Constitutional Property Law Research Articles

Private Rights of Nature

AbstractThe Rights of Nature concept not only breaks with the anthropocentrism of existing (environmental) law; it also recognizes that nature has private interests, in addition to being of public interest. That is, whereas in classic sustainability thinking, the use of certain resources is allowed as long as public interests are not systematically/systemically harmed, rights of nature facilitate the protection of nature before planetary boundaries are transgressed. This recognition of nature as having private interests enables the framing of disagreements around ‘nature’ as matters of corrective justice, which renders the application of private legal doctrines more easily conceivable and arguably even necessary.The contributions to this Symposium Collection showcase the viability of the intersection of private law and rights of nature. Firstly, it is necessary to research how existing private law will influence the effectiveness of rights of nature. Such an exercise is undertaken by Björn Hoops, who carefully assesses what rights for the German Black Forest would mean in terms of German constitutional property law. The mirror image of this approach is to explore what impact Rights of Nature will have on private law. Such an approach is taken by Alex Putzer and co-authors in their article on the transformation of land-ownership regimes after the introduction of Rights of Nature in Ecuador and Uganda. A third line of scholarship assesses the significance of Rights of Nature for private law theory: Visa Kurki proposes a new concept of legal personhood, prompting us to think through the meaning of statements like ‘a river is a legal person’.

What If the Black Forest Owned Itself? A Constitutional Property Law Perspective on Rights of Nature

AbstractOwnership has been a key tool in the exploitation of nature for centuries. However, ownership could also shield natural entities from extraction and pollution if it were vested in them, rather than in humans or corporations. Through a case study of German constitutional property law, this article examines the normative content of this constitutional right. It argues that in owning themselves, natural entities would have numerous tools to fend off human interference with their self-determination. Constitutional property law would require any harmful activity affecting the natural entity to be based upon legislation and necessary to achieve a public purpose. The natural entity would enjoy broader access to justice. Courts would also often award appropriate remedies; where the natural entity would be awarded only compensation, this would be unsatisfactory because money cannot replace nature. The article finds that constitutional property law offers the potential for further protection from human interference, which has not been realized because of anthropocentric value judgments prevalent in German legal doctrine. Ecocentric approaches to ownership and invalidity as a standard remedy would play an important role in unlocking the full potential of ownership for environmental protection.

The impact of constitutional property law on insolvency law in South Africa

AbstractIt is common for insolvency legislation to interfere with the property rights of debtors, creditors and third parties in pursuit of its purpose to provide an orderly and fair resolution to insolvency‐related problems. However, the South African property clause, Section 25 of the Constitution, prohibits arbitrary interferences with vested property interests. In light of this, this article focuses on the application of Section 25 to insolvency law in South Africa. The question is whether interferences with property rights in terms of insolvency legislation qualify as deprivations of property for constitutional purposes and, if so, whether they comply with the relevant validity requirements. This article investigates this question by explaining the interaction between insolvency law and constitutional law in general, followed by a closer look at the application and operation of the property clause in particular. Thereafter, three examples from case law are discussed to illustrate the role of constitutional property law in evaluating the effects of insolvency legislation in South Africa. The conclusion is drawn that, as long as the relevant requirements are met, the norms underlying the property clause do not hinder the development and implementation of legitimate and necessary insolvency procedures that could impact on vested property rights.

A comparative overview of European, US and South African constitutional property law

Traditionally, there is a distinction between private law property law and constitutional property law. Private-law property law concerns itself with the relations between two private parties in respect to an object or thing. This area of law has, depending on the type of legal tradition, been in development since Roman times (civil law) or since the battle of Hastings in 1066 (common law). Its principles and doctrine are aimed at facilitating trade between private individuals, the recognition of a limited set of rights with property (third party) effect, and rules on the creation, transfer and destruction of those rights. Constitutional law adds a dimension to property law that is mostly neglected by private-law property lawyers. Textbooks of property law, especially in European countries do not deal or only make mention of the existence of a constitutional dimension. Constitutional law and its influence on the law of property deserves a central place in any comparative study on the law of property. However, private-law property scholars, of course with the exception of some, often do not take knowledge of the constitutional dimension. This contribution is a descriptive contribution and seeks to show some of the basic aspects of constitutional property law. Keywords: Constitutional Property Law; Takings, Expropriation, 5th Amendment, A1P1, EU Constitutional Property Law.

The National Credit Act's remedies for reckless credit in the mortgage context

The National Credit Act prohibits the granting of reckless credit and also provides for certain remedies that courts can grant to consumers who have fallen victim to reckless lending practices. Depending on the circumstances, these remedies are the partial or full setting aside of the consumer's rights and obligations under the agreement; the temporary suspension of the effect of the agreement; and the restructuring of the consumer's obligations. This article investigates these remedies with a focus on the effect that they would have on a creditor provider under a mortgage agreement. The argument is made that the contractual and security rights of creditor providers amount to "property" for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution (the property clause) and that, to some degree or another, each of these remedies involve a "deprivation" (limitation or modification) of the creditor provider's rights (property). The consequence is that, when one of these remedies is granted to a consumer, the court must tailor the remedy in such a way that the effect on the credit provider is not "arbitrary" as meant in the property clause. Therefore, the proposal is that there must be a sufficient relationship between the purpose of the remedy (to discourage reckless lending and to rectify the damage caused) and the effects thereof on the credit provider. In general, the remedy should not go further than what is necessary to rectify the prejudice suffered by the consumer due to the credit provider's conduct. The formulation of the remedy should accommodate considerations such as whether and to what extent either or both parties have already performed under the agreement, and it should accordingly ensure that the consumer will not be unjustifiably enriched. The remedy should also account for the effect that it would have if the consumer is permitted to keep the property that was subject to the reckless credit agreement. The article furthermore raises doubts regarding the recent high court judgment in ABSA v De Beer, where all the consumer's rights and obligations under a mortgage agreement were set aside due to the credit provider's reckless conduct. Remedies like this have serious consequences and therefore it is imperative that courts carefully investigate all the effects that the order would have, so that a just and reasonable outcome is achieved. This articles accordingly aims to provide some guidance with reference to the principles of constitutional property law.

A Comparative Overview of European, US and South African Constitutional Property Law

Traditionally, there is a distinction between private law property law and constitutional property law. Private-law property law concerns itself with the relations between two private parties in respect to an object or thing. This area of law has, depending on the type of legal tradition, been in development since Roman times (civil law) or since the battle of Hastings in 1066 (common law). Its principles and doctrine are aimed at facilitating trade between private individuals, the recognition of a limited set of rights with property (third party) effect, and rules on the creation, transfer and destruction of those rights. Constitutional law adds a dimension to property law that is mostly neglected by private-law property lawyers. Textbooks of property law, especially in European countries do not deal or only make mention of the existence of a constitutional dimension. Constitutional law and its influence on the law of property deserves a central place in any comparative study on the law of property. However, private-law property scholars, of course with the exception of some, often do not take knowledge of the constitutional dimension. This contribution is a descriptive contribution and seeks to show some of the basic aspects of constitutional property law.

Arbitrary Deprivation of an Unregistered Credit Provider's Right to Claim Restitution of Performance Rendered: Opperman v Boonzaaier (24887/2010) 2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) and National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC)

The Constitutional Court in National Credit Regulator v Opperman confirmed the Cape High Court's decision in Opperman v Boonzaaier to declare section 89(5)(c) of the National Credit Act unconstitutional. Therefore, the forfeiture to the state of an unregistered creditor provider's right to claim restitution of monies advanced in terms of an unlawful (and void) credit agreement, was held to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property in contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution – the property clause. The provision in effect prohibited courts from deviating from the common law's strict par delictum rule in as far as the effects of unlawful contracts are concerned, the result being that creditors could not retrieve any of the amounts extended to the debtor, despite there being no turpitude or bad faith present. The purpose of this provision was to discourage the concluding of unlawful credit agreements – for instance, agreements concluded by unregistered credit providers – so as to protect consumers against unscrupulous behaviour. Although the broad purposes of the Act are undeniably valid, the Court held that there was no "sufficient reason" for the effects that the Act had in this case, since the credit provider in question was not guilty of the behaviour that the Act tried to combat. In other words, the effects of the Act were over-broad and not proportionate to its stated purposes. This case note comprehensively analyses these decisions in view of interpreting the "confused and confusing" wording of section 89(5)(c), with a specific focus on the application of the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness test. Reference is also made to the earlier judgments in the matter of Cherangani Trade and Investment 107 (Edms) Bpk v Mason. The Opperman decisions illustrate well how the non-arbitrariness test should be conducted in consitutional property cases generally but particularly also in the credit context. Of significance is the fact that the Court for the first time recognised that personal rights sounding in money (an enrichment claim in this instance) should qualify as "property" for constitutional property law purposes. In certain circumstances, therefore, credit regulation may involve deprivation of property such as must satisfy the requirements of the property clause. It is contended that recognising the role of section 25 in the credit context is a positive development that can be explored further. The constitutional provision also calls for lawmakers to draft legislation in such a way that regulatory mechanisms are rational and sufficiently proportionate to its stated goals.

When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court's state acquisition requirement (Part ii)

Section 25 of the Constitution provides two ways in which the state may interfere with property rights, namely deprivation (section 25(1)) and expropriation (section 25(2)). As only the latter requires compensation, there is an incentive for property holders to label any infringement upon their property as expropriation in the hope of being compensated for their losses. It is therefore essential to have a principled distinction between these two forms of state interference, especially given the danger that uncertainty in this regard can hold for legitimate land reform initiatives, which often entail severe limitations on property. In the Agri SA case the Constitutional Court recently revisited this distinction and held that the distinguishing of expropriation is that it entails state of property. Two aspects of this judgment are worthy of consideration. Firstly, the centrality of makes it necessary to clarify its meaning and role in our law. Secondly, the Court's effect-centred test to establish whether took place appears incapable of coherently categorising property infringements that fall within the grey area between deprivation and expropriation. To address these two questions this article is divided into two parts. Part I investigates the meaning and role of state in South African law. Pre-constitutional expropriation law reveals that expropriation is an original method of of ownership and that the objects of expropriation include ownership, limited real rights, and certain personal rights, which correspond to the meaning attributed to this requirement in Agri SA. However, post-constitutional judgments diverge from pre-constitutional law regarding the role of state acquisition, where it was merely regarded as a general hallmark of expropriation. After Agri SA state is (now) the key feature that distinguishes expropriation from deprivation. A brief analysis of Australian constitutional property law shows that the meaning attached to acquisition in that jurisdiction is broadly similar to the construction placed upon the term in South African law, which explains why the expropriation of limited real rights (as well as the extinguishment of claims in certain cases) amounts to of property. The jurisprudence of the Australian High Court also sheds light on one of the factors laid down in Agri SA for determining whether or not took place, namely the source of the affected right. It also confirms another aspect of pre-constitutional South African expropriation law, namely that whether a property interference results in expropriation or not does not depend only on whether or not occurred. In dealing with these considerations Part II of this article expands on the shortcomings of confining the expropriation question to whether or not took place. It then suggests an alternative approach to state acquisition, one which focuses on the purpose of the impugned statute, as opposed to its effect, as was done by the Constitutional Court in Harksen.

When does State Interference with Property (now) Amount to Expropriation? An Analysis of the Agri SA Court's State Acquisition Requirement (Part I)

Section 25 of the Constitution provides two ways in which the state may interfere with property rights, namely deprivation (section 25(1)) and expropriation (section 25(2)). As only the latter requires compensation, there is an incentive for property holders to label any infringement upon their property as expropriation in the hope of being compensated for their losses. It is therefore essential to have a principled distinction between these two forms of state interference, especially given the danger that uncertainty in this regard can hold for legitimate land reform initiatives, which often entail severe limitations on property. In the Agri SA case the Constitutional Court recently revisited this distinction and held that the distinguishing feature of expropriation is that it entails state acquisition of property. Two aspects of this judgment are worthy of consideration. Firstly, the centrality of acquisition makes it necessary to clarify its meaning and role in our law. Secondly, the Court's effect-centred test to establish whether acquisition took place appears incapable of coherently categorising property infringements that fall within the grey area between deprivation and expropriation. To address these two questions this article is divided into two parts. Part I investigates the meaning and role of state acquisition in South African law. Pre-constitutional expropriation law reveals that expropriation is an original method of acquisition of ownership and that the objects of expropriation include ownership, limited real rights, and certain personal rights, which correspond to the meaning attributed to this requirement in Agri SA. However, post-constitutional judgments diverge from pre-constitutional law regarding the role of state acquisition, where it was merely regarded as a general hallmark of expropriation. After Agri SA state acquisition is (now) the "key feature" that distinguishes expropriation from deprivation. A brief analysis of Australian constitutional property law shows that the meaning attached to "acquisition" in that jurisdiction is broadly similar to the construction placed upon the term in South African law, which explains why the expropriation of limited real rights (as well as the extinguishment of claims in certain cases) amounts to acquisition of property. The jurisprudence of the Australian High Court also sheds light on one of the factors laid down in Agri SA for determining whether or not acquisition took place, namely the source of the affected right. It also confirms another aspect of pre-constitutional South African expropriation law, namely that whether a property interference results in expropriation or not does not depend only on whether or not acquisition occurred. In dealing with these considerations Part II of this article expands on the shortcomings of confining the expropriation question to whether or not acquisition took place. It then suggests an alternative approach to state acquisition, one which focuses on the purpose of the impugned statute, as opposed to its effect, as was done by the Constitutional Court in Harksen.

One Fine Day in Stellenbosch: A Review of Bram Akkermans, Ernst Marais and Eveline Ramaekers (eds) Property Law Perspectives II (Intersentia 2014)

This essay reviews a recently published collection of articles that originated from a conference of the Young Property Law Forum (YPLF) and a closely linked master class, both of which took place in November 2012 at Stellenbosch University's Institute for Advanced Study. The authors are a diverse group in terms of nationality and experience.The largest group of articles in the collection, authored by emerging property law scholars from Continental Europe, explores concepts in traditional civil law property law doctrine, with a particular focus on the difference between objective and subjective methods of classifying things and real rights. In addition to demonstrating the resiliency of some of these traditional doctrinal concepts, the authors of these articles (Sofie Bouly, Shaun Charlton, Dorothy Gruyaert, Ann Apers, Mitzi Wiese, Valerie Twehuysen, and Ellen Dewitte) reveal a preference for objective measures of classification but struggle at times to reconcile this preference with the tendency of courts in the legal systems they study to engage in more subjective classification determinations. In contrast, two other authors of articles in the collection (Eveline Ramaekers and Sabrina Praduroux), who are primarily concerned with constitutional property law decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, are more comfortable with that court's embrace of open-textured decision-making in its "fair balance" interpretation of Article 1 to the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights. The authors of two more articles in the collection have a very different focus. One (Brendan Edgeworth) explores historical adaptations in the law of commercial leaseholds, while the others (Susan Bright and Lisa Whitehouse) recount an empirical study of the role of non-financial considerations in cases in which tenants and mortgagors lose possession of their residences. Two authors in the collection (Bram Akkermans and Joseph Singer) address broad questions of property theory and property law decision making norms-the operation of the numerus clausus principle and "rules of reason" respectively. These authors show that it is possible to think systemically about how a property law system sets limits on the number or recognized property types and that flexible standards and judicial discretion can be valuable supplements to clear, mechanistic property law rules. Finally, three articles address issues at the forefront of South African property law. The authors of these articles (Jeannie van Wyk, Bjorn Hoops, and Gerrit Pienarr) reveal the challenges posed by the need to develop South Africa's natural resources in an environmentally sustainable manner and the need to reconcile traditional customs regarding land tenure in South Africa with contemporary constitutional norms. Pienarr shows how innovations in other areas of property, for example condominium law, can serve as a repository for solutions to contemporary problems. In the end, this reviewer suggests that this volume will become a valuable resource for scholars interested in comparative property law because its contributions illustrate so well the sometimes divergent assumptions that property law scholars from different national backgrounds can bring to their scholarship.

European Union Constitutional Property Law

For European property lawyers, property is the law of things and this has been so for the past centuries. In this perspective, property law focuses on transactions of these things and is therefore transactional law. Increasingly there is a number of lawyers that considers property in a constitutional context. However, this is mostly done at a national level, or by comparing national constitutional property law, usually constitutional property provisions, to other countries. Constitutional property, I submit, is much more than just the national constitutional provision, and concerns the way in which property is to be understood, organised and applied in a legal order.In the EU legal order, which has a single or internal market, which is more than a mere sum of its components, there is a great need to rethink the position of property. The EU internal market is a social market economy to which fundamental principles of property law (freedom of ownership, free circulation of goods and freedom of contract) are inextricably linked. A change away from the market economy will bring great difficulties in the current composition of the EU legal order, as too many aspects are dealt with at the national level. The EU legal order relies heavily on the existence of these fundamental principles of property law in the systems of the Member States that ‘upload’ these to the EU level. EU economic constitutional law as well as EU social constitutional law can provide guidance for the development of EU (constitutional) property law. There is - borrowing from the South African experience - an algorithm for the development of property law in the EU, in which the primacy of regulation is with private parties, followed by the Member States who are all bound by the economic and social context provided for by EU law. That normative framework is not to be followed voluntarily, but comes with the method and thus with the force of supranational EU law, including direct effect, effet utile, and the principle of sincere cooperation between Member States. This is all balanced by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that keep the EU out of matters it should not concern itself with.

Property in Virtual Worlds

This work is a dissertation. However, it was written with the intention of disseminating it to the broad public and to be of use to academics, judges, legal practitioners, as well as the broad public. In due course a published book version will follow. This dissertation analyses and investigates how virtual property functions inside virtual worlds. It also determines if, within that context, virtual property is similar to, or should be treated like real world property. The questions that are addressed include the following. What is the (real world) legal status of property in virtual worlds? Is it worthwhile to recognise and protect virtual property in real world law? Is it possible to recognise and protect virtual property in real world law, given the differences? Would recognition and protection of virtual property in real world law require or be restricted to instances where virtual property is or can be recognised as real rights?The dissertation finds that there is a definable concept of “virtual property” as it is encountered in virtual worlds and there is a great degree of similarity between the function of property in virtual and real world systems. There are also sufficient justifications (social, economic and normative) to recognise virtual property as property. Even though the function of property is similar in both systems, the similarities are undermined by the absence, complete or almost complete, of real rights in virtual worlds. This creates a problem since, in real world law, real rights enjoy stronger protection than weaker personal rights. The first reason for this absence of real rights stems from the unique (and mostly uncircumventable) nature of game-code that removes the necessity to make all rights in virtual worlds real rights. The second reason relates to the fact that most virtual world rights are completely derived from and regulated by contract. It is concluded that it is possible to recognise and protect virtual property by means of traditional private law property law (both Roman-Germanic and Anglo-American), constitutional property law, and criminal law. While criminal law will fill some gaps left by the absence of real rights, the rest that are left are contractual rights. In certain circumstances, these contractual rights may be strong enough and in other cases they may require support from special legislation that strengthens weak personal rights and makes them into stronger property-like rights. In constitutional cases, these rights derive support from constitutional property law. However, in other circumstances recognition and protection will probably require recognition of real rights.

The Dynamics of Constitutional Property Clauses in the Developing World: China and South Africa

This article examines the theoretical development of Chinese constitutional property law, compared with the experience in South Africa, which is another emerging jurisdiction of constitutional property law. Being cautious of the political, economic and social differences between two countries this endeavour is nevertheless important, because of its potential to spark renewed interest in the comparability of property law systems worldwide. It highlights that the third-generational constitutions of the developing world focus not only on participatory and political rights, but also on social rights and responsibilities of citizens, and in fact supports actionable socio-economic rights. Perceptions of property that may be regarded in the developing world as ‘Eurocentric’, i.e. that a system of ‘individual’ property interests is the predominant form of organization, are losing support. From the Chinese perspective, there seems to be an awareness of the increasing need to limit the vast regulatory reach of the state and to afford the individual better protection and opportunities to engage in personal wealth-enhancing activity. Yet, the promotion of individual property right should be comprehended in the view of the communitarian needs.

Dynamics of Constitutional Property Clauses in the Developing World: China and South Africa

Our paper examines constitutional property protection in China.The Chinese constitutional amendments of March 2004 were far-reaching since they introduced into Chinese law a notion of property that renders a free-market economy more viable and economic development more sustainable. Nevertheless, the principles for constitutional property protection in China have yet to be translated into more concrete implications, especially in the context of expropriation. It is still not generally appreciated that the Chinese Constitution plays an important part in property law, and particularly in matters relating to expropriation. Our goal is more modest. China’s constitutionalization of private property rights has only just begun. This presents an appropriate opportunity to examine the possible theoretical development of Chinese constitutional property law, in comparison with similar developments from elsewhere in the world. At this point, the necessity and value of legal-comparative study cannot be denied. We base our analysis on lessons taken from another very recently emerging body of constitutional property law, namely that of South Africa.