This article contextualizes the meaning of nāmamātra in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya and explores the history of modifications of this term in the Yogācāra literature. The term already exists in the pre-Yogācāra literature, such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra, where it means name only. The chapter Bodhisattvabhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi applies this meaning and explains how to interpret it to understand the true nature of the contemplative object; that is, what is named is nothing but a name, and what exists is the inexpressible thing (vastu). When people lack this understanding and regard for the expressed object as existent, they suffer subsequent afflictions and suffering. A similar but slightly modified explanation is also found in the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, where the author states that a single object has two intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇas), the conventional and the ultimate, and that the former is expressed by a mere name and is non-existent, while the latter is ineffable and existent. However, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya and Sthiramati’s commentary on it, the *Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya, insert another meaning of nāmamātra: there are only mental factors. They also describe two contemplation phases, whereby practitioners should first understand the non-existence of the expressed object before recollecting the term nāmarūpa in the context of the five constituents (pañcaskandha) and concluding that material and physical factors (rūpa) do not exist; rather, only the mental factors do (nāmamātra). Finally, this second meaning of nāmamātra should be further contemplated, and the mere mental factors should also be regarded as ultimately non-existent because the external objects causing them were already considered non-existent. This examination of various Yogācāra explanations of nāmamātra sheds light on the multiple phases of modifications of Buddhist terms that occurred in the Yogācāra literature during the systematization of Yogācāra contemplation.