Section 165(2) of the South African Constitution of 1996 proclaims the independence of the courts. This principle is predicated on the philosophical notion of separation of powers prominently adopted in democratic countries like South Africa (SA). Separation of powers and the behavioural demands on judgeship have produced a general conception that the judiciary is independent; even of politics. This is not the case, politics and judiciary are inseparable since they both seek to achieve the same political objectives. This article adopts Critical Legal Theory (CLT) with historical and philosophical analysis to theoretically repudiate the generalisation. This is a qualitative study and has identified a gap in SA constitutional scholarship regarding interrogating the concept of judicial independence. Resolving this issue the article contends that politics are innate to the judiciary. This reasoning stems from the interrogation of the classical development of the “separation of powers”, and the principle of judicial independence. As a complex phenomenon, judicial independence here is not being explored institutionally and administratively. Rather, it is probed from its conceptual premises. Through court judgments, court activism, and South Africa’s history of constitutional development, the article determines that the judiciary and the law in SA are innate in politics. The intent is to disabuse scholarship from accepting the generalisation of the principle of judicial independence. This is not an anti-constitution critique, but a belief/notion that if adjudicators are not strangled with “judicial independence” general narrative, the courts will expedite the constitutions’ transformative objectives.
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