The community in the future may develop into an integrated heat-power system, which includes a high proportion of renewable energy, power generator units, heat generator units, and shared hybrid energy storage. In the integrated heat-power system with coupling heat-power generators and demands, the key challenges lie in the interaction between heat and power, the inherent uncertainty of renewable energy and consumers’ demands, and the multi-timescale scheduling of heat and power. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic model of the integrated heat-power system. For the welfare-maximizing community operator, its energy dispatch strategy is under chance constraints, where the day-ahead scheduling determines the scheduled energy dispatching strategies, and the real-time dispatch considers the adjustment of generators. For utility-maximizing consumers, their demands are sensitive to the preference parameters. Taking into account the uncertainty in both renewable energy and consumer demand, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg game equilibrium and develop a fixed-point algorithm to find the market equilibrium between the community operator and community consumers. Numerical simulations on integrated heat-power community show that the proposed solution outperforms the constant curtailment strategy with the daily cost reduced by 14.38%.
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