Contemporary Philosophy Of Mind Research Articles

Understanding Others, Conceptual Know-How and Social World

In contemporary philosophy of mind, understanding others is often presented as an activity of attributing mental states to agents or mindreading – the central question being then how to access their minds. The paper argues that this pervasive approach should be rejected, in favour of the view along which identifying an action comes from exercising conceptual skills acquired through being inserted into shared practices characterizing a social world. Examining the conditions of their acquisition then sheds new light on the semantics of psychological concepts as well as on the roots of misunderstanding.

Verbal disputes about the content of experience

Abstract A verbal dispute is one in which the disputants agree on all of the facts about the intended subject matter of the dispute and disagree only about how to use certain terms. This paper explores the possibility that the dispute between particularists and generalists about the contents of perceptual experience is a verbal dispute. The aim is less to provide a knockdown argument for the conclusion that this dispute is merely verbal than to show how difficult it is to uncover a substantive dispute between the two sides. A concluding section asks whether the argument generalizes beyond the particularism/generalism dispute to other prominent disputes in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Intentionality and Autonomy in Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Comprehensive Analysis of Conscious Decisions and the Transcendental Ego

This essay embarks on a thorough exploration of Edmund Husserl’s seminal contributions to the philosophical discourse on consciousness, with a particular focus on the dynamics of conscious decisions within the framework of phenomenology. By delving into Husserl’s nuanced examination of consciousness—its temporal structure, the nature of self-awareness, and the foundational concept of intentionality—the analysis reveals the intricate ways in which Husserl posits the transcendental ego as the nexus of meaning, judgment, and perception. The discussion illuminates how Husserl’s theory of intentionality and the intentional act’s matter and quality serve as the cornerstone for understanding the will’s engagement with the world. Through a detailed exposition of Husserl’s ideas on the phenomenological reduction, the essay articulates the active role of consciousness in constituting reality and the ethical dimensions underpinning the exercise of free will. The paper argues that Husserl’s insights into conscious decision-making challenge conventional views by framing free will within the contexts of knowledge, ethical deliberation, and the ego’s autonomy. This essay contributes to the ongoing dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind by highlighting Husserl’s profound impact on our understanding of consciousness, agency, and the existential significance of human decisions. Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology, Conscious Decisions, Transcendental Ego, Intentionality, Free Will, Consciousness, Epistemology, Temporality, Rationality, Autonomy, Phenomenological Reduction (Epoché), Intersubjectivity, Self-awareness

Platon’un Phaidon Diyaloğunda Uyum Argümanı ve Elemeci Materyalist Zihin Felsefesi

The subject of this paper is to examine ‘the harmony argument’, which is considered as a materialist understanding of soul in Plato's Phaedo (86a-94e), and to evaluate the 'eliminative materialism', which is a materialist philosophy of mind in the contemporary period. To do this, first of all, the main points of the harmony argument will be examined. The harmony argument is provided by Simmias in the dialogue. The harmony argument is advanced by Simmias in the dialogue. According to him, the harmony in the sound of a tuned lyre is something invisible and immaterial, just like the soul, while the strings of the lyre are corporeal, composite. However, when the corporeal string disappears, the harmony also disappears. Why not consider the same for the soul and the body? When we look at the contemporary philosophy of mind, it can be said that especially materialist philosophies of mind are in demand and that they reduce the mind to the brain, just as harmony is reduced to string in the example of the lyre above. Eliminative materialism, which is discussed in this paper, is at the far end of this issue and states that the mind is completely the brain and that the mind can be eliminated. If we consider the argument of harmony with the claims of eliminative materialism, according to them, there is nothing but sound and string, and movements in sound and string are called harmony in an unscientific way. Since there is no such thing as harmony, this concept will disappear as science progresses about the lyre and its strings. Philosophy of mind is a very current and important sub-field of philosophy as a field of study, considering topics such as artificial intelligence in the contemporary period. It can be thought that the philosophy of religion, in which subjects such as metaphysics and spirit are studied, can point to important places in this field, especially when it is considered that science is handled with a materialist way today. This paper, it is aimed to compare the harmony argument in the Phaidon dialogue, which is one of the most basic texts on the subject that the soul is a substance separate from matter, with the elective materialism, which is one of the contemporary theories, and to present the answers that can be given to materialism in this regard. While doing this, the text of the dialogue was analyzed and examined in a comparative way with contemporary thoughts. As a result, it was seen that three important issues arise in Socrates' answer to the harmony argument. According to Socrates (i) the soul exists before the body, and harmony emerges after the lyre and strings. (ii) The soul is active on the body, it can oppose the body. But harmony is not active on lyre and strings, it can only follow them. (iii) Spirit is simple, there is no such thing as being more or less spirit. But the harmony may be less or more. Considering these claims of Socrates, it has been seen that the second view, which we can call the problem of free will, is an important objection for eliminative materialism. It has hardly dealt with the other two issues above. However, it was concluded that while denying the subjective experiences of human beings, eliminative materialism did not fully base it, and it was criticized on this subject in the philosophy of mind.

Varieties of consciousness in classical Arabic thought: Avicenna, Averroes, and the mutakallimūn

ABSTRACT In classical Arabic philosophy, the topic of consciousness is commonly associated with Avicenna's ‘Flying Man’ thought experiment. But Avicenna's explorations of the nature of consciousness are not confined to the Flying Man, and he is by no means the only classical Islamic thinker to deem consciousness an important feature of our experience. Consciousness also plays a important role in the epistemology and moral psychology of Avicenna's intellectual rivals, the theologians (mutakallumūn), who represent important sources for Avicenna's own theorizing about consciousness. And while Avicenna's philosophical successor and critic, Averroes, seems to banish consciousness from the core of his cognitive psychology, in doing so he seems to anticipate contemporary efforts to expand the scope of consciousness through the notion of the ‘extended’ mind. This paper examines the varieties of consciousness recognized by Avicenna and several other classical Islamic thinkers with a view to understanding the extent to which their accounts can be mapped on to some of the concepts of consciousness delineated by contemporary philosophers of mind.

Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience

In contemporary philosophy of mind and psychiatry, schizophrenic thought insertion is often used as a validating or invalidating counterexample in various theories about how we experience ourselves. Recent work has taken cases of thought insertion to provide an invalidating counterexample to the Humean denial of self-experience, arguing that deficiencies of agency in thought insertion suggest that we normally experience ourselves as the agent of our thoughts. In this paper, I argue that appealing to a breakdown in the sense of agency to explain thought insertion is problematic, and that rather than following the prevailing binary approach which holds that certain features of consciousness go missing while others remain wholly intact, a better explanation involves construing thought insertion as a disturbing or disrupting of the subjectivity (for-me-ness) of experience. The result is that experiencing ourselves as the subject of our thoughts is where future research should be directed, given the robust persistence of this form of self-experience across psychopathological and non-psychopathological cases alike.

Ideas I: Transcendental Turn in Phenomenological Philosophy

The paper deals with transcendental turn in the development of the phenomenological philosophy witch the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl made in his work “Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology”. From this moment until the very end of his life, Husserl defined his philosophy as transcendental phenomenology. This is particularly evident in the title of his last unfinished treatise “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy”. The author tries to clarify the historical and philosophical background of this turn and its influence on the phenomenology and other philosophical trends until now. On the one hand, the transcendental turn in the development of the phenomenological philosophy is the result of the long philosophical tradition that based on Descartes rationalism and Kantian transcendental philosophy and at the same time on the empiricism by Berkley and Hume. On the other hand, this transcendental turn is very important for the modern discussion about the problem of consciousness not only in the phenomenological research, but also in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. For example, the “explanatory gap” problem as one of the most crucial consequence of the mind-body problem can be seen in a new light from the phenomenological point of view. So it is argued that phenomenology is one of the most elaborated version of the transcendental philosophy of experience, and that it is possible to create on the base of transcendental phenomenology the universal methodology of humanities and to bring something new even to the formulation of the fundamental problems of natural sciences.

Роль кантовской «способности суждения» в «ненововременном» исследовании сознательного опыта

One of the major problems in contemporary philosophy of mind is the dualism of first-person and third-person perspectives — the question of whether conscious experience is public and epistemically accessible or private and qualitative. Recognising the relevance of the arguments of both sides, naturalists and anti-naturalists, I attempt to resolve this dichotomy using Bruno Latour’s methodology on the theories of Immanuel Kant and Moritz Schlick. To do so, I propose not to reduce the theory of consciousness to one interpretation, but to consider conscious experience as a “boundary object” between the spheres of the private and the public, the accessible and the qualitative, the unique and the reproducible. Through the “practice of translation” I demonstrate the failure of ontologies of conscious experience proposed by both naturalism and anti-naturalism, and propose an “intersectional theory” as an alternative theory of conscious experience that affirms, on the one hand, the uniqueness of the individual’s epistemic position and, on the other hand, its reproducibility and communicability. I introduce the term “intersectional locality” to denote the ontological status of conscious experience. In the next step, I return to the necessary (according to Latour) “practice of purification” of those epistemic zones whose fusion was outlined earlier, which allows me to recognise the intuition behind the dichotomy of the two perspectives as legitimate and requiring conceptualisation. The mediation of Schlick’s positivist theory and Kant’s transcendentalist theory allows us to present first-person and third-person perspectives as two epistemic registers, subordinated to the position of a historically specific conscious subject. I treat the first-person perspective as a reflective power of judgment, and the third-person perspective as a determinative power of judgment; doing so, I establish the connection between the qualitative interpretation of phenomenal experience and the aesthetic principle of the reflective power of judgment. I conclude that conscious experience as a subject matter of research is a hybrid object, and only the project of “nonmodern” science will make it possible to create a relevant theory of consciousness that does not resort to reduction.

Is All Phenomenology Presentational?

This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phenomenally conscious? To make progress on these questions and explore the relationship between the two, I narrow my focus to a particular instance of each, viz. the (scope) question of whether thoughts possess their own phenomenal character and the (marks) question of whether all phenomenal character is presentational. First, I argue that a phenomenology of entertaining thought content, if it exists, is non-presentational. I then argue from the fact that every genuine phenomenal property can be thought about using a phenomenal concept, to the conclusion that all phenomenology is presentational. One implication is that a (standard form of) transparent, proprietary phenomenology of thought does not exist.

Williams’s Profundity: Pragmatic Naturalism and Distributed Poetic Thinking

Abstract This essay reads Williams’s poetry and poetics from the vantage of pragmatic naturalism to clarify the philosophical and pedagogical importance of Kora in Hell: Improvisations. Drawing on the work of John Dewey and contemporary philosophy of mind, it both reconsiders the status of things and objects in Williams’s compositional practice and clarifies the poet’s radical claims for the enabling role of poetry and the arts for human agency and thinking.

‘Trust me, i´m an illusionist.’ a critical response to Keith Frankish’s illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind

Article ‘Trust me, i´m an illusionist.’ a critical response to Keith Frankish’s illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind was published on July 1, 2022 in the journal Human Affairs (volume 32, issue 3).

Illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind

Illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind

The Re–Enchantment with the Buddhist Perspective on Phenomenal Consciousness in the Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

The present paper is concerned with a qualitative, analytical, and comparative method of exploring Buddhist perspectives on phenomenal consciousness. The phenomenal consciousness sciences have offered a mechanical explanation of the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of consciousness, but have failed to explain the ‘why’ of consciousness. The Buddhists have given a systematic explanation of conscious experience in Pancha–skandha, and it is in relation to the material world. In this scheme of things, consciousness is overly conditioned and arises from an interaction with other factors (physical or mental). Consciousness, in turn, influences one or more mental factors. Thus, consciousness and the mind–body (nama– rupa) are interdependent: there is no arising of consciousness without conditions. This is to say that there is an unbroken series of consciousnesses. I would like to demonstrate that the Buddhist notion of phenomenal consciousness not only goes against the possibility of a scientific explanation of phenomenal conscious experience but also establishes the philosophical grounds for the existence of a phenomenal conscious experience.

The Buddhist Turn in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

The Buddhist Turn in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

Śaṅkaran Monism and the Limits of Thought

Abstract A growing movement in contemporary philosophy of mind is looking back on Indian thought to gain new insights into the problem of consciousness. This paper weighs the prospects of thinking about mentality through the lenses of Śaṅkaran Advaita Vedānta. To start, I outline micropsychist and cosmopsychist accounts of consciousness, introduce Śaṅkaran monism, and describe a potential reason of attraction of the framework over micropsychist and cosmopsychist alternatives. I then show that the eliminativist commitments of the view threaten to yield a self-defeating account of ordinary experience, and that Advaitins took the accommodation of the issue to be beyond the reach of rational inquiry. Finally, I discuss how the analytical debate over Śaṅkaran monism might proceed based on these premises.

Husserl on Minimal Mind and the Origins of Consciousness in the Natural World

The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of minimal mind and his ideas pertaining to the lowest level of consciousness in living beings. In this context, the term ‘minimal mind’ refers to the mental sphere and capacities of the simplest conceivable subject. This topic is of significant contemporary interest for philosophy of mind and empirical research into the origins of consciousness. I contend that Husserl’s reflections on minimal mind offer a fruitful contribution to this ongoing debate. For Husserl, the embodied character of subjectivity, or consciousness, is essential for understanding minimal mind. In his view, there is an a priori necessary constitutive connection between the subjective and objective aspects of the body, between Leib and Körper, and this connection is especially important for exploring minimal mind from a phenomenological perspective. Thematically, the essay has three main parts. In Sect. 2, I present an overview of how minimal mind is framed in contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical research. I then analyse Husserl’s conception of embodiment with regard to the problem of minimal mind in Sect. 3. Finally, I present a more detailed investigation into Husserl’s account of minimal mind, highlighting features from his descriptions of animal mind and consciousness in early infancy (Sects. 4 and 5).

Empty Space, Silence, and Absence

AbstractThe idea that we can perceive absences is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind, and seeing empty space and hearing silence are alleged to be two paradigmatic examples. In this paper, I remain neutral over the question of whether empty space experiences and experiences of silence are genuinely perceptual phenomena, however, I argue that these experiences do not qualify as absence experiences. Consequently, our experiences of empty space and silence cannot be appealed to as proof of the perceptual view of absence experience.

Zur Phänomenologie der Aufforderungscharaktere

Abstract The author will try to develop the notion of ‘valence’ (‘Aufforderungscharakter’), first introduced in psychology by the work of K. Lewin, from a phenomenological point of view. In a first approximation, an object has valence insofar as it prompts us to action. Valence is an important – although in contemporary philosophy of mind quite neglected – feature of our practical experience. Here we will concentrate on the consciousness of valence and its descriptive features. After distinguishing, on the one hand, ‘valence’ from ‘value’, and pointing out how, on the other hand, ‘valence’ should also not be confused with J.J. Gibson’s ‘affordance’, we will try to develop the implications of this notion beyond the original scope of Lewin’s experimental psychology: on the one hand, by introducing the idea of ‘passive valence’ and, on the other hand, by investigating the relation between valence and emotion and discussing the possibility of ‘emotional valence’.

Diogenes of Apollonia as a Material Panpsychist

In my paper, I shall provide a reading of Diogenes of Apollonia such that his understanding of the metaphysics of differentiation and of individual ensoulment may constitute an ingenious answer to the problems of his time. To this extent, I will argue that Diogenes' worldview solves the difficulties of Anaxagoras' metaphysics and successfully integrates mentality in a causally closed conception of nature. Finally, I will suggest that a Diogenes-inspired approach might be relevant to treat some pressing concerns in the contemporary philosophy of mind – thus demonstrating how his production might offer some interesting solutions for the problems of our time too.

Another Look at Mode Intentionalism

A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience.