Western and Eastern varieties of virtue ethics, an overview of the six articles included in this Thematic Symposium, and a section with five common themes for further exploration and future collaborative research (namely, the centrality of rites and rituals, the normative status of social relationships and organizations, role modeling, the analogy of families and communities to define the business corporation, and the definition of social responsibilities).

The Problem of Acedia in Eastern Orthodox Morality

Eastern Orthodox accounts of acedia are often neglected in Catholic and Protestant circles, yet offer a range of insights for contemporary virtue ethics and moral psychology. Acedia is a complex concept with shades of apathy, hate, and desire that poses grave problems for the moral life and human wellbeing. This is because acedia disorders reasoning, desiring, willing, and acting, and causes various harms to relationships. Evagrius Ponticus and John Cassian discuss acedia in the context of a virtue ethic ordered to human flourishing that includes practices to combat vices and build character. The result is an Orthodox conception of virtue and moral psychology that rewards ecumenical attention.

Is the Virtue of Integrity Redundant in Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

Abstract Integrity – the darling of many contemporary virtue ethicists – does not seem to feature in Aristotle’s system. This article explores whether integrity is redundant in Aristotelian virtue ethics, even of the reconstructed neo-Aristotelian kind, in the sense that any role it could reasonably be expected to play is already adequately covered by other virtues. I explain why that may be the case. Nevertheless, I propose to answer this question eventually in the negative by carving out a role for integrity within Aristotelian virtue ethics, which arguably no other construct covers, in integrating the moral but non-virtuous commitments of the continent. Prior to that, however, some ground-clearing is needed, calling for a number of discrete arguments. We need to know, for instance, how to understand ‘integrity’, and whether vice is potentially amenable to integration in the same way as virtue allegedly is. We also need to inquire whether integrity is better understood as a moral or an intellectual virtue. While I am mostly interested in the role of integrity as a higher-order (‘meta’ and/or ‘master’) virtue, I pay some attention also to accounts that consider it simply as one standard virtue among many.

Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford

Reviewed by: Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford Anthony T. Flood Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), x + 280 pp. For Thomists and other Aristotelians working within the analytic tradition, the rise of contemporary virtue ethics (CVE) in current philosophical discussion seems like occasion for rejoicing. A rejection of deontology and consequentialism in the name of virtue by top members of the field leaves one thinking: "What is not to like?" But then, when we read the literature, something seems amiss, even to the point where we wonder if CVE is a coherent approach and if it has anything in common with what Aristotle and Aquinas mean by "ethics." Jonathan Sanford has clearly pondered these same questions and given Before Virtue to us as a result. [End Page 953] Sanford has performed a great service in offering a painstaking analysis of CVE and a sober assessment of its status as a viable normative ethical theory. This is no small task. To what CVE even refers is the source of much discussion. Seeking to include the wide array of thinkers and cover their viewpoints that make up the movement, Sanford offers the following characterization: "A contemporary virtue ethicist is an academic philosopher who subscribes to some of the principles shared by some virtue ethicists and who self-identifies with this movement" (89). Due to the wide extension of this description, he treats the multitude of thinkers self-identifying according to this characterization. In terms of Sanford's analysis of CVE, at no point does he reject the movement out of hand or fail to see the positive contributions many of its authors have made to contemporary discussion. Nonetheless, he makes a compelling case that it is a movement in disarray, in large part due to its rejection of key Aristotelian principles. Aristotle performs the central role in Sanford's case for three reasons: (1) the function G. E. M. Anscombe assigns to him in her analyses; (2) Aristotle serving as a common denominator in subsequent CVE literature; and (3) Sanford's contending that the framework of Aristotle's ethics is superior to the alternatives. Sanford's assessment of the CVE movement begins with Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy." In this article, Anscombe diagnoses the shortcomings of modern moral philosophy and suggests that it ought to be scrapped in favor of an ethics revolving around the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis and its place in the good life. Since subsequent virtue ethicists credit this article as the origin of CVE, Sanford thinks it legitimate to use Anscombe's principles as the standard of evaluation of the CVE movement. Against this measure, he thinks CVE ultimately fails to distinguish itself from the common framework of contemporary moral philosophy. The movement "has in many respects betrayed the recommendations of its mother" (183). Key to the fabric of what Anscombe thinks a suitable moral theory are both an affirmation of ethical absolutes and an adequate philosophical psychology. She points to Aristotle for addressing both considerations. Sanford posits three questions, the answers to which would constitute an adequate psychology: (1) What is human nature? (2) What is the purpose of human life? (3) And by what means can we judge progress made toward achieving the goal of human life? The raising of and providing answers to these questions constitutes the heart of the book. Attempting to employ the notion of virtue as the basis of an ethical theory without addressing these questions is likely either to fail or to be rife with confusion. As I read Sanford, CVE is plagued by attempt after attempt to treat virtue as [End Page 954] removed from the broader context in which it is intelligible. Before virtue, we must address foundational questions of moral philosophy and understand virtue as nested within this context. The book could stand on its own as a worthwhile critique of an important contemporary ethical movement; however, Sanford goes further by offering a second part, which I found to be the most compelling aspect of the work. He offers an overview of Aristotle and Aquinas that, while providing...

Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions

AbstractIn her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions.

Aretologiczna interpretacja (chrześcijańskiej) wiary religijnej

I argue that an aretaic model is apt for (Christian) religious faith. I begin with a&nbsp;presentation of two rival and radical models of faith present in philosophy of religion, which I&nbsp;label as, respectively, “intellectual” and “anti-intellectual” model. Then, I try to show some essential characteristics of faith that are ignored by these models, which results in a serious theoretical difficulty for philosophy of religion. I present the aretaic model as a convincing alternative, using Julia Annas’ developmental theory of virtue and some other conceptual tools provided by representatives of contemporary virtue ethics. The core of the argumentation presumes that religious faith and morality are similar, thus also the issues of philosophy of religion and ethics are similar.

From Philosophy to Neo-Confucianism and Back: Yong Huang's Why Be Moral?

From Philosophy to Neo-Confucianism and Back:Yong Huang's Why Be Moral? Kam-por Yu (bio) Special Features of the Book Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers by Yong Huang is a work of comparative philosophy with an original approach. It is a careful and learned study of two important philosophers in Chinese philosophy, but at the same time it is an interesting and stimulating alternative introduction to fundamental philosophical problems. Huang explains: "My interest is not in exploring the similarities and differences between Confucianism and virtue ethics in the West …, but in seeking the possible contributions Confucianism can make to contemporary virtue ethics" (p. 68). I think Huang is able to deliver very well the goods he has set out to deliver. The topics discussed are all living issues in contemporary philosophy. Such topics include: why be moral; the critique that virtue ethics is self-centered; the problem of the weakness of the will; the debate between universalism and particularism; the distinction between the political and the personal; and the idea of a moral metaphysics. The book aspires to "argue that the Chinese thinkers' views on … [certain] Western philosophical questions are superior to those found in the history of Western philosophy itself" (p. 11), while at the same time "to make sure that the views I present here are indeed the Cheng brothers' views" (p. 13). In what follows, I would like to respond critically in exactly these two regards, namely by asking: (1) How far are the philosophical views presented by Huang superior views? and (2) How far can the views be taken as accurate representations of the views of the Cheng brothers? Huang examines seven philosophical questions in the book. In this comment I will only engage in a discussion of three of the issues: (1) Why be moral? (2) Is morality one or many? and (3) How is morality related to human feelings? I shall comment critically on these three issues with reference to philosophical soundness and hermeneutic accuracy. Why Be Moral? Huang offers the dual observation that "Confucianism is a learning of self-cultivation," and "the highest goal of self-cultivation is joy (le 樂)" (p. 43). If [End Page 288] such Confucian views are justified, then there is an intrinsic relation between joy and being moral. The two are not just compatible, they are also inseparable. Huang argues that "as long as one is in accord with morality, one can find joy in anything one encounters" (p. 45). It is not that there must be joy in what one encounters, but that the joy comes directly and intrinsically from being moral. So, as long as one's heart is in what is moral, one has the joy, and such joy cannot be changed. I think Huang has argued very convincingly that there is an intrinsic connection between being moral and being joyful. The question is how strong such a joy is when compared with other joys, and how strong it is as a motivation for action. It seems right to say that the immoral or amoral person cannot have real joy or complete joy, as he lacks a source of joy that comes from being moral. But this is not the same as saying that a moral person can always have a net joy in being moral, even if it is granted that alternatives other than what is moral will only bring greater pain. Even if it is true that "a Confucian sage or superior person can find it a joy to be moral" (p. 49), this does not mean that he will never find pains that can outweigh his joy. If, for example, by insisting on doing what is moral he has to see innocent people, including his family members, friends, and loved ones, being cut into pieces (say, as in the case of Fang Xiaoru, 1357–1402) while they are alive, can he still have joy? As a moral person, he will still do what is right. He will not change his mind, and maybe will not even hesitate, and will have no regrets. He may feel peaceful, calm, and undisturbed, but can he still have joy in...

Political Responsibility as a Virtue: Nussbaum, MacIntyre, and Ricoeur on the Fragility of Politics.

Contemporary virtue ethics is often criticized for its silence on political issues. In this article, it is argued, however, that virtue ethical theory can provide a clarifying understanding of political responsibility. Building on the work of Nussbaum, MacIntyre, and Ricoeur, first, the virtue ethical meaning of politics is elaborated. Then, the vulnerability of politics for typical threats is presented. Finally, it is established what political responsibility as the virtue to deal with these threats encompasses.

Embodied wits – The representation of deliberative thought in rhetoricians’ drama

AbstractOne of the reasons for the enduring popularity of rhetoricians’ theatre was the efficacy of the spel van sinne, the Netherlandish version of the morality play, as a means of knowledge acquisition and transmission. This essay demonstrates how the rhetorical process of knowledge creation was literally bodied forth by personifications. These allegorical characters exemplified how knowledge ensued from discursive thought, thus turning man's wits inside out. They expressed the workings of the soul in its widest sense, that is, the functions of thinking, sensing, feeling, and willing. Their names are the starting point of the analysis, but in order to better understand their interactions, the staging conditions and likely performance of a number of plays are taken into account. The form and content of these plays have to be understood against the background of contemporary virtue ethics, as championed by humanists such as Erasmus and Coornhert, and can be compared to contemporary moral print.

Contemporary virtue ethics and action-guiding objections

Many defenders of contemporary virtue ethics contend that it directly competes with modern ethical theories such as consequentialism and deontology. One of the most common responses is that contemporary virtue ethics does not compare well because its proponents fail to provide guidance to an agent who is deliberating about what she should do. There are at least four different types of action-guiding objections to an ethical theory. They are based on moral dilemmas, indeterminacy, knowledge, and reasonable judgment. I will show how three current versions of virtue ethics are subject to at least one of those objections.