Abstract Constitution-making, especially the one that relates to a constitutional replacement, is an important process in any democratic polity. Such process offers citizens an opportunity to exercise their most important constitutional and political power, which is called “constituent power” – the power to constitute a constitution and framework of government. The chief purpose of a constitution is to control and limit governmental powers. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to deny the government or powerholders the right to make a constitution. Thus, parliament and government generally have no power to make a constitution. Instead, the people have the right to exercise such power. This is the essence of the idea of constituent power. To entrust parliament or Members of Parliament (MP s) with the constitution-making responsibility is like to leave a baby in the custody of a witch, an action that can be perilous. This is what happened in 2014. The Constituent Assembly was convoked to debate a constitutional draft that the Constitutional Review Commission prepared. However, to allow all MP s to participate in the Assembly was a fundamental mistake. Members of Parliament used that opportunity to frustrate all major constitutional reforms that people recommended. This paper discusses the 2014 Constituent Assembly, especially its composition and the consequent impact on the process as a whole. The paper employs the principles of popular sovereignty, constituent power and democracy as its analytical tools.
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